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For Aleka, Timothy, and Gabriel
I’ve drawn my scalpel through spacetime, space being the tumor, 
which I assign to the slops.
—Interview with Nicholas Garnham on BBC-2, 1968
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THiS Book SpanS two distinct intellectual domains—art and science—
and it seeks to be of use to readers on both sides of that sometimes conten-
tious boundary. Nabokov’s thought as an artist was heavily informed by 
his scientific passions: his lepidopteral research was guided by his aesthetic 
sense of the world around him. Everything Nabokov undertook had in it 
components of both discovery and expression, aesthetic evaluation and 
composition. Artistic creation becomes a kind of extension of scientific 
research, inasmuch as art is an explicit practice through which one can 
make known individual discoveries about life that would not find a place 
in the laboratory. If we treat artwork, no matter how strange or disturbing 
it might be, as something akin to a scientific experiment, then we cease to 
be troubled by art’s occasional obscurity or ambivalence or by the ten-
dency of artistic meaning to slip out from under efforts to define it. These 
same problems exist in the world of empirical research, too.
 Like scientific advances, novels and other art forms can be thought of 
as tentative steps forward in a world full of the unknown. Some works 
may endure in their ability to lead humanity toward greater knowledge 
and vision; others are more quickly eclipsed and forgotten. In this sense, 
artistic progress undergoes a confirmation procedure not completely unlike 
the scientific method. This development is essentially non-Popperian: great 
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artworks are not falsified (although lesser ones might be—there is such a 
thing as “flawed art”), but rather they may be outgrown when they cease 
to lead the mind toward new discoveries.
 Nabokov’s works in various genres offer the chance to consider art 
as part of the human quest for knowledge and understanding, to expand 
the traditional meaning of “science” to include art. It is not enough, how-
ever, for literary or artistic theorists to note the “scientific” importance of 
their subject, as if in confirmation of their own intellectual significance. 
Scientists and philosophers or historians of science, too, must be invited 
to consider the significance of such a reconceptualization. For this reason, 
I have chosen to craft a book not only for literary specialists or Nabokov 
scholars, but also for those who think more specifically about the role of 
science in human life and history. As a result, Nabokov specialists will 
find here many things that they already know among many other things 
that perhaps they only barely suspected. On the other hand, scientists and 
related scholars will view this study as the work of an outsider. Neverthe-
less, without their potential interest and engagement, a project such as this 
one means little. If, in fact, we believe that the arts have a role to play 
within the advance of knowledge, then what task could be more urgent 
than a consideration of a writer whose career blended the “passion of sci-
ence” with the “precision of art”?
 This book makes no claim to definitiveness or comprehensiveness. It 
provides at most an overview of some of the major concepts and their vari-
ations in Nabokov’s works. There is much that has been left out—most 
prominently, whole branches of natural science such as mathematics and 
chemistry. The first of these is being treated by others far more compe-
tent for that task than I. There are, of course, more details to be discov-
ered regarding each of the fields I have treated here, especially psychology, 
whose variegated reflections in Nabokov really warrant a book-length 
study in themselves. Nabokov’s likely relation to early modern philosophy 
of science has been barely hinted at. And there is much more to be learned 
about aesthetic qualities in Nabokov’s scientific work. Such explorations 
will require the efforts of many scholars, and I hope that some of my read-
ers will join in mapping these uncharted domains.
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Many parTS of this book could not have been written without access to 
restricted archival materials kindly granted by Dmitri Nabokov; likewise, 
I thank him for his permission to quote from unpublished sources and to 
reproduce here images from the archive. I am pleased to acknowledge sup-
port provided by a National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Sti-
pend in 2005. In 2005 and 2006, the University of Tennessee granted me 
a research leave, without which the bulk of the work presented here could 
never have been completed, and in 2006 it provided Professional Develop-
ment funding for trips to the Nabokov archives at the New York Public 
Library and the Library of Congress. The Department of Modern Foreign 
Languages and Literatures has been generous with travel funds, allowing 
me to present early versions of this work at various conferences during the 
last several years. Permission fees for the images in this book were paid 
by the University of Tennessee Exhibition, Performance, and Publication 
Expense fund. Stephen Crook of the Berg Collection at the New York Pub-
lic Library was invaluable as a resource on the contents of the archive, and 
the staffs of the Berg and the Manuscript Room of the Library of Congress 
epitomized efficiency.
 Many friends and colleagues have generously shared their acumen and 
wisdom as I have worked on the materials for this book during the last 
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decade. I am especially grateful to Dana Dragunoiu, who read the entire 
first draft and large portions of later drafts, making countless suggestions 
for improvements in substance and providing encouragement that helped 
sustain me through more difficult stretches. Victor Fet read a version of 
chapters 1 and 3 and saved me from important taxonomic blunders. Kurt 
Johnson kindly sent me an extended version of his ALA paper on Nabo-
kov’s lepidoptery and offered feedback on early drafts of the biological 
sections. Eric Naiman read almost the complete manuscript in its penulti-
mate form and challenged me, as always, to think about my subject from 
surprising angles. Dieter Zimmer provided guidance in absentia for navi-
gating Berlin’s libraries during my visit there in 2004, as well as serving 
the discipline with background research of the highest importance in his 
incomparable Guide to Nabokov’s Butterflies and Moths. Victoria Alex-
ander shared her own research with me and offered challenging sugges-
tions on early phases of this project. Jerry Friedman, Stan Kelly-Bootle, 
Jenefer Coates, and Gerhard Devries each gave a thoughtful critique of 
a late version of chapter 5, resulting in significant changes. Peter Hoeyng 
read chapter 2 and brought me to Berlin and its libraries in 2004. Brian 
Boyd provided encouragement and ideas throughout the project. I would 
also like to thank Tatyana Ponomareva of the Nabokov Museum in St. 
Petersburg, who invited me to lead a seminar on the subject of this book 
in July 2005. Yevgeny Belodubrovsky helped situate me in the National 
Library in St. Petersburg during that visit. Joanna Trzeciak, Yuri Leving, 
Marina Grishakova, and Leland de la Durantaye generously shared their 
own research with me.
 University of Tennessee colleagues provided a valuable early audience 
and interdisciplinary perspective on this work: Alan Rutenberg helped 
me frame the original proposal; Allen Dunn and Natalia Pervukhina read 
the full manuscript and offered valuable comments. The faculty colloquy 
on the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology (Ted Richards, 
Heather Douglas, Denise Phillips, Richard Pagni, Jeff Kovac, Millie Gim-
mel, Bruce MacClennan, and Susan North) provided scientific, philo-
sophical, and historical feedback on several chapters. My colleague Daniel 
Magilow kindly translated the epigraph to chapter 3. I am indebted to 
Aleka Akoyunoglou Blackwell, who provided meticulous proofreading 
and stylistic help in the final preparations and forced me to be more accu-
rate in my characterizations of scientific method.
 Sarah Stanhope, an artist and former student who once performed in a 
reader’s theater production of The Man from the USSR, has my admiration 
and gratitude for the marvelous work she did for this book’s cover. Work-
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ing with Sandy Crooms, Maggie Diehl, Linda Patterson, Jennifer Forsythe, 
Laurie Avery, and Ben Shriver of The Ohio State University Press has been 
pure pleasure. A more professional and competent team could not be imag-
ined, and I am especially grateful for their flexibility and responsiveness to 
my needs during the production process.
 With so much help from so many extraordinary people, one might 
expect this book to be perfect. It is not, and the only one responsible for 
its blemishes is me. Had I been able to incorporate every suggestion made, 
it would have been a far better book than it is. Whatever errors and gaps 
remain are my own, and I hope, in some other place, to make amends for 
its flaws.
 A note on the title: while checking for earlier uses of my chosen phrase, 
I found a student journal at Johns Hopkins University, published from 
1990 to 1993, called “The Quill and Scalpel.” It was devoted to the meta-
morphosis of medical students into physicians and was succeeded by an 
electronic version, called “Chrysalis.” What more could one ask of a 
namesake for this book?

in THe Mid-920s and early 1930s, Vladimir Nabokov lived in a series of 
Berlin apartments within a short walk of Albert Einstein’s residence, and 
they surely trod some of the same sidewalks on the same days. This coin-
cidence makes a pleasing icon for the overlapping worlds of science and 
art, even though the two figures had no reason ever to meet. From a small 
patch of cityscape emerged some of the twentieth century’s most potent 
rustlings.3
 As The Gift’s Fyodor Godunov-Cherdyntsev moves around Berlin in 
the 1920s, a time when “time is in fashion,”4 he appears somehow immune 
to the laws of physics: he wanders heedlessly but harmlessly across busy 
streets; he transforms straight tram-lines into circular ones; his watch occa-
sionally goes backwards. Like other modernist writers, Nabokov had dis-
covered the exciting philosophical and metaphorical potential of the new 
physics. Unlike most others, he was himself a scientist as well as an artist. 
Once we start to notice these references in The Gift and other works, they 
weave into a network of concepts deriving from Nabokov’s scientific out-
look, his constant effort to know the world. This passion to know is part 
scientific and part aesthetic; the resulting inseparability of art and science 
nabokov’s Science and art
introduction
you can get as close as possible to these living creatures and see reflected 
in them a higher law. mimicry and evolution are for me more and more 
fascinating. . . . i cannot separate the aesthetic pleasure of seeing a butterfly 
and the scientific pleasure of knowing what it is.
—interview with robert h. boyle, Sports Illustrated, 19591
There is an unknown, lawlike something in the object that corresponds to an 
unknown, lawlike something in the subject.
—goethe, Maxims and Reflections #13442
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is the core of Nabokov’s creative vision. The last of Nabokov’s Russian 
novels, The Gift, covertly but extensively incorporates themes from the 
new physics that had been lurking in the background of his works since 
the mid-1920s.
 Nabokov’s first adult years coincided with the fall of the Russian 
Empire and the rise of the new physics. Einstein completed his general the-
ory of relativity in 1915, but it did not receive wide attention until it was 
confirmed by Arthur Eddington’s eclipse-imaging expedition in May 1919. 
In November of that year, when Nabokov had just arrived at Cambridge 
University, newspapers everywhere loudly proclaimed the beginning of a 
new era in science. Subatomic and quantum theories were developing rap-
idly—Nabokov’s new College Master was J. J. (“Atom”) Thomson, one 
of the electron’s earliest investigators. The early post-war years also saw 
the first wave of Freudian psychoanalysis as a mass culture phenomenon. 
Indeed, by 1919 it had become such a fad that it was already attracting 
parodies and condemnations. At around the same time, Darwinian theory 
was undergoing significant challenge and refinement. Nabokov was busy 
too: in October of that year, he wrote his first published scientific article—
“A Few Notes on Crimean Lepidoptera”—as a newly enrolled student of 
zoology at Cambridge’s Trinity College. Before long, he switched to French 
and Russian literature so he could spend more time writing poetry.5
 Nabokov didn’t need the excitement of these astonishing years to 
become interested in science: he began studying butterflies at the age of 
seven. At thirteen, he made his first submission to a scientific journal 
(The Entomologist)—and was rejected: the species he thought was new 
wasn’t. His first scientific publication, in the same journal, came when he 
was twenty-one. While living in Berlin in the 1920s and 1930s as an émi-
gré writer, Nabokov frequently sought out butterfly experts, and he spent 
hours working in museums’ collections, examining known species against 
what he had found during his regular summer collecting trips.6 Later, hav-
ing arrived in the United States in 1940, Nabokov quickly resumed his 
lepidoptery work, beginning at the American Museum of Natural History 
in New York and soon moving to a nominally part-time curatorship at the 
Museum of Comparative Zoology at Harvard, where for six years in the 
1940s he conducted innovative research on North and South American 
butterflies. No wonder this was his least productive decade artistically—he 
wrote only one novel, Bend Sinister, and only after leaving his museum 
position in 1948 did he begin work on Lolita in earnest.
 Nabokov’s passion for lepidoptery drove him to work unpaid over-
time even when it would have been expedient to do something else more 
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remunerative (his family was constantly in financial need, then and even 
afterwards when he was well employed by Cornell University).7 Instead of 
working full time on his literary prospects, he risked damage to his eyesight 
by spending too much time at the dissecting microscope (he examined sev-
eral thousand and dissected at least fifteen hundred specimens, attending 
particularly to their minuscule reproductive apparatuses and the counting 
of tiny wing scales). This obsessive drive to create order in a disheveled 
area of taxonomy emerged as if directly from The Gift, in which he had 
indulged his childhood fantasy of becoming a great explorer and natural-
ist. Emblematically, that novel had helped prepare him for his first real 
stint as a professional scientist. This sort of artistic prediction of life was 
itself a mirror-image of the prefiguration of art in a real butterfly’s wing 
displaying “a dab of gilt redolent of turpentine,” as Nabokov’s surrogate 
told it behind the scenes of The Gift.8
 The laws of nature: these are the goal of the scientist. For Nabokov, 
aesthetic pleasure and scientific pleasure are inseparable. They both reflect 
a higher law. The aesthetic pleasure of seeing connects to the scientific 
pleasure of knowing. Both acts—seeing and knowing—represent peaks of 
consciousness, itself the pinnacle of natural evolution (as known on Earth). 
Vision and knowledge are among the main themes of nearly all Nabokov’s 
works, sometimes through their negations, blindness and ignorance (or 
solipsism). Nabokov’s comment to Robert Boyle asserts the unity of the 
two sides of human consciousness, the aesthetic and the scientific, and in 
a subtle way it insists on the importance of art (aesthetics) in humanity’s 
effort to know its world. Science alone is not enough, and neither for that 
matter is art (“there is no science without fancy, no art without facts”).9 
Every poem, painting, and melody can, and perhaps should, be viewed 
as a particular part of the human effort to know the world. That the lan-
guages of literature, music, or the plastic arts are not the language of sci-
ence means only that they see, and represent, the world differently than 
science does. Nabokov would insist that the difference is crucial, that aes-
thetic seeing is just as vital to human existence and “progress” as scientific 
exploration.
 Art and science are commonly thought to occupy totally different 
spheres of thought and activity. When someone comes along who excels in 
both areas, (a rare enough occurrence), it forces a reconsideration of ste-
reotypes. Do art and science have a common boundary? Do they perhaps 
overlap in important ways? Could it be that they are intimately related? 
This study begins with a desire to understand why Nabokov, at least, 
found that they were kindred fields of passion, patience, and precision.10
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Historical Context
Scientific Revolutions in Nabokov’s Early Years
Three areas of acute scientific interest stand out in Nabokov’s literary 
works: zoology (especially lepidoptery and evolutionary theory); psychol-
ogy (especially as the study of consciousness); and physics (especially in the 
post-Newtonian guise ushered in by Einstein, Planck, Bohr, and Heisen-
berg, among others). While Nabokov the naturalist is widely known, and 
the psychologist can be deduced fairly quickly after reading any of his 
novels, Nabokov the (armchair) physicist keeps a fairly low profile. This 
is surely because his level of study in physics was neither as deep nor as 
practical as his exposure to the fields of entomology or psychology.11 Of 
the latter he surely felt that his own everyday experience, extensive techni-
cal reading, and artistic acumen gave him a strong foundation. We have no 
evidence, however, that Nabokov ever performed a physical experiment, 
or succeeded (or even attempted!) in mastering the formulas of relativity 
or quantum mechanics. In one interview, he quipped, “while not having 
much physics, I reject Einstein’s slick formulae.”12 However, before taking 
him at his word, we should remember that his standards for what consti-
tutes knowledge of a subject were extremely high (his much trumpeted 
ignorance of German was based on his mere six years of high-quality sec-
ondary school study, for which he received top grades). His interest in rela-
tivity and quantum theory probably grew as he became familiar with their 
outlandish consequences, and as their story was told and retold on the 
pages of newspapers around the world. These included the Berlin paper his 
father co-founded, Rul’ (The Rudder), where his acquaintance Vladimir 
Tatarinov wrote articles summarizing the recent and ongoing scientific rev-
olutions. Dozens of books were published on the new physics throughout 
the 1920s and 1930s, along with regular discussions in the émigré Rus-
sian press. Many of the expositions in Rul’ and in Paris-based Poslednie 
novosti (The Latest News) are quite detailed. As we will see in chapter 5, 
Nabokov’s familiarity with at least the popular versions of the new physics 
shines through in direct and indirect references in several of his novels and 
in his lectures on literature.
Nabokov and the Materialists
Nabokov’s engagement with science was distinctive for other reasons 
besides his double-edged intellectual persona. It also needs to be viewed 
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against the background of his personal history, his philosophical commit-
ments, and the rise of the Soviet Union. This last event, especially, was the 
political culmination of a particular view of what the world is, what it 
can be, and humanity’s role in its progress. That view is generally known 
as positivist materialism in its socialist interpretation, and it was directly 
opposed to Nabokov’s core beliefs in every imaginable way. Soviet social-
ism brought its own brand of science with roots deep in the nineteenth 
century.
 The reasons for Nabokov’s antipathy to socialism were various, and 
not related to any kind of Tsarist sympathies. His father, Vladimir Dmit-
rievich Nabokov, was a leading member of the Constitutional Democrats 
(“Kadet”) party, and he was imprisoned by the Tsar’s police in 1908 for 
signing the Vyborg manifesto condemning the dissolution of the Duma.13 
Despite his wealth, V. D. Nabokov worked to produce democratic and 
socially just political reform, including the transfer of more land from the 
nobility to the peasants. This liberal agenda was based upon principles of 
respect for the individual, and it was also at least obliquely related to the 
work of the neo-idealists in the Moscow Psychological Society, a philo-
sophical organization. The neo-idealists included some prominent former 
Marxists like Nikolai Berdiaev and Sergei Bulgakov, and they produced an 
important volume in 1902 called Problems of Idealism and a more famous 
follow-up called Landmarks [Vekhi] in 1909, in which they worked to 
develop first principles for a liberal political philosophy as an alternative 
to revolutionary socialism.14 Several members of the circle were close to 
V. D. Nabokov, and there is reason to believe that he agreed with many 
of their positions and their neo-idealist foundations (he himself was an 
observing Orthodox Christian, though not strict in his son’s religious for-
mation).15
 This liberal, “bourgeois” agenda was the main target of the Bolshevik 
revolution: the liberal revolution of February/March 1917 had installed a 
government led by the Constitutional Democrats, which was swept away 
by Bolsheviks that October. If the value of the individual person as an end 
in itself grounded the neo-idealists’ philosophy and Nabokov’s own, in the 
Bolshevik outlook the individual had no meaning except as a participant 
in building the communist future. The same was true of all human activi-
ties that might emphasize individual achievement—including art and sci-
ence. As Nikolai Bukharin wrote in 1925, “Bourgeois scholars speak of 
any branch of learning with mysterious awe, as if it were a thing produced 
in heaven, not on earth. But as a matter of fact any science, whatever it be, 
grows out of the demands of society or its classes.”16 Thus Nabokov’s two 
great passions were nullified in the new regime.
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 Nabokov emerged from his chrysalis at a time when his core identity 
was rejected and negated in his homeland, both practically and philosophi-
cally. His life and career, as artist and scientist, were set in a contest with 
the positivist materialist philosophy embodied by the Bolsheviks, and in 
many ways it was a life-or-death battle waged in ink. He waged the battle 
not because he was rejected, but because he believed unflinchingly in the 
absolute falsity, cruelty, and crudity—alongside the patently self-contradic-
tory nature—of the new regime and its political/philosophical program; 
and also because, as he repeatedly discovered, more than a few western 
intellectuals were sympathetic to the Soviet project and ignorant about its 
real nature in practice. What he opposed to the Bolsheviks’ ideology of 
positivist certainty, teleology, mass conformity and control was an artis-
tic and scientific program based on individuality, curiosity, beauty, and 
the unknown, a program in which these central elements hover over any 
human intellectual endeavor. This stance gives his work and his life a par-
ticular anti-materialist, even idealist tinge, to which we now turn.
philosophical Context
Science, Materialism, and Idealism
In response to a criticism of his 1949 article “Nearctic Members of the 
Genus Lycaeides,” Nabokov retorted: “After all, science is responsible to 
philosophy, not to statistics.”17 On some level this statement must be true, 
as one’s philosophy determines how one thinks about the ultimate con-
stituents, or ground, of the empirical world.18 In other words, all scientific 
investigations are set within tacit or explicit assumptions about the world’s 
“ultimate essence.” From this point of view, there is one critical difference 
between an idealist stance and a materialist one. A monistic materialist 
metaphysics, which posits matter as the ultimate and only reality—and 
consciousness as a side effect of material interactions in the brain—tends 
to carry with it the assumption that all aspects and laws of the material 
world can be known and understood by the human mind. This, at least, is 
the version of materialism that came to dominate among Marxists in the 
nineteenth century, not least in Russia, eventually guiding the Bolsheviks 
in their revolution. Within such a world, science sets as its goal certain 
knowledge and, paradoxically, the eventual scientific and technological 
victory of humanity over all of nature, including human nature.
 The attractions of such an ideology are plain enough to see, but so of 
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course are the contradictions. Although this interpretation of materialism is 
not logically inevitable, it does seem to have possessed an irresistible allure 
in the age of high industrialism, perhaps because it took the tangible physi-
cal object, which seems so solid, stable, and real, as its icon and exemplar. 
A post-Kant idealist outlook, such as was embraced by Russia’s neo-ideal-
ists, presents a far more elusive field of study, and lends itself to much more 
tentative sorts of conclusions. For even if idealism may encourage belief 
in the reality of the phenomenal world, it recognizes explicitly the limits 
of knowledge caused by the “peculiar constitution of [human] cognitive 
faculties,” to use Kant’s own words.19 By the same token, because of this 
acceptance of an unknown, perhaps unknowable element at its very core, 
idealism allows more easily for a phenomenal reality that is not always a 
perfect fit with scientific conceptions of it. Notwithstanding the metaphysi-
cal implications of an idealist outlook, Kant suggested that human knowl-
edge of the world can only proceed along the lines provided by empirical 
science.20 That is, no matter what the ultimate, metaphysical “truth” might 
be, we can only know our world by establishing facts in the scientific man-
ner, according to the categories and a priori essence of consciousness. That 
still leaves the enormous, even infinite space of the unknown, unknowable 
(because inaccessible to human perception or reason) depths of reality. The 
invisible ubiquity of this unknown domain is what leads Nabokov to posit 
“leakings and drafts” in the world,21 indications that the empirical world 
does not exhaust all of reality. Its limits, he suggests, though not directly 
perceptible, can be inferred from irregularities or patterns in nature noticed 
by the extremely careful observer.
 In at least the early and middle parts of his career, Nabokov even held 
to the belief that science itself might discover such indications, for example 
in the notion that mimicry could not be explained by utilitarian natural 
selection (or by any other causal method, we may presume). This is not 
to say that Nabokov, as a scientist, set out to prove supernatural causes in 
nature (like modern “creation science” or “intelligent design”). Far from 
it. As we will see, his professional classificatory work was based upon the 
same strict procedures that characterize science today, and the results of 
his observations and innovations have gained increasing recognition and 
respect in the six decades since his work was completed. But he did fre-
quently draw attention to the limits of science’s scope: “We shall never 
know the origin of life, or the meaning of life, or the nature of space and 
time, or the nature of nature, or the nature of thought.”22 Thus, while 
scientific research is capable of providing astonishingly detailed infor-
mation about nature in the broadest sense, it is not and cannot be all- 
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encompassing. The constant awareness that science itself possesses a 
“beyond” defines Nabokov intellectually. This predilection reaches its 
extravagant apogee in Ada, his longest and most ambitious novel.
Science and Metaphysics
Due to the widespread attention to metaphysical formulations in Nabo-
kov’s works, and to his wife Véra’s comment that the “beyond” is the 
“main theme” permeating his entire oeuvre, scientists writing about him 
have taken pains to demonstrate that his metaphysical outlook did not 
color his scientific practice.23 This main theme, potustoronnost’, means 
literally “on-that-[other]-side-ness,” best translated as “the beyond,” 
and while it has primarily metaphysical associations in Russian, it can 
also have scientific or epistemological ones: that which is beyond human 
knowledge, or beyond the purview of human senses and consciousness. As 
practically all commentators have confessed, Nabokov revealed essentially 
nothing about his personal beliefs, although a majority accept that he cer-
tainly held some views that qualified as metaphysical or mystical. But did 
he actually believe in a benign creator, a “person unknown,” a benevo-
lent, aesthetically-minded designer of the world?24 There is no unequivocal 
answer. Thus, whatever Nabokov’s credo was, we know with precision 
only one key commandment: thou shalt not reveal thy credo.
 What is certain is that Nabokov liked to construct his fictional worlds 
in ways that drew upon mystical and metaphysical conceptions of real-
ity. Images of the author or his world regularly appear in what he called 
a demiurgic capacity in relation to the created fiction.25 But he also 
exploited the figure of the dreamer and the dream, a significantly more 
ambiguous trope, foregrounding the inconsistencies and limitations of 
consciousness more than metaphysical agency. If his works tell us any-
thing at all about metaphysical realities, it is that whatever the ultimate 
truth may be, it is quite beyond our human capacities to perceive, know, 
or understand it.
 Science, in its modern guise as shaped by Francis Bacon, Newton, and 
Kant, is by logical necessity not concerned with metaphysical truths. On 
the other hand, science is also sometimes more interested in trumpeting its 
explanatory power than in probing its limits. The modern debate about 
parapsychological phenomena is an interesting case in point: a small num-
ber of researchers attempted during the twentieth century to apply the sci-
entific method to such phenomena as ESP, precognition, and telekinesis, 
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among other mysteries. Although endorsed by some major scientists and 
philosophers by means of the Society for Psychical Research,26 this work 
was viewed with derision and hostility by “mainstream” science, and it 
received little funding—in part, because it was apparently unable to pro-
duce replicable results in any domain. Yet unbiased observers, including 
Einstein, admitted that such researches were not in themselves unjustified 
and could be praiseworthy if done in a truly scientific manner.27 Uncanny 
psychological phenomena, in which Nabokov took a distinct interest, 
appear to have been beyond the testing capacities of science, at least for the 
time being.28 And yet pursuing such questions is not in itself unscientific, 
as long as one is willing to accept negative results. It is like testing to see 
whether one department of “metaphysics” can be moved into the domain 
of science. If no hypothesis about a particular subject can be proved or 
disproved, then it can be said to be beyond the limits of scientific inquiry. 
It remains metaphysics, and hence unknown.
 Nabokov’s scientific work mostly concerned testable hypotheses, 
although there is one ambiguity to be admitted here: it is notoriously 
impossible to prove a negative, and one of Nabokov’s ambitions was to 
demonstrate the existence of non-utilitarian forms in nature. His well-
known early choice in this quest was mimicry (including object resem-
blance, or “crypsis”), which he felt exhibited precision beyond any 
imaginable predator’s visual acuity. Although this last belief has turned 
out to be false, we do have some idea of how Nabokov might have made 
a scientific effort to show that non-utilitarian mimicry exists.29 Had he 
been given the opportunity to complete his envisioned compendium of 
“all examples of mimicry in the animal kingdom,” he must have hypoth-
esized that such a mass of data would have provided a few striking or 
at least highly suggestive examples.30 His metaphysics appears to have 
included belief in the existence of mechanisms other than causal ones, and 
causes other than utilitarian ones. It was not unscientific of him to wonder 
whether these beliefs might be testable. However, knowing that his ideas 
were near the outer limits of the scientific method, he was circumspect in 
his approach, to the point of leaving the project undone.31 Nabokov knew 
where science ended and metaphysics began, and although he may have 
wanted to shift the boundary slightly, he was not able to do so. In this way, 
Nabokov’s metaphysics left a distinct imprint on him as a scientist, and his 
desire that science might provide hints about metaphysical truths led to his 
interest in exceptions to established natural mechanisms. But he was never 
able to pursue these exceptions scientifically, and his published research 
remained within the traditional boundaries.
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Science, Art, and the Limits of Cognition
One of Nabokov’s primary strategies for assaulting positivist materialism 
was his well-known tendency to question or qualify the existence of “real-
ity,” which he insisted should always appear within quotation marks.32 
Most of these statements appear in interviews following upon his post-
Lolita fame, but they also appear earlier, in essays and lectures on liter-
ary figures. The questioning of reality was, in the middle of the twentieth 
century, a surprising position for a scientist to take. However, upon careful 
review it becomes clear that Nabokov does not ever deny the existence 
of reality (that is, of existence itself); he disputes the independent exis-
tence of “average reality”—the concept that is at the core of naïve realism: 
“Average reality begins to rot and stink as soon as the act of individual 
creation ceases to animate a subjectively perceived texture.”33 Nabokov’s 
refutations of naïve realism and his assertions of the importance of con-
sciousness and its creative activity are so insistent that they constitute a 
fundamental principle of his art and thought. In a virtual litany of such 
passages, quite early in his period of fame, Nabokov refers his audience 
to the “creative force of human consciousness,” to the “depths of reality,” 
to the “unquenchable,” “infinite” nature of the quest for knowledge on 
even the most confined subject.34 Nabokov thus emphasizes the fact that 
nature is extraordinarily complex, and that many, even most elements of 
this complexity are inaccessible to immediate perception; some are hidden 
from the senses altogether, and hence also from direct knowledge. Nature, 
even without reference to a Kantian “thing in itself,” in many ways escapes 
our awareness, because our senses have evolved to respond to a particular 
set of environmental stimuli that are relevant to human existence, and for 
the most part that means material existence.
Knowledge and Falsehood in Art and Science
The link between Nabokov’s conceptions of art and science derives from 
his outlook on knowledge as a feature of human consciousness. Knowl-
edge of nature and of other beings is elusive and hard-won. Few writers 
pay as much attention as Nabokov to the widespread existence of false 
beliefs about the world. In the Russian tradition, both Gogol (for example 
in The Government Inspector) and Tolstoy (especially in War and Peace) 
stand out as his major precursors. What is perhaps surprising is that in 
Nabokov’s case this attention includes a sensitivity to false knowledge in 
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the hard sciences.35 Like Goethe, another artist-scientist about whom we 
say more further on, Nabokov nurtured a suspicion of the dominant quan-
titative, Newtonian mode of scientific investigation and progress, with its 
atomistic mechanical base and its effort to explain all natural phenomena 
by means of quantifiable forms or formulae, which he called the “artificial 
logical world.”36 But he found in popular Darwinism and Freudianism spe-
cial opponents whose over-application of nonempirical (un- or undersub-
stantiated) theory contributed to a myth of the perfectibility of scientific 
knowledge in various spheres, such as the mechanisms or source of life, 
or the human mind.37 To understand why Nabokov took on these giants, 
we need to achieve a sense of how he viewed the entire project of coming 
to know something about “reality.” A crucial part of Nabokov’s view of 
knowledge was his understanding of how the mind can deceive itself.
Epistemological Gaps and the Mind’s Fictions
Nabokov’s characters are typically portrayed as possessing knowledge 
of only a limited portion of the world around them, although the better 
natures among them attempt to peer past the limits of individual exis-
tence. The ongoing, largely successful efforts of science to discover hidden 
aspects of reality imply two things: first, that the world is in fact more 
complex than we perceive it to be; and second, that our senses are attuned 
to only a fraction of the world’s totality. Both of these facts are forgotten 
with amazing ease, along with an important corollary: that the mind tends 
to fill in gaps in knowledge with plausible theories—to “invent a cause or 
modify an effect rather than have none at all.”38 It creates soothing fictions 
for itself and generally misinterprets the world around it. This tendency, 
in Fyodor’s parodic literary portrait in The Gift, repeatedly describes the 
socialist agitator Nikolai Chernyshevsky.39 Such gap-filling is no less char-
acteristic of the practice of philosophy itself than it is of individuals in 
their daily lives. More surprisingly, it is just as common within the natu-
ral sciences—which is why, of course, science “advances” as it overcomes 
its misconceptions.40 In fact, as we shall see in chapter 2, one of Goethe’s 
main criticisms of Newton’s optical experiments was that in them, Newton 
approached his experiments with a preconceived idea of what the outcome 
would be, and then conducted a few reductive tests—the experimentum 
crucis—in confirmation of the theory.41 (Nabokov was not very likely 
to have been aware of this critique of Newton, as the anti-Newtonian 
“Polemical Part” of Goethe’s The Theory of Color was omitted from many 
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German editions, and all translations. Indeed, the eminent Russian/Soviet 
geologist Vladimir Vernadsky, in his article on Goethe’s science researched 
in the 1930s and published in 1944, appears not to have been aware of 
it.)42 Consequently, it is just as important to be wary of misinterpreting the 
empirical data of phenomena as it is to be suspicious of the reports of oth-
ers. “Bare facts,” Nabokov asserts, do not exist because of the necessarily 
subjective nature of all observation, and all stories about “facts” are prone 
to involve many distortions introduced by the teller (this was also a major 
theme of Tolstoy’s War and Peace). For Nabokov, “bare facts do not exist 
in a state of nature, for they are never really quite bare: the white trace of a 
wrist watch, a curled piece of sticking plaster on a bruised heel, these can-
not be discarded by the most ardent nudist. A mere string of figures will 
disclose the identity of the stringer as neatly as tame ciphers yielded their 
treasure to Poe. . . . I doubt whether you can even give your telephone 
number without giving something of yourself.”43 And so for Nabokov, 
nature can be studied, and it can be known scientifically in part, but it can-
not be known absolutely. This is due to the inherent limits of knowledge 
recognized by Kant (developing upon Hume’s skepticism), who also recog-
nized the possibility of more advanced or sensitive types of consciousness 
that would have a commensurately greater knowledge of the world.44 The 
problem of discerning where the inventions of one’s own consciousness 
begin to diverge from empirical phenomena stands at the heart of some of 
Nabokov’s most moving works.
nabokov’s Solipsists
Nabokov’s interest in the failings of human perceptive abilities reaches 
full expression in his portraits—usually fictitious self-portraits, logically 
enough—of characters whose relationship to the world approaches pure 
solipsism. This side of human psychology drew Nabokov precisely because 
it allowed him to demonstrate vividly just how “realistic” an absolute fan-
tasy world might seem to the afflicted individual. Most significantly, we 
see this type embodied in Lolita’s Humbert Humbert, Despair’s Hermann, 
Pale Fire’s Kinbote, and to a somewhat lesser degree in The Eye and in 
Laughter in the Dark. This is the limit case of epistemological blindness: 
a character’s deepest flaws, passions, and insecurities cause the creation of 
an alternate reality in conflict with the one perceived by others. Fragments 
of “real life” might contradict necessary features of that imaginary world, 
but they are modified or elided by those same cognitive mechanisms that 
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fill in the gaps of a healthy outlook. The result, in Nabokov’s worlds, is 
usually harm or even death to someone within reach of the afflicted char-
acter.
 Nabokov’s works represent an attempt to explore the far reaches of 
human consciousness, which, in all its incredible mysteriousness, includes 
these cases of individuals almost totally cut off from “reality” (with a lit-
erary heritage that goes back at least to Nabokov’s favorite Dostoevsky 
novel, The Double). The study of such aberrations is part of the knowl-
edge-seeker’s quest to understand the details of nature in all its forms; 
consciousness too is a “gift of nature,” as Fyodor’s father tells us.45 These 
cases do raise troubling questions of culpability and of the individual’s 
autonomy: for example, why do such aberrations occur? Do they arise 
from a cause? We are left to wonder where the intersection between free-
dom and causality lies in human consciousness. Mental activity at the 
other extreme—say, of artists like Fyodor, or of Van and Ada, or of John 
Shade—gives an alternative that emphasizes in varying degrees the ability 
to focus on and discover details of the outside world and other conscious-
nesses.
artistic and Scientific Modes of discourse
Once one accepts the limitations of consciousness and the inevitable dis-
tortions of “objective” narrative even in the domain of science, the door is 
opened to explore the murky territory where artistic and scientific modes 
of perception overlap. Nabokov chose to make such an experiment in an 
area where, he felt, art and nature themselves intertwine: in the patterns 
on a butterfly’s wings, especially in mimicry. But first some background is 
in order.
  As his memoir demonstrates, Nabokov cherished a desire to use 
animal mimicry (in its broadest sense, including “object resemblance”) 
as the main evidence in his argument against the omnipotence (August 
Weismann’s “Allmacht”) of natural selection.46 The claim, as Nabokov put 
it, was that moth or butterfly mimicry of various natural objects in their 
environments is so precise that it must far surpass the visual acuity of the 
predators it is meant to deceive. However, although Nabokov did publish, 
in scientific papers, his doubts about the universal applicability of natural 
selection, and he submitted an article on mimicry to the Yale Review, he 
did not complete or even preserve materials for an envisioned comprehen-
sive study of mimicry in nature.47 In other words, it seems that he became 
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persuaded that his work would not receive a sympathetic hearing among 
the scientists he so respected, or else he himself came to doubt the valid-
ity of his claims in the face of mounting counterevidence.48 However, even 
before attempting to make these arguments within essentially scientific dis-
course,49 he had attempted to work them up within an artistic context—
through his created lepidopterist Konstantin Godunov-Cherdyntsev and 
his son Fyodor in The Gift and its abandoned supplements.
“Father’s Butterflies”
Almost all of The Gift’s second chapter is devoted to the career and 
thoughts of the narrator’s father, Konstantin Kirillovich Godunov-Cher-
dyntsev, who is presented as one of the top entomologists of his gener-
ation—and, philosophically, an idealist. In the abandoned expansion of 
The Gift recently published as “Father’s Butterflies,”50 Nabokov adopted 
a special strategy in his effort to explore alternative theories of speciation, 
based on doubts raised by mimicry. Godunov-Cherdyntsev senior is said to 
have written a thirty-page summary of his proposed new theory of specia-
tion. Rather than represent the professional voice of a scientist directly, by 
means of his lepidopterist character, Nabokov instead has the scientist’s 
son Fyodor, a poet and budding novelist, re-create a vision of the Rus-
sian scientific text indirectly, by means of fragments that have been trans-
lated into English and retranslated back into Russian, with the assistance 
of memory. Why all these added layers of complexity? They might, most 
simply, reflect an artistic choice not to quote several pages of “scientific” 
prose within a fragment of fiction. But I think there was another, more 
important aim: to have the technical prose grasped almost from the void, 
distilled, and refracted by an artistic mind. The choice had two key ben-
efits: it saved Nabokov from the need to set his scientific fancies in a form 
that might someday be mistaken as one of his actual scientific texts. That 
is, it preserved an adequate buffer to ensure that Godunov-Cherdyntsev’s 
theories would never be attributed to Nabokov as a scientist: he was 
already a published amateur at the time. Still more significantly, it suggests 
an artistic component, and the intellectual validity of that component, in 
the scientist’s perception of nature and even in nature’s inner workings. In 
other words, we find in the story not an inserted, unassimilated piece of 
scientific discourse, but rather a scientific approach to nature that has been 
absorbed and interwoven with the very fabric of the artistic text itself, 
by means of the artist-son’s consciousness and memory. Fyodor may not 
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have fully grasped every aspect of the theory in his father’s “supplement,” 
but his intense urge to do so, and to integrate that experience into his art, 
tells us a great deal about Nabokov’s ambitions for the nexus between his 
own scientific and artistic passions. This unusual intimacy between words’ 
role in aesthetic form and their ability to describe nature precisely helped 
Nabokov to produce works that defied typical classification and sought 
out the boundary across which consciousness and “reality” confront one 
another.
The Scientization of Literary Studies
As background to The Gift’s aestheticization of science, it is worth bear-
ing in mind that Nabokov’s career also began at a time when literary work 
itself—especially the study of literature—was striving to become more sci-
entific and objective. The quantitative approach was spreading into tradi-
tional humanist fields, with the result that scholars like Boris Eikhenbaum, 
Viktor Shklovsky, Yuri Tynianov, and other Formalists (and, first of all and 
most intriguingly, Andrey Bely) were analyzing literary art into its compo-
nent structures and motivating forces. Such methods grew up alongside 
biographical and historiographical practices that attempted to document 
the past by means of contemporary accounts and reminiscences, a method 
that was highly fashionable in the first two decades of the Soviet regime. 
In other words, study of the arts was undergoing a transformation that 
tended to emphasize their structured, constructed nature, and they were 
being integrated into anthropological, sociological, as well as psychologi-
cal study, whose goal was to overcome notions of subjective content and 
authorial intent and replace them with formal and developmental laws.51 
Aesthetics ceded to structural analysis, and authorial intent made way for 
psychological or psychoanalytical documentary. These approaches, with 
their tendency to valorize the knower (or the system of knowledge) at the 
expense of the “known,” brought forth Nabokov’s critical acumen and 
evoked in his work a constant attention to the pitfalls and limitations of 
knowledge, to the need to be wary of the tyrannical impulses of both sci-
ence and narrative. This concern helped produce an increased aesthetic-
epistemological tension in two important works from 1937–38, The Real 
Life of Sebastian Knight and “Pouchkine, ou le vrai et le vraisemblable” 
(Pushkin, or the True and the Verisimilar), which compounds the tension 
already so vividly foregrounded in the “Life of Chernyshevsky” chapter of 
The Gift.52 These works explore the relation between human life, aesthetic 
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form, and the possibility of biographical knowledge.53 In each of them, just 
as in his science-saturated work on The Gift and its supplements, Nabo-
kov points again and again to the contingency of knowledge and espe-
cially of narrative upon the activity of the perceiving consciousness, with 
its ability to reach out beyond itself to the phenomena around it. This is 
precisely what Chernyshevsky (as portrayed in The Gift) could not do, and 
his “objective” aesthetic study, The Aesthetic Relations of Art to Reality, is 
shown to be an altogether unreliable foundation upon which to construct 
any science or science-based worldview. For Nabokov, Chernyshevsky 
was the first and most important example of dangerous overconfidence in 
human cognitive abilities, in the power of language and logic to create a 
perfect understanding of reality. Chernyshevsky’s glib prose stands as a foil 
to all of Nabokov’s elusive, ambiguous, multivalent writings.
nabokov, Goethe, and the Science-art nexus
I devote considerable attention in this book to another literary artist who 
was also a scientist, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. This is a tempting step 
to take because, alongside many other affinities with Nabokov, Goethe 
invented the scientific term that names Nabokov’s special research area, 
morphology. Organic form, as subjectively viewed and as a source for 
holistic insight, was crucial to both authors. Goethe stands as the most sci-
entifically active and productive of major literary figures prior to Nabokov, 
and thus as a kind of prototype for the literary artist with a passion for 
scientific investigation. Awareness of their similarities should foster some 
insight into the possible advantages of alternative scientific methodologies. 
On the other hand, they were driven by divergent goals: Goethe worked to 
discover the universal and governing realia behind natural manifestations; 
Nabokov’s passion appears to have been most drawn by the discovery of 
exceptional forms. Whereas Nabokov found joy and ultimate meaning in 
the unfathomable variety and complexity of nature, Goethe sought the 
common archetypes that unite and link nature’s proliferation of forms: the 
“Urtypus,” such as the Urpflanze, for example, or his discovery that con-
trary to prior belief, homo sapiens shares the intermaxillary bone of the 
face with all other mammals. Notwithstanding this difference in tempera-
ment, both were devoted to the idea of nature as dynamic and ever-chang-
ing.
 Although he considered himself a realist, Goethe was famously told by 
Schiller that his notion of the Urpflantze was an “idea” in the Romantic, 
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idealist sense. Nabokov, while appearing sympathetic toward the ideal-
ist outlook, does not reveal his ultimate metaphysical commitments, and 
only his fictional scientist Godunov-Cherdyntsev asserts anything like ideal 
forms. Nabokov projects in all of his work an intense connection to the 
actual experienced phenomenon. Moreover, Nabokov is more explicit than 
Goethe in his combination of principles of art and those of nature. Repeat-
edly within his own nonscientific writings—and occasionally in the scien-
tific ones—he refers to the artistic qualities of nature. The artist deceives, 
and nature is the “arch-cheat.”54 Nature seems “created precisely for the 
intelligent eyes of man”; it appears designed and patterned; it includes 
“family jokes” and “rhymes.” 55 These types of comments occur across the 
spectrum of Nabokov’s writings.
 For those thinkers of the Romantic era who desired to broaden the 
scope of scientific (and not just artistic) approaches to truth, one available 
path was to challenge the ability of Newtonian science to provide a full 
account of nature’s variety, intricacy, and beauty. More than elsewhere 
this took place within the context of the German proponents of Naturphi-
losophie, most especially Schelling and Schiller. Also among this group one 
often finds the name of Goethe; however, as we shall see, his approach to 
science was in many ways distinct from mainstream “nature philosophy.” 
Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that Goethe too sought to develop 
an alternative to the Newtonian approach to empirical study. Obliquely 
associated with the idealist Naturphilosophen, yet strictly inductive in 
its methods and principles, Goethe’s scientific work was long viewed as 
little more than a curiosity item in the history of literary art, and not at 
all as serious or important science in its own right. Reappraisals by lead-
ing figures of science like Helmholtz in the late nineteenth century and 
Heisenberg in the twentieth have sought to assign a much greater value to 
Goethe’s work. Reflecting upon Goethe’s scientific legacy, the student of 
Nabokov is immediately struck by the two authors’ willingness to chal-
lenge major authorities and introduce radically new explanations and sys-
tems within their chosen fields of study. A closer look at their scientific 
achievements will also reveal even deeper affinities between the two, based 
in part on a firm commitment to the careful, detailed observation of phe-
nomena, combined with a passionate embrace of nature as something of 
fundamental value within their outlooks. What distinguishes Goethe’s sci-
entific approach is his belief in the value of deep insight, intuition into 
the very nature of the object of study. Such a methodology reserves a spe-
cial place for the subjective element in observation, a position starkly at 
odds with the putative absence of subjectivity within Newtonian practice 
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as commonly understood. Goethe’s method rests in part on a belief that 
human consciousness has more than passing, more than coincidental affin-
ities with the empirical world (the “real” world, with or without Kantian 
“things in themselves”)—a perspective that anticipates Nabokov’s own 
comment about “bare facts.”56 In the chapter exploring the contours of 
Nabokov’s own scientific work and thought, I will consider to what extent 
his empirical approach to the natural world shares a view of this special 
relationship between the subject and the object, between the knowing, 
observing consciousness and the thing observed.
 Over the centuries, science and art have moved together and apart 
in an irregular cycle. For the most part, the Newtonian brand of study 
with its Spartan, numerical emphasis has governed and driven nearly all 
mainstream science as science for the past three centuries. There is a vari-
ety of reasons why this should be so, not least among them the fact that 
numbers produce results that can lead to direct, practical application, and 
application leads both to technical innovation and to economic advance-
ment. However, there is another side to science that is unashamed of its 
subjective elements, and which approaches art in spirit and helps us rec-
ognize the epistemological relationship between the two. It was Goethe 
who first advanced a highly developed version of this alternative method-
ology, based upon an experimental picture that observes phenomena in 
their natural situation and in their entirety, including an awareness of the 
perceiver’s role in giving shape to phenomena.57 Nabokov too sought to 
develop a new kind of discourse about the natural world, not restricted by 
the Newtonian-Kantian emphasis upon causality and phenomenal experi-
ence. Godunov-Cherdyntsev’s spherical species theory bears some resem-
blance to Goethe’s archetype theory, in its “emergence” from his enormous 
empirical experience.
The Questions of Science
The key questions raised by Nabokov’s conjunction of art and science are: 
how well do we know (or perceive) our habitat, “visible nature”; and how 
well do we know ourselves. Typical modern science tends to ask slightly 
different questions: How does the world (nature) work? How do we 
humans and our minds work? The difference is crucial, for the latter ques-
tions presume (or at least encourage the presumption) that our knowledge 
progresses in a thorough and accurate way, while the former investigate 
also the reliability of that knowledge itself. Nabokov refuses to suspend 
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awareness that the world is given to us by our senses, and in many ways 
is created by our conscious activity which “animates” subjective reality, or 
may “invent a cause or modify an effect.”58 Hence the scientific study of 
the world is in part the study of human creativity, the hidden art of con-
sciousness in presenting the phenomenal world to us. As we explore the 
scientific dimensions of Nabokov’s art, we will discover a presentation that 
finds the maximum of human conscious potential fulfilled only in such 
observation as takes account of aesthetically perceived relations as well as 
quantitatively perceived ones. Accuracy, detail, aesthetic sense, and self-
consciousness are all key components of this activity that leads to what 
Nabokov considered the highest states of being available to humanity. It is 
a goal rarely achieved in the worlds he created, but one clearly indicated 
for the attentive character and reader.
 This book’s structure represents a series of concepts that, in my judg-
ment, best illustrate several important aspects of Nabokov’s commingling 
of scientific and aesthetic ideas. Rather than work on a novel-by-novel 
basis, I have chosen to offer six different science-related perspectives upon 
Nabokov and his work. Chapter 1 examines his actual work as a scientist 
in some detail, discovering particular features in his articles and research 
notes that shed significant light on his entire outlook. It also proceeds to 
give a closer examination of the fusion of scientific and artistic perspec-
tives in The Gift and “Father’s Butterflies.” Chapter 2 offers a preliminary 
account of the suggestive commonalities shared between Nabokov and 
Goethe, the most distinguished artist-scientist of the modern era. Goethe’s 
kinship with and differences from Nabokov provide a vital perspective 
from which to assess the later author’s originality within this unusual inter-
disciplinary framework. I then offer three chapters on discrete scientific 
disciplines as they are reflected in Nabokov’s writings: biology, psychol-
ogy, and physics. Nabokov was an expert amateur and later a professional 
biologist with a special interest in evolutionary theory, and in the chapter 
devoted to biology I explore how his works embody some of his efforts 
to think about nature, which includes both human consciousness and art. 
In psychology, Nabokov’s knowledge came primarily from his wide read-
ings in the subject, and his attitude toward mind and consciousness is best 
elucidated by the writings of William James. Recognizing that everything 
known and experienced derives from the interaction of individual con-
sciousness with phenomenal reality, Nabokov’s psychological approach 
to human subjectivity focused on the shaping and self-deceiving potential 
within consciousness. Simultaneously, he waged a life-long battle against 
Freudian and other psychological approaches that attempt to explain 
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mental life through clearly discernable causal mechanisms. Physics, Nabo-
kov’s worst subject in high school, attracted him later as the quantum 
and relativity theories raised questions about the essence of time and the 
role of causality at the deepest levels of “reality.” Motifs from these new 
fields appear in his works throughout his career, and are a major shap-
ing force in several. The penultimate chapter investigates in greater detail 
how Nabokov’s scientific and epistemological concerns interrelate to pro-
duce the distinctive quality of his art by means of a poetics of absence 
and discontinuity. In the conclusion, I attempt to allay possible concerns 
about the uncomfortable proximity of Nabokov’s thought to modern 
“anti-science,” and I close with a reconsideration of previous Nabokov 
scholarship in the light of the present work.
 Every Nabokov novel is enriched by a familiarity with its scientific 
undercurrents. These may not always be as strong as they are in The Gift, 
but still they are there in all but perhaps the very earliest works. By attend-
ing to the way Nabokov incorporates his understanding of biology, psy-
chology, and physics into his philosophical outlook and creative practice, 
we can appreciate the strangeness of his novels as a reflection of his fun-
damental vision of the world’s essence. His fiction suggests that the world 
is not exactly what quantitative science describes; that the creations of the 
mind are error-prone; and that life at its core is—or can be—driven by 
laws other than the utilitarian struggle to survive. The quantitative sci-
ences provide only a single, limited perspective on “reality”; this must be 
supplemented by qualitative perception and study.59 Even so, consciousness 
cannot know more than its capacities allow, but it will, Nabokov optimis-
tically asserts, be “looking in the right direction.”60
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WHaT doeS one Say about a scientist who claims to have stepped into 
the base of a rainbow? Nabokov did not make this claim, but his favorite 
fictional scientist did: Fyodor, the narrator of The Gift, tells us that “once 
in Ordos my father, climbing a hill after a storm, inadvertently entered 
the base of a rainbow—the rarest occurrence! and found himself in col-
ored air, in a play of light as if in paradise. He took one more step—and 
left paradise.”1 It is a puzzling vision, easily dismissed as the son’s poetic 
interpolation, a mirage like the ones his father Konstantin Godunov-
Cherdyntsev witnessed and heard of during his Asian travels. But Fyodor 
aspires to uncompromising truthfulness concerning his father’s life, and 
although he recognizes the elusiveness of this ideal, he is unlikely to invent 
for his father such a fantasy.2 We have every reason to believe that the story 
comes from Godunov-Cherdyntsev himself. Meanwhile, Fyodor’s father is 
“the leading entomologist of his time.”3 In creating this image of a scientist 
who, like Marco Polo, experiences the impossible, Nabokov challenges his 
readers and the intellectual community at large to rethink the very nature 
of the scientist’s work and the possibility of the marvelous even within 
a scientific life. And although Nabokov’s published work as an amateur 
and professional scientist generally conforms to the standards of scientific 
nabokov as a Scientist
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discourse, there are some occasional wrinkles of style and image that 
remind his readers that he might be looking for secret loopholes in the 
norms of scientific practice.
 There have now been several evaluations of Nabokov’s work as a lepi-
dopterist, including some from his scientific colleagues (such as Charles 
Remington), his successors (Kurt Johnson and Steve Coates, Robert M. 
Pyle), his translators, and, one might even say, general curators (Dieter 
E. Zimmer). Brian Boyd’s pioneering biography is distinguished by care-
ful and detailed treatment of Nabokov the scientist. Thus it is no longer 
necessary to rehabilitate Nabokov’s entomological accomplishments, or to 
spend much time describing his major articles’ scientific significance. My 
purpose here is not to create a detailed picture of what science Nabokov 
actually did, but rather, drawing on the texts and others’ assessments of 
them, to explore what special qualities his scientific practice and discourse 
embodied. It will emerge that these qualities are ones that take us right to 
the common border of the aesthetic and the empirical.
 What kind of scientist was Nabokov? When historians of science 
categorize or describe their human subjects, they draw attention to the 
inductive or deductive methodology behind a scientist’s work, with its 
accompanying reliance on empirical or theoretical origins. No doubt 
every scientist is a blend of these types, with one tendency or the other 
dominant. Nabokov may be harder to categorize in this regard, because, 
as at least one scientist writing about him has observed, he incorporates 
significant components from both sides. According to Kurt Johnson and 
Steve Coates, “he was a lepidopterist of an analytic rather than a synthetic 
bent,” suggesting an empirically grounded practice, but he “did, however, 
think about the broader aspects of systematics, and his notions [ . . . ] were 
more sophisticated than he is sometimes given credit for.”4 Within his cho-
sen field of taxonomy, he struck a similar balance: here, the tension falls 
between “lumpers,” who prefer a system leading to fewer, larger genera 
and a smaller total number of distinct species, and “splitters,” who tend 
to award genus or species status based on a lower threshold of distinc-
tion. Nabokov was known to establish new genera where none had been 
before—thus splitting existing ones; but he also collapsed, or lumped, 
existing taxa into single groups. He was rigorous and consistent in apply-
ing rules that made sense to him. Likewise, he has not over-eager to pro-
mote a subspecies to a distinct species without the application of very strict 
criteria.
 He was also an extraordinarily productive worker. In his six years at 
the Museum of Comparative Zoology, he dissected at least 1,570 butterfly 
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genitalia under the microscope: an average of 261 per year, or one per 
weekday not accounting for summers spent away from Cambridge.5 Many, 
even most of these preparations he drew and annotated with extreme detail 
and precision. Add to this his wing-pattern analyses of over 3,500 butter-
flies, also with extensive figuration and the mapping and even counting of 
individual scales. When one takes into account his scientific correspon-
dence, the time to compose the articles themselves, and the need to read 
existing research and reports on the relevant species and genera, it seems 
almost unimaginable that Nabokov was simultaneously researching and 
writing a novel and a memoir in English, teaching Russian language and 
literature, going on lecture tours, publishing translations of Russian poetry 
and a study of Nikolai Gogol as well as his own short stories. If the list 
sounds exhausting, the impression is deepened when one looks through 
the voluminous folders bursting with hundreds of meticulous, lovingly 
drawn and colored images of butterfly wings and genitalia at various mag-
nifications, for his own personal research use and for publication with the 
articles themselves. Each minute cilium on a butterfly’s wing is represented 
with the same care as the most radiant wingspot (see figure 1).
 Characteristically, Nabokov was highly critical of sloppy work by some 
of his predecessors in the description and classification of certain lepidop-
tera. He found a scientific career for himself in the practice of perceiv-
ing with greater care and precision than those who came before him. He 
detected errors of consequence, saw patterns where others had not, and 
could distinguish both important differences and trivial similarities.
 After several decades of neglect, Nabokov’s scientific reputation was 
enhanced by a resurgence of interest in his research areas in the 1980s. 
Kurt Johnson, Zsolt Bálint, and Dubi Benyamini happened to be indepen-
dently initiating studies of the genera that Nabokov had worked on in 
the 1940s, and in the process they found Nabokov’s articles (which were 
prominently published in Psyche and elsewhere). They wound up continu-
ing the work he had begun, updating that area of taxonomy and also giv-
ing greater publicity to his discoveries and innovations. The upshot of their 
work was a series of articles building upon Nabokov’s foundations, and 
also the book Nabokov’s Blues, written by Johnson together with Steve 
Coates. In their book, Johnson and Coates suggest that Nabokov’s research 
amounted to more than simple classification work: he was “ahead of his 
time” and did “big science.”6 In other words, Nabokov was a researcher 
who made significant contributions not only to taxonomic knowledge, but 
also to theoretical notions of how different species were likely to be related 
or to evolve. He offered important insights into the fundamental processes 
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of nature; some of those insights, in their neglect, were duplicated much 
later by other scientists with far more sophisticated tools at their disposal. 
As Johnson and Coates observe, Nabokov’s “good eye had brought him to 
a level of taxonomic sophistication beyond that of many of his contempo-
raries, but in a sense it also made it easier for his work to be overlooked or 
misunderstood by those who weren’t disposed to look as deeply.”7
 The very concept of species was one of Nabokov’s areas of particular 
interest. There was, at the time, a lingering controversy concerning the 
definition of species, and Nabokov had his own uncompromising views. 
He denied the primacy of “biological” definition advocated at the time by 
Ernst Mayr and especially Theodosius Dobzhansky, which relied upon real 
or theoretically interbreeding individuals, as too restrictive and dismissive 
of what to him was the true test of an organism’s identity: morphology.8 
Like other lepidopterists, Nabokov came to the conclusion that in general 
it is the morphology of the male (and to a lesser extent female) genital 
apparatus that provides the most useful clues for determining the closeness 
of related butterfly or moth species, and his criteria for establishing distinct 
taxa include both the specific proportions of the male armature and some 
details of wing structure.9 As a result, his main work consisted of the dis-
section, microscopic examination, and figuring of these forms (over fifteen 
hundred preparations for the four major papers), comparing the morpho-
logical and proportional variations of the different structural parts. Some 
of these he was the first to name—for example, Plebejus idas sublivens 
Nabokov10—which is also like saying that he was the first human, ever, 
to see these butterflies distinctly. He proposed (inductively) the existence 
of a “magic triangle” formed by three apexes of the armature, creating a 
heuristic tool for his comparison of the many similar but subtly distinct 
apparatuses he studied (see figure 2).11
 Nabokov’s other key component for identifying specific distinctness, 
the hindwing, also called forth a new way of seeing: wing-patterns are 
made up of hundreds or thousands of individual scales, and these are laid 
out in a matrix that can be mapped and labeled. As a result, Nabokov was 
able to give a coordinate-level description of the variations between wing-
pattern features (such as macules—spots—and lines), a level of detail that 
had not been imagined before. Thus, by applying these two simple prin-
ciples with an unprecedented degree of accuracy, Nabokov within his area 
of study (subfamily Plebejinae) produced major advances in butterfly clas-
sification. As Kurt Johnson suggests, his methods and his interpretations 
of the data were ahead of their time and even audacious, uncovering deep 
realities that have withstood advances in science and technology through 
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the several decades since Nabokov did that work, surpassing even his own 
ambitions for them.12
 Nabokov’s emphasis on form, or what he called “the morphological 
moment,” is telling. In contrast to the “biological” criterion of interbreed-
ing, knowledge of morphology requires microscopic study, attention to 
minute detail, and comparison of various facts. (Even today, DNA analysis 
does not supplant morphology in determining separate species.)13 In other 
words, it incorporates more empirical data than establishing whether two 
creatures can or do produce fertile offspring. It is also more practical, 
of course, because animals can be more easily dissected than caught in 
copulo. And in those cases where mating pairs resist detection, by mat-
ing, say, only in the forest canopy, the morphological approach removes 
arbitrariness and speculation by focusing on concrete data. (Nabokov did, 
like other biologists, allow the question of interbreeding to enter consid-
erations after morphological judgments had produced their results). Mor-
phological features themselves are amenable to one of the distinguishing 
traits of the human mind: the ability to collect and systematize perceptible 
details. These details, in turn, can be viewed and interrelated in a variety of 
ways, providing the examiner with a multifaceted web of data. As a result, 
the scientist’s knowledge of what a species is both deepens and broadens. It 
includes a certain aesthetic (qualitative) element, related to the perceptive 
acuity and sensitivity of the scientist: the ability to see beyond the accumu-
lation of measurements (as, for example, the “magic triangle”).
 The other result of a focus on morphology relates to what is actually 
seen under the microscope and described by Nabokov. What he reports is 
great variability of form, even within a single species. Nabokov describes 
the size ranges for parts and wing markings, as if the variations within, 
and intergradations between, any given species or subspecies constitute 
the main point of interest, so that the gist of Nabokov’s last large lepidop-
teral work, “Nearctic Members of Genus Lycaeides Hübner,” is formu-
lated thus: “According to my present views, argyrognomon is represented 
in North America by ten multiform intergrading subspecies which may 
be grouped in three geographical arrays . . . ,” and “the other species, 
Melissa, consists of a Western nearctic group of four multiform intergrad-
ing subspecies . . . and of a monoform, isolated Eastern nearctic subspe-
cies (samuelis).”14 The variations themselves relate to discussions of the 
similarities of distinct species or subspecies, and Nabokov seems most 
delighted of all when he can detect what looks like a continuous move-
ment of variation across an entire group of species, with all the interme-
diate forms preserved, because it creates a simulacrum of nature in flux 
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across time: “From Alaska southwards and eastwards alaskensis imper-
ceptibly turns into scudderi, the delicate underside maculation becoming 
clear on a grayish or whitish ground and the female upperside becoming 
of a brighter blue with more or less developed aurorae.”15 What most 
intrigues Nabokov is the development of change itself, the fluid sweep of 
species variation. He writes of one creature “becoming” another, as if such 
a metamorphosis actually takes place when an insect crosses a particular 
geographical boundary. His picture of intergraded species represents also 
a kind of play with the interaction of time, space, and the progress of life. 
We imagine a series of forms that look as if they move chronologically, 
progressing from one extreme to the other as time advances—and in fact 
they might have evolved that way, although in reality Nabokov is talking 
about simultaneously existing species, not about a proposed evolution-
ary sequence. Nabokov draws attention to the dangers of such metaphors, 
which create the illusion of grasping the mysteries of time by means of 
spatial variation: “This scheme of course is not a phylogenetic tree but 
merely its shadow on a plane surface, since a sequence in time is not really 
deducible from a synchronous series. What seems certain, however, is that 
scudderi in its actual structure stands about midway between argyrogno-
mon and Melissa . . . .”16 These intergradations—almost like the frames of 
a film—between forms among living organisms become an emblem of the 
processes of life as they continue beyond our efforts to describe them in 
the shape of individual species.
 In contrast, the traditional species description based on a single indi-
vidual leads to a deceptively static picture of nature. After reporting that 
Nikolai Kuznetsov denied the real existence of species, Nabokov wrote 
that “if [species] do exist they do so taxonomically as abstract conceptions, 
mummified ideas severed from and uninfluenced by the continuous evolu-
tion of data-perception, some historical stage of which may have endowed 
them at one time with a fugitive sense. To adopt them as logical realities 
in classification would be much the same as conceiving a journey in terms 
of stopping places.”17 In other words, a species is active in time, mobile: 
Nabokov worked to perceive species holistically, in the full context of their 
imagined evolutionary development and interrelationships. And while it 
was his responsibility and his passion to describe and classify, he also kept 
in mind and transmitted a vivid sense of nature’s fluidity and mutability, 
its lively ephemerality. In this way, Nabokov’s scientific work never ossi-
fied in the enumeration of measurements, but rather always reached out to 
consider the breadth of nature’s motion. His articles emphasize the active, 
productive capacity of nature; the evolution of forms (wing patterns, 
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reproductive armatures), compressed in time as if viewed by the narrators 
of Transparent Things,18 becomes the sensuous movement of life itself.
 The “general public” has always felt that there is something absurd 
and even a bit indecent about the passionate study of butterflies, Nabokov 
relates.19 A boyhood fascination with butterflies and moths (which exist in 
greater variety in Nabokov’s European homeland than in eastern North 
America),20 and even a more mature scientific interest in them, seems natu-
ral enough. However, the fact that Nabokov came to be obsessed with 
lepidoptera tells us important things about him and his relationship to 
nature, and it also has significant consequences. It tells us, first of all, that 
he felt a direct response to the rush of nature surrounding the family estate 
in Vyra.21 What began at age seven as the collecting of butterflies quickly 
became their study and the absorption of information from various guide-
books. Nabokov gives us a sense of his feelings about butterflies in his 
description of Fyodor’s childhood as a curieux, in “Father’s Butterflies,” 
and also in Speak, Memory. Here too, we see a blend of different aspects 
of consciousness brought to bear upon the perception of the natural object. 
For those of us who are not, and never have been, either collectors or ama-
teur lepidopterists, the question arises: what causes the fascination that 
Nabokov felt for these insects? Their frequent beauty and color are obvi-
ous attractions, but that is not enough—and many of Nabokov’s favorite 
creatures are not at all eye-catching. Knowing Nabokov’s other passions, 
we can surmise that it was the intricacy of design, the great variety of 
forms, and the apparent ingenuity of many of those forms that seduced 
him (along with the lure of becoming the first to see, perceive, and name a 
piece of nature). The consequence of his passion was a lifelong devotion to 
discovering the details of nature’s secret workings, a devotion that surely 
nurtured, and was fed by, his sensitivity to uniqueness and intricate detail 
in all spheres of life. It is also significant that butterflies and moths, in their 
great variety, represent nature at its most dynamic. The profusion of forms, 
adaptations, and devices—more than 160,000 species22—put the world of 
nature’s flux at Nabokov’s direct disposal, and from an early age he began 
to see things like mimicry as emblematic of special and mysterious powers 
behind nature’s ebullience. As Nabokov would learn during his years as a 
professional researcher, that variety and its implications are even greater 
than he imagined in his youth.
 All this exposure to the many species of lepidoptera produced in Nabo-
kov an acute awareness of the generative power of nature, and he was 
clearly persuaded that life was evolving. As is well known, Darwin’s the-
ory of evolution by natural selection was in the ascendant, although it was 
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undergoing significant revision and challenge during Nabokov’s childhood 
and early adulthood. His notorious distaste for Darwinian theory is in fact 
exaggerated by many writers—even by himself. There were several reasons 
for this antipathy, but the most important was grounded in the popular-
ized theory’s emphasis upon utility for survival as the main, perhaps only, 
determinant of a feature’s evolutionary preservation. For historical and 
philosophical reasons mentioned in the Introduction, Nabokov objected 
to the notion that utility should be a fundamental determinant of anything 
in the world. (Some of these reasons are probably related to the parodic 
view of Darwinism that Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina expresses during her final 
emotional catastrophe: that all people should hate and attempt to destroy 
one another).23 Natural selection as Nabokov understood it clashed with 
his liberal-idealist leanings and his strong aversion to all material-based 
explanations of phenomena, an aversion surely deepened by materialism’s 
victory in the Bolshevik revolution. Whether or not natural selection is 
a purely materialist theory, Nabokov clearly saw the inevitability of its 
exploitation by materialist thinkers and its incorporation into “dialectical 
materialism.”24 He subscribed to the liberal (Kantian) outlook according 
to which the individual person is an end in itself, and he seems to have 
generalized this notion to apply as well to the phenomena of nature (within 
limits: specimens—e.g. butterflies—could be caught for the sake of human 
knowledge, and such study is part of the progress of nature). To subordi-
nate an entity to a system of “struggle for existence” is, he felt, to reduce it 
to its “utility” and to deny its fundamental value as an “end in itself,” as 
an integral part of nature as a “whole,” or as an object of consciousness. 
The other flaw in Darwin’s theory, from Nabokov’s point of view, rests in 
its emphasis on the process of elimination over the process of creation.25
 So, whereas Nabokov accepted evolution as a “modal formula,”26 he 
rejected the materialist implications of the theory in the form that was 
well-known during the years leading up to his own empirical research. 
Curiously, he did not propose any other method of species development in 
his professional scientific writings, although he did put forward a theory 
of speciation in the abandoned second addendum to The Gift, “Father’s 
Butterflies.” At least into the 1940s, he shared with The Gift’s fictional 
scientist a conviction that nature is far too creative and detailed in its 
forms, that it seems too well aligned with the precise needs and whims 
of human consciousness, to be fully described by a system that central-
izes chance and strife. Nabokov and his fictional scientist Godunov-Cher-
dyntsev both focus on mimicry (and object resemblance more generally) as 
a key example of nature’s surplus of creativity, likely perceptible only to 
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the human eye. (It has since been shown that many predators possess very 
keen vision, at least as far as their prey is concerned, so that this argument 
of Nabokov’s has become dated.)27
 Irrespective of this claim’s validity, it is worthwhile to explore exactly 
what it shows us about Nabokov’s approach to nature. The argument is 
developed in greatest detail in “Father’s Butterflies,” a fictional work which 
nevertheless has much overlap with Nabokov’s nonfiction comments about 
mimicry. Most often, passages describing extraordinary or even unlikely 
feats of mimicry are connected to the idea of design in nature and indeed 
in human life, and to the relationship between such design and the percep-
tive abilities of human consciousness: “Certain whims of nature can be, if 
not appreciated, at least merely noticed only by a brain that has developed 
in a related manner, and the sense of these whims can only be that—like 
a code or a family joke—they are accessible only to the illuminated, i.e., 
human mind, and have no other mission than to give it pleasure. . . .”28 
Sometimes, these patterns and designs are linked with the notion of a pat-
tern-maker, implying some variant of a creationist worldview. However, 
we need to be careful not to take metaphysically intoned suggestions in 
Nabokov’s fiction as direct statements of a proposed outlook or (pseudo-) 
scientific theory. After all, Fyodor warns us that “so far, all this is but an 
approximate image, in the same way as it would be purely allegorical for 
us to start affirming that the initial division of all earthly specimens into 
two groups were a separation of two halves under the influence of cen-
trifugal force.”29 These “miracles” of nature, or of life, do seem to indicate 
a designing presence, but that they seem to do so is, as Kant demonstrated, 
a necessary part of the way human beings perceive the world.30 Exam-
ples of nonutilitarian mimicry—or any other nonutilitarian phenomenon 
of nature—would demonstrate the gaps in natural selection’s explana-
tory power. They were, or would have been, particularly vivid banners for 
those lacunae.31 In short, they were part of Nabokov’s effort to suggest that 
nature was not purely mechanistic and driven by causality. There must be, 
he felt, alongside or even above selection and competition, another force 
behind nature: one that drives the development of life and its intricacies in 
the first place.
 His skeptical attitude toward natural selection was not only philosoph-
ically motivated: it also had scientific grounding that was shared by other 
biologists of the decades leading up to Nabokov’s work.32 Even the great 
Russian entomologist (and translator of Goethe) Nikolai Kholodkovskii, 
imagining yet unknown elements hidden behind nature’s veil, wrote that 
“natural selection is a controlling and choosing factor, but not a creative 
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one: it concerns itself, so to speak, with the expediency of changes taking 
place within organisms; it does not create those changes.”33 And so when 
Nabokov, through Godunov-Cherdyntsev, comes to offer a vision of evo-
lution—the diversification of life—he focuses not on the forces that drive 
the elimination of species but rather on those that drive the generation 
of new forms. His fictitious offering is a “spherical” theory, according to 
which forms of life arise in bubble-like groups from some unknown gener-
ative source behind all of nature, the “wind” that “animates the dance of 
the planets.”34 This process, as he describes it, has certain self-reinforcing 
traits (feedback) inherent to it, which contribute to its development and its 
complexity. Strikingly, he does not deny natural selection in all its forms, 
but he does refuse to give it central attention in a story that is, to him, 
really about the generation of nature’s immense variety and of conscious-
ness itself. The fact that nature, life, and consciousness seem intertwined 
and mutually reinforcing produces a vision of the world that attempts to 
comprehend it as a whole. It is not scientific in the Newtonian sense: In 
Nabokov’s view, the quantitative analysis is ancillary to qualitative judg-
ment.35 Such vision is not amenable to quantification because it does 
not break down the object under study (the natural world [universe] as 
embraced by consciousness), but rather attempts to view it and understand 
it as a whole. Significantly, this is precisely the kind of approach to nature 
that was taken by Goethe, to whom we will return in the next chapter.36
Mechanism versus essence
The key to distinguishing Nabokov’s scientific thought and practice from 
that of mainstream scientists rests in the difference between the study of 
mechanism and the study of essence. This is the same distinction that fas-
cinated Goethe, and he (perhaps first among modern scientists) came to 
doubt the Newtonian emphasis upon mechanistic analysis of natural phe-
nomena and its primary tool, mathematics. The dominant form of scien-
tific study is based upon mechanistic assumptions—the knowledge that 
causality is an effective heuristic by which to analyze and understand all 
natural phenomena that take place at the mundane level—that is, the level 
that aligns well with classical, Newtonian physics. To some extent, even 
quantum and relativistic phenomena fall within this model, with the pro-
viso that they represent extreme cases where mathematical truth departs 
from the fiction of physical appearance. However, the modern culture of 
scientific knowledge, which accounts for all but a tiny fraction of scientific 
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work, abjures by necessity questions concerning the ultimate origin, cause, 
or essence of the materials and patterns of change it studies. Because cau-
sality, for the scientist, represents a closed system (except in certain dis-
puted quantum cases, and perhaps in the black hole), units other than links 
in the chain of cause and effect are hard, if not impossible, to fit into the 
explanatory system. Such units could include concepts that transcend the 
boundaries of a typical causal agent—for example, a diachronic view of a 
given line of evolution; or ideas about forms or patterns in the universe or 
in biological nature; or the complexities of human mind, perception, and 
psychology. These phenomena all relate to the recently popular theory of 
emergence—the appearance of complex forms, structures, and systems that 
could not be predicted using known causal laws and accessible data. Sec-
ondarily, patterns may also be discovered among lapses in apparent cau-
sality, if one admits the possibility of such lapses. These are, by definition, 
heretical within the Newtonian system, with the result that an experiment 
that fails to produce a conclusive result relative to mechanistic effects is 
simply considered a failed experiment, its results discarded.37 Thus, to take 
natural selection as our example, Darwin repeatedly mentions the inability 
of his theory to make any claims whatsoever about the causes of species 
mutation, or the causes or origins of life itself.38 Instead, his study focuses 
precisely upon the interface between living organism and environment, 
proposing causal relationships between environmental facts and organ-
ismic consequences. His interest lies in the great variety of extant forms 
and in their evolution from earlier, similar forms, as a result of ecological 
interactions or pressures. But he is explicitly not interested in the concept 
of form itself, in the patterns behind interrelations of an organism’s parts, 
nor in any larger questions of what, as it were, propels the flow of natural 
forms. Nabokov was interested in most of these questions, and his science 
shows it.
 If we look at Nabokov’s most important research articles, we find a 
distinct attention to the manner in which species relate to each other. His 
main guide in this research was form, or morphology, which he gave prior-
ity over the possibility of biological reproduction.39 In his 1944 article on 
the genus Lycaeides, Nabokov—in marked contrast to his fictitious scien-
tist—vividly demonstrates his preference for the evolution and morphol-
ogy of genitalic structures as markers of relatedness within genera, species, 
and subspecies. His reasons for this choice derived specifically from his 
understanding of natural selection and its action upon exterior form: as he 
writes, in “Notes on Neotropical Plebejinae,” “Adaptation to surround-
ings, to climate, altitude, etc., and hence ‘natural selection’ in its simplest 
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sense, certainly had no direct action whatever on the moulding of the 
genital armature, and we know nothing of the physiological processes of 
which that elaborate sculpture is the structural overflow. [ . . . ] Hence the 
conviction that there is some phylogenetic link where there is a recurrence 
of similar genitalic characters and that certain groupings—the new genera 
to which we now must turn—may be so devised as to reflect the natural 
affiliations of the species.”40 Thus genitalic forms demonstrate a part of 
the animal that is protected from natural selection in the “simplest” sense, 
and yet which does change and evolve. Even within these minute struc-
tures, Nabokov comes to differentiate between the parts that are more and 
less “prone” to morphological mutation:
I view evolution in Lycaeides as a twofold process of growth: 1. as a 
generic growth—involving the whole of the male genitalic structure, 
so that the absolute size of the uncus (independently from the size of 
the wings) in its general graduation from the most primitive structures 
(F+H+U=about 0.9mm.) to the most specialized ones (F+H+U=about 
1.8mm.) is doubled at the maximum limit of development; and 2. as a 
specific growth—a process acting upon the relation of parts F, H, and 
U, attacking one part more strongly than the other, whereupon the latter 
tends to catch up with the former, producing at a certain stage stabili-
zation and equilibrium, which eventually are again broken by unequal 
growth. . . . [T]here is also a difference in the rhythm of the specific 
growth; and that throughout the general process stunted by-products 
occur (holarctically), reduction in absolute size of structure synchronizing 
here with reduction in size of wings.41
The structure, if viewed through various examples within a species, pro-
vides a visual representation of the rhythmic motion of evolution in a 
place where it is least affected by environmental pressures. He goes on to 
identify six “peaks of speciation” within the genus, and up to 120 subspe-
cific forms “clustering around the main peaks” (see figure 3, pp. 36–37). 
We see here how Nabokov attempts to determine an atemporal sense of 
organismic change, which in turn defines the essence of what constitutes a 
species or a genus. What differentiates Nabokov from other taxonomists 
of his day is his effort to perceive and define this mobile aspect of species’ 
and genera’s essence, asking his reader to imagine the flow of mutations 
one into the other as a species evolves. “Nature is motion and growth,” as 
Van writes in Ada.42
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 Likewise, in his study of wing patterns, Nabokov seeks out evidence 
for the forces guiding species change, especially in the distribution of mac-
ules (spots) and lines across related species’ wings.43 It was in this area 
that he invented his (briefly controversial) scale-line system for mapping 
the precise location of wing imagery, thus removing certain subjective 
flaws from the research method.44 But notice how in this area, too, as well 
as in the “Notes on the Morphology of the Genus Lycaeides” paper, he 
departs from the accepted practice of providing a detailed description of 
an accepted holotype (authoritative representative) of a species, moving to 
a synthetic description of a species’ varietal range across its geographical 
range. In the following passage, Nabokov proposes rhythm as the defining 
trait of a polytypic species: “‘Rhythm’ depends on the following: if B, L, P, 
T represent in one species of Lycaeides certain combinations of characters 
as revealed by definite subspecies, and if in another species the combina-
tion L fails to be represented at all, while on the other hand P is not rep-
resented by a single definite subspecies, but is spread over several, these 
omissions, gaps, fusions, and syncopatic jerks will produce in one species a 
variational rhythm different from that of another.”45 Nabokov’s goal is to 
discover “differences in rhythm, scope, and expression, the total of which 
would produce the synthetic character of one species as differing from the 
synthetic character of another.”46 This is the same “synthetic character” 
that he imagines following a species in its journey through time, an image 
he projects upon the hidden history behind modern forms of Plebejinae 
in the New World: “Going back still further, a modern taxonomist strad-
dling a Wellsian time machine with the purpose of exploring the Cenozoic 
era in a ‘downward’ direction would reach a point—presumably in the 
early Miocene—where he still might find Asiatic butterflies classifiable on 
modern structural grounds as Lycaenids, but would not be able to dis-
cover among them anything definitely referable to the structural group he 
now diagnoses as Plebejinae. On his return journey, however, he would 
notice at some point a confuse adumbration, then a tentative ‘fade-in’ of 
familiar shapes (among other, gradually vanishing ones) and at last would 
find Chilades-like and Aricia-like structures in the Palearctic region.”47 An 
individual butterfly is not just a butterfly: it is a member of a species. But 
a species is not a static unit; rather, it is an ephemeral manifestation of 
nature’s growth and development through time, and the attempt to visual-
ize the rhythmic form that characterizes the evolution of species is typical 
of Nabokov’s approach to science. It is a holistic approach that strives 
to surpass quantitative analysis (even though it may have quantitative 
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components, such as the size of various structural parts or the number and 
position of wing-scales). The value of this method, although questioned by 
F. Martin Brown at the time of its first use, was confirmed by its ability to 
produce accurate revisions in the classification of butterflies and moths.
Mimicry
The most renowned—or notorious—part of Nabokov’s thought about 
nature is his view of mimicry.48 In his informal lexicon, mimicry refers 
both to classical mimicry between species (such as the Viceroy’s appar-
ent mimicry of the Monarch), and also to what is more technically called 
“object resemblance” or “protective coloration.” Thus, in his works, 
moths can “mimic” leaves or flowers, and caterpillars can mimic roots (or 
roots caterpillars!). There is a fascinating and clear distinction between 
what Nabokov wrote about mimicry in his fictional or memoiristic works 
and what he wrote as a professional lepidopterist. Although he submit-
ted an article on mimicry to the Yale Review and spoke regularly on the 
subject during 1942 and 1943,49 and although he envisioned for a while 
composing an exhaustive work on mimicry “with a furious refutation of 
natural selection,”50 there remain no traces of this radical thought among 
Nabokov’s preserved scientific notes and publications. What we do see, 
however, is a special attention to occasional similarities between species 
that are usually caused by chance or else by deeper forces of nature that 
natural selection may not explain.51 For example, in some notes from 1944 
defining the term “homopsis” (inter-generic resemblances within a fam-
ily), Nabokov differentiates this term from mimicry: “. . . mimetic forms 
[are] forms belonging as often as not to different families and moreover 
linked by a (still inexplicable, in my opinion) coincidence between mimetic 
aspect and mimetic behavior and mimetic habitat, this coincidence being 
as impossible to explain satisfactorily either by blind accidental causes or 
by the blind coordination of accidents termed natural selection (even if 
the protective value of mimetic resemblance is proved).”52 False resem-
blance (of which some cases might be mimicry) and false dissimilarities 
must be extremely rare, and he implies that existing mimetic relationships 
far exceed the number that could be achieved by chance mutations. The 
text or notes from those 1940s lectures have been lost, it seems, and there 
is no record of what his lecture “Mimicry in Theory and Practice” con-
tained. From the minutes of the CEC meeting of April 12, 1943, we know 
only that the talk was distinguished by “entertaining informativeness and 
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clarity,” followed by “considerable stimulating discussion.”53 Although 
Nabokov remained interested in composing a scientific compendium on 
all forms of mimicry as late as 1952, there are no documents or notes that 
shed any particular light upon his views at that time (unless we consider 
his informal anti-Darwinian comments in his memoir Conclusive Evidence 
[1951]). Kurt Johnson has proposed that Nabokov may have eventually 
destroyed his mimicry materials, perhaps having decided that his argu-
ments were too clearly disproved by advances in evolutionary biology 
after the 1940s.54 To be sure, it is strange that there is nothing in his papers 
that brings us any deeper into his thought about mimicry—a topic of such 
fascination for him!—than the few passages in The Gift, “Father’s But-
terflies,” Conclusive Evidence/Speak, Memory, and the slight traces in his 
literary lectures. Be that as it may, his cause would not have been helped 
by the fact that his most stunning examples of nonutilitarian mimicry were 
either erroneous or fictitious.55 It does seem, to judge from the published 
articles, that he came to find sufficient source for wonder even in the non-
mimetic forms of nature to support his views on the merely partial scope 
of natural selection. His personal scientific emphasis was on the creative 
side of evolution, nature’s generation of new forms, rather than on the 
selective reason for the success of one form over another, and nonutilitar-
ian mimicry had simply provided him with an especially vivid example of 
such an exception. He must have known that in order to convince active 
biologists of nature’s “non-utilitarian delights,”56 he would have had to 
rely upon far more sophisticated and subtle arguments. Kurt Johnson has 
argued that Nabokov’s inability to prove the limits of natural selection 
would not have forced him to “give up [ . . . ] the ‘magical’ view of the 
world, so evident in his fiction,” and that neither would acceptance of the 
Modern Synthesis.57 His magical sense of nature could have been retained 
and nurtured by other concepts, including by his synthetic, Goethe-like 
sense of nature’s mobility. However, within his lifetime, as within Goethe’s, 
it may have been a losing battle as far as the mainstream scientific commu-
nity was concerned. Although in the past fifteen to twenty years there has 
been some increased interest in “Goethean” holistic science, in the 1940s 
and 1950s this was not the case.58
Science into Fiction
Although the fragment known in English as “Father’s Butterflies” por-
trays a theory developed by a fictitious scientist, we should pay it some 
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attention as a legitimate expression of ideas that Nabokov was consider-
ing during his years composing The Gift and the quickly ensuing shift to 
professional lepidoptery. We do not need to claim that these ideas were 
all conclusively accepted by Nabokov to take them seriously as authentic 
scientific thought, if only in the domain of hypothesis. It is well known 
that Nabokov’s and Godunov-Cherdyntsev’s opinions about mimicry as 
a refutation of natural selection were nearly identical (although the fic-
tional character has the advantage of being able to refer to more perfect 
and conclusive examples—which, as it turns out, are as fictitious as he is). 
Nevertheless, the scientific material in “Father’s Butterflies” is challeng-
ing, rigorous, and engaged with real controversies of the day; its contents 
are based upon Nabokov’s authentic and deep knowledge of evolutionary 
theory, lepidoptery, and nature; and the speciation theory it proposes has 
its own authenticity and significance as it stands. As a whole, it helps us to 
understand more clearly how Nabokov saw the role of scientific thought 
in approaching true knowledge of the world, by elaborating in the clearest 
possible terms the link between idealist philosophy and idealist science.59
 Why did Nabokov include such a detailed speciation theory within this 
fragment? And why as an afterthought, a possible addendum to The Gift, 
rather than as part of the novel itself? Close reading of the text (and exam-
ination of the manuscript) reveals that Nabokov approached this section 
with the same intensity, care, and preparation that he did The Life of Cher-
nyshevsky, Fyodor’s scandalous book in The Gift proper. This should come 
as no surprise: after all, Godunov-Cherdyntsev Sr. was proposing a theory 
that was intended to sweep away all previous approaches to evolution and 
speciation—first and foremost natural selection, but other explanations as 
well. His “spherical” species theory was revolutionary, incomprehensible 
to nearly all contemporary scientists, and yet, within the logic of the frag-
ment, true almost beyond question. No doubt the discovery of such a radi-
cal truth was a passionate dream of Nabokov’s: remember that “furious 
refutation” he was preparing, as a scientist, in 1941. We are made con-
stantly aware of the theory’s significance by a series of allusions to revolu-
tions in two other branches of science, astronomy and physics.
 Godunov-Cherdyntsev’s speciation theory is uncompromisingly ideal-
ist, and it starts out by setting up systems of analogies that highlight its dif-
ference from materialist explanations. The most important consequence of 
this approach is that the theory avoids all mention of causality as a force 
driving species change. Fyodor’s summary asserts that “by ‘species’ he 
intends the original of a being, nonexistent in our reality but unique and 
definite in concept, that recurs ad infinitum in the mirror of nature, creat-
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ing countless reflections; each one of them perceived by our intelligence, 
reflected in that selfsame glass and acquiring its reality solely within it, as 
a living individual of the given species.”60 This platonic-sounding intro-
duction is merely the opening gambit in a rhetorical strategy that repeat-
edly draws attention to aspects of the species idea that are not captured by 
mechanistic treatments and that exist—or seem to exist—alongside causal 
relationships. Not only does Godunov-Cherdyntsev play down the mate-
riality of a species; he also focuses (like Nabokov) upon the concept of 
variability. His “spheres” are ideal figures that express the relationships 
between a number of organisms with a common heritage; they demon-
strate, in time and in space, how a species occupies an extended conceptual 
space through its variety. The species is not static and it is not unitary; it 
represents and expresses a certain ideal content that transcends its physical 
manifestations. This approach to a species’ essence focuses on its overall 
state of being, its quality, its variety, its status in nature as a temporally 
located, partially complete fulfillment of an idea. It posits that there is an 
ideal reality to this holistic and fluid approach to the conception of spe-
cies, even though it is “non-existent in our reality.” While not denying the 
mechanistic and causal relationships between and within biological organ-
isms, Godunov-Cherdyntsev’s theory suggests that this shadow-like essence 
is more fundamental and more important, just as Nabokov himself would 
later focus on the “synthetic character” of species. His idealist model pro-
poses that even the very phenomenon of species, as a collection of related 
and similar beings, had to “evolve,” and that this phenomenon’s ideal evo-
lution is itself fundamental, behind the scenes of empirical reality. “Just as 
an increase in the brain’s complexity is accompanied by a multiplication of 
concepts, so the history of nature demonstrates a gradual development in 
nature herself of the basic concept of species and genus as they take form. 
[ . . . Q]uite literally, in the human, cerebral sense . . . nature grows wiser 
as time passes . . . The only nit that can be picked is that we do not know 
what we imply when we say ‘nature’ or ‘the spirit of nature.’”61
 This discussion of species is particularly striking in its similarity to 
Nabokov’s metaphorical treatment of other aspects of reality in various 
works. It can also be related directly to Nabokov’s interest in Andrey 
Bely’s diagrams of lyric poetry: in these, poems are found to cast an ideal, 
negative pattern based on the position of unfulfilled stresses, something 
of a graphic “shadow” of the poems (see figures 4 and 5). Richer poems 
reveal richer patterns. Bely, a symbolist theoretician as well as literary art-
ist, suggests that these patterns are in some way connected to the hidden 
value of a work (and hence to its ideal existence or essence). Nabokov was 
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fascinated by these patterns from his youth onward, and he filled many 
notebooks with such schematic analyses of Russian poetry. As he describes 
in Speak, Memory, Nabokov even tried composing poetry starting from 
certain interesting shadowgrams—a process that, in tacit conformity with 
Bely’s thesis, did not work very well.62 We can see how these diagrams 
offer a model for suggesting how a phenomenon (poem or species) can 
Figure 
Poetry diagram, showing patterns made by mapping the “missed” beats in the poetry of evgeny 
baratynsky. (Source: henry W. and albert a. berg Collection of english and american literature, The 
new york Public library, astor, lenox and Tilden foundations)
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exist in both “real” and “ideal” phases. As we saw, Nabokov’s discussion 
of species also includes references to such negative components—unful-
filled spots in the species sphere, or the rhythmic interplay of presence and 
absence in a species’ phylogenetic realization—as important characteristics 
for our understanding of the “real” species state relative to its ideal core. 
We will return to these patterned absences in chapter 6.
Figure  continued
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Figure 
Wing spot diagram, showing progressive location of spots across the wing of related butterflies of two 
genera of blues, Lycaena and Polyommatus. (Source: henry W. and albert a. berg Collection of english and 
american literature, The new york Public library, astor, lenox and Tilden foundations)
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 The next step in Godunov-Cherdyntsev’s idealist exposition of spe-
ciation is to establish as fundamental this analogy between “nature” and 
mind. In doing so, he follows Coleridge and Emerson as well as Goethe 
and the German Romantics.63 Nature, in his usage, refers to whatever is the 
ultimate mysterious essence, the underlying source of reality as we know 
it, even though “we do not know what we imply when we say ‘nature’ or 
‘the spirit of nature.’”64 It is, clearly, a definition that does not shy away 
from metaphysics. Fyodor summarizes:
Reaching again into the basket of generally accessible examples, let us 
recall the analogy noticeable between the development of individual and 
species. Here an examination of the human brain can be most fruitful. 
[ . . . ] In the course of life we learn, among other things, the concept of 
“species,” unknown to the ancestors of our culture. Yet, not only is the 
history of mankind parodied by the developmental history of the writer 
of these and other lines, but the development of human ratiocination, 
in both the individual and historic senses, is extraordinarily linked to 
nature, the spirit of nature considered as the aggregate of all its manifes-
tations, and all the modifications of them conditioned by time. How is it 
conceivable, in fact, that amid the huge jumble containing the embryos of 
countless organs [ . . . ] nature never included thought.65
It is here that Godunov-Cherdyntsev offers his mimicry argument, accord-
ing to which the details of disguise exceed the perceptive acuity of the 
predator. Now, considering the fact that mimicry turns out, after all, to 
protect creatures from extremely perceptive predators, and thus has at 
least one mission aside from giving pleasure, his (and Nabokov’s) theory 
would seem to be disproved. However, in fact only the old-fashioned, tele-
ological side of the argument is disproved: the idea that things in nature 
exist exclusively for human benefit or enjoyment. It remains the case that 
recognizing, and even finding wonder and humor in, mimetic disguises 
is an ability reserved for a certain development of consciousness, so far 
known only in humans. Godunov-Cherdyntsev’s key point is not that feats 
of mimicry seem gratuitous (although he does argue this), but rather that 
consciousness, as a product of nature, detects in nature signs of its own 
creative principles, hence, signs of consciousness underlying nature itself. 
Such an argument—an idealist one to be sure—can be made successfully 
with or without gratuitous mimicry, although the latter would make it eas-
ier to couch the case within empirical discourse. 66 Even there, however, it 
is not strictly necessary, because it is possible to find nonutilitarian muta-
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tions, or to discuss the generative, rather than regulative, side of evolution 
(and besides all this, within Kantian empirical discourse, such appeals as 
Godunov-Cherdyntsev’s to metaphysical underpinnings are banned from 
scientific argument while also being a necessary part of human conscious-
ness). The fact that nature evolves and constantly develops more complex 
forms and variety is deeply mysterious (at least, Darwin thought so); that 
humans (as products of nature) partially recognize and understand nature’s 
dynamism is more mysterious still.
 Continuing his analogy between the development of mind and the 
evolution of nature, Godunov-Cherdyntsev insists that “the appearance 
of species is unarguable; and neither the evolutionist ‘how’ nor the meta-
physical ‘whence’ can be answered until we agree to admit that it was not 
species that evolved in nature, but the very concept of species.”67 He is 
equally interested in the nature of species differentiation, which on the one 
hand he views as becoming less and less likely as the “species concept” 
itself becomes more distinct and as existing species acquire firmer delinea-
tions. There is a crucial moment in the process of differentiation where 
the emergence of new species from the variations of an existing, fading 
species “contradicts the limits of the concept of species.”68 The point is 
quite obscure, but Godunov-Cherdyntsev seems to imply that in its own 
evolution, the species concept reaches a stage where mutation is no lon-
ger active; new species, as such, cease to develop from existing species. 
However, the result is not stasis in the natural world: a “leap” takes place 
(“somewhat similar to what we find when we compare mechanical and 
animal motion”) whereby the multiplication of diversity shifts from the 
outer world to its representation in consciousness: thus, after centuries 
of unified identity, a species comes under human scrutiny, reveals hidden 
divergences that define some of its members, and suddenly where there was 
one species now there are two: “suddenly our eyes open wide, and how 
could one ever have overlooked those very traits that, with such elegant 
precision, now distinguish the two butterflies.”69 Thus the play of diver-
sification that had worked itself out on the field of phenomenal nature 
continues in the increasing refinement of human consciousness. Nabokov’s 
proposal in Speak, Memory that space, time, and thought are connected 
is prefigured here in the suggestion that worldly mechanical evolution 
achieves its natural extension in the increasing complexity and creativity of 
human conscious activity.
 One of the surprising features of Godunov-Cherdyntsev’s theory is that 
despite what some would call its romantic, fanciful, even quaint attempt to 
create a vision of natural progress not founded upon mechanistic causality, 
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it employs an insistent stream of analogies from the physical sciences—
especially astronomy, and also particle physics. Indeed, the progression of 
metaphors may be seen to trace the course of planetary analogies in the 
study of subatomic structure during the years 1907–13 by Ernest Ruther-
ford and Niels Bohr. The sequence is compelling: early passages draw our 
attention to the fact of the solar system, and the planets’ orbits, reminding 
us of the radical shift in perception that took place following the “Coper-
nican revolution” and its refinement by Johannes Kepler. Visions of space 
filled with stars and “the dance of the planets” continue to accompany the 
argument, telling us that “spherical classification” brought about “delir-
ium and confusion,” just as would “the measurement of the earth or the 
laws linking it to the other planets, if humanity had not already had an 
inkling of its roundness and rotation.” The analogy of thought becomes 
one of form, too, as the species and genera themselves begin to appear with 
“annular principle” and “ringlike pattern forming new ringlike systems.” 
Similarly, the theory itself possesses “stellar elegance” (zvezdoobraznyi-
stroinyi), but due to its novelty and science’s lack of preparation for it, it is 
“eclipsed by its own explosion.”70 When the discussion finally reaches the 
concept of “genus rings,” a subtle shift in terminology occurs: the central 
or type species of a genus sphere suddenly becomes the “nucleus” spe-
cies. The connection to atoms, rather than cells, becomes clear when we 
read that “the number of satellites revolving around the central nucleus 
is expressed in the even numbers four, six, and eight—and, as far as it has 
yet been possible to determine, does not exceed the highest of those.”71 
The planetary model of atomic structure was proposed by Ernest Ruther-
ford in 1907 and refined by Bohr by 1913, so that a well-read anglophile 
scientist likely would have been aware of these theories by 1917 (the year 
Godunov-Cherdyntsev set off on his final journey and Rutherford received 
the Nobel Prize). The restricted variations of satellite counts are especially 
reminiscent of the specific numbers of electrons in each fixed orbit.
 There are a number of ways we might interpret this sequence of met-
aphors, which, we are told, first occurred to Godunov-Cherdyntsev in 
his last year (1917). He had been studying and classifying organisms for 
decades; he possessed a vast wealth of data and experience from a wide 
variety of ecosystems. Significantly, he was not looking for any theory dur-
ing the years of his fieldwork: he simply applied the existing schemes of 
classification, imperfect as they were, because he was too busy describ-
ing new species and their habitats. And yet “something lurking behind the 
mental capabilities he called on for the straightforward investigation of 
haphazardly accumulating materials suddenly manifested itself. [ . . . ] The 
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hour had come when my father suddenly sensed a truth had matured that 
he had not consciously sought but that had harmoniously grown out of an 
internal association of elements he had gathered. The mystery was only in 
the very act of association, and akin to capillary attraction—happening, 
as it were, independently of the gatherer’s will.”72 Thus in some hidden 
but innate way, Godunov-Cherdyntsev’s insight emerged as a spontaneous 
outgrowth of his conscious scientific work. The new theory is meant to be 
understood as radical, virtually incomprehensible, and undeniably “true” 
(he “sensed a truth”). That the theory bears strong analogies to other 
major discoveries (of the solar system, and of atomic structure) might be 
meant as a sign of its rational accordance with other revolutions in the sci-
entific world.73 Or it might be meant to suggest that this pattern of spheres, 
satellites, and orbits is in some way indicative of hidden unities within the 
“spirit of nature,” as he calls it. In both cases, the metaphorical develop-
ment reminds readers of the history of intellectual innovation, of the pat-
tern of human discovery as it shatters old worldviews and envisions new 
ones. This process is founded upon the ability of consciousness to over-
come its own creations and tear down its own scaffolding as it achieves 
greater and greater insight into “nature”; this conscious activity is the nat-
ural extension of evolution as Godunov-Cherdyntsev understands it.
The artist and the explorer
It is telling that Nabokov was a naturalist, not an experimentalist. Rather 
than “torturing nature,” as Baconian and Newtonian scientists were wont 
to do (devising experiments with conditions that would never obtain in 
nature), Nabokov chose simply to observe and study nature at ever 
increasing levels of detail.74 Whether climbing mountains or digging among 
forgotten collections of specimens in a museum’s vault or examining thou-
sands of minute organs through a microscope, he was traversing space 
and matter as nature presents them. In these efforts, he was attempting to 
find what had previously been hidden, to discover uncharted ways, to spot 
unnoticed relationships or undiscovered beings. He was, in this sense, an 
explorer, and it is perhaps through the figure of the explorer that we can 
best understand Nabokov as a scientist and grasp the scientific component 
of his artistry. This is why the main image we find in Nabokov’s works is 
of the individual looking for something: whether it is the artistic principle 
behind life, as in The Gift, or the essence of human identity and kinship, 
as in The Real Life of Sebastian Knight. It is not that experimental sciences 
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are invalid, but that they are sterile, by design and by necessity: they are 
free of life and its vicissitudes, deliberately immune to chance. They strip 
life of its messiness and characteristic features. Nabokov and his surro-
gates strive to discover whole essences with their context, like a butterfly 
on its host plant in its special environment. Even characters whose efforts 
lead them toward more destructive or self-destructive ends demonstrate 
this crucial difference: Humbert Humbert wants Lolita in his personal pos-
session—not in her full natural glory (notwithstanding his quasi-scientific 
study of her features and environment). He is like Nabokov’s despised 
German butterfly collectors and traders who care only about possession, 
not about knowledge.75 Kinbote in Pale Fire likewise wants to colonize the 
poetry of John Shade, rather than learn whatever might be his secret or 
appreciate his art.
 The analogy is brought to its clearest form in The Gift, where the main 
protagonist is both an artist and a would-be lepidopterist and explorer. As 
an artist, Fyodor explores the souls of others: he projects himself into them 
and attempts to imagine them completely. As he says, he recreates not just 
the color of their eyes, but also the color behind the eyes (tsvet zaglaznyi).76 
He can, so he thinks, imagine the inner worlds of other people and discern 
the patterned essence of their lives. This imaginative daring is akin to his 
fantastic accompaniment of his father on explorations of Central Asia: 
based on anecdotes, the works of various explorers, and his father’s own 
texts, Fyodor creates an entire world that hovers before him as he contem-
plates and writes it down. His (and Nabokov’s) researches into Cherny-
shevsky’s life are similar in their exhaustiveness; like a lepidopterist in the 
field, Fyodor immerses himself into the world of his object, reading masses 
of socialist literature, theory, and propaganda, along with diaries, letters 
and autobiographies, and based on that experience produces his work of 
art. Fyodor’s book on Chernyshevsky is exceedingly self-conscious in its 
use of device and baring of device, which is roughly analogous to the way 
science uses and discloses its tools and methods. The artist must be an 
explorer, Nabokov suggests, a discoverer of new or unknown phenom-
ena—including mental phenomena, images of the world reflected in con-
sciousness: the artist’s own and those of others.
 The scientist, too, can choose to view an object holistically, rather than 
reduce it to a list of components and rules governing them. This, in effect, 
is what Godunov-Cherdyntsev does when he produces his “supplement,” 
the result of his years of experience observing and classifying butterflies 
and moths. Not content to rely on the mechanism of natural selection to 
understand speciation, he intuits a deeper essence in the emergence and 
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proliferation of species. The fact that his “outline” fills thirty incompre-
hensible pages, and “Murchison’s” (fictional) exegesis attains more than 
three hundred, demonstrates the notion of the incommunicability of phe-
nomena at a certain level of complexity and abstraction. We are told in 
Fyodor’s summary that the figures used are an “approximate image” of 
what is really happening in nature, which his father has apparently per-
ceived in full depth and complexity, but which can only be seen through 
a fullness of vision like his own, not through reading his or anybody else’s 
report of it. (Such irreducibility is reminiscent of Schopenhauer’s and Tol-
stoy’s comments about their own work, which Nabokov himself echoed in 
an interview.)77
devices and Wholes
The interconnections of art and science relate to Nabokov’s awareness 
of his creative and intellectual environment in the 1920s and 1930s. The 
school of literary criticism known as Formalism was expanding its influ-
ence and its range of concepts during the years of Nabokov’s artistic for-
mation. Developing a self-consciously scientific approach to artworks of 
all types, Formalism sought to identify universal principles and artistic 
units—devices, functions—that would allow full dissection and systematic 
study of a narrative or a painting. Some of the most famous of these early 
formalist works invoke explicitly scientific language, like Vladimir Propp’s 
Morphology of the Folktale. The mechanisms whereby literary works 
incorporate components of their precursors became objects of “scientific” 
literary study; they were cultural and psychological facts and principles, 
which could be applied toward a scientific understanding of how artworks 
fit into the flow of human culture, viewed objectively and mechanistically 
as a part of a naturally evolving behavioral system. Propp’s choice of the 
term “morphology” occasions some chance irony, because the term was 
invented by Goethe without any intent to explore mechanistic or even 
quantifiable aspects of nature.78
 Nabokov’s interest in formalist writings has been clearly demonstrated 
by others, as has the fact that he made use of their texts and ideas for his 
own purposes—(illustrating a principle that perhaps eluded the formalists’ 
view: the exploitation by art of criticism and theory itself).79 Considering 
his commitment to natural morphology (at both large and small scale), it is 
logical that Nabokov should find some congenial elements in this Formal-
ist method. After all, why shouldn’t an artwork of any sort be compared 
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to a living organism? Why shouldn’t it be made up of identifiable compo-
nents, systems, have a genealogy? We have already seen how Andrey Bely, 
who inspired some of the earliest methods of Formalism, devised a scheme 
for analyzing poems based upon their unfulfilled stresses. Nabokov discov-
ered in Bely’s analyses a tool for probing and studying secondary patterns 
in art and nature. Nabokov’s own discussions of other artworks explore 
details and structural principles of novels and stories; they also employ 
biological metaphors like “heartbeat.” But, echoing Bely, still more impor-
tant for Nabokov is the concept of the “missed heartbeat,” or the gap or 
quirk in visible nature, in life, or in literature. The artifice or “madeness” 
of literature (as in Boris Eikhenbaum’s classic “How Gogol’s ‘Overcoat’ Is 
Made”) is a constant theme for Nabokov, and it is in order to underscore 
these gaps and discontinuities, rather than to claim that “all is language,” 
that Nabokov repeatedly inserts traces of authorial craft throughout his 
fiction. A thing is “made” out of parts, components, rules. But there is one 
more component, both in the biological prototype and in the artwork: the 
whole, or life itself.
 Whether or not a novel or story is “made”—Nabokov also invoked 
the romantic notion that he merely transcribed, as accurately as possible, 
something that existed independently of his conscious creation80—such an 
artwork, like a living organism, comprises parts, systems, and rules. But to 
insist on the primacy of mechanistic relationships among these elements, 
without paying any attention to the life of the work, to its living coexis-
tence within an intellectual ecosystem made up of thinkers, artists, con-
sumers, and tradition is the same as supposing that a mounted butterfly 
and its scientific description represent all there is to know about it. Nabo-
kov insisted that a lepidopterist must spend many years in the field observ-
ing the actual life cycles and behaviors of a creature before having any 
hope of understanding it.81 What is that understanding, once achieved? 
How can such an experience be communicated? By definition, it can’t—it 
is so complex and multifaceted that it can only be lived, and it has no 
substitute. In short, one can collect and count as many facts as one likes, 
but without life the facts remain incomplete, barren, meaningless.82 It is 
the same for a novel or any work of art: it can be dissected and described, 
but its full essence can only be lived in actual aesthetic perception. One of 
Nabokov’s purposes in engaging the concepts and methods of Formalism 
surely was to demonstrate that a work of art is much more than the sum of 
its parts. This holistic attitude characterizes Nabokov’s thought about art 
and about nature as well: a species is not a static unity, but rather a mobile 
multiplicity. Formalism, like positivist science, draws attention to what can 
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be quantified and communicated neatly and accurately; but it downplays 
the things that can’t be tidily encapsulated. Like much positivist science, 
it enshrines a myth of certainty and of communicability that requires the 
erasure, the willful overlooking, of that which cannot be communicated or 
quantified. Nabokov, in contrast, constantly reminds his audience of the 
presence of the undetectable, the incommunicable, the unknown; and his 
works, like all art, cannot be condensed or explicated without sacrificing 
what is most essential in them. As a scholar, translator, and lecturer, too, 
Nabokov attempted to indicate the nature of the irreducible elements of 
an artwork, insisting upon the perceptual effort and struggle of each indi-
vidual who confronts a novel or story in its entirety.
 Science for Nabokov is always some form of approach to the world, 
“reality,” visible nature. As a fundamental human activity, one that 
expands our conscious awareness of our inner nature and our natural 
environment, science can be evoked whenever we attempt to confront the 
world in some new way. But science can also be inverted or perverted, inas-
much as it may set up faulty schemes, use flawed or broken devices, or lose 
sight of its own contingency. Those works of Nabokov’s that demonstrate 
the breakdown of rational powers may be related also to the problems 
that science has in establishing knowledge of the world. In either case, sci-
ence provides a tentative confirmation of the world’s shape as it is known 
at any one time. The coming chapters will explore how discoveries and 
insights from three scientific domains give shape to the themes and struc-
tures of Nabokov’s art.

naBokov Made surprisingly few comments about Goethe. He did pub-
lish a translation of the dedication to Faust for the centenary of Goethe’s 
death; and a decade later he mentioned the “streak of poshlust [‘philis-
tine vulgarity’] running through” the German poet’s masterpiece.1 Aside 
from that, a handful of allusions to Goethe’s work have been found in 
Nabokov’s prose, but not much else.2 However, as fellow artist-scientists, 
the two share a unique place in the parallel histories of literature and of 
science. Considering them together, we can begin to suggest characteristic 
traits for the artistic scientist. As I juxtapose these authors’ scientific work, 
I will focus on commonalities in their empirical approaches to data collec-
tion, in their thought about the subjective nature of observation, in their 
shared emphasis on facts over theory, and in their mutual interest in holis-
tic, dynamic studies.
 One of the goals in this book has been to demonstrate that Nabokov’s 
artistic and scientific aims were fundamentally related and, by corollary, 
mutually illuminating. In his scientific work, Nabokov strove to find accu-
rate ways to describe specific phenomena of nature, to establish a sense 
of their fluid development over time. In his literary art, he sought to offer 
varying models of the way human consciousness embraces and contributes 
nabokovian Science and Goethean Science
2
C h a P T e r  2

to its world, its “reality,” which is made up of specific empirical phenom-
ena, including numerous consciousnesses interacting with those phenom-
ena and with each other. Because Nabokov’s scientific practice stood apart 
from the mainstream of his time, and because of his suspicion of purely 
quantitative and statistical analysis, it is essential to characterize how his 
work relates to that of previous thinkers.
 The best, and perhaps the only, analogue to be found for Nabokov’s 
integration of scientific and literary work is Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. 
Goethe’s contribution to the sciences was surely broader than Nabokov’s: 
he lived the life Nabokov might have lived, had he not been forced into 
exile. But Goethe’s passion to know and understand the world of nature 
drove him to study it in exhaustive quantity and detail. He collected enor-
mous amounts of sample materials for his mineralogical, osteological, and 
botanical studies. He believed in and practiced a strict empiricism, based 
upon the accumulation of very large quantities of evidence. His theories—
of archetypes and metamorphosis, of color—were arrived at only after 
minute analysis of his samples. For his color theory, he “collected” an ency-
clopedic array of the possible manifestations of color as known to human 
perception, including physical or chemical colors as well as physiological 
and subjective-psychological colors. And Goethe’s theory of theories—that 
every fact, or empirical observation, is already theory-laden—resulted in 
his extreme caution concerning the place of major, abstract theories in the 
determination of research programs. It was a scientific method that Nabo-
kov would surely have found to be both rigorous and honest—even, per-
haps, inspirational.
 Although there is no clear evidence that Nabokov read Theory of Color, 
or Metamorphosis of Plants, or On Morphology, there can be little doubt 
that he read about these works and was aware of Goethe’s broad scientific 
activity. One need not suppose that Nabokov was influenced in any way 
by Goethe’s scientific methods or style: it is just as likely, and probably 
more revealing, that Nabokov’s scientific style was as much a part of him 
as his creative drive. Looking at these two artist-scientists side by side, 
we can begin to develop an idea of how an aesthetically and qualitatively 
oriented scientist may differ in outlook from a nonartistic, quantitatively 
focused one. Because of this innate kinship, a review of how historians and 
philosophers have come to understand Goethe’s approach to nature will 
offer a partial vocabulary for framing and describing Nabokov’s synthetic 
work. Goethe’s scientific output, although different in scope and ambition 
from Nabokov’s, provides an essential context for assessing the interrela-
tions of Nabokov’s scientific and artistic activities.
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 Artists, or at least some artists, ought to make for excellent scien-
tists: they have keen observational skills, an eye for detail and pattern, 
the drive to represent and preserve something from the world in durable 
form. An artist is a person who wants to, and does, express something by 
selectively using the full literal and figurative power of a language (verbal, 
musical, tactile, and/or visual). A scientist is someone who wants to dis-
cover a secret, some pattern or mechanism, hidden in nature. Artists may 
feel driven to discover things, too, but often they are seeking truths within 
themselves, or in a transcendent realm, and they tend to believe that the 
truths they seek cannot be expressed directly. The artist-scientist should 
be a person who has both urges: to learn nature’s secrets, and to express 
various discoveries or insights. In such a person, the scientific work will be 
colored by the holistic, aesthetic sensitivities of the artist, and the artwork 
will include traces of the scientist’s urge to collect, analyze, experiment, 
and synthesize. It might even be imagined that artist-scientists offer us the 
most complete ability to envision and describe nature, precisely because of 
this dual sensitivity and drive. Nevertheless, their work has been viewed 
with suspicion by the scientific community, in large part because of their 
willingness to challenge the basic assumptions that underpin mainstream 
research. The effort by an outsider to discredit Newton or Darwin can 
appear quixotic, raising doubts among those who do not question estab-
lished orthodoxy.
 Goethe presents a convincing parallel for Nabokov in part because 
both authors demonstrated a passionate affection for the phenomena of 
“reality,” especially as expressed in nature—even while exhibiting strong 
idealist tendencies that might seem to de-emphasize or discount the physi-
cal realm. It will be useful to summarize what is known about Goethe’s 
practice and philosophy of science, and by necessity I will rely almost 
exclusively upon existing scholarship to do this.3 A great deal has been 
written about Goethe’s science that is worth rehearsing here. Rather than 
interrupt at each opportunity to claim “Nabokov too!” I will for a time 
rely on the reader to keep in mind the specifics of Nabokov’s scientific 
methods discussed in chapter 1.
 From the outset, Goethe was an unorthodox scientist. He was not for-
mally trained in any branch of science; he was not an experimentalist, and 
his empirical approach was highly suspicious of theories and hypotheses 
as guiding forces behind discovery. Instead, he continued the tradition 
of extensive observation and collection of natural details, whether in the 
sphere of physical objects such as plants or that of psychological phenom-
ena like colors. Distinguished by its attention to form and to extensive, 
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cumulative observation, Goethe’s research relied on the perceptual power 
of human consciousness, rather than on the quantitative power of math-
ematics.4 His interest in form as a continuous and guiding feature of the 
natural world led him to create the term “morphology,” giving voice and 
unity to a diverse set of empirical interests across traditional scientific 
boundaries;5 it led him to focus on the discovery of the natural archetype, 
the Urphaenomen, or the commonality behind the formation and evolu-
tion of various species and other natural phenomena.
 Goethe did not hesitate to question received wisdom, or even to chal-
lenge the titans of science. In his Metamorphosis of Plants, he took on Karl 
Linné’s system of classification, suggesting improvements and modifica-
tions in the great taxonomist’s methodology; in his osteological studies, 
he overthrew the dominant view of human skull-structure and argued for 
the morphological kinship of humans, apes, and other vertebrates (thus 
providing strong evidence in favor of transformation of living forms, or 
evolution);6 in physics, he rejected Newton’s claims to have exhausted sci-
entific knowledge of color and severely criticized the scientist despite—and 
to some extent because of—his mythic stature.7
 Goethe has been credited with fostering a holistic approach to the 
study of nature.8 Accordingly, in an essay from the collection On Mor-
phology, he wrote: “[W]e often think the best way of gaining an insight 
into the relation between [natural objects’] inner nature and the effects 
they produce is to divide them into their constituent parts. . . . But these 
attempts at division also produce many adverse effects when carried to an 
extreme. . . . Thus scientific minds of every epoch have also exhibited an 
urge to understand living formations as such, to grasp their outward, vis-
ible, tangible parts in context, to see these parts as an indication of what 
lies within and thereby gain some understanding of the whole through an 
exercise of intuitive perception. It is no doubt unnecessary to describe in 
detail the close relationship between this scientific desire and our need for 
art and imitation.”9 This emphasis on the whole as a context that condi-
tions not just our perception, but the situational reality of the parts, gives 
Goethe’s science a quality that requires the kind of back-and-forth across 
levels of perception, or synthesis, that human consciousness can provide, 
but that instruments or mathematical formulae generally cannot. Similarly, 
Goethe was aware of the tendency of science to study and quantify objects 
as if they were static, whereas in fact they are always moving and chang-
ing. In his words,
[N]othing in [organic Gestalten] is permanent, nothing is at rest or 
defined—everything is in a flux of continual motion.
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If something has acquired a form it metamorphoses immediately to a new 
one. If we wish to arrive at some living perception of nature we ourselves 
must remain as quick and flexible as nature and follow the example she 
gives.
. . . the ever-changing life of nature . . . .10
Goethe thought of the human cognitive-perceptive ability as itself an organ 
and a refinable tool of scientific investigation—in fact, as the most sophis-
ticated tool available.11 By extension, one part of the power of cognition 
lies in the affinity between consciousness (or self) and any natural observed 
object: not only is human perception uniquely suited to discover certain 
kinds of pattern and regularity in nature, but it is so because it is immedi-
ately of nature. Subject and object are interrelated and even interpenetrat-
ing (they make and shape one another). The categories of reason are an 
expression of nature in consciousness; by means of them, the human mind 
grasps and understands the nature that produced it.
 This intimate relationship between subject and object forms the core 
of Goethe’s subtle philosophy of science. One of the dominant character-
istics of Goethe’s approach is his unflagging awareness that one cannot 
ignore or wish away the presence of consciousness as a defining constitu-
ent of any act of observation (a formulation that anticipated Ernst Mach’s 
assertion that one cannot imagine a completely isolated object, because 
the imagined observer violates the isolation),12 a position he lays out in 
the essay “The Experiment as Mediator between Object and Subject.” His 
main criticism of so-called “objective” science arises from what he calls 
its error, whereby the scientist “loses the yardstick which came to his aid 
when he looked at things from the human standpoint; i.e., in relation to 
himself.”13 The quest for “objective” knowledge—knowledge fully inde-
pendent of a subject’s perception—is fraught with dangers and also with 
fallacies, because the individual consciousness, with all its baggage, can 
never be fully suppressed and eliminated from the field, although it is easy 
to pretend that it has been. The effort to produce objective knowledge is 
valuable, but its limits are real and inescapable: the scientist “must be his 
own sharpest critic where no one else can test his work with ease, [ . . . ] 
he must question himself continually even when most enthusiastic—it is 
easy to see how harsh these demands are and how little hope there is of 
seeing them fully satisfied in ourselves or others.”14 It is for this reason 
that Goethe is often described as a phenomenological scientist, that is, one 
who saw every empirical observation as theory-laden, never losing sight of 
the fact that all observations are taking place in a context of phenomena 
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accessible to sensation and cognition as well as intellectual expectation and 
response.15 The best antidote to the pitfalls of objective science, Goethe 
suggests, is to be found in collaborative work and the complete sharing 
of all information, as early as possible: “no scientific edifice should be 
built until the plan and materials of its structure have been widely known, 
judged and sifted.”16
 As a result, Goethe’s preference for inductive science emerges from these 
very concerns, and a concomitant suspicion of theory guides his scientific 
endeavors. When theories arise from collections of data carefully amassed, 
they are valid, useful, and a “tribute to their author’s intelligence”; but 
these same theories often take on a life of their own, suppressing or twist-
ing the collection and observation of new data, as “with undue applause 
or protracted support they soon begin to hinder and harm the very prog-
ress of the human mind they had earlier assisted.”17 This, to Goethe, was 
the fate of Newton and his theory of colors expressed in Opticks: the great 
man had let a tacit theory regarding likely outcomes guide his research, and 
he selected only a few experiments that would confirm this theory, rather 
than striving to present an exhaustive account of how colors exist and 
function within the world and human consciousness.18 Although Goethe’s 
attack on Newton and his scientific method did not win him followers in 
the nineteenth century—the practical utility of Newton’s discovery was too 
powerful for Goethe’s critique to win many allies—it was recognized in the 
twentieth as a perspective that had certain value in establishing approaches 
to scientific knowledge not based exclusively upon reducing phenomena to 
quantifiable constituents.19
 The key to understanding nature, for Goethe, was the extensive accu-
mulation of detailed evidence: “We cannot exercise enough care, diligence, 
strictness, even pedantry, in collecting basic empirical evidence; here we 
labor for the world and the future. But these materials must . . . not [be] 
arranged in some hypothetical way or made to serve the dictates of some 
system.”20 Evidence (details) first, theories (generalizations) second, he con-
tinues: “once the sequential evidence of the higher sort is assembled, how-
ever, our intellect, imagination and wit can work upon it as they will.” He 
is confident in the ability of a large number of collected facts to outweigh 
the tendency of the human mind to “unite all external objects known to 
it,”21 but suspicious that theory-driven science is prone, even doomed to 
become despotic and misleading. This is what happened with Newton’s 
Opticks, he felt, producing over a century of slavish imitation and no legit-
imate extension or refinement of the original work.22
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 Goethe’s color theory was dismissed in its day, but a century later some 
scientists began to recognize the value of his approach along with the 
important distinctions to be made between the proper subjects of New-
ton’s and Goethe’s researches. For Newton was examining, specifically, 
properties of light—especially, its composition from different colors whose 
“refrangibility” varied, as proved by his prism experiments. Goethe, on 
the other hand, was focused on color itself in its various manifestations, 
including physical, chemical, and physiological.23 Goethe paid particular 
attention to the effect of context on color, such as the way the surround-
ing background may affect the perceived value of a color, or the changes 
of color when under shadow. Newton, of course, was aware of these phe-
nomena, but he made no effort to bring them into his system, which con-
cerned only the physical behaviors of light, particularly in its refractions 
when passing through glass lenses and prisms, rather than the multifari-
ous phenomena of color as experienced by humans. To Goethe, Newton’s 
choice represented a careless neglect of color in its fullness as phenomenon 
(or a group of phenomena), a willful refusal to explore all the facets of col-
or’s manifestation in nature—including human nature. Although Goethe 
was wrong about the value of Newton’s theory within its own sphere, he 
was right about its narrowness and its inability to account for much of 
what color actually does in everyday life. Today, Goethe’s work is valued 
especially for its insights into the physiology and psychology of color per-
ception.24
 Another aspect of Goethe’s career that hindered his scientific reputation 
was his intimacy with major proponents of German Natürphilosophie, the 
idealist philosophy of nature developed and espoused especially by his 
friends Schelling and Schiller. Contemporaries firmly associated Goethe 
with these metaphysically inclined colleagues who had, finally, no creden-
tials in empirical science. However, Robert J. Richards has argued that 
although Goethe was attracted, and at times committed, to some aspects 
of Schellingian idealism, he was in the end too much of an empiricist, 
intensely drawn to the reality of nature, to accept a fully mystical-idealist 
interpretation of the world.
 One of the most famous episodes in Goethe’s connections to Romantic 
nature philosophy occurred during his first extended conversation with 
Schiller, in which the latter, having heard Goethe’s theory of the archetypal 
plant or Urpflantz, retorted, “that is not an observation from experience. 
That is an idea.”25 At the time, Goethe regarded himself as a thorough-
going realist: he even felt that his intuited “symbolic plant” was part of 
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perceived reality. He was suspicious of the idealist philosophers’ outlook, 
and he was quite nearly offended by Schiller’s suggestion that his experi-
ences were not “real” after all. But the ensuing debate established a work-
ing détente between the two, as well as a close friendship that endured 
until Schiller’s death in 1805. The solution to the apparent contradiction 
in Goethe’s thought, Richards suggests, is to be found in Natürphiloso-
phie’s debt to Spinoza’s pantheism: “A Spinozistic monism, in which natu-
ral processes have a mental counterpart that can be recognized through 
careful experimental procedure and that can be captured at a higher level 
of cognition—these assumptions seem to lie behind Goethe’s methodologi-
cal pronouncements. ‘The simpler powers of nature,’ if thus resident in 
an external world, would remain inaccessible to a Kantian mind. Herein 
would lie the attractiveness of Schelling’s idealistic Spinozism, which took 
its departure from Kant, yet which spoke of a nature that did not lie irre-
vocably hidden in a noumenal world but was continuous with our very 
selves.”26 Thus through the inherent connection of mind and nature, the 
reality of archetypes is reasserted; physical, empirical objects—“nature”—
exist within and beyond mind in a way that surpasses the Kantian phe-
nomenon, because human beings have an immediate intimacy, even a unity 
with that world (the one “beyond mind”). Such a solution allowed Goethe 
to remain grounded in his love of physical nature while feeling that his 
“ideas,” or intuitions, were also part of nature’s own reality.
 Goethe’s understanding of nature as a changing, evolving domain is 
of obvious interest from the standpoint of Nabokov’s scientific outlook. 
We have seen above how Goethe views the archetypes of nature as a “flux 
of continual motion,” how “if something has acquired a form it meta-
morphoses immediately to a new one.” Nature is “ever-changing”: this 
epithet refers not only to dynamics of ecology and the lifecycle, but also to 
the fact that forms themselves evolve towards greater complexity and (as 
Goethe the good teleologist thought) perfection. Hence, “creatures gradu-
ally emerge in two opposite directions toward perfection, with the plant 
finally reaching glory in the tree, perduring and rigid, and the animal in 
human beings, the epitome of mobility and freedom.”27 Acknowledging 
adaptation of form to environment, Goethe mentions the seal, “where 
the exterior has grown quite fishlike even though the skeleton still retains 
all the features of a quadruped.”28 For Goethe, these transformations are 
driven by a vital force, guided and constrained by the archetype and the 
inherent relation of idea to empirical form and environment.
 The status of the archetype as empirically “real” brings Goethe and 
other idealists into conflict with Kant’s third Critique, since there the 
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teleological principle suggested by the archetype has hypothetical value 
as a regulative principle, but lacks actual valence in reality. As Richards 
summarizes: “The Kantian biologist, then, should only deploy arche-
typal notions heuristically, as if organisms had been the products of an 
ideal plan, while yet searching for proper mechanistic causes. Schelling 
and Goethe—and those biologists following their lead—countered that if 
archetypes proved a necessary methodological assumption for the biolo-
gist, then there was no reason—especially on Kantian grounds—to argue 
that nature was not intrinsically archetypal, that is, essentially organic 
rather than mechanistic.”29 As we shall see, both the archetypal conse-
quences of this stance and the anti-mechanistic ones resonate powerfully 
with some of Nabokov’s scientific formulations. The archetypal view of 
nature has not, with a few notable exceptions, found much support among 
modern scientists. Rather, science has focused on causality, on mechanism, 
and on the local interplay of physical or ecological forces. Goethe wanted 
to demonstrate the value of an approach that considers mechanistic sys-
tems as part of a larger whole that includes guiding archetypes. It was easy 
enough for scientists to dismiss this approach, because its results tend to 
be neither clean nor distinct: that is, they lack the black-and-white quality 
that post-Newtonian research has come to expect. The adoption by mod-
ern science of the Newtonian-Kantian mechanistic methodology has had 
its own set of serious consequences, which Goethe’s followers today are 
attempting to counterbalance.30
 Goethe’s conception of evolution would thus not be entirely mecha-
nistic, that is, driven exclusively by the cause-and-effect of environmental 
pressures. Life is change, and change occurs along various defined path-
ways in concert with the requirements of physical survival in an environ-
ment. Hence the seal’s—or, more dramatically, the dolphin’s—mutation 
into a fish-like form, while it still retains the archetypal skeleton and 
organs of a mammal, as Goethe discussed in “Toward a General Com-
parative Theory.” Aquatic life fosters the emergence of certain hydrody-
namic modifications in marine mammals, while the underlying structures 
continue to exhibit a family resemblance with land mammals, rather than 
(re)converging with fish. To put it another way: if a species is bound to 
change and metamorphose, following a law of nature, then it is problem-
atic to say that any particular stimulus has caused that change: it has sim-
ply directed the change that must inevitably occur. What looks like cause 
and effect on the local level looks like the details of an integrated process 
when seen from a broader, holistic perspective. Such a perspective does 
not deny the existence of causes and effects, but it does attempt to move 
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beyond a point of view that considers causality to be the only legitimate 
lens through which to study nature’s progress. We will see a very similar 
inclination in Nabokov’s scientific exploits.
 For Goethe, nature did not progress mechanistically (or, at least, not 
only mechanistically), but rather through its own inner, creative force. He 
thus embraced a view of nature as creative, with human consciousness 
both expressive of and participant in that creativity: “We ought to be wor-
thy, through the intuition of a continuously creative nature, of mental par-
ticipation in its productivity.”31 In the creativity of nature itself Goethe 
also found a source for the kinship of art and science, his two passions, so 
that intuition and imagination are not wholly alien to discovery of nature’s 
secrets but rather enhance them in the context of human consciousness 
and creativity.32 Such a view also implies that scientific and artistic activ-
ity are not radically distinct; rather, they reflect and respond to a com-
mon essence—an implication easily discerned in Goethe’s assertion that 
“there is an unknown, lawlike something in the object that corresponds 
to an unknown, lawlike something in the subject.”33 It also hints at a deep 
commonality between art and nature, helping to suggest a new meaning 
for the ambivalent phrase “art for art’s sake,” so often misinterpreted as 
a license for decadence or meaninglessness. Both art and science involve 
intuitive discovery of hidden truths. When differentiated from his idealist 
companions, Goethe offers an example of a thinker who sees nature and 
art as expressive of the highest truths, but who refuses to accept that those 
truths exist independently from the nature and art that embody them. An 
abstract, metaphysical “spirit” or platonic “ideal,” somehow superior to 
or independent of a subordinate nature, was as alien to Goethe as was 
Kant’s “noumenon,” for it appeared to devalue the significance of empiri-
cal reality and nature.
 This partial overview of Goethe as a prototype of the artist-scientist 
gives us a rich context within which to consider Nabokov’s own double-
edged career. Especially in view of the strong indications we have of Nabo-
kov’s idealist sympathies, the Goethean point of view provides special tools 
for interpreting some of Nabokov’s most elusive scientific and philosophi-
cal observations.
 We can see at the outset that Nabokov’s scientific work shares much in 
common with Goethe’s. In his speciation theory—never given explicit form, 
but suggested in his papers on lepidoptery and in the fictional “Father’s 
Butterflies”—we find an interest in the progress of nature and its inescap-
able motion: Nabokov saw nature as “in flux,” claiming that an overween-
ing attention to species as a static form is like conceiving a journey only in 
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terms of stopping points. Although interested in finding new species—as 
demonstrated in his poem, “A Discovery”34—Nabokov was always even 
more focused on the connection between any species and its relatives and 
subspecies. A polytypic genus, or even a group of genera, presents a broad 
picture of nature’s varied development, the profuse emergence and varia-
tion of many forms within a relatively small corner of the natural world. 
Following upon his “journey” metaphor, Nabokov tends to survey large 
groups of related species, thinking of the whole as a continuum in which 
various species and subspecies serve as snapshots of an organic, contin-
uous process. He also, somewhat illegitimately (but with self-conscious 
irony), pretends to view these contemporary creatures as if they present 
the image of a chronological evolutionary series. The point, however, is 
that he writes about groups of butterflies like the subfamily Plebejinae as 
if they were an organism in their own right, changing, mutating, evolving 
in ways sometimes predictable, sometimes surprising. In “Father’s Butter-
flies,” we witness how, in a fictional setting, Nabokov creates a theory that 
expresses the organic nature of life’s systemic developments by means of 
Godunov-Cherdyntsev’s “spherical” speciation theory. That theory, by the 
way, is not strictly locked away in the world of fiction, for we see traces of 
it in Nabokov’s own scientific writings, too.35 His “magic triangles” (see 
chapter 1) are akin to Goethe’s archetypes, governing the development of 
forms within a certain species or genus.
 Does philosophical idealism guide Nabokov’s science? Godunov-
Cherdyntsev, in “Father’s Butterflies,” asserts that a species is an “idea” 
reflected in the “mirror of nature.” This is, no doubt, an unabashedly ide-
alist claim. It is some of these hints, along with Nabokov’s public opposi-
tion to Darwin’s theory of natural selection, that have raised doubts among 
some scientists about Nabokov’s acumen and his commitment to empirical 
science.36 These passages are some of the most difficult to interpret in all of 
Nabokov’s fictional oeuvre, because of the philosophical weight the meta-
phors are forced to bear. In contrast, we do not find anything resembling 
idealist statements in the research papers themselves, a fact that demon-
strates Nabokov’s willingness to practice science within accepted Kantian 
boundaries. The Goethean perspective helps us to discover the common 
ground between these two poles in Nabokov’s thought.
 Nabokov’s attack upon Darwinian theory—upon classical natural 
selection—echoed Goethe’s attack on Newton in that he implicitly accused 
the theory’s proponents of overlooking or ignoring counterevidence. Nabo-
kov does hint at the inadequacy of a mechanistic model of evolution, such 
as Darwin proposed, when he states in one article that he is “not satisfied 
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with any of the hypotheses advanced in regard to the way it works.”37 
In this rather subdued critique, Nabokov merely refuses to endorse the 
Darwinian as well as any other theory of speciation: that is, he appears 
to be concerned that the theory had come to control and distort the per-
ception of data—that hypothesis, rather than empirical observation, was 
driving science. We saw in chapter 1 how he was repelled by the utilitarian 
whiff of the “struggle for survival” and expressed contempt for causality 
as the exclusive engine of natural history and life. There can be no doubt, 
however, that Nabokov accepted the basic premise that evolution allows 
and fosters the production of forms better suited to survival, as when he 
wrote that “the zebroid [wing] patterns, peculiar to certain groups in cer-
tain environments, suggest specialized protective adaptations rather than 
primitive designs.”38 His hoped-for proof against natural selection’s uni-
versality—nonutilitarian mimicry—can be viewed as a particular failed 
hypothesis about nature: that some case(s) of mimicry or object resem-
blance can be proved to confer no survival benefit to its owner. However, 
even without such a silver bullet, Nabokov’s apostasy was intellectually 
valid, for Darwinism was and is a hypothesis concerning how new spe-
cies develop from old ones when faced with varying environmental pres-
sures. The theory’s core concept, mutation, was a phenomenon without 
an explanation, and Darwin himself readily and frequently admitted that 
its cause was absolutely unknown. To Nabokov, Darwinism—especially in 
its Spencerian guise—left out the most important part of nature’s story by 
ignoring the entire question of origins, and by accepting discernible adap-
tations as a substitute for other missing knowledge about evolution. Like 
Goethe’s aversion to Newton, Nabokov’s rejection of Darwinism consti-
tuted a refusal to accept the universality and comprehensiveness of a partial 
theory. If natural selection is assumed to be “all-powerful,” as Weissman 
claimed it was, then it could be presumed to answer every conceivable 
question about life. Put another way, Weissman’s version suggested that 
henceforth living nature could only be questioned with the tools of natural 
selection.39
 We do know that Nabokov’s envisioned “Animal Mimicry” project 
would have presented the kind of data set that Goethe deemed essen-
tial to good science. It is striking how extensively Nabokov presents his 
morphological data concerning butterfly variation, whether relating to 
the structural components of genitalia or to wing markings. If one fol-
lows his argument, there is a suggestion that the wing patterns vary across 
subspecies and species in a way that seems governed by laws of predict-
able development, as by an archetype, even while it is not clear that any 
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of the variations upon a given theme has a survival advantage over oth-
ers.40 And his opinions concerning the morphology of butterfly genitalia 
are even more remarkable for their Goethean overtones. Nabokov dis-
tinguishes between the external features that are more likely to take on 
new forms when faced with a new environment, and the internal ones, 
like sexual organs (Goethe’s example had been skeletons), that are not 
directly confronted with environmental pressures. These hidden forms are 
much slower to change, and hence preserve the marks of specific kinship 
far longer than external features do. And even when external features and 
internal features vary distinctly, Nabokov, like Goethe, relishes most of all 
the family similarities between distinct organisms. Compare, for example, 
the following passages, in which both authors consider continuous resem-
blances between diverse groups of animals:
From Goethe:
What a gulf between the os intermaxillare of the turtle and the elephant, 
and yet an intermediate series of forms can be found to connect the two! 
What none would deny of the entire body could here be shown in a small 
part of it.41
From Nabokov:
Indeed a loss in thickness less than the difference between, say, southern 
and northern individuals of the Cascade Mts. forms of [Lycaeides] argy-
rognomon, together with a weakening of the hook, would be enough to 
change [Lycaeides] argyrognomon longinus (holotype) into [Lycaeides] 
melissa. As will be seen further, in the Jackson Lake region such intergra-
dation actually does occur, [ . . . ] At this point of its development argy-
rognomon does turn into melissa (from which, however, only 300 miles 
to the west, it is sharply separated in all characters). That it wavers here 
at the crossroads of evolution and may select another course, is proved 
by the ismenias-like genitalia of the paratypes.42
And:
A complete sequence of intergrades (more complete than I originally 
thought) exists between argyrognomon and scudderi in the palearc-
tic branch and between argyrognomon and subsolanus in the nearctic 
one . . .43
Nabokov sees the continuity of forms across closely related taxa as a mat-
ter of primary interest when considering nature’s development and its 
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constant movement through various states. This sustained attention to 
these dynamic, large-scale natural phenomena implies a belief that such 
metaphenomena are themselves expressive of certain realities hidden within 
nature. Such a viewpoint cannot be attained without the careful amassing 
of data and their comparative analysis, with an eye toward secondary pat-
terns to be found among “gaps” and “syncopatic jerks” encountered in 
the diversified species. From the standpoint of modern evolutionary the-
ory, considerations of this so-called “synthetic character of a species” and 
its emerging patterns would have given Nabokov a better platform than 
mimicry from which to view secrets of evolution that go beyond natural 
selection.
 Mimicry itself serves a dual function within Nabokov’s broader out-
look: first, as a conjectured proof that not all dramatic morphological 
changes take place due to a survival benefit; and second—and far less sci-
entifically—as evidence of an artistic principle embodied within nature 
itself. This essentially romantic view of nature is not surprising, but it is 
telling that Nabokov, an exhaustive empirical researcher, thought that he 
had discovered a way to prove nature’s extension beyond the law of cau-
sality. Nabokov is not the first serious post-Darwinian scientist to propose 
creative or artistic components of nature’s dynamic process. The physicist 
and philosopher Ernst Mach also felt that some investigative behaviors of 
chimpanzees reflected gratuitous curiosity, unrelated to the potential utility 
of the object of attention.44 Simeon L. Berg had summarized several puta-
tive examples of non-utilitarian mimicry in 1922.45 And Nabokov’s inter-
est in Henri Bergson’s vitalism is quite well-known.46 One could certainly 
counter that the continual emergence of new forms in nature does not need 
to be proved useless in order for it to have deep affinities with art (and 
nonutility is surely as hard to prove objectively as any other “negative fea-
ture” might be). At any rate, we see vividly expressed throughout The Gift 
and “Father’s Butterflies” the affinities between nature and art, including 
even natural anticipation of the materials of human painting, displayed 
on the wings of a moth, in the spot “resembling a dab of gilt redolent of 
turpentine, [which] must therefore be copied (and recopied!) in such a way 
that the painter’s work transmits, besides all the rest, a resemblance to the 
work of a painter!”47
 Consciousness itself is a part of nature as Nabokov and Goethe both 
understood so well, and its own creative acts are, likewise, part of the 
world’s natural development. Nabokov believed in the creativity of the 
individual artist, and in the necessity of allowing artists to produce their 
work unimpeded. At the same time, he recognized certain limitations on 
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creativity, which are most easily discerned in his statements about “tran-
scribing” his novels as if from a transcendent or ideal state. This second 
claim appears to be in direct conflict with the first, so it is worth pausing 
for a moment to sort them out. After all, what kind of creativity is it that 
merely transcribes an existing form? When we consider anticipations like 
the gilt wingspot or the alleged preexistence of consciousness in nature’s 
storehouse as described in “Father’s Butterflies,” it is tempting to con-
clude that, indeed, Nabokov was proposing a dualistic, platonic structure 
where the “real” reflects concepts from transcendent or noumenal reality. 
We should bear in mind, however, Fyodor’s warning that “these are only 
an approximate image.”48 A Goethean interpretation of this artistic credo 
might provide a more satisfying, and less contradictory, solution. Recall 
that Goethe, following Schelling and Schiller, felt that the subject and the 
object are fundamentally continuous, and that human consciousness is inti-
mately part of and unified with the development of nature—the world—
itself. That unity gave Goethe a sense of his own ability to perceive nature 
in both its superficial and its hidden (archetypal) essence, and allowed him 
to define his experience of hidden, “ideal” phenomena as immediate and 
direct. What the artist perceives and expresses cannot but be part of the 
world’s natural development: as Kant put it, “genius is the inborn mental 
trait through which nature gives the rule to art.”49 The imaginative indi-
vidual may have immediate access, through conscious or unconscious intu-
ition, to emergent phenomena or archetypes. What these intuitions reveal 
may be incomplete or unclear, and the artist communicates as distinctly 
as possible—“with the utmost accuracy and perception”50—that which 
emerges from the darkest recesses of inner consciousness for, as Goethe had 
written, “our mind stands in harmony with the deeper lying, simpler pow-
ers of nature and so can represent them in a pure way.”51 The problem for 
the individual with such intuitive powers is that whatever is so perceived, 
if it is in fact a new creation of nature, has never before been expressed in 
human language or art. Therefore, its appearance in art or science is likely 
to be both disturbingly unfamiliar and, for a time, incomprehensible. For 
this very reason, Nabokov asserts that authors create their readers.52 In his 
informal, non-scientific moments, Nabokov suggests that the patterns and 
compositions in nature and within a human life are indicative of some-
thing hidden or transcendent, “the underside of the weave,” “other climes 
of this world,” life’s “unusual lining,” “Person Unknown.”53 These tenta-
tive metaphysical gestures, “approximate images,” appearing mostly in 
artistic or autobiographical works (and in a few scientific texts as “Mother 
Nature” and perhaps also visible in the “synthetic character” of a species 
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explored in “Notes on the Morphology of the Genus Lycaeides”), give an 
unusual context for appreciating the form of Nabokov’s empirical science. 
They, like Fyodor’s musings in “Father’s Butterflies,” demonstrate the pos-
sibility of grounding an empirical, objective approach to phenomena in 
a noncausal, nonmaterial interpretation of nature’s sources. Idealist ten-
dencies do not preclude good science, but we see in Nabokov’s case as in 
Goethe’s how they may shape the contours of the scientist’s agenda. The 
discoverer’s task leans toward detecting and understanding nonmecha-
nistic phenomena that relate to larger, intuitable but perhaps unprovable 
essences.
 Nabokov’s approach to color also shares important affinities with 
Goethe’s. Although Nabokov never attempted to create a science of color, 
he was fascinated by color from childhood on. A painter’s sensitivity to 
shading, shadow, and hue accompanied his early thoughts of becoming 
a landscape painter. Goethe’s own effort to develop his theory of col-
ors emerged from his journey to Italy, which was originally undertaken 
in order to study the art of painting. It was precisely the artist’s intuitive 
grasp of color’s variability and complexity that led him to his experiments 
in the psychology of color. Nabokov the writer was acutely sensitive to the 
play of various shades in his works and the importance of distinguishing 
between closely related hues. We see this theme developed most explic-
itly in Pnin, where the adolescent Victor, an aspiring painter, has already 
learned to discern the shadow-colors of different objects.
 Nabokov comes close to exploring a partial science of color in study-
ing his own, and later his wife and son’s, “colored hearing”: in his nine-
teenth year, and again in his forty-seventh, he mapped out the precise color 
associations provoked by each sound and letter, distinguishing carefully 
in detailed charts between the sounds of English, French, and Russian 
phonetics.54 This special cognitive feature and family trait was a source 
of pride and fascination for him; evidence of blurring across perceptual 
categories, which he called “drafts and leakings,”55 intimated possibilities 
of still higher forms of perception, related to phenomena generally inacces-
sible to human sensibilities.56 The experience of such perceptual interpen-
etrations reinforced Nabokov’s sense of mind’s essential inscrutability.
 Taken broadly, Nabokov’s scientific endeavors conform to the 
Goethean conception of science. The same impulse can be seen in his unre-
alized dreams as a scientist. He envisioned, planned, and in some cases 
even substantially completed four encyclopedic works: a complete guide 
to the lepidoptera of Europe (largely complete, except photography); the 
same of North America (partially complete); mimicry in the animal king-
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dom (one article written and apparently lost); and butterflies in art (some 
materials collected). Each of these projects exhibits the same urge to collect 
a voluminous amount of data over a period of years, arrange it properly 
according to detailed analysis, correct errors in earlier publications by less 
attentive researchers, and thus create the possibility of surveying large sub-
divisions of nature with a comprehensive, synthetic eye. Such a resource 
would assist scientists in discerning those most Nabokovian phenomena, 
pattern and syncope (elision, absence).
 An exhaustive account of mimicry in nature, if it went according to his 
hypothesis, would have presented at least a few examples of possibly gra-
tuitous mimicry or object resemblance (as, say, when there are no preda-
tors found to hunt a particular quarry). It would also have illustrated how 
extensively and exuberantly nature likes to copy itself, and how the idea 
of detailed imitation and representation was already built into the natural 
world long before human beings created their version of art. As butterflies 
and moths embody for Nabokov nature’s artistic impulse, a compendium 
of lepidoptera in art would show the tradition of human beings appreciat-
ing the connection between their own activity and its natural origins. The 
possibility that such connections may have transcendent or idealist impli-
cations need not be dismissed just because it is not subject to scientific 
investigation—just as the butterflies and moths portrayed in human art are 
not rejected because they lack scientific accuracy. Such inaccuracies should 
be noted, but they do not disqualify a painted butterfly from the history of 
art, or from the history of human perceptions of nature.
 Whether Nabokov studied Goethe’s scientific works is impossible to 
determine. It would be convenient to rely upon the generally held opinion 
that Nabokov read everything, and thus was likely to have read everything 
by Goethe, too. But it is not really so important. We do know that he read 
and thought about Goethe in general, and to honor the centenary of the 
poet’s death in 1932 he even published a Russian translation of the dedica-
tion to Faust.57 The Russian émigré communities in Berlin and Paris were 
significantly involved in celebrations of Goethe’s art, and commemorative 
events were announced in the newspapers frequently throughout the year. 
Lectures on “Goethe and X” were ubiquitous: there was even a Russian 
presentation called “Goethe and the Law” in Berlin. Aside from his liter-
ary works, Goethe’s autobiography and his conversations with Eckermann 
were available in Russian (as well as English), and Nabokov certainly read 
them; both of these volumes include significant references to Goethe’s sci-
entific studies. The most important indication we have that Nabokov was 
reading widely in Goethe’s nonfiction writings is the title of his lecture 
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“Pushkin, or the Real and the Plausible,” delivered for the centenary of 
Alexander Pushkin’s death in 1937.58 This essay discusses the impossibility 
of creating a true biography of any historical figure—especially a poet—
and, more broadly, the very problem of truth in representation. Written in 
French as “Pouchkine, ou le Vrai et le Vraisemblable” [Pushkin, or the True 
and the Verisimilar], the title is certainly an evocation of Goethe’s essay 
“On the Truth and Verisimilitude of Art,” and it also echoes Goethe’s the-
oretical concerns about the nature of historiography and biography more 
generally.59 Despite Nabokov’s suggestion that Goethe’s Faust contained a 
significant vein of “poshlust,”60 he most likely saw Goethe the scientist as 
a kindred spirit, if he ever took the time to consider the matter. Nabokov 
was surely also intrigued by the art-science crossover made by the admired 
Russian lepidopterist Nikolai Kholodkovskii, who was the leading transla-
tor of Faust into Russian.
 It is ironic that one of the criticisms leveled by Nabokov’s detractors in 
the 1930s was his supposed un-Russianness, and especially an un-Russian 
indifference to nature.61 While planning to write a novel near the end of 
The Gift, Fyodor tells his mother that it will contain all the hallmarks of 
great Russian literature, including “descriptions of nature.” When nature 
appears in Nabokov’s works—in lepidoptera, orchids, the effects of light 
and color, or in other physical phenomena like rolling beads of water or 
undulating grass blades—it does so with the aid of the author’s precise 
attention, as part of a complex network of artistic and naturalistic com-
ponents. It is the interconnection of all of these levels, ranging from the 
natural to the psychological to the metaliterary, that most evokes Goethe’s 
vision of the oneness of nature. Such a sense of unity emerges as an explicit 
part of Nabokov’s aesthetics and even his philosophical outlook, in what 
he called “cosmic synchronization” and illustrated in the following oft-
quoted passage: “And the highest enjoyment of timelessness—in a land-
scape selected at random—is when I stand among rare butterflies and 
their food plants. This is ecstasy, and behind the ecstasy is something else, 
which is hard to explain. It is like a momentary vacuum into which rushes 
all that I love. A sense of oneness with sun and stone. A thrill of gratitude 
to whom it may concern—to the contrapuntal genius of human fate or 
to tender ghosts humoring a lucky mortal.”62 Nabokov here argues that 
both despite and because of science, simply being in nature, deeply known, 
offers access to mysteries “hard to explain”: intensely real, beloved, but 
not amenable to objective analysis.
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THe BioloGiCal FoundaTionS of Nabokov’s science contribute to 
many of his literary works’ themes, and even more significantly to their 
forms. “Biology,” as the broad rubric to be discussed in this chapter, 
includes the organic world of living nature. It comprises conceptual mat-
ters like evolutionary theory, and more specific concerns like the structure 
and habitat of a particular butterfly or flower. Nature’s apparent artistry 
and generosity are frequent visitors in Nabokov’s work; on the other hand, 
so also is the paradoxical force of (generally human) sexuality, which at 
times creates profoundly un-beautiful consequences. Implicit throughout 
Nabokov’s work is the tension between the practical utility of any physi-
cal or behavioral feature and the extent of its inutile capacity to produce 
idle pleasure or ecstasy. Among nature’s products are human conscious-
ness (which will be discussed more fully in the next chapter) and, through 
it, art. In his effort to discredit pure Darwinian theory, Nabokov draws 
explicit connections between artworks—objects not particularly beneficial 
to physical survival—and their origins in, and emergence from, nature. We 
notice this almost exaggerated attention on Nabokov’s part to the defini-
tion of his artworks: they “serve no moral purpose,”1 nor, we are encour-
aged to believe, any practical purpose either, like a “violin in a void.” 
utility and Futility
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The wondrous growth on nigabsi defies explanation: everything on this island 
appears enormous and alien. for instance, in the island’s interior, butterflies 
(species vanessa) were observed whose wingspan was established as being 
approximately 1m 75cm.
—“The Wondrous island nigabsi,” Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung, 1 april 1925, 
p. 445. Translation by daniel magilow. (See image, overleaf.)
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overleaf: Figure 
april fools’ image printed with a mock-scientific report from Polynesia origi-
nally in Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung, 1 april 1925 (445), which was included in the 
Soviet journal Krasnaia nov’ as real news, as reported in Rul’, June 21, 1925. The 
butterfly is identified as a 1.5-meter example of the Vanessa genus.
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Nabokov, echoing Pushkin, claimed to write for his own pleasure and to 
publish for the money.2 The existence of higher sorts of intellectual plea-
sure—aesthetic bliss—depends upon the possibility of escaping, if only 
briefly, from the struggle to survive. This question of “purpose” and its 
absence therefore grounds our understanding of Nabokov’s approach to 
living forms and evolutionary change.
 As we saw in the preceding chapters, Nabokov viewed living nature 
as a domain of boundless creativity. It is this creativity that animates his 
view of life in the broadest sense—and most likely his view of the physi-
cal realm generally. Creativity by definition requires freedom as well as 
constraint; and thus it implicitly contradicts mechanistic and determinis-
tic hypotheses. There is, in nature as in Nabokov’s works themselves, an 
enigmatic tussle between freedom and necessity (“the choice that mim-
ics chance”).3 Nabokov accepted evolution (as any scientist surely must), 
and he even accepted the mechanism of natural selection up to a point: 
his articles acknowledge the adaptive advantages of certain features pro-
duced by evolution, and so it cannot be said that he was blind to the play 
of cause and effect in complex systems. However, selection, as we saw in 
chapter 1, is by one definition a controlling factor, not a creative one, and 
like several other late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century scientists, 
Nabokov considered that the force impelling life to expansion and varia-
tion was fundamental, whereas the selective power of Darwin’s theory 
was secondary.4 Whether recalling Henri Bergson’s élan vital or some 
other impetus, nature’s continuous expansion and variation is to Nabo-
kov emblematic of the principle of innovation through the free develop-
ment of organic form.
 Consciousness plays an essential role in this story of evolution, both as 
its most exciting known result, and as a hypothetical background for its 
development. When The Gift’s Konstantin Godunov-Cherdyntsev argues 
that consciousness, “in the storehouse of the bestower,”5 preexists its 
manifestation in human form, he exposes himself to the charge of teleo-
logical thinking—the idea that nature is predestined to achieve an end in 
consciousness (in its human or some future guise); and also to the charge 
of creationism, as his claim suggests that nature arbitrarily delivers forms 
from the transcendent to the phenomenal realm. However, there is another 
way to interpret Godunov-Cherdyntsev’s image, more in accord with 
Nabokov’s scientific outlook and his idealist leanings: consciousness may 
be seen as a mode or principle of being (like an ultimate substance, say, or 
like the laws of physics), which manifests itself in the forms that emerge 
within its progress, but not predefining all possible phenomena that can be 
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generated out of it. It thus would be part of the stuff of nature, constantly 
appearing, not the goal as such.
 There is a semblance of inconsistency in Nabokov’s approach to these 
concepts, but careful consideration reveals a self-consistent set of princi-
ples. It is not immediately clear, for example, how a nature that produces 
its forms with the “aim” of amusing human beings can be said to be free 
(here freedom from mechanism becomes enslavement to the telos of con-
scious amusement). In Speak, Memory (but notably not in his scientific 
articles), Nabokov emphasizes the “nonutilitarian delights” of nature, 
suggesting its innate freedom, although one might note that nonutility 
and freedom are not necessarily synonymous. Godunov-Cherdyntsev, in 
“Father’s Butterflies,” proposes a designing “Nature” that creates—not by 
a plan but freely—the overall patterns of life’s flow (even if this is “but an 
approximate image,” and “allegorical”).6 Within this model, it is not the 
constituents of nature that are necessarily free, but rather the animating 
drive behind them.7 Time and causality themselves come into question, as 
sequence defers to form and structure (as in the back-and-forth structure 
of Pale Fire’s numerous cross-references). Events may relate to one another 
in identifiable ways, but causal chains can also conceal other construc-
tive or creative principles at work behind nature’s surface. If consciousness 
confers a kind of freedom upon its possessors, that freedom might not 
relate to everyday interactions with the physical world in its concrete form. 
If nature is free (i.e., not fully mechanistic or predetermined) in some hard-
to-detect way, then phenomena within nature, including the phenomenon 
of evolution, can exist in ways not fully explained by efficient cause.8 On 
the other hand, artworks, as free products of the mind, represent nature’s 
freedom within the bounds of what is knowable by human consciousness. 
Such is Nabokov’s philosophy of nature and art, and these principles shine 
through all of his works. Thus we find in his art many images taken from 
organic nature (usually as emblems of nature’s free creativity, with a hint 
of its consciousness-like undercurrent), and the fiction itself is structured 
by analogy to this outlook.9
 Biology is concerned with the growth, reproduction and interrelations 
of living organisms as well as with the evolution of life forms on the planet. 
The novels that most extensively and explicitly broach biological themes 
are The Gift and Ada, but these topics appear insistently throughout Nabo-
kov’s works, and not only in the form of butterflies and moths. Once we 
take into account Nabokov’s passionate interest in questions about life’s 
ultimate essence (and especially the question of its possible roots in free 
creativity or in mechanism), we begin to see biological concerns hidden 
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in unexpected contexts. (As early as The Eye [1930], Nabokov alerts his 
readers to his, and his narrator’s, zoological training in a discussion of 
Linnaeus and problems of species and subspecies classification.)10 The cor-
ollary to his conviction about nature’s creativity is his belief in, and sus-
tained attempt to demonstrate, the inadequacy of natural selection as the 
causal agent behind all evolution. Among scientists, efforts to supplant 
Darwinian theory came from multiple directions, including purely mecha-
nistic explanations of species variation over time (as, for example, ortho-
genesis, the law-governed development of form), and, of course, renewed 
Lamarckism (the heritability of traits acquired during life). But Nabokov’s 
concerns were precisely not with any mechanistic components of nature: 
he believed, rather, that nature conceals within itself gaps, fissures, rents 
and flaws in reality’s tapestry, a metaphor that Nabokov probably bor-
rowed, with polemical intent, from Alexander Herzen’s My Past and 
Thoughts. Donna Tussing Orwin has shown the importance of this meta-
phor in Tolstoy’s reflections on the relationship between Darwinian biol-
ogy and history. Tolstoy had written to Herzen objecting to his “carpet” 
image, in which individual selves are both “woof and weaver” in the con-
text of a free-floating history where “there is no master, there is no design, 
there is only the warp (foundation) and we all alone by ourselves.”11 In 
his redeployment of this figure, Nabokov takes what had been for Herzen 
an image of mechanical construction, pattern-making, system, and organ-
ization, and instead focuses on another side of metaphor’s realistic poten-
tial: gaps in interspaces, flaws, foldability and surprising, super-imposable 
patterns, and the existence of an “underside of the weave” or “lining” 
of life.12 Nabokov subverts Herzen’s metaphor by foregrounding the fine 
structure and discontinuity of textile. The irregularities found there offer 
another figure for the limitations of materialist analogies.
 The essential first move in Nabokov’s gambit is to take on the con-
cept of utility, in nature and also in human life, which he recognizes as a 
development of nature. Against the Darwinian postulate that randomly 
acquired features are retained by nature if they serve some purpose ben-
efiting individual and hence specific survival, Nabokov argues that nature 
creates novel features not randomly but freely, and that some features can 
persist despite their uselessness. In the 1930s he would have argued that 
certain extravagant designs in nature demonstrate this principle; even to 
the end of his life, he held that consciousness represents the prime exam-
ple. At the same time, it is important to remember that as someone who, 
at the least, considered idealism a plausible metaphysical stance, Nabo-
kov apparently felt that consciousness might offer access to states of being 
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that are removed from the vicissitudes of physical existence. Consequently, 
physical survival is not a priori the most desirable outcome, as he illus-
trates in The Defense, Invitation to a Beheading, Bend Sinister, and Glory, 
to give only the most vivid examples.13
 The short 1931 novel Glory (in Russian called “Podvig”—a high deed 
or exploit) begs for such a discussion, inasmuch as its protagonist’s main 
foil is named Darwin.14 This Darwin, not a biologist but a war veteran and 
a writer of short stories, embodies practicality (especially the stereotypi-
cally English variety), strength, sensibility, virility, wit, attractiveness—all 
the features that suggest fitness for survival and the successful rearing of 
progeny. In his Cambridge years, however, Darwin’s fiction and his actions 
are iconoclastic and pointedly nonutilitarian. Yet survive he does, having 
settled by novel’s end into the comfortable life of an established journalist 
who speaks of “success, of earnings, of splendid hopes for the future” and 
is “particularly interested in the sepulchral-sounding ‘moratoria,’ what-
ever they were.”15 Darwin is winning his struggle, but this type of victory 
is meant to strike the reader as hollow. It is Martin Edelweiss, the sensi-
tive, intelligent, but aimless and ungifted Russian émigré, who animates 
the novel’s creative core. He does not really provide much of a plot or 
energize the narrative. The novel is perhaps Nabokov’s most understated, 
and in a Chekhovian way it reflects the undramatic, even anticlimactic 
nature of Martin’s life, while at the same time surrounding his existence 
with an enchanting texture of natural environment, emotion, and richly 
lived imagination.
 Aleksandr Dolinin and Grigorii Utgof note the thematic significance 
of the novel’s juxtaposition of the “weak” character Martin with the 
“strong” character Darwin, suggesting that natural selection is refuted by 
the fact that Martin undergoes greater spiritual growth during the novel.16 
In fact, the novel’s anti-Darwinian currents run much deeper than that, 
although indeed the tension between the two protagonists creates a focal 
point for Nabokov’s struggle with “struggle.” Curiously, in the transla-
tion’s foreword Nabokov describes Glory as his only novel written with 
a “purpose.”17 That purpose was contrarian: describing a time of great 
purpose, of passionate struggle for political and economic survival, Nabo-
kov chose to emphasize the opposite principles: idleness and uselessness. In 
the heat of the Russian civil war, while many Russian acquaintances enlist 
and fight to regain their homeland, Martin dreams and fantasizes, chases 
romance, and studies Russian literature. As a student at Cambridge, he 
does not even attempt to find a career for himself.
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 Given this lack of practical drive, it is intriguing that Martin is espe-
cially drawn to competition: he is skilled in tennis, soccer, and boxing. He 
particularly likes to be overmatched, even if it means near-certain defeat, 
because the goal of winning is not a trophy, but a feeling (and preferably 
also an unlikely, Herculean achievement). In a telling exception, during the 
University soccer championship Martin hopes his game-winning saves at 
goal will impress the elusive Sonia, perhaps winning her heart; but Sonia 
is indifferent and bored by the whole affair, leaving the game early.18 Simi-
larly, when Martin and Darwin engage in a boxing match, in part spurred 
by competition over Sonia, the fight leads not to some prize for the vic-
tor—the maiden’s hand, which neither of them achieves—but to a renewed 
sense of camaraderie, as if the competition’s sole purpose were to elimi-
nate its own putative goal. The bloody fight has a sublime quality to it, as 
well as a cathartic one, but even this most explicitly biological duel over a 
desired mate winds up having an entirely unpredicted and unproductive 
result. Senseless, the match is its own reward.
 The consequences of active striving come into full relief in Martin’s 
reflections upon the death of Iogolevich, a Social-Revolutionary activist 
who had snuck across the Soviet border several times on mysterious anti-
Bolshevik missions. Having read the obituaries, Martin is struck by the 
way his world of anti-Bolshevik struggle has reduced the man (and oth-
ers like him) to a public cliché, a “true toiler” who “burned with love for 
Russia”; these words “somehow debased the deceased” in their universal 
applicability. Martin thinks of Iogolevich’s idiosyncrasies, “his gestures, 
his beard, his sculpturesque wrinkles, the sudden shy smile, the jacket 
button that hung by a thread, and his way of licking a stamp with his 
entire tongue before sticking it on the envelope and banging it with his 
fist. In a certain sense this was all of greater value than the social merits 
for which there existed such easy little clichés . . . .”19 The ability to notice 
and appreciate such minutiae, like the minutiae themselves, lacks any par-
ticular utility, and yet for Martin the details and their perception are of 
“greater value” than patriotic valor. What Martin calls Iogolevich’s “origi-
nality” (svoeobrazie)20 represents one of life’s greatest treasures, and one 
that, as the obituaries demonstrate, is too quickly neglected even by Rus-
sian Liberals. The emergence of such values, and what they imply, dem-
onstrates for Nabokov that not all aspects of life are utilitarian. Martin, 
whom Nabokov calls a martyr in his foreword, proves his own freedom 
from life’s struggle by perishing for the idea of uselessness. True, he will 
leave no progeny, his bloodline is ended; but Nabokov wants his readers 
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to consider the aesthetic, fantastical structure of Martin’s life, akin to 
something Nabokov found in nature, as a beguiling tale of a life lived for 
its own end, with its own mysteries. Such considerations fill Darwin’s final 
moments in the novel as he pauses on the forest trail.
 Martin spends his entire life trying, as it were, to enter the picture over 
his childhood bed and explore its mysterious forest path, much as Kon-
stantin Godunov-Cherdyntsev in The Gift enters the base of a rainbow. 
He yearns to perform some high deed of great risk and no purpose—a 
romantic exploit—and for this reason Nabokov’s working title for the 
novel was “The Romantic Age” (Romanticheskii vek). Martin’s chosen 
act—a choice reinforced for him by certain mysterious, fateful signs—is 
afterwards decried by his friends and acquaintances as pointless and even 
absurd (not to mention suicidal): to cross from Latvia into Soviet Rus-
sia, spend the night, and return across the border. Martin has no ulterior 
motive, and the glorious, gratuitous danger of the proposed feat consti-
tutes its only rationale. Martin tells no one of his plans except, just prior 
to his departure, Darwin himself, whom he meets almost by chance in Ber-
lin while preparing to set out.21 By this point, almost three years after their 
time together at Cambridge, Darwin has become even more stolid and 
evolutionarily secure (secure from both danger and imagination: he has 
given up writing fiction). Why does Martin confide precisely in Darwin, 
and not in, say, Sonia or some chance acquaintance—or in no one? The 
purpose, from a narrative point of view, is to put the Darwinian notion of 
fitness in direct contrast with the dramatic demonstration of futility and its 
consequences. Darwin, the character, is forced to confront the entire com-
plexity of Martin’s design and its implications. Martin surely perishes at 
the hands of the Soviet border patrol while wending his way through some 
forest path like the one above his childhood bed; and Darwin winds up on 
another wooded trail, attending closely to sounds of surrounding nature 
(gurgling water, a bird). Martin’s image merges with the natural scene and 
environs of his youthful imagination; Darwin, the survivor, quietly reflects 
upon—what? We do not know, but we are convinced that something in his 
consciousness is moved, has taken on a new form.
 It may be, as Charles Nicol has suggested,22 that the result (but not 
the purpose) of Martin’s exploit is a reawakening of artistic sensibility in 
Darwin. That almost sounds like a causal explanation, which would be 
problematic in light of the contention that Nabokov’s goal in this novel is 
to demonstrate a noncausal principle in nature and life. (This noncausal-
ity is underscored as well by the patternings in Martin’s life, and by the 
fact that his dreams tend to come true.23 These events seem supernatural, 
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if they are not simply amazing coincidences; they suggest a principle of 
composition in life that stands outside cause and effect: they are subtle 
flaws in the surface texture of life.) Part of the response to that dilemma 
lies in unpredictability: Martin does not know that his deed will eventuate 
in Darwin’s change. But it is not just Martin’s deed that acts on Darwin; 
it is also the particulars of the setting where the car slides into the ditch 
and Darwin faces, unknowingly, a scene much like the one hanging over 
Martin’s bed and also much like a passage in Pushkin’s Ruslan and Lud-
mila. And within that scene, what is it that affects Darwin? Is it the water? 
The wicket? The gray snow? Perhaps, indeed, nothing decisive has hap-
pened within Darwin’s mind—we are given no strong sign that it has—but 
rather he has been opened, like the wicket, to new courses of action, to 
possible creative responses that may or may not take shape. Nicol shows 
how “Darwin has now both entered Pushkin’s universe and taken the path 
that Martin had been on since he was a child.” Martin’s dreams and fan-
tasies are fulfilled; he fades away into fantastic imagination. Darwin is 
left behind to contemplate the meaning of life and death, the struggle for 
existence or for glory, while readers (who know much more than Darwin 
does) are left to ponder the beauty of uselessness and the meaning of a life 
sacrificed for nothing. The deceptive first impression left by Glory is of 
the simplest and least overdetermined of all Nabokov’s works;24 its facile 
surface conceals a depth that makes it perhaps Nabokov’s most haunting 
novel.
Sexual Selection and the Survival of Species
One may struggle to survive or one may seek glory, but in order to par-
ticipate in evolution any animal needs to mate. Outside Russian émigré 
circles, Nabokov became famous because of the troubling role of sexual 
desire in his third novel in English. Lolita is primarily devoted to the psy-
chological profile of its pathological narrator and the harm he does to his 
victim. The novel is less about sex than it is about abuse and enslavement, 
and also about the psychological condition of solipsism—to name only 
the most prominent of its themes.25 However, the sexual component is 
real, and it forms the basis for Humbert’s obsessive passion and his ability 
to destroy, almost blindly, the life of another human being. Viewed from 
the perspective of biology and evolution, Humbert’s sexuality takes on an 
additional nuance: it is directed at a girl who is, according to his precise 
definition of nymphet, not yet capable of conceiving a child.26 Hence, like 
C h a P T e r  3
0
homosexuality, it cannot be viewed as a reproductive sex drive. It is a 
beguiling choice on Nabokov’s part: he had been toying for two decades 
with the idea of the child-bride, borrowed from Dostoyevsky, Poe, and 
Dante and deployed as early as Camera Obscura in 1932 (and reappearing 
in Invitation to a Beheading, The Gift, The Enchanter, Bend Sinister, and 
Transparent Things). There are a number of ways that one can read this 
pedophilic passion symbolically, most of which are encoded and mocked 
within the novel itself. The emblematic case appears in the “return to child-
hood” theme implied by the “Annabel Lee” narrative at the novel’s begin-
ning. There is, however, something far too comfortable and convenient 
about the Annabel story and its conventional Freudian causality. It has the 
feeling of a handy alibi, but not much more. Humbert’s sexual peculiar-
ity stands independently from the Annabel episode; it is, as far as we can 
tell, a distinct part of him, one that may be innate in him just as “normal” 
sexuality is innate in someone else. By all indications this is what Humbert 
is, and at least as far as his passions are concerned he cannot be any other 
way (but he can, and in moments of strength sometimes does, find ways 
to redirect his deviance). His arguments about the acceptability of very 
young brides in some cultures are quite beside the point: these nymphets 
will always grow up, but Humbert will remain besotted by their departed, 
youthful, infertile form and its repetitions all around him.27
 Thus, on a certain level Humbert’s proclivity represents a nonproduc-
tive mutation, a diversion of sexual energy, fated always to be directed 
toward infertile objects. It is a Darwinian dead-end, rather than a causally 
evoked Freudian short-circuit of the sexual mechanism. And yet, Hum-
bert is more than his sexuality, and this seems to be especially true at the 
time that he composes his “confession.” He is, at the very least, a display 
piece: he puts himself on display, if not with complete honesty or even 
self-knowledge, at least with a degree of sincerity and a demonstration of 
certain sensitivities and weaknesses. If we believe at the end of the novel 
that Humbert’s narrative contains something valuable, that he has, even 
in his rather smug and self-serving, obfuscating way, communicated some-
thing vital about Dolly and his exploitation of her, and presented us with 
an artistic image—perhaps even unwittingly—of the ugly reality of certain 
habits or traits of consciousness, then he has transcended his criminality, 
his defect, and his biological uselessness. If the novel’s tragedy contains 
an element of truth, and if Humbert’s perception of it contributes both 
to the novel’s own truth and to its tragedy, then his artistic existence is 
validated in a way that his biological existence never can be, at least in 
Darwinian terms. This is likely why Nabokov grants him a “green lane in 
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paradise” and yearly furlough from eternal punishment, while “hell shall 
never parole” his precursor Hermann Karlovich Hermann from Despair.28 
Humbert, for all his crimes, exhibits through his narrative some necessary 
traits of humanity and even an embryonic indication of the ability to love. 
Despair’s Hermann, in contrast, subordinates everyone around him to his 
own solipsistic, self-aggrandizing fantasy. In his mind, he is the only pos-
sible love object.29
 When Nabokov centralizes sexuality in a novel, he tends to choose a 
variation on the typical reproductive urge and presents a version of human 
carnal passion that excludes even the possibility of offspring. In this way, 
the physiological sex drive is explicitly torn away from the survival of the 
species. Despite his open aversion to homosexuality, Nabokov must have 
become aware of the fact that it represents a phenomenon inexplicable in 
Darwinian terms. Although it passes fleetingly across the façades of several 
works (perhaps due to the existence of at least two homosexuals within 
his close family), homosexuality does not make a central appearance until 
Pale Fire.30 Kinbote’s sexuality is famously exaggerated, but what is espe-
cially interesting in the novel’s formulation is its variegated play with con-
cepts of fertility, fertilization, conception, and birth, as figured against a 
background of John Shade’s life at Wordsmith College, on the one hand, 
and of the frolicsome, sterile escapades of “Charles Xavier Kinbote” on 
the other.
 The sexual drive has a special place in Darwinian theory as the force 
that propagates and preserves many species.31 Building upon this funda-
mental biological fact, Freud and his followers explained various sexual 
“perversions” as mechanistic consequences of various childhood proto-
sexual mishaps or Oedipal malfunctions—explanations that Nabokov 
largely rejected.32 In fact, it may have been more congenial for Nabokov 
to view nonprocreative sexual urges as innate, rather than as causally and 
psychologically motivated. The unbridled sexuality in Kinbote’s life, with 
no clear aim besides carnal pleasure, puts into distinct relief the human 
idolization of sensuality, of sexual desire, in complete isolation from any 
reproductive motives.33 That something so central as the sexual urge can 
be fully detached from the service of procreation and evolution must have 
struck the zoologist Nabokov—expert in butterfly genitalia!—with par-
ticular force.34 His creative response to this enigma is intriguing: rather 
than demonstrate the evolutionary futility of such a variation, he uses the 
occasion to model the transition from nature to consciousness when “sud-
denly our eyes open wide,” as outlined by Godunov-Cherdyntsev in his 
“Supplement” (in “Father’s Butterflies,” discussed in chapter 1).35
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 Kinbote displays, even flaunts his sexuality in his tales of his lost king-
dom of Zembla. We can have no idea to what extent his fantasy corre-
sponds to any possible reality; we cannot know whether the Zemblan 
homosexual escapades and his unconsummated marriage to Queen Disa 
have any basis in the character’s “real” biography, as opposed to in his fan-
tasies. As far as we can tell, Kinbote does have an active, albeit frustrating, 
homosexual sex life during his stay at judge Goldsworth’s house. Accept-
ing his homosexuality as diegetically “real,” along with his casual acquain-
tance with his poet-neighbor John Shade, we witness a very strange tale in 
which sex and sexuality play a confounding role. Kinbote’s creation—the 
story of Zembla and King Charles’ flight from it—is in many ways a tour 
de force. Ignoring for the moment the complex relationship between his 
story as it develops in the commentary and Shade’s poem “Pale Fire,” we 
can appreciate the drama, the humor, the suspense, and the pathos of Kin-
bote’s narrative. Yet, standing on its own, it hardly has the makings of a 
great novel or long modern poem. The tale is not truly autobiographical 
(since Charles Xavier does not exist as such in the novel’s outer reality), 
but it does create what Shade calls “a brilliant invention” that takes the 
place of Kinbote-Botkin’s “drab and unhappy past.”36
 Kinbote relates the life story of Charles Xavier, which reaches its first 
major complication when the young prince becomes king and is expected 
to wed and produce an heir. Charles is sexually repelled by women, and 
despite his wife Disa’s beauty and some conscientious effort on his part, 
he is unable to perform his biological role in extending his dynasty. Brian 
Boyd has connected Disa’s name with the orchid Disa uniflora, which is the 
“flower-of-the-gods” orchid King Charles brings when he visits her in the 
Riviera. As Dieter Zimmer has revealed, the genus Disa comprises mostly 
orchids that are visited only rarely by the necessary fertilizing insect, and 
thus many members of each new generation die without producing off-
spring.37 Hence Disa’s barrenness is situated within a biological subtext, 
which in its own way reinforces the theme of evolution gone awry: what 
survival purpose could possibly be served by a failure to attract fertiliza-
tion, hence procreation?38 Her situation is all the more puzzling, as her 
beauty and, as far as we know, fertility (further enhanced by her social 
advantages) should assure her the chance to pass her genes to future gen-
erations. Clearly, something has derailed the normal functions of individu-
als within the evolutionary machine. The alpha male has abdicated his 
Darwinian throne.39
 Shade’s daughter Hazel is also doomed to de-facto infertility, but for 
different reasons: it is her external appearance that makes her unlikely to 
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find a mate. She is, however, intellectually superior, creating a Darwinian 
paradox (should not higher intelligence enable her to overcome her super-
ficial obstacle? If the intelligence of homo sapiens is a selected adaptation, 
should not intelligence itself be a trait that increases survival and repro-
ductive likelihood?). Moreover, aside from her mundane burdens, she is 
privy to otherworldly communications from her Aunt Maude and seems 
also to stir up a poltergeist in the house. Such a combination offers yet 
another evolutionary quandary: if advanced abilities (mental and maybe 
even psychic) coincide with a weakening of fertility, what evolutionary 
goal is served? Certainly none, from a Darwinian perspective. The stan-
dard adaptationist reply would be that these psychic mutations, if real, 
are random and are just as likely to occur in a physically attractive pack-
age as in an unattractive one. However, this reply discounts the value of 
such individuals as ends in themselves,40 while justifiably dismissing the 
unverifiable hypothesis that consciousness might present a special phase of 
evolution, some sort of bridge to unknown states of being. However, such 
dismissal leaves important—to Nabokov, at least—questions unexplored. 
What takes place in the minds of individuals with “enhanced” conscious-
ness may have some bearing on aspects of reality that are not commonly 
perceived. In a vision of the world that scoffs at causality and the struggle 
for survival, such gifted individuals make special contributions to human 
life aside from the procreative. These may be artistic, scientific, or spiri-
tual, Nabokov suggests. It is precisely such contributions that he high-
lights as markers of where life, through consciousness, might be heading 
next.
 Pale Fire, after all, sprouts from infertility, from biological dead ends.41 
For even John Shade and his wife Sybil, although happily married and 
fertile themselves, do not manage to project their lineage into the future. 
Their gifted daughter sinks into the lake through melting ice and, like 
Ophelia, meets her end. According to Boyd’s analysis, however, Hazel’s 
influence on the world of Pale Fire does not end with her physical life. 
And we need not take a purely occult standpoint concerning her influence 
over Kinbote during his Zemblan storytelling. Even without such ghostly 
interpretations, Hazel haunts Shade’s poem as well as Kinbote’s version of 
Shade’s recent life. If, as Kinbote suggests, he has a strange kinship with 
Hazel (whom he has never met), that link may itself be enough to justify 
the various invocations of her that we find in the Zemblan narrative. And 
yet, this convergence of John Shade, Hazel, and Kinbote is credited with 
producing something like Pale Fire, a novel of great complexity and many 
intertwined strands of meaning. Where this artistic product might lead its 
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readers in consciousness is a question that trumps the concerns of heredity 
and biological fitness. It leads, Nabokov suggests, to Zembla (the last item 
in the index), to all the riches of imagination and art.
intelligence, Creativity, and the limits of evolution
If there were any doubt that Nabokov’s oeuvre traces the biological theme 
through its creative permutations, Ada should lay them to rest. Written 
just after Pale Fire, in a sequence interrupted only by Pnin, Ada presents 
the culmination of Nabokov’s erotically oriented art. It also brings to a 
dramatic conclusion his play with counter-evolutionary sexuality. Hav-
ing already examined pedophilia and homosexuality, Nabokov combines 
incest with physiological sterility in his most ardor-laden novel. Van and 
Ada, whose mutual passion is born when he is fourteen and she twelve, 
learn early on that they are biological siblings (even though in law they 
are cousins). Once an adult, Van learns to his delight that he is perfectly 
sterile. This situation resolves the obvious problem of contraception, and 
the slightly less obvious one of the genetic consequences associated with 
incestuous procreation. What are we to make of this baroque tangle of 
evolutionary missteps, in which infertility becomes a good thing because 
it prevents mutant offspring? There is yet another twist: not only are Van 
and Ada both passionately, eternally enamored with their sibling (some-
thing that evolution should select against, of course); they are also both at 
the far extreme of human intelligence (if such distinctions are important, 
they are probably even more highly developed than Hazel in Pale Fire).
 In this structure, Nabokov is working along several different tracks 
at once. Ada (unlike her brother) is an amateur lepidopterist, and also a 
student of plant biology, especially in the very diverse species of orchids. 
These flowering plants fit into Nabokov’s biological narrative in several 
ways: through various ornate mechanisms (including mimicry of insects), 
they lure creatures to pollinate them and facilitate procreation—and in this 
regard they seem to embody the survival principle in nature. The varieties 
of orchid are extremely numerous, demonstrating the success and creativ-
ity of this particular natural lineage.42 And they are very frequently phallic 
(rather, both phallic and testicular): the flowers, themselves often resem-
bling the testicular sack, often grow on a thick shaft. The name orchid 
comes from the Greek orchis, testicle, revealing their ancient totemic 
associations. Their pollination strategies are highly diversified and often 
include self-fertilization. They are the procreative urge incarnate, both in 
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themselves with their extruded and dominating reproductive organs, and 
from an anthropomorphic perspective in their false mimicry of human 
reproductive organs. Finally, they demonstrate the creative power and 
deceptiveness of nature, as well as its complexity and ornate beauty.43 
 All this, in a novel that begins with genealogy and a family tree (a tree 
designed at once to highlight and obfuscate biological links) and ends with 
the fading away of a pair of sterile sibling-lovers, who, rather than conclud-
ing their narrative in any conventional way, fade into a blurb describing 
the very novel in which they feature as lead characters.44 They by necessity 
leave no offspring, and they spend their final four decades (we presume) 
engaged in little more than constant, happy, mutual love, which eventu-
ally culminates in the creation of Van’s memoir (which is also Nabokov’s 
novel). The lack of story once they are finally and forever united develops 
logically from the original, unmutilated form of the Tolstoy misquotation 
that opens Ada—namely, that all happy families are happy in the same 
way and thus make for banal storytelling.
 Ada is more sexually elaborate than its sibling novels: the two main 
characters are granted insatiable libido, and their prodigious lovemaking 
is surely meant as yet another jab at Darwinism. (At one point eight-year-
old Lucette queries, “could a boy bee impregnate a girl flower through 
something, through his gaiters or woolies or whatever he wore?”)45 The 
novel also nurtures some very different concerns in its deepest core, for the 
ethical considerations raised by the siblings’ treatment of their half-sister 
Lucette are distinctly subtler than those in Humbert’s “confession.” Nev-
ertheless, Ada is similar to its predecessors in its emphasis on the transfor-
mation of a particular biological, or physical, problem into an artistic, or 
ideal, solution. The “problem” is the breakdown of biological procreation; 
the “solution” is the expansion of human consciousness into a truly cre-
ative entity and the “reality” of its creative products.
 This solution is figured, to some extent, in Ada’s paintings of orchids, 
in which she takes nature’s designs and extrapolates according to her own 
artistic sense in harmony with her sense of nature, as when “she combined 
one species with another (unrecorded but possible), introducing odd lit-
tle changes and twists that seemed almost morbid in so young a girl so 
nakedly dressed”; or her painting of “the marvelous flower that simu-
lated a bright moth that in turn simulated a scarab.”46 And, most obvi-
ously, it becomes manifest in the shape of the novel itself, which is their 
collaborative memorial to life, love, nature, consciousness, and passion. 
The novel elaborates Nabokov’s notion of a progressive consciousness, 
as well, in its figuration of Antiterra and Terra which, although utterly 
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separate “worlds,” do come into contact through apparent aberrations in 
consciousness, at least in Ada’s world (we do not know whether these rev-
elations are mirrored on Terra). But the parallel, skewed existence of these 
two worlds is more closely related to advances in physics, which we will 
visit in depth in chapter 5.
novelistic Structures: art as organism
Nabokov intends his novels, stories, plays and poems as exemplars of 
organic artistry. That is, they are to be viewed as somehow natural, organ-
ically produced works in which the various parts and the whole coexist in 
a naturally connected way that transcends the mechanics of construction. 
Such a conception of art dates back at least to the Romantics, and it stems 
from the view of the artist’s inherent unity with nature. Although Nabo-
kov would likely have embraced this outlook, in his works we find a situ-
ation complicated by the onslaught of modern life, genocide, and warfare. 
Significantly for their era of composition, all of Nabokov’s works appear 
to imply a unity of being upholding life, unlike the fragmentation and dis-
continuity embodied in much modernist and especially postmodernist lit-
erature. Even while exploring some of the anxieties of modern existence, 
Nabokov’s novels and stories follow coherent trajectories of development, 
and when they are not strictly linear, or when the narrative seems to decay 
into discontinuity, these are instead parables of the seeming fragmenta-
tion of existence within a larger unifying context. For example, while the 
shifting narrative voice of The Gift might be seen as an emblem of the 
fragmented subject, alongside similar strategies used by other authors in 
the early twentieth century, it in fact merely represents the multiple sides of 
a single creative person whose life synthesizes these fragments into a larger 
whole. Lolita erects many layers of defense around its central significance, 
and it still surely holds many surprises. Nevertheless, the novel projects a 
definite, if elusive, oneness; at its most basic level, it represents the failings 
of one man and the sufferings of one little girl as if these things matter in 
any imaginable frame of reference. Pale Fire, perhaps the most superficially 
incoherent Nabokov novel and the hardest to pin to any particular version 
of “reality,” nevertheless remains grounded in the linked fates of its two 
main characters and their loved ones. Its development, although erratic, 
does follow the course of one character’s innate creative urge and inner 
tragedy. It is that sense of mattering that unifies Nabokov’s oeuvre, that 
promotes the notion that things in the world have meaning despite their 
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apparent senselessness and randomness. In their mimicry of—we might 
instead say simply isomorphism with—organic phenomena, Nabokov’s 
works underscore their commitment to an ideal, value-laden substrate 
beneath the development of natural life.47
 There is nothing particularly new in the suggestion that an artwork is 
the organic product of consciousness. This idea harks back to the Roman-
tic age and its emphasis on nature’s divinity, reinforced by ideas of art’s 
connection to higher realms of truth and spirit.48 In Nabokov’s case, how-
ever, with his emphasis on nature’s creativity as a counterweight to Dar-
winian theory, it is worthwhile to examine the figuration of an artwork’s 
development as an outgrowth of this specifically creative procession.
 Nabokov’s primary focus, in nature, lived life, and art, was pattern.49 
The existence of unlikely patterns at all three levels, discernable by human 
consciousness, is evocative of a creative force, but not necessarily a cre-
ator, behind life. And it is by now a truism that Nabokov constructed his 
works, with their layers of concealed patterns, as an embodiment of this 
principle—some would argue, as signs of the designer behind the design. 
As Brian Boyd has shown, the reading and rereading activity they encode 
mimics the process of living life with full, energetic, and creative conscious-
ness.50 But such mimicry (and even pattern itself) is only one part of the 
creative cycle at nature’s disposal. We should expect to find in Nabokov’s 
works other signs of art’s kinship with a creative evolutionary process, and 
in fact we find such markers both within individual works and running 
through his oeuvre taken as an organic whole.
Mimicry
Nabokov’s favorite among nature’s tricks, mimicry is the most frequent 
biological analogue embodied in his works; it stands as the prime exam-
ple of nature’s most persistent feature: deception. Mimicry represents for 
Nabokov the natural equivalent of human artistic practice: the reproduc-
tion of existing forms or their transposition into a new context. In other 
words, mimicry is the adoption of a pattern or design from one area of 
nature as camouflage to conceal some other creature. One might say that 
mimicry is the dominant biological mode in such genres as parody or 
travesty, although in parody the main emphasis is perhaps one of differ-
ence rather than similarity. This is true in nature, too, as it is only external 
appearance or behavior that is subject to mimicry. Likewise, travesty pre-
serves essential surface formalities of a genre, while replacing its under-
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lying content. It becomes a mock repetition of the original form, while 
the intent is actually subversion. (Parody and travesty may be said to be 
parasitic in this way, in addition to being acts of pseudo-mimicry).51 Sig-
nificantly, a parody’s intent and identity are not concealed as they would 
be in forgery. Mimicry can also be said to lie behind all efforts at artistic 
conformity, and behind innovation when it emerges through slight differ-
entiation. This focus on imperfect similarity explains the use of the term 
mimesis in discussing art, going back at least to Aristotle (artworks not 
only mime nature; they also mime the accepted modes of miming).
 Mimicry, as the creation of an illusory or camouflaged surface, relates 
to the description of The Gift’s architectonic principles as discussed by 
Irina Paperno and then later by Marina Kostalevsky and greatly extended 
by Dieter Zimmer and Sabine Hartmann.52 In this case, the larger, com-
plete text is meant to appear organic, original, and internally continuous, 
whereas Paperno demonstrated how Nabokov used principles of mimicry 
(crypsis) to conceal the foreignness of cited texts within the flow of the 
novel. In effect, the same principle is active whenever Nabokov inserts 
an intertextual reference that might go unnoticed by a reader without an 
encyclopedic memory. Rather than rely exclusively upon overt references 
to other authors, Nabokov encodes many such references in a way that 
makes them appear to be a natural part of the ongoing narrative—as in 
fact they are, on a different level. This is true of verbatim quotations as 
well as of the importation of imagery and other cultural motifs.
 By using this artistic analogue of biological concealment, Nabokov is 
able to increase the cultural and linguistic density of his works without 
obstructing the flow of the narration itself. The result allows for another 
kind of mimicry, albeit metaphorical: a work constructed with adequate 
complexity can mimic the multilayered reality of human culture as well 
as the intricate and interdependent patterns of nature. This is the line of 
inquiry pursued by Savely Senderovich and Yelena Shvarts, especially in 
their synthetic work, “Approaching Nabokovian Poetics.”53 On this view, 
Nabokov is attempting to encode both nature’s and culture’s systematic 
complexity in the fullest way attainable within the narrative form.
 Mimicry appears in all artistic works in some ways, with varying 
degrees of intent on the part of the author. In Nabokov’s case, nearly all 
acts of mimicry can be viewed as conscious artistic decisions.54 In partic-
ular, on the level of intertextual or cultural echoes (where special inter-
textual words mimic “ordinary expressive” words), the mimicry can be 
said to pervade almost every sentence of Nabokov’s prose. Another type 
of mimicry occurs when a text contains a first-person narrator, whose 
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psychological profile it then mimics. Novels like The Eye, Despair, The 
Real Life of Sebastian Knight, Lolita, Pale Fire, and Ada fit this mold, 
because we know that the author does not in fact share the personalities 
and biographies of the given narrators. In The Gift and Pnin the situa-
tion is somewhat different, because the narrator is a writer not very unlike 
Nabokov himself (one can only mimic what one is not), so that the mim-
icry effect is essentially suppressed by the play of distortion and parody. 
This theme reaches its fullest expression in Look at the Harlequins, where 
the narrator is an explicit self-parody and the novel a mock-autobiography 
of its real-life author.
 Genre mimicry is also a significant component of Nabokov’s palette: 
Pale Fire could be said to mimic the form of the annotated scholarly edi-
tion, although such an identification is problematic because the mimicry 
is so radically imperfect. Strictly speaking, it is a travesty, because just the 
form of scholarly notes is retained, while the content only occasionally 
bears any resemblance to conventional annotation. John Shade’s poem 
should properly be said to mimic an American narrative poem of the twen-
tieth century (Frost is typically invoked),55 in that it was written not as a 
poem in its own right but purely as part of the novel and as the launch pad 
for Kinbote’s wild commentary. Another Nabokov poem falls into this cat-
egory: in the notorious “Vasily Shishkov” affair, in which Nabokov fooled 
Georgy Adamovich, leader of the anti-Nabokov “Paris” circle of writers, 
into praising his poem “The Poets” published under the name of V. Shish-
kov. Apprised of his mistake, Adamovich called Sirin “sufficiently talented 
to mimic genius.”56 What Nabokov had really done in “The Poets” was to 
mimic the kind of poetry Adamovich most admired and to trick his erst-
while adversary into public praise of the bogus verse. (Ironically, one could 
view this prank as part of a literary “struggle for survival,” as Adamovich 
was Nabokov’s most respected and eloquent detractor in the emigration, 
accusing the novelist of a preponderance of “style” over serious content, 
among other failings).
 Other novels may mimic, or seem to mimic, various types of literary 
models. Lolita may be seen to mimic the detective novel; it explicitly mim-
ics a literary confession and perhaps also a Freudian case history. Ada at 
least purports to mimic a “family chronicle” (the moniker that forms part 
of its subtitle); the idea that it could in fact be a family chronicle in the tra-
ditional mould is fairly outrageous. I have suggested elsewhere that Glory 
mimics an apophatic tale (in which “nothing much happens”) while in fact 
concealing hidden messages and significance that its form appears to deny. 
Fyodor’s “Life of Chernyshevsky” in The Gift mimics a biography; and 
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the posthumously published chapter 16 of Conclusive Evidence mimics a 
book review.
 Mimicry receives a different sort of embodiment in Despair, where the 
narrator thinks that he and his chance acquaintance Felix are perfectly 
alike. Although the case is complicated by the fact that the resemblance 
is actually slight or nonexistent, Hermann’s use of Felix to mimic his own 
corpse carries a distinctly utilitarian slant, in that he hopes through this 
ruse to collect his own life insurance and escape from his collapsing choc-
olate business. In contrast to Hermann’s, Nabokov’s own celebration of 
mimicry centers on the idea of the nonutilitarian copy, especially the one 
that far exceeds in detail and perfection the acuity of its intended dupe. In 
this regard, Hermann’s botched “perfect murder as work of art” attempts 
to suggest the emptiness of mimicry and struggle enacted solely for utilitar-
ian purposes of survival and self-enrichment.
Metamorphosis
Just as some creatures mimic not just the appearance but also the rhythms 
or movements of their targets, artworks can represent and also embody 
the pattern of specific natural lifecycles. One of the most amazing events in 
nature, and for Nabokov one of the most fascinating, is the metamorphosis 
of butterfly and moth larvae that transforms them from something utterly 
earthbound into something airborne, often colorful, and emblematic of 
the free spirit. This extraordinary change and rebirth apparently signals 
to Nabokov an eloquent hint of humanity’s own future prospects, and we 
find that nearly all of his mature works are structured around a thematic 
or narrative metamorphosis of one sort or another. Thematically, the most 
obvious of these are in Invitation to a Beheading and Bend Sinister, in 
which characters who seem to escape a sordid reality enter into an afterlife 
accompanied by images of a special moth. In Invitation, the moth escapes 
the captors’ cleaning efforts as Cincinnatus is led to his execution; in Bend 
Sinister, the “author” greets a moth that lands on his window screen just as 
Krug is granted insanity and release from his hellish world. More covertly, 
we see textual metamorphoses occur in such novels as The Gift, The Real 
Life of Sebastian Knight, Pale Fire, Lolita, Pnin, Transparent Things, and 
the story “The Vane Sisters”—among others. In these works, the narra-
tive produces doubts about itself and its point of origin (for example, the 
identity of the narrator)—usually at or near the end of the first reading. 
This happens in The Gift¸ when Fyodor announces that he is distorting 
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his experienced world in his novel about it; in Pnin, we learn in the final 
chapter that Pnin’s story has been composed by an unreliable source—and 
hence everything we have read needs to be reconsidered in light of the new 
information about our subjective informant. In Lolita, the date-counting 
anomaly has caused similar transformations in readers’ approach to the 
novel’s events and their import (reading Lolita also induces other trans-
formations, such as well-known shifts in the reader’s sympathy for and 
complicity with Humbert).
 This type of metamorphosis reaches its zenith in Pale Fire, where the 
reader comes to doubt, through successive readings and meditations on the 
novel, first the narrator’s main story (of Zembla), then his secondary story 
(of Kinbote), and finally the very source of the poem occasioning the com-
mentary, as when readers begin wondering which “author” created which 
“character.” But all of this unhinging does not indicate an arbitrary, mean-
ingless world (at least, for Nabokov it does not): it simply gives rise to an 
entirely different level of contemplation, a new, perhaps confusing, but 
by no means senseless representation of the novel in consciousness. The 
metamorphosis is radical: what begins as an ostensibly straightforward 
text-and-commentary model becomes, with time, a reflection on how the 
text, preface, commentary, and index present one version of a story while 
hinting at an entirely different version, with details that emerge specifically 
from the surprising interplay of the novel’s parts. At the same time, the 
suggested role of transcendent beings—ghosts—in both the novel’s action 
and in its genesis calls forth yet another degree of complexity, as readers 
model and consider variations on the putative generation of the fictitious 
text. Nabokov’s artistic practice in his novels includes the deployment of 
numerous small puzzles with specific solutions (often based on literary 
allusiveness), but as these are solved, they tend to generate further possibil-
ities for interpretation of the text in hand. These broader metamorphoses, 
it seems, increase and multiply and are not meant to resolve into a single, 
permanent, and defining solution. We have already seen in chapter 1 how 
such representations in consciousness are themselves proposed as part of 
the evolutionary process. The novel’s phenomenal form is no longer lim-
ited to the narrative’s evident content, but expands to include the various 
metamorphoses it undergoes over time (as well as multiple figurations of 
the concept of metamorphosis itself).
 It is worth considering for a moment why metamorphosis is an impor-
tant element of Nabokov’s artistic thought and philosophy. It is not simply 
a matter of a sentimental analogy between a caterpillar’s transformation 
and human ascent to a higher spiritual state after death. Whether Nabokov 
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believed that death itself necessarily leads the human soul to a higher state 
remains uncertain. However, as a figure, the concept and example of lepi-
dopteral metamorphosis is extremely powerful in its implications for life’s 
potential development, particularly in the realm of human consciousness. 
As he demonstrates in his lectures, Nabokov was interested in the differ-
ent modes of apprehension that a literary work can traverse. In relation 
to nineteenth-century novels, he notes the chronological and linear track 
imposed by the act of a first reading: “When we read a book for the first 
time the very process of laboriously moving our eyes from left to right, 
line after line, page after page, this complicated physical work upon the 
book, the very process of learning in terms of space and time what the 
book is about, this stands between us and artistic appreciation.”57 Even in 
texts that do not themselves challenge conventional realistic representation 
and chronology, Nabokov urged a mode of reading that violates not only 
the linear-chronological form of a book, but also the underlying causality 
that marks its superficial law of progression, as when he demonstrated 
the chronological flaw in Anna Karenina.58 In other words, his proposed 
practice of reading, through multiple rereadings, is intended to transform a 
linear, causally grounded experience into one that is nonlinear, noncausal, 
in which the rules of progression, pattern, and form—the active “laws of 
nature”—are subordinated to the live work of the experiencing conscious-
ness. The reader’s creativity is aligned, potentially, with the writer’s. The 
“metamorphosis” is one from linearity, causality, and passivity, to mul-
tidimensionality (unpredictable freedom), consciousness, and activity. It 
is perhaps a charming coincidence that we think of caterpillars as linear 
creatures restricted to the two-dimensional world—with the inch-worm as 
epitome—while butterflies and moths are “free,” nectar-drinking creatures 
of three dimensions. Although with regard to nineteenth-century works 
Nabokov needed to create explicit guidelines for enacting the transforma-
tion, in his own works he built the stimulus to transcend the linear text 
right into his narrative structures.
 Nature prefigures some of the later possibilities of its evolution: thus 
mimicry foretells representational artistry, and the emergence of new spe-
cies anticipates authentic conscious creativity. Creative engagement with 
a novel, and the transformative progress from linear reading to multidi-
mensional rereading, echoes the shift within nature from the evolution of 
species to the evolution of consciousness and knowledge of nature. Like-
wise, metamorphosis within a single life form holds out the possibility that 
human consciousness, at some unknown point, might undergo its own 
extraordinary transformation.
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 Transformations, however, are subject to arrest and derailment. Lolita 
is in large part a novel about a metamorphosis that the hero desperately 
wants not to happen. Humbert is rather well read in the science of puberty, 
but he wants to catch that moment in its first transitional stages and freeze 
it forever. He yearns for a timeless and changeless Lolita, an eternity of 
nymphetry in perpetual service of his carnal passion. This resistance to 
change and development, to the “fugitive” reality of life and human expe-
rience, is the strongest sign of Humbert’s error. His monstrosity is not sim-
ply a misdirected sexual urge; it is a metaphysical quest to thwart time 
and the universality of change. Humbert struggles against all of nature. 
Recognizing his error and his crime, at the novel’s end Humbert tells us 
why he has undertaken his “confession,” which offers in compensation a 
surrogate metamorphosis into what he calls the “local palliative of articu-
late art.”59 Humbert, mentally accepting the mature Dolly Schiller (whose 
pregnancy further underscores her successful metamorphosis), acknowl-
edges the depth of his error and understands its consequences. He believes, 
or wants to believe, that he can take his past and transform it into an artis-
tic embodiment of the very metamorphosis he had fought. If the novel 
ends on a distinctly ambivalent note, it is because there can be no sugges-
tion that it was “worth it” (notwithstanding John Ray, Jr.’s crass assertion 
that had Humbert averted his tragedy, “neither would there have been this 
book.”)60 His aestheticized confession is, simply, the best Humbert can do 
in expiation of his tragic desire to possess and freeze in time an innocent 
little girl. But it can never be enough.
nature, Creativity, and artistic evolution
To state that Nabokov’s works embody creativity as a natural tendency or 
force is to broach tautology. Are not all artworks by definition “creative”? 
However, I want to argue that Nabokov strives for an art that is not only 
creative in a general sense, but is also formally, even morphologically cre-
ative and expansive. If his passion as a naturalist responds to the amaz-
ing diversity of forms and the apparent creativity driving their emergence, 
his works explicitly recreate that natural principle. They do not simply 
tell a new story, or tell an old one in a new way or from a new perspec-
tive. Nabokov regularly attempts to produce entirely new kinds of literary 
form, and he does so on a variety of levels, ranging from narrative struc-
ture to intertextual density. This commitment to innovation suggests an 
effort to create art that realizes the highest available potentials of nature-
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in-consciousness. It is an art that strives to produce, as it were, new species 
of artistic creation. However, this creativity is not unconstrained: unlike 
his predecessors in the Futurist movement, Nabokov did not want to toss 
Pushkin from the “ship of modernity” and destroy or discard the literary 
tradition.61 His creative principle is analogous to evolution in nature (but 
not, of course, Darwinian evolution), and thus it makes use of all that 
comes before and builds upon it in architectonically valid ways, as implied 
by Kant’s definition of genius.62 Artistic mutations emerge from existing 
forms, within certain limits of variation, limits that are necessary in order 
for them to continue to stand as “art” within the culture at large.63
 If we think about how Nabokov’s works relate to one another from 
the standpoint of evolutionary development, we witness a general trend 
toward greater complexity. Also significant is Nabokov’s frequent practice 
of linking the various novels through migrating characters, thereby fore-
grounding, almost exaggerating the organic connections between them. 
From within each work, it is not particularly important that its characters 
also exist in a different text, but from a broad perspective on Nabokov’s 
creative output, it encourages us to confront the entire corpus as a single 
interconnected whole.
 In the earlier works, it is not always easy to see the evolutionary prin-
ciple in action. There is not an obvious development in the transition 
between Mary and King, Queen, Knave, or between the latter and The 
Defense. Upon closer inspection, however, we can identify at least one cru-
cial step that each subsequent novel takes beyond its predecessor. King, 
Queen, Knave, for example, differs from Mary in its focus on German 
characters, rather than Russians or émigrés. (This could be viewed as a 
predicted organic move inasmuch as Ganin abandons his Russian past—
embodied by Mary—on the station platform, and boards a train for other 
parts, leaving behind the Berlin émigré community). The Defense departs 
from the previous two novels in its incorporation of a main character with 
an anomalous—some would say deranged—psychology, and also in its 
explicit play with the concept of a life’s pattern. (The Defense also intro-
duces Nabokov’s first major temporal discontinuity, in the chapter 3 eli-
sion between Luzhin’s childhood and his adult years.)64
 In each novel, several of the devices from previous novels are present; 
they do not simply accumulate and expand, but rather occur in various 
combinations—with always some new narrative structure or device gen-
erating the novel’s core artistic energy. Thus, the anticipatory comments 
first introduced in The Defense become a regular feature in Glory and The 
Gift. This phenomenon may help explain some of the superficial similar-
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ity among Nabokov’s novels, as was noted in an interview with Herbert 
Gold when Nabokov replied that “artistic originality has only its own self 
to copy.”65 The point is not that Nabokov’s art is repetitious because he 
repeatedly mined the same old veins, but rather that those plot elements 
where he was repetitious were not the focus of his innovation, but were 
rather signs of the organic relatedness, the base from which the vari-
ous mutations evolved. This biological analogy for novelistic innovation 
makes sense, because when a new species emerges, it will be more similar 
than dissimilar to its “parent” species.66 Or, to return to Nabokov’s sci-
entific work, a collection of subspecies will have a “synthetic character” 
expressed in the patterns of presence and absence of specific features.
 These formal modifications occur in tandem with thematic novelties. 
As we have seen especially in the case of Lolita’s heroine, these new for-
mations often have a hidden history within earlier works. We can trace 
thematic genealogies within Nabokov’s oeuvre and discover where new 
compositional elements arise, and in what ways they have emerged from 
earlier forms.67 Thus it appears that Nabokov approached his artistic 
creativity as, itself, a kind of changing, transforming agent of emerging 
consciousness. One can look at his output as a single organism gradually 
revealing its ontogeny, or, from a different perspective, as a series of related 
organisms expressive of nature’s creative impulse.68
 We see Nabokov’s playful engagement with an analogue of such change 
in John Shade’s favored game, “Word Golf,” in which the player starts 
with a given word and attempts, changing only one letter at a time, to 
produce a series of real words leading to a prespecified goal. Thus: “lass 
to male in four moves,” or “live to dead in six moves”; “hate to love in 
four.” Nabokov worked out several of these on his note cards as he was 
writing Pale Fire.69 The similarity between this model and natural evolu-
tion is striking when viewed graphically. For example, lass to male: lass-
bass-base-bale-male. The particular examples Kinbote has chosen are both 
extreme and paradoxical, but the point is not the logical or biological 
propriety of the chosen sequence. It is rather the principle of innovation 
through gradual, constrained change, along with the creativity of discov-
ering amusing sequences. From an evolutionary point of view, each new-
found transformation is new as a whole, as is the game itself. The principle 
of evolution in consciousness is revealed in the conscious production of a 
novel game modeling evolution. The “purpose” is not the target word (it 
is not the “telos”), but rather the delight occasioned by amusing new dis-
coveries (thus, perhaps, disarming the suggestion that Nabokov’s view of 
evolution is design-oriented or teleological, as the start-finish structure of 
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the puzzles might suggest: here, the game’s directionality serves the aim of 
aesthetic pleasure).
 A telling passage from The Gift brings together letter-based or ana-
grammatic play with the themes of evolution and metamorphosis. In his 
letter to his mother near the novel’s end, Fyodor describes the strange 
mutations a word can undergo in consciousness during focused scrutiny: 
“You know, like taking a simple word, say ‘ceiling’ and seeing it as sealing 
or sea-ling until it becomes completely strange and feral, something like 
‘iceling’ or ‘inglice.’”70 The possibility for ordinary words like “ceiling” 
to veer away from established, orderly language to become untamed and 
wild represents a precipitous step beyond the evolutionary adjustments of 
Kinbote’s word golf. This final, irrational step—like the one into a rain-
bow?—communicates a metamorphosis into a new phase of lexical being: 
not merely logical and legal anagrams, but suggestive neologisms that 
might expand human consciousness and expressivity. Fyodor immediately 
observes, “I think that some day that will happen with the whole of life.”
 Clearly, such fancies represent transformations that are derived from, 
but are not strictly of a kind with, those that occur in nature—either 
between species (as evolution) or within them (as metamorphosis). A but-
terfly does not look like a caterpillar, but it is after all a development of 
the exact same creature. Nevertheless, if nature can prefigure its future 
forms—in the “dab of gilt” on a butterfly’s wing or in a “death’s head” on 
a moth—then the metamorphosis from larva to imago might someday find 
a fantastic elaboration in “the whole of life,” as Fyodor puts it.71 A specu-
lative point, to be sure, but one that clings to the open and unknowable 
possibilities of the future. In their evocation and recapitulation of natural 
forms, Nabokov’s works gesture toward the “unlimited possibilities”72 of 
human and natural creativity. Consciousness itself is one of the primary 
sites for such potential fantastic leaps; accordingly, Nabokov’s novels 
embody many striking transformations of human mental life. In the next 
chapter we will explore Nabokov’s engagements with the potentials and 
realities of nature’s most complex and inscrutable product: mind.
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naBokov Believed in evolution, and he also believed in the mystery of 
mind. In one of his lectures, he wrote: “Let us not confuse the physical 
eye, that monstrous masterpiece of evolution, with the mind, an even more 
monstrous achievement”: whose achievement, exactly, is left unsaid.3 In 
Bend Sinister the philosopher-protagonist describes his son: “a fusion of 
two mysteries, or rather two sets of a trillion of mysteries each; [ . . . ] thus 
formed and then permitted to accumulate trillions of its own mysteries; 
the whole suffused with consciousness which is the only real thing in the 
world and the greatest mystery of all.”4 Such statements put the goal of 
understanding mind in the far, far distant future, if not beyond human 
abilities altogether. Nevertheless, the science of psychology existed, ambi-
tiously, throughout Nabokov’s career.
 Since the early twentieth century, psychology has been the most dis-
united of scientific enterprises. Competing schools have successively 
attempted to redefine the nature of psychological study in an effort to cre-
ate a science as stable and objectively valid as physics, biology, and chemis-
try. From Nabokov’s perspective as a young man, the most visible branches 
of the growing discipline were Freudian psychoanalysis, behaviorism, and 
to a much lesser extent functionalism and Gestalt psychology. The first 
anti-psychological
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all novelists of any worth are psychological novelists. 
[ . . . ]
every original novel is “anti-.”
—Interview with Alfred Appel, 19701
berlin’s first psychoanalytic clinic has opened in a former sanitarium in Tegel.2
—“Chronicle,” Rul’, april 12, 1927
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two of these branches seem diametrically opposed, since psychoanalysis 
explored the world of the unconscious through the code of dreams and 
neuroses, whereas behaviorism attended only to outwardly measurable 
actions, objectively observed during a formal experiment, without any rec-
ognition of mind or consciousness at all. But they both shared in common 
the presupposition that the object of study (mind or behavior) could be 
translated into a finite logical system that would explain the phenomena in 
causal terms.
 Gestalt psychology and functionalism were less concerned with deter-
mining mechanistic laws of mind or behavior. Nabokov may have known 
something about Gestalt psychology, which was prominent in Berlin 
before 1933 and in the United States when he arrived there. He is less 
likely to have had direct contact with functionalism, which grew from Wil-
liam James’s eclectic evolutionary approach to mental life. In both of these 
schools, the scientist’s aim was to understand a system holistically, as some-
thing that is greater than the sum of its parts. Gestalt psychology, in par-
ticular, explored “higher-order units of thought perception,” irreducible to 
lower-level components.5 This desire to see conscious behavior as a series 
of emergent wholes, and not strictly as a mechanism, may have failed to 
generate great quantities of statistically verifiable data, or clear answers to 
questions about causality.6 But we can easily see how, in its methodological 
dispositions, it offers a congenial fellow-traveler for Nabokov’s anti-Freud-
ian, anti-behaviorist convictions. Thus, when in the coming pages I refer to 
his psychological approach as holistic and nonreductive, I am highlight-
ing parallels with specific schools that existed within psychological science 
during Nabokov’s creative life. Far from being forgotten or rejected false 
trails in psychology, both Gestalt psychology and functionalism have been 
partially incorporated into the discipline’s modern form.7
 Freudianism, in its popularized form, became a special target of Nabo-
kov’s constant mockery. This sparring has garnered nearly all of the atten-
tion of critics exploring Nabokov’s responses to academic psychology 
during his career. However, he also demonstrates an unmistakable animus 
towards experimental behaviorism, especially in the first three novels writ-
ten in the United States (Bend Sinister, Lolita, and Pnin). When Nabokov 
creates his characters’ lives as complex and psychologically unpredict-
able, he is advocating a particular epistemology of mind. The tenor of his 
character portrayals also urges that empirical psychology be held in con-
stant proximity to philosophical reflections upon the nature of mind. In 
this regard, Nabokov resisted the schism between the two disciplines that 
accompanied the rise of experimental psychology.
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 Unlike the other sciences discussed in this book, the very essence of 
psychology has remained controversial since its inception. Various of its 
“schools” have been, not infrequently, the butt of humor (including Nabo-
kov’s own humor at Freud’s expense). Beginning over a century ago, and 
continuing even in recent years, there has been debate over whether psy-
chology can even be called a science. William James called it “only the 
hope” for a science in 1892; a century later, former academic Stephen B. 
Wilcox claimed that institutional psychology was merely “a giant welfare 
program for psychologists.”8 More recently Raymond Tallis wrote that 
“we are not yet able to explain human consciousness,” and The Econo-
mist proclaimed that “consciousness awaits its Einstein.”9 The object of 
study has changed over the years, traversing sensations and perceptions, 
introspections concerning mental phenomena and mental states, observ-
able behavior, and organism-environment systems—to give only a very 
condensed list.10 Nabokov’s relationship to this inchoate science was dis-
tanced, filtered through his own readings and philosophical commitments. 
While a few of his attitudes about psychology leap off the page, his core 
psychological convictions remain essentially latent. Generous attention 
has been paid to his disdain for Freud, and Nabokov’s antithetical views 
respecting the falsity of generalizations and the freedom of the individ-
ual from any mechanistic or mythical laws of personality have been thor-
oughly illustrated. However, to paint Nabokov’s psychological interests as 
a Freud/Not-Freud polarity is to neglect the varied scientific context that 
forms the background of his art. Nabokov in fact becomes much more 
interesting when we recognize how his psychological portrayals of char-
acters’ actions reflect some of the twentieth century’s major scientific and 
philosophical conceptions of mind.
 As Nabokov entered adulthood, psychology as a scientific discipline 
was undergoing tremendous change. This transformation was occasioned 
in part by the rise of Freudian psychoanalysis, in part by a shift among 
non-Freudians away from introspectionist accounts of mind and toward 
behavioral and causal explanations of psychological regularities. The need 
for a “scientific,” experimental psychological practice was felt especially 
by those who saw psychoanalysis as a near-mystical threat to the science 
of mental phenomena.11 There was pressure in some quarters to extinguish 
from psychology consideration of such things as consciousness and mind, 
focusing instead exclusively on behaviors and responses that could be mea-
sured quantitatively. The new approaches considered the human mind as a 
mechanism—Freudians, a mechanism of mental objects; the behaviorists, a 
mechanism of physical nerve pathways, sensations, and reactions. Fading 
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out of the mainstream was the introspectionist psychology practiced by 
Edward Titchener and others with its inherent acceptance of mind as an 
investigable scientific entity. The behaviorists, led by John B. Watson and 
developing lines of inquiry opened up by Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov, 
worked to establish the laws governing human behavior’s physiological 
roots in its environment, often by means of comparative studies in animals. 
Those who continued to study mind and consciousness, for the most part 
followers of and defectors from Freudianism (in the 1910s and 1920s), 
were also attempting to analyze the mind’s functioning into component 
parts and causal systems (such as Freud’s ego, super-ego, and id). But the 
problem with a science of the contents of mind was that no matter what 
form it took, it could not be tested scientifically: there was no way to pro-
vide objective access to information that could only be retrieved or pro-
duced by an individual’s introspective narration.12 Thus, on the one hand, 
we have scientific denial or willful ignorance of mind; on the other, a scien-
tifically untenable (and for Nabokov, personally objectionable) explication 
of mental life. One of Nabokov’s goals in his works is to present varieties 
of psychological phenomena in consciousness that allow readers to ponder 
the existence of various sorts of mind. Human mind and consciousness, 
after all, feature in “Father’s Butterflies” as the current pinnacle of evolu-
tion, the “greatest mystery of all,” and as such the most exciting area of 
scientific research—even if we do not necessarily possess all the tools nec-
essary to understand the object of study. By extension, creativity and art, 
as products of mind, are psychological phenomena—a fact not lost upon 
Freud, of course, and well illustrated in some of Nabokov’s readings.
 Nabokov used his art to advocate the continued importance of intro-
spectionist psychology, by placing at the forefront of his concerns the irre-
ducible mystery of human consciousness. His characters become a gallery 
of individuals—“finite individual selves”—whose actions can be partly, 
but never fully, explained by possible or likely causal sequences. In creat-
ing this gallery, Nabokov expanded his effort to emphasize the reality of 
qualitative phenomena that resist explication in quantitative terms, but 
which nevertheless can be collected and described in some detail. In this 
chapter, after exploring the background of Nabokov’s psychological com-
mitments, I embark upon a discussion of how Nabokov’s view of human 
psychology becomes manifest in a variety of his characters, in tension with 
the competing Freudian or quantitative fashions.
 Nabokov’s works are primarily devoted to exploring how individual 
minds perceive, interact with, shape and are shaped by the worlds around 
them. His human subjects range from the super-intelligent to the average 
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(or worse), from the highly creative to the purely destructive. Nabokov 
presents to us vividly imagined, complex individuals who, usually in their 
own first-person narratives, demonstrate the intricacies of how mind and 
world interact. Before we embark on an examination of how Nabokov’s 
works embody his psychological interests, we need to establish what, to 
him, was the proper object of psychological study.13
psychology versus psychoanalysis
In choosing his approach to individual characters as psychological speci-
mens, Nabokov had to decide what he intended by the concepts “con-
sciousness,” “mind,” “self,” “individual.” Philosophy had struggled with 
the status of these notions since at least Descartes’ time. In the nineteenth 
century, empirical psychology began the attempt to put the discussion on 
solid ground. Some researchers chose to deny the reality of metaphysical 
entities like “soul” or “spirit” standing at the core of personality, offer-
ing instead theories of mind grounded in the mechanical development of 
the nervous system as part of the evolutionary process. These explana-
tions, with their often materialist presuppositions, tended more and more 
to view consciousness and personality as accidents of animals’, and finally 
primates’, interactions with their environment and each other.14 Most 
renowned among those who preserved a place for a “soul,” despite his 
Darwinian slant in Principles of Psychology, was William James. James 
also drew attention to the metaphysical assumptions underlying materi-
alist accounts, pointing out that idealist theories accepting existence of 
the individual “soul” were in no way logically inferior to mechanistic dis-
course, even though they could not be accommodated within the scientific 
method.15 Another influential component of Nabokov’s heritage was the 
pre-twentieth-century tradition of considering psychology together with 
philosophy, as exemplified in the prominent Moscow Psychological Soci-
ety—a group which was, in the main, devoted to idealist philosophy (and 
several of whose members were close to Nabokov’s father).16 Nabokov’s 
affinities with this group were reinforced later by his friendship with Iulii 
Aikhenvald, who had been the society’s research secretary from 1895 to 
about 1902.
 Judging from all of his artistic output and other comments on the mat-
ter, it is quite clear that Nabokov was inclined to accept the existence of a 
mysterious, inaccessible, individual self, which might be called a “soul,” 
and which might or might not imply immortality and survival apart from 
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the body. There is no evidence that he credited the possibility that con-
scious selves are illusory side effects of brain activity. The self thus becomes 
the first principle of all his compositions. As a result, the concept of the 
autonomous individual consciousness plays a crucial role in Nabokov’s 
explorations of psychology—of human behavior and its possible expla-
nations—and of “Psychology”—the formalized study of human behavior 
that took shape during Nabokov’s lifetime.
dismissing Freud
With a cautious wink toward Freudian psychoanalysis, we could say that 
Nabokov’s characters serve as “case histories.” Throughout his career 
Nabokov famously locked horns with Freud and his legacy. The reasons 
for this antipathy have been in dispute: some say it was because Nabo-
kov feared that Freudian interpretation would reveal his deepest personal 
secrets and he must therefore disarm it in advance; some that he despised 
and mocked the reductive sexual implications of Freudian psychoanaly-
sis.17 Still others have proposed that he saw in Freudianism a dominant 
cultural opponent with which he had to contend if his own, contrary views 
about personality and mind were to gain any attention in their own right.18 
What is certain is that the Freudian movement was entering its heyday 
around the world when Nabokov entered Cambridge University in Octo-
ber of 1919.19
 Freud’s sexuality-based theory might never have achieved such domi-
nance had it not appeared at the end of the Victorian era, with its repres-
sive attitude toward the human body and especially toward sex.20 No 
doubt, Freud’s success was in part also engendered by his own narrative 
skill and energy; by the quantity of his output and the strange familiarity 
of his cases; and by the public’s attraction to the theory’s clear and sim-
ple, story-like yet positivistic explanations of human nature. The method’s 
practical applications and apparent clinical successes produced a cultural 
maelstrom that by 1920 had generated discussion groups, psychoanalytic 
societies, and spin-off publications—in short, an industry. For much of the 
twentieth century, “psychology” was synonymous with “Freudianism” in 
the popular imagination. And it was largely against this popular behemoth 
that Nabokov directed his polemic and parodic wit.21
 Nabokov evidently knew Freud’s work when he attended a talk by one 
“Mlle. Ioffe” at the Tatarinova-Aikhenvald circle in 1926, referring to the 
topic ironically as a “most pleasant theme” beforehand, and afterwards 
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calling Freud a “witchdoctor” (znakhar’).22 By 1931 his anti-Freudian ani-
mus was fully charged, producing that year the essay “What Should Every-
one Know?,” a mock-promotional text hawking “Freudianism for All,” 
a tonic to assuage all maladies.23 The same year saw the beginnings of 
Despair, Nabokov’s first virulently anti-Freudian fictional work. It is sur-
prising that he turned down a request from Gleb Struve in 1931 to write 
something on Freud for the newspaper Rossiia i slavianstvo, presumably 
in connection with the theorist’s seventy-fifth birthday celebrations, but 
Nabokov suggested that he was weary of the topic for the moment.24
 Notwithstanding such fatigue, the Freudian theme became a leitmotif 
in Nabokov’s oeuvre, as well as a permanent fixture in the forewords to 
his translated Russian and reissued English works. However, this recur-
rence does not by itself embody a psychological aspect of Nabokov’s 
art—although Jenefer Shute has argued that it tells us about Nabokov’s 
anxiety regarding Freud’s cultural dominance.25 Rather, the Freudian battle 
has to do with the theory of mental symbolism and how artistic creations 
relate to their authors’ childhoods. The anti-Freudian polemic represents 
an ideological argument opposing the reducibility of all human behav-
iors and pathologies to sexual causes—or to causality in general.26 It lays 
the groundwork for the development of a different kind of psychological 
exploration than Freud’s, one that holds that the human mind is too com-
plex, mysterious, and surprising to be defined by a single underlying cause, 
such as childhood trauma, sexuality, or the urge to reproduce.
 Given that psychoanalysis, like literature and unlike experimental psy-
chology, focuses on individuals and their stories, and recognizing how 
quickly its methods were applied to literature even by Freud himself, it is 
quite natural that a literary writer would be competing with Freud, for in 
important respects they shared and competed for the domain of human 
narrative.27 The key distinction between them, for Nabokov, is expressed 
by Ardalion in Despair, when he says “what the artist perceives is primar-
ily the difference between things. It is the vulgar who note their resem-
blance,”28 a direct jab at a theory that quickly attempted to generalize 
from individual cases to universal laws. Nabokov’s view of human psy-
chology was based on the belief that unique individual traits are more 
important than commonalities or developmental laws, and that even in the 
case of abnormal behavior, generalized answers will not suffice. His cru-
sade against Freudianism enacted a twofold strategy: open mockery of the 
theory’s sexual reductivism, and the generation of a series of counterex-
amples, human beings of various types—some normal, some not—whose 
personalities cannot be adequately explained by means of psychoanalytic 
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paradigms. A covert side strategy was to draw continual attention to the 
fact that it is impossible for one person to know all the phenomena taking 
place in another’s mind (even with the aid of a confession), implying that 
without this knowledge, conclusions about universalities and psychologi-
cal causality are premature. This inaccessibility of others’ inner life was an 
important artistic challenge for Nabokov, one that he found treated care-
fully in William James’s Principles of Psychology.29
 James’s encyclopedic work gave Nabokov vigorous preparation for 
his future battles. It surveys in impressive detail all the then-known ele-
ments of mental life, including its many aberrations.30 What must have 
struck Nabokov with particular force was James’s ability to describe the 
systems of cognition and behavior from a point of view that simultane-
ously respected Darwinism and its implications for the evolution of human 
behavior and also preserved belief in mind’s essentially secret nature.31 He 
surely was fascinated by James’s emphasis on the stream of thought within 
consciousness as the primary data of personality (and he proudly credited 
Tolstoy with inventing “stream of consciousness” narration in Anna Kar-
enina a decade or so before William James coined the term).32 At the same 
time, by regularly demonstrating the necessary limits of empirical knowl-
edge about the human mind and its behaviors, James provides strong sup-
port for anyone unwilling to ascribe a provable, mechanistic nature to 
mental life.33
 Such a background, combined with likely exposure to Moscow Psy-
chological Society writings on the philosophy of mind and self, made 
Nabokov well-equipped to think carefully about consciousness and its 
mysteries.34 And his study did not end there. The few glimpses we have 
of his psychological readings indicate that he read broadly and eagerly in 
this field, which was so close to his own artistic practice. Various sources 
confirm that he read Freud, Havelock Ellis, Cesare Lombroso, Élie Metch-
nikoff, and Grigorii Aleksandrovskii; he is very likely as well to have read 
Herbert Spencer, Remy de Gourmont, Théodule Ribot, Hyppolite Taine, 
Otto Weininger, and Veniamin Tarnowski, whose books were widely 
known and also held in his father’s ample library.35 He also had probably 
read at least some works of Karl Jung and Otto Rank by the late 1930s, 
most likely earlier (he mentions Jung explicitly only in Pnin, while Jung-
ian traces have been found in Despair).36 To this list we can add a series 
of books and research papers listed in notes made during the creation of 
Lolita, Pnin, and Pale Fire. Considering that our documentary glimpse 
of what Nabokov read or had available to him amounts to merely a few 
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snapshots, it is fair to conclude that he also read significantly beyond the 
mentioned titles.37
nabokov’s psychology: Subjects and objects
While Nabokov was conversant with the main directions in modern psy-
chology, his works focus on the internal phenomena of consciousness, 
on the nature of the stream of thought and its relation to memory. This 
emphasis makes sense, given Nabokov’s humanistic commitment to the 
individual, the self, as fundamental principle and axiological center. In 
practice it means that Nabokov’s main artistic impulse in his works is to 
create fully developed individuals whose psychology appears plausible and 
self-consistent, if not always perfectly coherent or obedient to discernable 
causal laws. Although there are many peripheral characters in his nov-
els who are psychologists or psychiatrists, only one of his narrators, Van 
Veen in Ada, takes on this profession (and the reason he does so is appar-
ently driven by his interest in paranormal Terra-related phenomena, evok-
ing William James’s interest in what is now called parapsychology.)38 The 
hypotheses of other psychologists in his works are suffused with irony, 
usually by association with caricatures of Freudian or behaviorist theories 
(such as Luzhin’s doctor in The Defense [1929, Nabokov’s third novel], 
the inhuman behaviorist experimenters in Bend Sinister [1947], and Eric 
and Liza Wind in Pnin [1957]).39
 Breaking down the psychological plane of Nabokov’s work into sci-
entists and those they study, we find that the first group presents several 
variations on the theme of the crank or charlatan, while the second group 
offers a much larger and more diverse collection of types. This imbalance 
reflects Nabokov’s partiality to the variety and inaccessibility of individual 
selves, and his disdain for the efforts of psychoanalysis to “explain” con-
sciousness and the essence of self or mind, and of behaviorism to reduce 
human mental life to a collection of external manifestations. Given this 
evident bias, it might be argued that Nabokov was in fact opposed to psy-
chology as a science, in that he rejected his era’s dominant approaches to 
the study of human nature, personalities, and pathologies. But it would be 
more accurate to say that his approach to mind was roughly aligned with 
other schools—especially Gestalt and functionalist psychology—that were 
less visible to the public than psychoanalysis and behaviorism, but whose 
effects upon the science’s development were no less authentic or enduring.
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 Nabokov’s psychologists, with the exception of Van Veen, display vary-
ing degrees of Freudian influence, and this fact betrays Nabokov’s concern 
that Freudianism was overwhelming the study of human mind. Begin-
ning with Luzhin’s doctor, psychoanalytic buzz words are the hallmark 
of this role. This psychiatrist is presented to us as an unalloyed Freudian 
whose method for achieving Luzhin’s recovery is to get him to experience 
a “rebirth,” a gradual re-entry into life, from which all the disturbing ele-
ments that led him to obsessive chess playing are deleted. While apparently 
successful at first, the treatment is also implicated in the chess master’s last 
mental breakdown. At least that Freudian thought he was doing good; 
his patient’s well-being was his aim. In Bend Sinister, Nabokov creates 
an explicitly harmful blend of Freudian and behaviorist psychology in an 
incompetent team of experimenters for the totalitarian Ekwilist regime. 
The logic of scientific research meets the institutional rejection of the indi-
vidual’s moral value (a rejection that was realized in Soviet practice). Their 
experiments involve studying the ameliorating effects of child-torture and 
murder on the subsequent behavior of the violent criminal.
 A more sophisticated but no less parodic incarnation of a modern psy-
chologist appears in John Ray, Jr., author of the fictitious “Foreword” to 
“Lolita, or, The Confession of a White Widowed Male.” Ray has written 
a prize-winning book called “Do the Senses Make Sense?”—a title raising 
curious questions about the relation between the world perceived through 
the senses and the “sense” within the consciousness that may or may not 
be “made” by them. Ray’s moral relativism parading as philosophical 
sophistication appears in his assertion that “‘offensive’ is frequently but a 
synonym for ‘unusual’; and a great work of art is of course always origi-
nal, and thus by its very nature should come as a more or less shocking 
surprise”—a view which in some Nabokovian contexts would be laudable, 
but here reeks of “poshlust” (vulgarity). Our suspicions of his ethics are 
meant to be deepened by his platitudinous praise of the confession’s moral 
dimensions: “they warn us of dangerous trends; they point out potent 
evils. ‘Lolita’ should make all of us [ . . . ] apply ourselves with still greater 
vigilance and vision to the task of bringing up a better generation in a safer 
world.”40 If this is the best response psychology can give to Humbert’s nar-
rative, Nabokov suggests, then the discipline has reached a blind alley.41 
Lolita also includes several parodies of behaviorist experiments, including 
one in which participants are paid to spend a whole year walking on hands 
and knees, consuming only bananas.
 The series of mock(ed) Freudians continues with Eric Wind, in Pnin, 
who represents a jumble of Freudian and post-Freudian psychoanalytic 
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trends. He and his wife, Liza (also Pnin’s ex-wife), attempt to raise their 
son Victor guided by these theories, doing “their best to impersonate Laius 
and Jocasta” (that is, Oedipus’ parents).42 Wind propounds that “preg-
nancy [is] really the sublimation of a death wish.”43 Lastly, although Ada 
does include some lightly veiled mockery of Freud (“Dr. Froid of Signy-
Mondieu-Mondieu”) Van Veen stands apart from other Nabokovian 
characters due to his primary focus on mental aberrations associated with 
paranormal phenomena and the mysterious Terra. “As Van Veen himself 
was to find out, at the time of his passionate research in terrology (then a 
branch of psychiatry) even the deepest thinkers, the purest philosophers, 
Paar of Chose and Zapater of Aardvark, were emotionally divided in their 
attitude toward the possibility that there existed ‘a distortive glass of our 
distorted glebe.’” Van’s clinical experience led him to compose his novel, 
“Letters from Terra,” derived in part “from his own reports on the ‘tran-
scendental delirium’ of his patients.”44 Echoing William James and his era, 
Van is as much philosopher as psychologist, composing the erudite, play-
ful, and challenging essay “The Texture of Time” that becomes the novel’s 
Part Four. However, there is no indication that Van as psychologist really 
understands any of his patients (despite having “a passion for the insane 
as some have for arachnids or orchids”).45 Notwithstanding his extreme 
intelligence, he is equally insensitive to the psychological needs of his half-
sister Lucette. But this lack of insight is more a function of individuality’s 
secrets than of his incompetence.
“Trillions of Mysteries”
Nabokov’s works present individuals whose minds are to be explored as 
if from the inside, through a vicarious introspection, not analyzed from 
without or associated with predefined causal mechanisms, mapped out in 
convenient dream sequences. There is nothing surprising in this empha-
sis: after all, as Nabokov insisted, psychology is often the main content 
of literary art. Nabokov wrote to Gleb Struve that the many writers who 
eagerly made plots based on Freudian themes were not producing litera-
ture.46 Considering carefully what kind of psychology Nabokov practiced 
in his works, we find that he explored the human mind not by searching 
for its unknown motivations and sources, but by presenting a mental por-
trait as complete as possible, no matter how contradictory in nature. He 
was inclined to study how the active mind chooses to act—that is, how 
it engages purposively with the world around it. Not all actions can be 
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explained causally, either through self-interest (as Chernyshevsky and the 
radicals would have it) or through Freudianesque chains linking childhood 
traumas to adult psychoses.
 Nabokov’s novels and stories do not seek out causes to explain why a 
character behaves one way or another. In this respect, he is an essentialist 
who, as noted above, believes in the utility of the autonomous self as a 
working hypothesis, if not as a certain reality. This belief may bring accu-
sations of mysticism, as it did to William James: characters act a certain 
way not because of laws of personality or revealed psychological develop-
ment, but for reasons that are essentially hidden.47 This obscurantist per-
spective suggests that we cannot know why people (including criminals) 
behave as they do.
 Sometimes, Nabokov’s characters seem to offer hints of a causal mech-
anism behind their actions. If we think of Axel Rex in Laughter in the 
Dark, of Franz and Marta in King, Queen, Knave, of Hermann in Despair, 
and to some extent of Humbert in Lolita, there is a common strand that 
makes up the background for the criminal act or its attempt that readers 
may consider to be an underlying cause. Nabokov himself said that crimi-
nals lack imagination—specifically, the inability to imagine a life behind 
bars.48 Maybe so. Even more significantly, they lack respect for the dignity 
and autonomy of others in general (they may also lack the ability to love, 
within Nabokov’s world). But this lack too must have its origins; and these 
are nowhere to be found among causal chains in Nabokov’s works. We do 
not know why Hermann in Despair is so narcissistic; we do not know why 
Humbert is for so long blind to his own destructive acts; we do not know 
why Franz and Marta in King, Queen, Knave come to believe that Drey-
er’s life is expendable. In Despair and in Lolita, there are tempting hints 
at Freudian causal explanations. But these hints do not bear out: in both 
cases, Hermann or Humbert could have acted much differently if there had 
been a desire to do so. There was not. Why they desired specifically to act 
as they did is a matter of personality, perhaps of perversion. (Nabokov did 
believe that a mind could follow a perverse path, although it is not clear 
that he felt all such paths led to harmful, criminal, or murderous acts). His 
dissent from causality as a universal system meant he could argue that, 
perhaps, such paths are chosen by the individual for unknowable reasons. 
It is not a very scientific perspective, but it does bring attention to the pos-
sible limits of scientific psychology. “We shall never know . . . the nature 
of thought.”49 He was in good company: even James, the father of modern 
psychology, preserved space for the mysterious and unknowable elements 
of the individual’s self—things that were not accessible to the scientific 
method.
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Serial Selves
One of the best ways to get inside the mind of a character is through a 
first-person narration, and Nabokov adopted this method surprisingly late 
in his novel-writing career: in The Eye (Sogliadatai, 1930), his fifth novel. 
Smurov, the main character, is also Nabokov’s first unreliable narrator 
characterized by dubious mental stability. Not surprisingly, the short novel 
contains many psychologically suggestive themes. The most immediate 
anomaly to present itself is actually concealed during most of a first read-
ing of the text: the narrator, who apparently shoots himself after a thrash-
ing he receives from his lover’s jealous husband, goes on narrating “from 
the beyond.” It is from this otherworldly perspective that he takes up his 
role as an “inner spy” of the events surrounding his former existence. It 
eventually becomes clear that he is not dead, but is in fact experiencing a 
kind of dissociation, viewing himself and his interactions with others as if 
from the outside, making his “self” the focus of an objective, rather than 
subjective, analysis.
 The origin of Smurov’s malady or mental state can be linked in part 
to the psychological concept of dissociation, which appears as well in a 
Freudian-sexual context in Despair. Nabokov likely derived this concept 
from reports of injured war veterans who believed that they had died, and 
looked upon their bodies as something dead and completely separate from 
their surviving psyche.50 This connection is all the more likely in light of 
Smurov’s claims of military derring-do in the Russian Civil War (1918–
21), compounded by the violence precipitating his suicide attempt.51 As we 
learn from Olga Skonechnaia’s commentary to the short novel, it includes 
many references to sexual and cultural realia from Silver Age literature 
(ca. 1890–1916).52 Smurov’s somewhat ambiguous sexuality, and also his 
name, alludes to the protagonist of Mikhail Kuzmin’s 1907 novel Wings, 
which contained openly homosexual themes (homosexuality had ideologi-
cal and even mystical significance in symbolist and decadent intellectual 
circles). His “afterlife” experience leads him to believe that everything 
around him is “only my imagination, only a mirror,”53 including his love 
interest Vanya (a sexually ambiguous but generally masculine name), the 
young woman who is also another man’s fiancée. On the one hand, other 
people and the world do not exist, except as part of his otherworldly solip-
sism; on the other—he himself does not exist, except as reflected in the 
minds of others (“You see, I do not exist—all that exists are thousands 
of mirrors, each reflecting me”).54 In the end, of course, Smurov’s psycho-
logical aberration amounts to existential angst, driven by his failure to 
integrate his “inner” self with its “outer” perception by others.55 Yet it 
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also seems that his dissociative state is to a certain extent willful. If this is 
so, then the tale presents a counterexample to the influence of repressed or 
subconscious mental phenomena. If Smurov’s strange experience is essen-
tially a creative act, it suggests other sources besides the unconscious for 
altered or anomalous mental states. However, Smurov’s case is not pushed 
very far; Nabokov appears to have been engaged in exploring the narra-
tive potential of self-conscious solipsism and the relative realities of mind 
and world, rather than in examining insanity. As for minds truly at odds 
with their environment—these Nabokov had already begun to study from 
a third-person perspective in the shady area between extreme intellectual 
gifts and troubling mental deviations.
Genius or insanity?
Nabokov confronted the basic problem of genius and its possible prox-
imity to insanity in the work of Cesare Lombroso, which he placed on 
his Crimean reading list in 1919.56 As an artist who felt the distance 
between himself and the world around him, Nabokov was certainly ready 
to explore the psychology of genius, and also to turn a critical eye to its 
reception in a typical human environment. The linking of genius to mental 
disorders conformed to a growing quest among psychologists for demon-
strable, empirical components of consciousness. If the primary mode of 
modern psychology was to establish causal processes that would explain 
various human behaviors and personality traits, perhaps including genius, 
then Nabokov’s direct engagement of that mode entailed an effort to dis-
credit the alleged causal chains.57 In part such a project relates to his neo-
idealist affinities and a corresponding commitment to the autonomy of the 
individual, which presumed the existence and autonomy of an inherently 
mysterious willing self. We see this effort most distinctly in The Defense, 
Despair, Lolita, Pale Fire, and Ada, but it also forms a subtle undercur-
rent in Glory, The Real Life of Sebastian Knight, Pnin, and Transparent 
Things. It even causes a few ripples in The Gift and elsewhere. When we 
speak of causes, we imply effects, which in this case are the acts of indi-
viduals. Why characters do what they do—why they murder, rape, com-
mit suicide, or write books—is a question that psychology might hope to 
answer, assuming that behaviors and the mind can be found to obey laws 
of cause and effect. But throughout his career, Nabokov crafted examples 
of why the explanatory urge is doomed to fail when it comes to the secrets 
of the individual mind.
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 The beginnings of this search for noncausal aspects of mind appear 
in The Defense (1929). The novel is designed, from one perspective, as 
an explicit argument against the idea that anything in Luzhin’s childhood 
has brought about his adult “misfortunes”—beginning with his obsessive 
chess-playing, and ending with his developing paranoia and flight from 
life.
 Luzhin’s mental life comes to us in phases, with special attention to 
his pre-chess youth, his transitional period, and his adult state, when lit-
tle exists for him outside the world of chess forces. The child who was a 
frightening enigma to his parents first notices only, among the details of 
his transition from home lessons to secondary school, that there he will 
be called “Luzhin” rather than “Vanya.” Only some days later, during the 
return journey to the city, does he recognize that so many beloved fea-
tures of his regular existence would be canceled by this change. When he 
runs away, he “played for a while with a beetle nervously moving its feel-
ers, and then had quite a time crushing it beneath a stone as he tried to 
repeat the initial, juicy scrunch.” His adjustment to school is unsuccessful, 
in part because of other students’ response to his singular nature. During 
recess, he always escaped to an unobtrusive wood pile in order to evade 
torment: “He had chosen this spot on the very first day, on that dark day 
when he had discovered such hatred and derisive curiosity around him 
that his eyes had automatically filled with a burning mist, and everything 
he looked at—out of the accursed necessity of looking at something—was 
subject to intricate, optical metamorphoses. The page with criss-cross lines 
grew blurry [ . . . ] and his desk neighbor, an insidious brute with down on 
his cheeks, would say with quiet satisfaction: ‘Now he’s going to cry.’ But 
Luzhin never once cried.” Meanwhile, little Luzhin developed a deep love 
for the stories of Conan Doyle, in the form of two books given him by his 
aunt, and “only much later did he clarify in his own mind what it was that 
thrilled him so about these two books: it was the exact and relentlessly 
unfolding pattern.” This affection transfers onto the practice of magic, and 
he also daydreams about abstract mathematics, “and he lingered long in 
those heavens where earthly lines go out of their minds.”58
 Nabokov takes some pains to convey the workings of little Luzhin’s 
observational and imaginative life during his early immersion into chess, 
as in this passage describing his response to the ephemera of an idle day 
out of doors, a day without access to an opponent or new chess ideas:
That day Luzhin junior was in low spirits. All the games in the old maga-
zine had been studied, all the problems solved, and he was forced to play 
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with himself, but this ended inevitably in an exchange of all the pieces and 
a dull draw. And it was unbearably hot. The veranda cast a black triangu-
lar shadow on the bright sand. The avenue was paved with sunflecks, and 
these spots, if you slitted your eyes, took on the aspect of regular light 
and dark squares. An intense latticelike shadow lay flat beneath a garden 
bench. The urns that stood on stone pedestals at the four corners of the 
terrace threatened one another across their diagonals. Swallows soared: 
their flight recalled the motion of scissors swiftly cutting out some design. 
Not knowing what to do with himself he wandered down the footpath by 
the river, and from the opposite bank came ecstatic squeals and glimpses 
of naked bodies. He stole behind a tree trunk and with beating heart 
peered at these flashes of white. . . . Afterwards, lolling on the drawing 
room couch, he drowsily listened to all manner of slight sounds, to an 
oriole’s cry in the garden, to the buzzing of a bumblebee that had flown in 
the window, to the tinkle of dishes on a tray being carried down from his 
mother’s bedroom—and these limpid sounds were strangely transformed 
in his reverie and assumed the shape of bright intricate patterns on a dark 
background; and in trying to unravel them he fell asleep.59
It is a curious moment: Luzhin engages sensuously with the world around 
him, transforming it partially into chess imagery, partially into other sorts 
of mysterious patterns, in a way that appears to be vaguely comforting 
to him. That very evening, his father returns having learned of Luzhin’s 
extraordinary talent, and the prodigy’s childhood effectively ends: he is 
quickly submerged in the world of tournaments. When we meet him as 
an adult, aged thirty, he has much more trouble interacting with the realia 
of everyday life, and his future bride is perhaps the only person to have 
interacted with him on this level in almost eighteen years. He emerges 
from the “usual murk” of his life, and he “noticed with surprise that 
he was actually talking with her.” She is “so unexpected and so famil-
iar, and . . . spoke with a voice that had been sounding mutely all his life 
and now had suddenly burst through the usual murk.” He begins “with 
a series of quiet moves . . . his own peculiar declaration of love.” When 
he finally proposes, most strangely (“And therefore in continuance of the 
above [‘above’ appears to refer to their trite discussion the day before] 
I have to inform you that you will be my wife, I implore you to agree 
to this, it was absolutely impossible to go away, now everything will be 
different and wonderful”),60 he then bursts into tears and makes various 
awkward physical gestures while his beloved attempts to adjust to her 
situation. Who would have expected such an emotional outburst from 
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a man wedded to chess? Exactly how and why her voice had “sounded 
mutely all his life” is not revealed. But this persistence of his openness to 
love, even his latent desire to love and be loved, his sensitivity to certain 
details of a person, his desire to give and receive affection, all show us a 
man who cannot be glibly dismissed as an insane chess master. Nabokov 
provides Luzhin’s psychic life with a degree of worldly texture, precari-
ously perched above the abyss of pure chess ideas. None of these facets of 
personality is explained. Despite the apparently predestined fate toward 
which Luzhin is driven, there is much about his mental life that remains 
outside the ominous patterns that coalesce into his vision of a malevolent 
opponent.
 Nabokov presents a carefully wrought story of a maladjusted boy who 
becomes a maladjusted, asexual man—who also happens to be a chess 
genius. The causes of his first and second breakdowns have been a matter 
of considerable debate, a fact which bespeaks the psychological motiva-
tion behind the book. It makes us ask the questions: why does Luzhin have 
mental breakdowns; and why does he go mad and decide to “leave the 
game” at the novel’s end? From one perspective, it may seem that Luzhin’s 
breakdown is caused by the emotional imbalance, rooted in his childhood, 
that manifests itself in his chess addiction. Consequently, Luzhin’s final 
insanity and suicide are caused by his inability, even after treatment, to 
escape hints of the “chess world” that reclaim him (the roll-up board, Val-
entinov). Alternatively, Luzhin’s collapse in the championship may have 
been brought about by the conflict between his new, human interest (his 
future wife) and his burgeoning chess abilities; his final paranoia and sui-
cide, by his treatment itself, even by Mrs. Luzhin’s overzealous complicity 
in it. Nabokov structures the novel carefully to give readers ample oppor-
tunity to look for Freudian causes in Luzhin’s childhood—for example, 
his father’s barely concealed affair with his wife’s second cousin, his moth-
er’s consequent hysteria—and, in general, what appears to be his parents’ 
inability to nurture Luzhin in an effective, healthy way. It is on this dys-
functional childhood that the novel’s Assyrian-bearded psychiatrist blames 
Luzhin’s obsessiveness and his nervous collapse. The doctor’s efforts to 
discover these roots meet with failure:
“Let me imagine your house—ancient trees all around . . . the house large 
and bright. Your father returns from the hunt. . . .” Luzhin recalled that 
his father had once found a fat, nasty little fledgling in a ditch. “Yes,” 
replied Luzhin uncertainly. “Some details,” asked the professor softly. 
“Please. I beg you. I’m interested in the way you occupied yourself  
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in childhood, what you played with. You had some tin soldiers, I’m 
sure. . . .”
 But Luzhin rarely grew enlivened during these conversations. On the 
other hand, constantly nudged by such interrogations, his thoughts would 
return again and again to the sphere of his childhood.61
The iconic references to Freudianism are unmistakable, as is Luzhin’s lack 
of receptivity to this method. The novel refocuses vividly upon Luzhin’s 
childhood, which now takes on an utterly different significance in his own 
reminiscences than it might in a psychoanalytic interpretation. His recol-
lections evoke in him a feeling of warmth; even his once-dreaded govern-
ess, whose entrapment between floors in the elevator Luzhin often relished 
in youth, is a fond presence in remembered childhood. And yet, strangely 
and even paradoxically enough, this memory with its “tender constric-
tion”62 comes back empty, just like the elevator that has taken her as if up 
to heaven. Luzhin’s nostalgia for his truncated childhood cannot bring it 
back. The glimpse of it we are given suggests that, although unconven-
tional, Luzhin’s childhood experiences carried a value and perhaps also a 
magic in them that—although in the past, lost—represents a positive sig-
nificance in his life, rather than a source for neurosis.
 The remainder of the novel consists of his wife’s efforts to protect 
Luzhin from all reminders of chess, while the chess world inevitably, 
relentlessly finds its way back to him, apparently causing his final panic 
and escape out the window. This presents readers with two choices: (1) 
Luzhin’s demise is caused by chess and, most immediately, by his “chess 
father” Valentinov; or (2) it is caused by the psychiatrist and his pre-
scription for Luzhin’s recovery. It might seem most logical to assume that 
Nabokov would wish to pin the blame on Freud, whose disciple has driven 
the vulnerable character to insanity through his manipulations: “‘Horror, 
suffering, despair,’ said the doctor quietly, ‘those are what this exhausting 
game gives rise to.’ And he proved to Luzhin that Luzhin himself was well 
aware of this, that Luzhin was unable to think of chess without a feeling 
of revulsion, and in some mysterious fashion Luzhin, melting and corus-
cating, and blissfully relaxing, agreed with his reasoning.”63 Our atten-
tion is frequently drawn to the professor’s “agate eyes” and his soothing 
tone, and one really wonders whether he might be hypnotizing Luzhin 
(“he proved to Luzhin . . . ; Luzhin . . . agreed”). Most likely, Luzhin is in 
a suggested state of suppressed chess-interest, and his surreptitious, con-
fusing, and incomplete emergence from this state finally combines with 
a disjointed vision of life’s relentless patterning, causing him to seek an 
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escape. Much of the evidence points in this direction. Although such a 
solution also amounts to a causal explanation of Luzhin’s actions, it does 
not explain his chess gift or his predilection for seeing patterns and repeti-
tions. The causal chain might be rather compared here to a game of chess 
itself, where each action evokes an unpredictable reaction.
 Luzhin’s decision to “leave the game” relates to how we interpret the 
construction of his character, and how that character experiences and 
responds to the world around it. One of the key assumptions that has 
guided most critics’ readings of The Defense is the notion that the best out-
come for Luzhin is for him to live a happy, balanced life, perhaps regain-
ing his chess abilities, perhaps not, but in any event experiencing a loving 
relationship with his spouse, Mrs. Luzhin (who has no other name in the 
novel). It is a tempting vision—after all, it is what most people want for 
themselves (substituting some personal interest in the place of chess, and 
adding perhaps a child or two). However, there is nothing in the novel that 
would suggest to us that such an ordinary, bourgeois existence is inher-
ently desirable, or that it is in all situations the best alternative.64 Indeed, 
the bourgeois existence of Mrs. Luzhin’s parents is subjected to significant 
irony throughout the novel. Luzhin’s case is very special, and the novel 
forces us to question whether he is at all suited to such a life. We need to 
explore what his options really are.
 The beginning of the novel offers us a peek back into the chessmaster’s 
childhood, through the memories brought on during his convalescence 
(this relationship between a childhood experience and its future recollec-
tion is one of Nabokov’s favorite themes). What we find recalled is a child-
hood that, for all its strangeness, seems essentially sweet and wondrous, as 
we see in these memories of Luzhin’s governess:
Many years later, in an unexpected year of lucidity and enchantment, it 
was with swooning delight that he recalled these hours of reading on the 
veranda, buoyed up by the sough of the garden. The recollection was 
saturated with sunshine and the sweet, inky taste of the sticks of licorice, 
bits of which she used to hack off with blows of her penknife and per-
suade him to hold under his tongue. And the tacks he had once placed 
on the wickerwork seat destined, with crisp, crackling sounds, to receive 
her obese croup were in retrospect equivalent with the sunshine and the 
sounds of the garden, and the mosquito fastening onto his skinned knee 
and blissfully raising its rubescent abdomen. A ten-year-old boy knows 
his knees well, in detail—the itchy swelling that had been scrabbled till it 
bled, the white traces of fingernails on the suntanned skin, and all those 
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scratches which are the appended signatures of sand grains, pebbles and 
sharp twigs.65
It was, to him, a cherished and safe existence, despite his fragile makeup; 
so that the news of his having to leave home and the regular routine of life 
with his governess (whose initial acceptance by him had been equally tur-
bulent) causes him great distress. “His daily morning walks with the gov-
erness—always along the same streets, along the Nevsky and back home, 
by way of the Embankment, would never be repeated. [ . . . ] Finished also 
were his agreeable after lunch musings on the sofa, beneath the tiger rug, 
and at the stroke of two, his milk in a silver cup. [ . . . ] In exchange for all 
this came something new, unknown and therefore hideous, an impossible, 
unacceptable world. . . .” Not, perhaps, an extraordinary childhood, but 
one filled with many pleasures and with a high degree of sensitivity on 
little Luzhin’s part. But already we see signs of danger: his parent’s fear 
of him, his difficulty adjusting to change around him, his preference for 
losing himself in abstractions like mathematics. In addition, he inherently 
attracts “hatred and derisive curiosity” from other boys; there is no hope 
of him fitting in, or becoming a normal part of childhood or grownup 
social structures. Only when he discovers chess does he begin to acquire 
an existence that seems commensurate with his own inner life: “‘It must 
be a great pleasure,’ his father had said, ‘to assimilate music in its natural 
state.’ It was a similar pleasure that Luzhin himself now began to expe-
rience as he skimmed fluently over the letters and numbers representing 
moves.” There are signs that chess is for Luzhin more than a mere obses-
sion. Consider the first time he ever plays, with that same aunt with whom 
Luzhin Sr. is having an affair: when she repeatedly attempts to put him off 
and delay the lesson till another time, Luzhin exhibits his surprising pas-
sion: “‘No, now,’ said Luzhin and suddenly kissed her hand. ‘That was 
sweet of you,’ his aunt said softly. ‘I never expected such tenderness. . . .’” 
Even before he has played the game, he watches his classmates, “feeling 
vaguely that he understood the game better than these two, although he 
was completely ignorant of how it should be conducted.” Once his chess 
“vision” is unveiled, he is able to read the notation of chess moves, “per-
ceiving their melody mentally through the numbers and signs.” Luzhin’s 
chess activity is described as a kind of contact with another dimension, 
the world of “chess forces” and concepts. He enjoys playing blindfold, 
because “one did not have to deal with visible, audible, palpable pieces 
whose quaint shape and wooden materiality always disturbed him and 
always seemed to him but the crude, mortal shell of exquisite, invisible 
a n T i - P S y C h O l O g i C a l

chess forces. When playing blind he was able to sense these diverse forces 
in their original purity.” During his match with his archrival Turati, this 
world of pure chess forces encroaches further and further into everyday 
life, leading finally to his delirium during the suspended game (there is a 
certain logic to this formulation: it makes sense that Luzhin might find 
it impossible to step out of the chess world in the process of unfinished 
play). Nabokov encourages us to believe that Luzhin is indeed in a tran-
scendent state of mind, one where pure ideas—in this case, the interactions 
of chess forces—are the most immanent reality. This is a world of beauty, 
not unlike music—as Luzhin is told by the violinist who first shows him 
the chessboard, echoed by Luzhin’s attraction to a game’s “melody.” If we 
accept that this portrait of Luzhin’s mind is accurate, then we are left with 
a mystery: why is Luzhin a “chess genius”?66
 Is Luzhin’s final unhinging caused by the psychiatrist, or by his wife, or 
by his “chess father” Valentinov? Let’s examine once again the contribut-
ing factors. The psychiatrist, with Mrs. Luzhin’s complicity, attempts to 
expunge chess from Luzhin’s life as if it were a mental cancer. Certainly 
this course of action sets the stage for Luzhin’s rediscovery of chess and the 
inexorable slippage in his mind between its ethereal world and the physi-
cal world around him. Valentinov, so urgently attempting to have Luzhin 
reenact his match with Turati, completes a pattern that Luzhin recognizes 
as a repetition. In Nabokov’s works such patterns often have meaningful 
implications, and in this case Luzhin descries an analogy between patterns 
in a game of chess and patterns in his life.
 Luzhin is one of the few characters in Nabokov’s novels who observe 
these meaningful repetitions, and his ability to notice them is surely related 
to his chess gift—just as Fyodor’s ability is part of his artistic one in The 
Gift. Luzhin, however, is more extreme: his engagement with the world of 
ideas and concepts is so intense that it removes him from his ordinary life 
(as does Fyodor’s when he is writing). Already on two occasions, he has 
had attacks of delirium: at his first achievement of fame as a child chess 
prodigy (which caused him to run away from home), and at his champi-
onship match with Turati. In short, Luzhin is by nature easily overcome 
by the world of concepts.67 The ordinary world has only a tenuous hold 
on him; he is more at home on the plane of chess forces and ideas: “he 
accepted this external life as something inevitable but completely uninter-
esting.” His situation is not unlike that of Cincinnatus in Invitation, who is 
vividly out of place in his slapdash surroundings. In other words, Luzhin’s 
perception of and affinity with an ideal realm, exemplified by chess forces, 
makes him ill-suited for the world around him, which is generally so much 
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more concrete than the one of abstract “chess forces.” In the prosaic tour-
naments Valentinov relentlessly had guided him to, Luzhin’s chess abili-
ties gradually seemed to decline, despite a continuing inner creativity: “the 
bolder his imagination, the livelier his invention during his secret work 
between matches, the more oppressive became his feeling of helpless-
ness when the contest began and the more timidly and circumspectly he 
played.” His decline from the very top, superstar level into a “cautious, 
impenetrable, prosaic player” seems to have to do with his performance 
at matches—that is, in the world—rather than with his harmony with 
“chess forces,” which was now manifest only during “secret work between 
matches.”68
 His fall from preeminence is unmistakably associated with his exploi-
tation by Valentinov, whose concerns are exclusively prosaic and material-
istic. Valentinov “had a peculiar theory that the development of Luzhin’s 
gift for chess was connected with the development of the sexual urge, that 
with him chess represented a special deflection of this urge, and fearing 
lest Luzhin should squander his precious power in releasing by natural 
means the beneficial inner tension, he kept him at a distance from women 
and rejoiced over his chaste moroseness.”69 This obviously Freudian inter-
pretation of Luzhin’s psychology turns out to be patently false within the 
novel’s own logic, for the appearance of a beloved woman in his life coin-
cides with the reemergence of his abilities. If we accept that Luzhin’s early 
relationship with his fiancée is meant to demonstrate a positive mental 
development, then we witness a process, truncated in the novel’s world, 
whereby Luzhin’s chess play and his emotional connection to another 
become mutually reinforcing. However, Luzhin and his wife are not the 
novel’s only characters, and all others conspire to squelch the grandmas-
ter’s consuming passion. In such a world, Luzhin’s very existence becomes 
impossible.
 That is not meant to imply that Luzhin’s end is predestined in any spe-
cific way, but rather it is likely to come sooner rather than later, given his 
incongruity with his environment. In a certain sense, by taking his own 
life Luzhin fleetingly regains earthly control, just before losing it. How-
ever, the nature of his psyche makes it very unlikely that Luzhin would be 
able to remain apart from his beloved chess realm, and this attraction in 
itself works against his physical survival. Luzhin’s mind is drawn to pat-
terns, as it had been even in his earliest childhood before he had heard of 
chess; these patterns, through chess, alienate him more and more from the 
world of physical embodiment. It is not a matter of cause, but rather one 
of essence, which is why at the last instance—while falling—Luzhin recog-
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nizes that he cannot really escape from the play of chess forces; they are 
too much a part of him.
 Mrs. Luzhin also has significant psychological depth: she is not simply 
a person who latches onto a pitiful creature out of an irrepressible drive 
to nurture—although that drive is part of her makeup. Her attraction to 
Luzhin is subtle, finding in him “something pathetic, a charm that was dif-
ficult to define but that she had felt in him from the very first day of their 
acquaintance”; “She wanted to make his acquaintance, talk Russian—so 
attractive did he seem to her with his uncouthness, his gloominess, and 
his low turndown collar that for some reason made him look like a musi-
cian”; there was “no time to sort out” her previous attractions to men, for 
“too much space had been taken up by this taciturn, fantastical, enigmati-
cal man, the most attractive of all the men she had known.” And when she 
has wordlessly (or at least internally) accepted his proposal, she wonders 
“how she could show this man to her father and mother, how could he be 
visualized in their drawing room—a man of a different dimension, with 
a particular form and coloring that was compatible with nothing and no 
one.” In this way, she exhibits a particular, almost uncanny capacity to 
sense the value, or authenticity, or goodness, of people around her. She 
recognizes Luzhin’s superior cultural sensitivity, in spite of his basic igno-
rance and lack of education. She feels the falsity of her Soviet visitor (at 
first the nameless visitor seems “interesting,” but fairly soon Mrs. Luzhin 
concludes that her “opinions were false and stupid—but how prove it?”).70 
Perhaps most significant, this special perceptive capacity comes along 
without any particular evidence of intelligence. Mrs. Luzhin has goodness, 
and the ability to perceive goodness or truthfulness in others, despite the 
unabashed if well-intentioned poshlost’ of her father and mother—and the 
overt anti-Semitism of the latter.
 Her unusual sensitivity comes into special relief at the party she hosts 
in order to bring Luzhin into contact with what she hopes will be positive 
intellectual influences. There appears a “plain looking man” who had just 
been listening to a journalist’s “tortuous idea,” and we learn that Mrs. 
Luzhin
liked him very much, and precisely because of his plainness, the neutrality 
of his features, as if he were himself only the outside of a vessel filled with 
something so sacred and rare that it would be a sacrilege to paint the 
clay. His name was Petrov, not a single thing about him was remarkable, 
he had written nothing, and he lived like a beggar, but never talked about 
it to anyone. His sole function in life was to carry, reverently and with 
C h a P T e r  4
20
concentration, that which had been entrusted to him, something which it 
was necessary at all costs to preserve in all its detail and in all its purity, 
and for that reason he even walked with small careful steps, trying not 
to bump into anyone, and only very seldom, only when he discerned a 
kindred solicitude in the person he was talking to did he reveal for a 
moment—from the whole of that enormous something that he carried 
mysteriously within him—some tender, priceless little trifle, a line from 
Pushkin or the peasant name of a wild flower.71
This is an excellent example of Nabokov’s reformulation of Gogol’s 
mock-classical digressions. But whereas in Gogol the comic asides trail off 
into humorous nonsense, here, this long, irrelevant passage actually goes 
straight to the heart of what matters for Nabokov. He allows his text to 
convey the idea of a person who, although outwardly unremarkable, car-
ries a hidden truth, an “enormous something” that is completely concealed 
by his demeanor. Here we see Nabokov giving his purest impression of 
essentialist psychology. This Petrov—strikingly, one of the very few named 
characters in the novel—makes no other appearance in the story, he has no 
depth of character beyond what appears in this single, unusually penetrat-
ing description. We, as readers, are expected to accept, unquestioningly, 
the truth inherent in the passage about him. But his existence in the novel 
is not so important in itself: what is important, for an interpretation of 
The Defense, is that Mrs. Luzhin intuitively appreciates his “sacred and 
rare” interior or essence. The scene reinforces, just before the novel’s end, 
the notion that she too, despite her flaws and her lack of intellect, nurtures 
a connection to some sort of “truth.” It serves to validate her attraction 
to Luzhin, her love for him, and her sense of his superiority to his sur-
roundings. Yet this fact does not mean that she is infallible, or that she 
understands the things she intuits. Her too-easy acceptance of the bearded 
psychiatrist’s prescription helps set in motion the sequence that leads to 
Luzhin’s paranoia and death. She remains a complex mix of personal 
traits: pity, tenderness, intellectual gullibility, and at the same time an inde-
finable sensibility. Nabokov wants readers to sense this strange, irreducible 
blend and notice Mrs. Luzhin’s not-quite predictable actions. But he does 
not hint at anything that might explain where these traits come from.
 The novel comes across as neutral in regard to Luzhin’s plight. Are we 
to regret his abandonment of the “real world”? Perhaps, to an extent: it 
did hold some charms and delights for Luzhin, at times, as it does for so 
many of Nabokov’s characters. Yet somehow, despite the potential joys of 
living, Luzhin seems likely to have difficulty being at home among ordi-
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nary human beings with their material concerns, callousness, and occa-
sional cruelty. After all, the world of pure chess concepts appears beautiful 
to Luzhin, as well as terrible. When he awakes in the hospital, we are told 
that “the heavenly void in which his transparent thoughts floated was 
being filled from all sides.”72 We can feel sorry at Luzhin’s breakdown, 
and we can understand why he chooses certain acts, based on our under-
standing of his personality and psychology. But we cannot explain—based 
on the novel’s evidence—why Luzhin is the way he is, nor where the line 
between genius and insanity may fall: his individual mental essence lies in 
that domain that is impenetrable to the eyes of science.
The psychological Causality of Crime
In considering the presentation of Luzhin’s inner life and its consequences, 
we had the advantage of an unbiased, omniscient third-person narrator. 
The psychological situation is much more complicated in Despair and Lol-
ita (as also in The Eye) because our only source of information is the very 
character whose mind and motives we want to understand. Even worse, 
these characters report having committed serious crimes. Their narratives 
serve as an effort to justify the crimes or ameliorate the reader’s judgment 
(or possibly, in Humbert’s case, as an act of atonement). Thus we have, 
really, no reason to trust what they say, and we must read everything as 
if it has been shaped with an eye toward manipulating our response. As 
a result, a reading of each text becomes, by default, a reading between 
the lines, an effort to discover places where the villain’s real concerns or 
actions seep through the stylistic veneer. Each story is therefore double: 
we read the confessional narrative, and from the way it communicates its 
content, we draw conclusions about the teller. We attempt to reconstruct 
the man from traces and tracks left in the narrative; this image may have 
little in common with the one we actually read about. It is worth keeping 
in mind Nabokov’s fond topic of the distorting character of even a suppos-
edly faithful autobiography, as in Fyodor’s plan to “twist” his own story 
to render its autobiographical content invisible. Hermann and Humbert 
have as much motivation as any author might to manipulate their readers’ 
impressions.
 The psychological crux of Lolita resides in the following three ques-
tions: what does Humbert want his narrative to do; why does he want 
this; and does he succeed? There are several possible aims Humbert might 
have in mind: he wants to evoke sympathy in his imagined reader or judge; 
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he wants to get revenge (for his abandonment); he wants to transfigure his 
deformity into a work of art as a sort of penance (as he implies). The ques-
tion of sympathy relates to how his rhetorical strategies attempt to provide 
a rationale, hence a cause, for his behavior, with this specific text. If he can 
diminish a judge’s sense of his responsibility for his acts, then he has suc-
ceeded in securing sympathy. The aim of this tactic might be to receive a 
reduced sentence; it also might be to salvage a modicum of self-respect. As 
for revenge—well, Humbert’s pursuit of Quilty is a rather straightforward 
tale of revenge, although whether it reflects Humbert’s “reality” remains 
questionable, if we also accept his moral epiphany as “real.” His recogni-
tion of his acts’ horror, and his evident self-accusation following Dolly’s 
disappearance, opens the way to considering as well how the work might 
function if it is not intended to exculpate the criminal.
 We can’t know whether Humbert’s self-respect is served by his confes-
sion, but to judge from decades of criticism, his effort to evince sympa-
thy is largely successful with first-time readers. How does he do it? As 
is well-known, he adopts a two-fold strategy: first, he offers stories from 
childhood that have allegedly affected his sexual development; second, he 
attempts throughout his story to suggest Lolita’s own culpability and her 
moral failings, and to hint that she is not quite civilized, depraved, even.73 
The second of these has been well rehearsed in recent criticism and need 
not be presented here. Although mitigated near the novel’s end, its net 
effect is to suggest that she is the cause of his and her own downfall, which 
is in a way but a variation on the questions of causes (hence, excuses) we 
turn to next.
 We do not know, but we can accept that Humbert is earnestly inter-
ested in discovering the source of his obsession with pubescent girls. The 
hypothesis that he maps out rests on three components, all of which have 
a Freudian resonance: his mother’s early death (“picnic, lightning”: he was 
three); his aunt’s “fatal rigidity” in certain undisclosed matters (“Perhaps 
she wanted to make of me, in the fullness of time, a better widower than 
my father”);74 and his “fatal,” unconsummated affair with the doomed 
(typhoid fever) Annabel Leigh. He thus proposes a series of psychologi-
cal “causes” for his misfortune. And just in case we are not Freudians, he 
keeps the “F”-word concealed, appealing instead to our mystical inclina-
tions, saying he is “convinced, however, that in a certain magic and fateful 
way Lolita began with Annabel.” This waffling between deterministic and 
predeterministic arguments evokes similar equivocation by Grigory Pecho-
rin, the manipulative lady-killer who wrote “The Fatalist” in Lermontov’s 
A Hero of Our Time, which Nabokov was teaching while writing Lolita. 
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In case we are not fatalists, either, Humbert elaborates his theory of “nym-
phets,” whose “true nature is not human, but nymphic.”75 Freud, McFate, 
or Magic: he has his bases covered. The point of all this is to show how 
Humbert repeatedly suggests that his predilection is out of his control and 
that it has a cause. It may well be beyond his control, but his effort to pin 
it to a source is belied by the sources’ variety, and he is equally uncon-
vinced by all of them—and for precisely this reason he is driven to write 
his narrative. In truth, he has no idea why he is the way he is, and neither 
do we. Nabokov hopes that we will recognize, through various smoke-
screens, that there is no way to determine why Humbert is a pedophile. 
Nabokov suggests that the psychology of crime can be just as mysterious 
as the psychology of art. And he asks us to imagine whether a criminal can 
be an artist, and if so, to ponder the significance of that fact.
 Viewing the confession as both work of art and penance becomes plau-
sible when we recognize that Humbert cannot excuse or justify his acts 
even to his own satisfaction, but he can at least (and at most) make a go 
at self-punishment. An important part of his controversial “moral apo-
theosis” is his claim that, after Dolly’s disappearance, he came to recognize 
his crimes: he had “inflicted” “foul lust” upon her; she was “deprived of 
her childhood by a maniac”; he was “despicable and brutal.”76 He rue-
fully confesses his own willed ignorance of her inner life. He does not even 
propose that his confession might atone for his acts, only that it is a “treat-
ment for [his] misery,” a “very local palliative.” This repentance, if we 
accept it as such, raises a special problem. Humbert the individual can 
both hold within himself a cruel and brutal monster who subjects his vic-
tim to living hell; and he can be a person who acknowledges his foul deeds 
and feels extreme pain and remorse at what he has done, using his last 
strength to generate something “good,” a work of art honoring Lolita-
Dolly, from what he has learned.
 This possibility is real in the novel, even if it does not convince all read-
ers, as we can judge from Nabokov’s statement that Humbert becomes a 
“moral man” at his story’s end. If we accept that Humbert’s “Lolita” rep-
resents an act of contrition, and perhaps of penance, then we must accept 
the extraordinary psychological enigma of a deeply intelligent, gifted, elo-
quent individual, with a powerful imagination, who can simultaneously 
harbor a capacity for deeply inhuman behavior. We must also accept that 
such an egotistical monster can somehow achieve a capacity for love and 
respect for others. In the works of many authors, as in Dostoevsky, this 
kind of transformation is presented within Christian structures; accord-
ingly, Humbert mentions his attempt to adopt the Catholic faith, but he 
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“was unable to transcend the fact that whatever spiritual solace I might 
find, . . . nothing could make my Lolita forget the foul lust I had inflicted 
upon her.”77 Humbert’s escape from his solipsism precludes him from 
finding actual solace. In rejecting what faith might offer him, Humbert 
nevertheless turns to what might be seen as ascetic self-flagellation in com-
posing his confession, forcing himself to relive the moments that constitute 
his guilt and shame—a thunderous echo of Coleridge’s ancient mariner 
(and by coaxing readers to side with him in his exploitation, he forces 
them to glimpse the fragility of their own presumed normality). But even 
if Humbert’s post-crime actions, including his misery, make a certain kind 
of sense, we remain completely ignorant of why he is a pedophile, and of 
how he can be both monster and artist. Despite these apparent contradic-
tions, Humbert remains a remarkably plausible character.
 Similarly, in Despair we are offered various hints that might explain 
Hermann’s obsession with having a double, but we have no real sense of 
why he comes to believe that murder can be an art. Compared to Lolita, 
Despair offers a slightly clearer boundary between fictional “world” and 
narrator’s narcissistic self-aggrandizement—his “light-hearted, inspired 
lying” notwithstanding.78 Hermann, luckily, is not a psychiatrist-manqué; 
however, he does employ a dizzying variety of Freudianesque imagery to 
accompany his tale. At the historical time he is “writing” (around 1930–
31), Freudianism was already a cultural industry, and we cannot exclude 
that Hermann himself, like Humbert, uses psychoanalytic discourse to 
create an attempted justification for his acts. However, he is to the end 
unapologetic: he does not seek to exculpate himself, but rather takes pride 
in his deed until his error—the overlooked walking stick—is brought to 
light. Since Hermann does not seem to be attempting to offer a Freud-
ian alibi for his actions, the novel’s phallic and mythological dimensions 
belong to the implied author’s sphere of influence, not Hermann’s; they 
serve as the author’s method for aligning Hermann’s thought process with 
that of a discredited social fad. By filling the murderer’s surroundings with 
mock-sexual tokens, giving him, in effect, a phallic obsession that he seems 
not to notice, Nabokov may be suggesting that Hermann has a perverse 
sexual fixation that makes him akin to Freud. Hermann himself mentions, 
but seems not to dwell upon, certain childhood events that might be given 
a psychoanalytic twist: “for such sweet lying my mother would give me a 
cuff on the ear, my father thrash me with a riding whip which had once 
been a bull’s sinew. That did not dismay me in the least—rather, it fur-
thered the flight of my fancies. With a stunned ear and burning buttocks, 
I would lie on my belly among the tall weeds in the orchard, and whistle 
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and dream.” Nabokov tempts us with the possibility that poor parenting 
might have caused Hermann’s amorality, but he simultaneously mocks this 
idea: after all, Hermann could be lying even now.79
 There also lurks beneath the surface his wife’s affair—perhaps it is just 
sexual play—with Ardalion, her “cousin,” from whom Hermann seems 
to want to escape. But we do not really have enough biographical details 
about Hermann to distinguish, a), why he should have a phallus/castra-
tion complex as the novel’s imagery implies or, b), why he should choose 
murder as a solution to his financial problems.80 The novel’s shock comes 
not so much from the idea that Hermann resorts to desperate measures 
like murder and insurance fraud, but from his conviction that such an act 
could be considered art. He too, like Humbert, considers his meeting with 
Felix to be a sign of fate, a mechanism that continues its work as time 
passes: “But what, above all, gave me delight, delight of such force and 
ripeness that it was difficult to bear, consisted in the fact that Felix of his 
own accord, without any prompting from me, had reappeared and was 
offering me his services; nay, more: was commanding me to make use of 
his services and, withal doing everything I wished, was relieving me of any 
responsibility that might be incurred by the fatal succession of events.”81 
Nabokov here openly parodies the revulsion and fatal mechanism found 
in Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment, but with a twist. Like Raskol-
nikov, Hermann swears off his aim (“what a fascinating thought; to take 
the advice of fate and, now, at once, leave that room, forever leave and 
forget, and spare my poor double.[ . . . ] I was now superstitiously keen to 
turn away from temptation for ever”).82 When he thinks, erroneously, that 
Felix has come to find him at his home, right when he most fears to see 
him, he tells the maid to send him off. But when he discovers his mistake, 
that it was not Felix after all, the error changes his mood. Unlike Raskol-
nikov, whose passion was rekindled by an actual coincidence (he hears a 
merchant discussing the pawnbroker just when he has given up his horri-
ble thought), Hermann is spurred by a noncoincidence—a coincidence that 
occurs in his mind but not in reality—thus emphasizing the purely inner 
source of his depravity (“My passion for my double was surging anew”; 
“One day something very like somnambulism took me to a certain lane I 
knew well, and so there I was moving nearer and nearer to the magnetic 
point that had become the peg of my being”).83 Hermann’s brief wavering, 
whether based on morality or simple squeamishness, is the only sign we 
have that he perceives the horror of his plan. Considering the cold-blooded 
assurance with which he follows it through, one wonders that he wavered 
at all.
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 Hermann’s repugnance is tangible, but its cause is elusive. His author 
endows him with a variety of psychological deformities: amorality, sex-
ual deviation, narcissism, and aesthetic blindness. He also makes him 
an atheist and Soviet sympathizer, a rather ironic position for a business 
proprietor, albeit a failed one. However, these psychological traits are not 
organized to show a causal relation: rather, it seems that they are lumped 
together as if inherently united. Hermann’s fixation on having a double, 
his inability to notice or value individuals and differences, derives from his 
innate makeup. His lying, from childhood on, and his indifference to the 
needs or feelings of people around him, suggest rather a fundamental flaw, 
a manifestation of essential evil in the guise of an educated and sophis-
ticated man, one who for the most part manages to pass himself off as 
decent. Humbert, for all his crimes, appears not to be amoral. Hermann, 
in contrast, simply cannot value the existence of another human being, a 
trait that Nabokov, by repeated association, connects to the imagery of 
Freudian-style sexual obsession. Nabokov wants to suggest that Freudian-
ism itself is like Hermann, despite its respectable public appearance.
The nonanalyzable and the limits of psychology
If in Despair the concern with Freudian theory is latent but central, in Pnin 
it comes out into the open, while also becoming peripheral. Written imme-
diately after Lolita, Pnin exhibits Nabokov’s most elaborate confrontation 
with the psychoanalytical establishment; it is his first novel with analysts 
as significant characters. Nabokov read scholarly books and research 
journals in producing his parodic image—a parody which is nevertheless 
drawn straight from actual scientific journals. The main character, Rus-
sian Professor Timofey Pnin, is the ex-husband of a devoted student of 
Freudianism. She left him for another Freudian, with whom she had a son, 
Victor. This poor lad, we discover, becomes the object of his parents’ pas-
sionate Oedipal expectations, and he is brought up in accordance with all 
the latest psychoanalytic theories. Remarkably, Victor fails to conform to 
Freudian or any other norms, and also fails to be emotionally harmed by 
the extraordinary pressures his parents have brought to bear on him. He 
is an artist, and his psychic world appears to be directed more from the 
inside than from the outside. Subjected to a gamut of psychological pro-
file tests, Victor’s personal essence remains inaccessible to the scientist’s 
quantifying probes. For his part, the narrator seems to encourage a sense 
of mockery directed at these tests. Victor is “tested psychometrically at 
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the Institute,” where he undergoes a whole battery of tests, some possibly 
invented and some derived from sources Nabokov was consulting while 
at work on the novel.84 The tests are apparently meant to demonstrate the 
absurdity of psychoanalytic—and much psychological—study of the pre-
ceding half-century.85
 This shared mockery, however, conceals an irony that is lost on the 
narrator himself. For he is, or appears to be, just the kind of “psycho-
logical novelist” whom Hermann mentions during Despair. The narrator, 
V.V., wants to define Pnin for his readers, to create a definitive image for 
them. This puts him in an awkward position. He seems to feel that his 
credentials for producing such a portrait would be strengthened if only 
he could demonstrate some kind of personal closeness with Pnin. Having 
rescued Pnin, perhaps, from the grotesque distortions of Professor Cock-
erell’s impersonations, the narrator wants to have his own way with him, 
and to do so with Pnin’s consent if not with his blessing. However, unlike 
Lermontov’s Pechorin from A Hero of Our Time, Pnin does not hand over 
his notebooks and invite his chronicler to peer into his soul. If the narra-
tor’s remarks are to be believed at all, Pnin does not even allow V.V. to 
get a good look at him, much less speak to him, as he leaves Waindell in 
the closing pages. Pnin is unwilling to be defined by anyone—even as a 
unique individual.86 His actions, as far as we can gather from this some-
what unreliable narrator, seem profoundly “normal” and free of any sort 
of neurotic or pathological component. Nevertheless, the narrator cannot 
really get close to a picture of the inner man. The thoughts and feelings 
he projects onto Pnin are creative and plausible—he imagines Pnin seeing 
the ghosts of deceased friends and family before his lecture at Cremona, 
in chapter 1, and he imagines his pain on remembering Nina Belochkin in 
chapter 5—but they do not dip into deeper strains of psychological moti-
vation, such as why Pnin refused to work with him, or why he continues 
to love his vapid, exploitative, unfeeling ex-wife (he cannot love Betty Bliss 
because “his heart belonged to another.”)87 In this way, the narrator shows 
the limits of his ability to imagine, respectfully, the inner life of another. 
Of course, there are most likely reasons behind this reticence that relate 
as well to the narrator’s own desire for privacy (he conceals, or pretends 
to conceal, his own affair with Liza Bogolepova-Pnin-Wind), and so his 
desire to protect himself makes it impossible for him to explore Pnin as 
fully as he might.
 Pnin was born as an “Anti-Freudian story.” On one note card, Nabokov 
focuses on the creation of a character who defies Freudian stereotypes and, 
like Victor Wind in the novel, is “not even a nail-biter.” Even the epithet 
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“impregnable” appears in both notes and novel, as do most of the initial 
comments about Victor’s “abnormality.”88 Pnin’s ex-wife Liza and her sec-
ond husband Eric Wind are co-authors, with Dr. Albina Dunkelberg, of 
“Group Psychotherapy Applied to Marriage Counseling.” This fictitious 
study derives from the real article “Group Therapy in Sexual Maladjust-
ment,”89 which Nabokov called in his notes “one of the most grotesque 
and hilariously funny ‘papers’ I have ever seen”; he produced five full note 
cards for future reference. The fact that both Liza and Eric remarry during 
the novel further undermines the value of their psychoanalytical work as 
marriage specialists.
 The narrator is clearly well aware of these ironies, and he shares Nabo-
kov’s scorn for the mass-culture phenomenon of Freudian psychoanalysis. 
He appears more interested in the rule-bound aesthetic shape of Pnin’s life, 
as opposed to a Freudian explanation of his personal quirks. After all, Pnin 
is not described as having any particular neuroses. Young Victor Wind is 
“abnormal” only in his resistance to Freudian or Jungian categorization. If 
the narrator has chosen Pnin as an attractive, idiosyncratic character for a 
“type” portrait, he is interested in the determinism of personality as such, 
but not in seeking formulaic causes for individuals’ traits. He seems to 
accept and take an interest in Pnin’s personality, in his individual self, even 
if this self is set within a network of causal relationships that determine its 
actions in varying degrees. In this approach he follows William James, at 
least as he expresses himself in Principles of Psychology. Pnin’s desire for 
privacy is, in part, Nabokov’s own—but it is also representative of that 
fundamental inaccessibility of anybody’s inmost self to all outside observ-
ers, no matter what the approach (as Nabokov had discussed in “Pushkin, 
or the Real and the Plausible”). V.V. may have hoped to be able to offer 
his readers a glimpse of “The Real Life of Timofey Pnin,” but his effort 
fails, just as disaster miscarries in his first chapter. Except in its most basic 
elements—as an explanation of details of sensory perception and other 
physiological phenomena—psychology, for Nabokov, does not reveal the 
secrets of self. The secrets—or “mysteries,” as they are called in Bend Sin-
ister—always escape, even when the investigator is not a Freudian.
 Pnin falls in with those works that steer clear of exploring the actual 
psychological functioning of their characters, despite, or perhaps because 
of, their anti-Freudian intent. Others in this group include Ada and Trans-
parent Things. Ada is certainly Nabokov’s least psychologically nuanced 
first-person narrative, an irony made all the more acute by Van’s career as 
a psychiatrist. The closest thing Van provides to any sort of psychological 
self-revelation is in his description of his aesthetic and erotic responses to 
Ada’s physical being. We are invited to form an ethical judgment of his and 
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Ada’s actions toward Lucette, but there are no psychological treasures hid-
den here. The lovers’ behavior is guided by their narcissism, and its appar-
ent consequence—Lucette’s death—brings them real remorse. However, 
except perhaps as demonstration studies for Lombroso’s parallel between 
genius and mental disturbance (if we assume this narcissism to be such a 
disturbance), Ada and Van do not offer readers much psychological grist. 
They love; they frolic; they (especially Van) become jealous; they produce 
creative works; they separate and reunite. They blindly spark Lucette’s 
feelings for Van, which seem to be a blend of erotic and romantic love.
 Lucette’s obsessive love in her adult years is somewhat mysterious, 
and it presents the novel’s most authentic psychological riddle. Was her 
love for Van caused by witnessing her siblings’ intimacy when she was 
eight years old? Was it deepened by Van’s gift of a book of poems, given 
as a distraction so he and Ada could have their own fun away from her 
“cucumicolour eye”?90 Why, finally, is it such a despairing love, such that 
Lucette decides that if she cannot possess Van at least physically, her life 
is not worth living? Readers of the novel know essentially nothing about 
Lucette’s inner life, a surprising fact considering the central role she plays 
in the novel’s architectonics as defined in the most powerful readings of 
it.91 According to Brian Boyd, Lucette is the fulcrum on which the work’s 
ethical balance pivots; she is the selfless counterpoint to the immeasurably 
self-absorbed Van and Ada. Of course, our ignorance as readers must be a 
reflection of Van’s own—he is our only guide to Antiterra. For a psychia-
trist, he is surprisingly reticent about his own and his sisters’ conscious or 
subconscious motives.
 In fact, we cannot know why Lucette takes her own life—and Van’s 
refusal to attempt a more complex but nevertheless fictitious account of 
her psychology suggests his recognition of its essentially secret nature. In 
this sense, Lucette’s act is kin to some other suicides in Nabokov’s works: 
like Hazel Shade’s in Pale Fire, or Luzhin’s in The Defense, or the boy’s 
in “Signs and Symbols,” there are partial explanations in certain causal 
chains, but no complete revelation of why the suffering mind decides it 
must escape.92 Causes may be as plentiful as we like, but psychological rea-
sons can still remain beyond reach, mysterious.
The Minds of others
Lucette, like the Shades and like the Vane sisters, appears to be able after 
death to influence the living, and this strange fact has its own implications, 
perhaps deriving from Nabokov’s understanding of how minds relate 
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to each other and exist in ways that go beyond the individual’s discrete, 
cranium-bound existence. Usually, this lingering influence is interpreted 
by critics as essentially spectral, as in Vladimir Alexandrov’s Nabokov’s 
Otherworld, and there is every reason to believe that Nabokov had such 
readings in mind (whether or not he believed in such phenomena as 
“real”). But he also, most likely, entertained other possibilities—versions 
which he expressed more directly in the 1920s and early 1930s. In at least 
two compositions, his commemorative piece on Iulii Aikhenvald (1928) 
and The Eye (1930), Nabokov made suggestions about the continued exis-
tence of the deceased within the minds of those who knew them.
 In “In Memory of Iu. I. Aikhenvald,” Nabokov expresses his grief 
over the untimely accidental death of his dear friend. The commemoration 
exudes not only respect but also love, combined with the bitterness of loss. 
“Iu. I. is no more,” he writes, but he then revises that sentiment to suggest 
that Aikhenvald continues on in the minds of his friends, acquaintances, 
and even readers. “Oh yes, there is an earthly possibility of immortality. 
The deceased continues to live, in detailed and varied form, in the souls of 
everyone who knew him [ . . . ] And each acquaintance has assimilated an 
individual version of the person, so that the deceased remains on earth in 
many forms, sometimes harmoniously supplementing one another.”93 This 
passage, perhaps out of sentimentality, perhaps out of an unwillingness 
to let go, or perhaps simply out of conviction, strongly suggests that this 
lingering existence is not exactly a mere memory. It proposes that some-
thing more substantial takes place between two minds when they know 
one another, and that others’ imprints in our minds are permanent and 
carry with them tangible psychological consequences. This same thought 
is echoed by Smurov in The Eye (1930), who, having shot himself, already 
believes himself to be nothing but this lingering presence in others’ minds, 
through the inertia of life that carries the mind past the boundary of death. 
If the “ghosts” in works like Pale Fire and Ada are of this type—mental 
fragments, as it were, of the departed, rather than creatures of a more tra-
ditional “otherworld,” it would represent a striking hypothesis on Nabo-
kov’s part: that an individual’s mind, or psychology, is composed of layers 
of impressions left by others, in addition to whatever might be identified as 
a fundamental “self.” From this perspective, one person’s psychology takes 
on even more “mysteries” than had been hinted at in Krug’s musings in 
Bend Sinister. Maybe Lucette lives on in her reflections in Van’s and Ada’s 
minds; but if she does, then those minds are not quite the unitary agents 
that their owners feel them to be. These possible figments of others’ selves 
lurking in each person’s consciousness complicate the task of defining one 
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individual’s psychology, as they multiply the number of influencing factors 
present in the mental foreground and background.94
 This is the very problem that animates Pale Fire, in which several char-
acters appear to have significant influence upon the mental lives of others, 
even from the grave, as it were. As Charles Kinbote composes the com-
mentary, foreword, and index, there are three dead characters, only one of 
whom he knew directly—John Shade. This novel seems to offer a compos-
ite of two stories: the story of Shade’s effort to understand and appreciate 
his own life and his daughter’s death; and the story of Kinbote’s fantastical 
invention of a world called Zembla. In each case, the reader is confronted 
with direct narration by the person in question—Shade in his poem, Kin-
bote in his commentary. Both narratives have a blatantly psychological 
purpose: the poem is Shade’s verbal exploration of his own sensations and 
responses to life’s trials; the commentary is Kinbote’s complicated effort to 
transform his deepest anxieties into a completely new verbal texture—to 
present his life history in a new form and associate it with great poetry. 
His need to do this derives in part from his homosexuality, a trait which 
gives him significant unease, especially during his dreams.95 Curiously, his 
story does not suggest any cause for his homosexuality. Indeed, there is 
little or nothing we can derive from the story about the “real” Kinbote-
Botkin. That he is homosexual, we can be confident: the Zembla story has 
all the markings of a wish-fulfillment fantasy, depicting a land where male 
homosexuality is unconstrained and even an elite practice. In its flagrant 
libidinousness, the narrative short-circuits any Freudian investigation: 
there is no coded language, no hidden message of illicit sexual urges here. 
Everything is in the open. This novel, like Despair, is bursting with false 
trails for psychoanalytic interpretation (such as the long tunnel the King 
uses for his escape—formerly used for his ancestor’s trysts with an actress; 
the red caps; the Steinmanns). But in the end, like all such trails, they lead 
us nowhere, and we are left in near total ignorance of the “real life” of 
the scholar “V. Botkin,” Kinbote’s alter ego. If we presume that Kinbote-
Botkin’s acquaintance with Shade was an important source of a tenuous 
inner equilibrium, the latter’s death marked the end of such balance, and it 
is all he can do to finish writing his “commentary.” Shade’s murder, which 
Kinbote feels he has indirectly caused, has undone him, removing his only 
access to the creative investigation of self. He finds another outlet in the 
commentary, which sustains him until it is complete. Of his psychologi-
cal underpinnings, we can only say that he seems to lack the “indecent” 
optimism that Nabokov himself experienced.96 Nevertheless, despite our 
general sense that Botkin-Kinbote’s sexuality has something to do with 
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his suicidal tendency and his need to create an alternate reality, we do not 
really have any access to the person who generates these phantasms, and it 
is hard to see how the texts he has left us give us conclusive insight into his 
psychological being.
 Hazel’s path is just as mysterious. Although the immediate precursor of 
her death is her rejection by Pete Dean, it is hard to accept that this char-
acter would kill herself merely because she cannot be physically attractive 
to men. One might criticize Shade for heightening her opportunities to 
face rejection in a world that values surface appearances. But can it really 
be true that the Shades have been so fully swayed by popular norms that 
they collude in destroying Hazel’s self-esteem? Can the intelligent Hazel 
have set such a high value on those norms? It seems unlikely, although her 
chosen doom is particularly unnerving. Still, Hazel could have other rea-
sons that would motivate, reinforce, or confirm her decision to depart this 
world, having more to do with her tendency to have spectral encounters 
than with her looks. Hazel may leave the world because she feels out of 
place in it—like Cincinnatus, but without his worldly attachments. But we 
cannot really say with confidence: we only know that Shade feels despair 
at her physical deformity.
artistic psychology: The Fragility of Genius
Alongside these various psychological studies of variously “normal” and 
“abnormal” individuals, Nabokov presents as well the psychological por-
trait of the creative type, from two essential points of view: the psycho-
logically “normal” or balanced, and the “abnormal” or mentally ill. A 
curiosity about the mental conditions of artistic creation was fundamental 
to Nabokov’s thinking from early on; his 1918 reading list included both 
Cezar Lombroso’s Genius and Insanity and Grigorii Aleksandrovskii’s 
On the Psychology of Poetic Creation. On one side of this equation, the 
likes of Hermann, Humbert, Van, and Kinbote all create something while 
in variously compromised mental states, although they do not all qualify 
as artists. By contrast, Fyodor in The Gift, Sebastian in The Real Life of 
Sebastian Knight, John Shade in Pale Fire, and Vadim Vadimich in Look 
at the Harlequins! are presented as artists first and foremost, albeit with 
varying degrees of perceived “sanity.”
 Nabokov’s interest in the psychology of the artist would probably have 
led him to explore works by Freud and by Otto Rank in this connection, 
and it also reminds us of his reading of Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as 
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a Young Man. Rank’s Art and Artist came out in English in 1932, offering 
its vision of the emergence and meaning of the artist-hero type in modern 
culture. It also presented the concept of the neurotic as an artist-manqué—
an image so important to both Despair and Lolita.97
 The Gift’s Fyodor is both the most autobiographical and by far the san-
est of these artist-characters, and for this reason it is not surprising that his 
method of perception and composition anticipates Nabokov’s own mem-
oir, Speak, Memory, in many ways. What we see in Fyodor is Nabokov’s 
portrait of how an artist with stable and reliable senses and mind perceives 
the world and transforms it into art. And that is almost all he does: every-
thing he perceives in the course of the novel is material for future works, 
finally coalescing into the novel itself, in a strange, distorting way.
 As a psychological portrait, The Gift leaves us without any sense of 
initial causes, and this is just what the novel’s title leads us to expect. In 
effect, the novel seeks to prove the inexplicability of Fyodor’s creative 
urge, and in doing so it reenacts possible psychological investigations. The 
first chapter includes a lengthy recapitulation of Fyodor’s first published 
book of poems, written in a Proustian mode of recovering childhood. One 
remarkable feature of these poems is how they demonstrate the translation 
of the ordinary into the artistic: lost and found balls, trips to the dentist, 
the winding of clocks. Events that might constitute the trivia of any young 
life become the stuff of poetry and enhanced vision. They are the possibili-
ties offered at every step to the alert consciousness with an eye for pattern. 
The novel, as we read it and reread it, comes to express this idea of con-
sciousness as the creator of its own artistic reality. We learn that Fyodor 
believes that “there is something” behind his reality, even though there is 
“no one to thank” for the riches of existence, or for this artistic sensibility 
that allows him to appreciate those riches.98
 What might be called the abnormalities of the artist’s personality come 
out during moments of intense creative work. While thinking up verse on 
the street, Fyodor wanders blindly into traffic where, thankfully, “some-
thing preserved him”; about to leave for a masked ball to meet with Zina, 
he hesitatingly takes up his pen to correct a word in his “Life of Cherny-
shevsky”—and when next he looks up, the ball is over and Zina’s door 
angrily slams, his own mask lying unused beside his manuscript.99 Fyodor 
also turns out to be subject to mild hallucinations, or enhanced imaginary 
conversations with the image of his poetic rival, Koncheyev. On the whole, 
however, he possesses many features of a psychologically normal, opti-
mistic, and likeable character, even though Zina will at times “be wildly 
unhappy” with him.100 This image probably comes fairly close to how 
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Nabokov saw himself as a human being and as an artist—although his 
foreword suggests that Koncheyev and Vladimirov are nearer approxima-
tions.101 Pale Fire’s John Shade is but another version of this same concept, 
Nabokov’s assertion of the plausibility, contrary to Freud and Lombroso, 
of a normal artist.
 But such a creature’s existence did not reduce the fascination of the 
less balanced artistic types, and so it is no surprise that the latter are also 
important Nabokovian characters. In The Real Life of Sebastian Knight, 
the title character is a writer with a significantly gloomier outlook than 
Fyodor’s. He is unable to find happiness with the kind, loving, and devoted 
Clare Bishop, and he is passionately drawn to a rather superficial Russian 
femme fatale who severely undervalues him (and he her, she suggests). V., 
his brother and the book’s narrator, calls Sebastian’s thinking “a dazzling 
succession of gaps”;102 he is, apparently, significantly more mysterious and 
also stranger than Fyodor. Nevertheless, it is not this one love that defines 
him—and in the end, a major point of the novel is that Sebastian cannot 
be captured biographically or psychologically.
 Vadim Vadimych of Look at the Harlequins!, inasmuch as he is a par-
ody of the public misperceptions of Nabokov’s biography and character, 
possesses many traits that invert the ones Nabokov confesses as his own 
in Speak, Memory, Strong Opinions, and in letters to friends. Somewhat 
comically, Vadim is obsessed with a mental deficiency that prevents him 
from imaginatively spinning on his heel after a short stroll and retracing 
his steps through a landscape, a trait that indicates his imaginative one-
dimensionality. He continues to write novels and poems, becomes famous, 
has three unsuccessful marriages and finally, late in life, finds his true love, 
a young woman his daughter’s age—while also coming to doubt the inde-
pendence or reality of his own existence. These doubts, of course, are quite 
well-founded within the novel’s logic—he is a parody, after all—and in the 
end readers are not left with the sense that Vadim Vadimych is an artist on 
the same level as Nabokov, Fyodor, or Sebastian Knight.
 In the case of Vadim as well as of Kinbote-Botkin, Nabokov toys with 
the idea that a character’s consciousness may exist in a state of depen-
dence upon another mind.103 As we have seen, Nabokov was interested in 
phenomena of multiple personalities as well as in claims of “possessions” 
or channelings of the dead. We can trace this interest as far back as The 
Eye (1930) or even The Defense (1929),104 but in his known readings this 
interest reached a peak in the 1950s and early 1960s. The cases Nabokov 
read about in Donald James West’s Psychical Research Today involved 
mostly examples of subordinate personalities that emerged and took over 
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spontaneously or in the process of “automatic writing” (notably “Patience 
Worth,” a seventeenth-century English persona who appeared in the auto-
matic writing of a midwestern American, Pearl Curran, 1883–1937; and 
Ansel Bourne/A. J. Brown).105 There is nothing in his notes that proves that 
he either accepted or rejected a “supernatural” explanation of these phe-
nomena: while he marks for further study certain phenomena that were 
demonstrably faked, he also intended to read affirmative accounts of the 
Patience Worth case.106 What we can say with certainty is that in many of 
his works, most vividly in Pale Fire, The Real Life of Sebastian Knight, 
and Look at the Harlequins!, Nabokov sets up the idea of the secondary 
personality as an exploration of the nature of consciousness.
nested personalities
Much has been made of the narratorial play in Pale Fire. Quite an aston-
ishing amount of debate has taken place concerning the relative “reality” 
of the narrating characters. For not only is it a book with two ostensible 
authors (the poet and the annotator), but one of those authors is demon-
strably insane—or is pretending to be. Kinbote’s instability, his fantastic 
imagined life as King of Zembla, and his “real” identity with V. Botkin, 
combine with various hints in Shade’s poem “Pale Fire” to suggest that 
perhaps the mad commentator is simply Shade’s invention. The reverse—
that Kinbote, or rather Botkin, has in fact invented Shade and all the other 
characters—has also been argued forcefully and not without solid evi-
dence. More recently, Brian Boyd has attributed many of the text’s strange 
features to the intercession of ghosts (Hazel’s and Shade’s) behind the 
scenes, while arguing the individuality of both Shade and Botkin (who is, 
or generates, Kinbote).107 More recently still, suggestion has been made 
that all main characters besides Shade are fragments of his own personal-
ity, shattered by a stroke or other neurological trauma—and occasionally 
taking over his “body” to produce the poem plus commentary structure.108 
And Dmitri Nabokov reported in 2008 that his father told him that “it 
does not matter much; let’s just say that each invented the other.”109 That 
a personality can split or develop a secondary form is scientifically known, 
and Nabokov would have read about these phenomena in William James’s 
work as a young teenager, decades before his preparations for this novel.110 
But in Pale Fire, Nabokov explicitly mixes these psychological realities 
with more controversial events, like alleged poltergeists and barn haunt-
ings. Furthermore, if Shade’s poem bears traces of Hazel’s otherworldly 
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hand, while Kinbote’s commentary contains Shade’s ghostly imprint, then 
the workings of a secondary personality within a single living mind take 
on a fully ambiguous significance. How can one discern between the influ-
ence of a ghost and that of a lasting imprint of another’s personality within 
a mind or soul, as Nabokov had written at Aikhenvald’s death? What are 
the sources of artistic inspiration? What sorts of causes can obtain at the 
outer reaches or deepest recesses of the mind? In producing such a tan-
gle of consciousnesses—“imaginary” or “real,” worldly or otherworldly, 
healthy or deranged, visible or camouflaged—Nabokov creates an insol-
uble conundrum. There are so many possibilities, all or mostly open, that 
the interpretive path followed by Freudian psychoanalysis stands out in its 
narrowness and apparent confidence. Nabokov presents his readers with 
many more questions than answers, and like William James he does not 
propose to have even approximate knowledge of what makes a conscious-
ness function, or what makes it change.
 Insanity has its own links to a “beyond” in Nabokov’s worlds. Hazel 
is strange to say the least, and her strangeness is explicitly linked to her 
participation in paranormal events—a trait she shares with many Nabo-
kov characters. Nabokov never commits to the “reality” of the worlds 
perceived by his troubled characters; those supernatural or metaphysical 
glimpses remain ambiguous, ephemeral, uncertain. And yet he also refuses 
to dismiss or mock their possible veracity. The gaps and breakdowns in 
the texture of an individual’s consciousness are natural features of a world 
where thought itself may form the closest link to “higher truths”—if one 
embraces idealist philosophy—even though, ordinarily, the mind is oblivi-
ous to those truths’ proximity. The nested, or secondary, personality is an 
extremely apt representation of this problem, for if the embedded person-
ality is unaware, as Kinbote appears or pretends to be, that its thought and 
essence are sharing a brain with another personality, then that second self 
exists within a larger, hidden and unknown, mental context or reality. In 
William James’s exposition of such cases, the secondary personality is usu-
ally a “shrunken” version of the original, a personality possessing some, 
but not all, of the characteristics of the primary one.111
 As if in illustration of this Jamesian, shrunken secondary self, Vadim 
in Look at the Harlequins! intuits or catches glimpses of a larger, “pri-
mary” self at various times during his waking and semi-conscious life. 
These glimpses are like flaws in the texture of his existence: mistakes in 
his speech (he once calls his daughter “Dolly,” confusing her with a for-
mer lover and a Lolita he never knew)112 and in that of those around him; 
his own feelings of uncanny precursors; his spatial-imaginative disability. 
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Vadim’s psychological limitations and discontinuities serve as an embodi-
ment of the epistemological concerns that permeate Nabokov’s oeuvre. 
His sudden, lengthy blackout near the novel’s end gives him a view of his 
other or outer self—the “real” Nabokov, the implied author of Vadim’s 
text. As in many other examples we have seen, Vadim’s revelation hints at 
the idealist notion that consciousness sustains reality in ways beyond the 
purely subjective. Significantly, his ambivalently spatial or temporal prob-
lem, occurring exclusively within his thought, brings us back to the space-
time-thought dialectic proposed in Speak, Memory, in which thought is 
proposed to warp outward into a “special space” or other transcendent 
dimension. It does not matter whether Nabokov literally believed that 
space, time, and thought were in fact dialectically continuous. The point 
is rather that he finds the idea intriguing and even plausible—(in Kantian 
formulation, space and time are the a priori forms of human cognition—
they are, as it were, the contours or manner of sensuous thought about 
the phenomenal world).113 As a variation on his idealist leanings (if not 
convictions), this formulation enacts Nabokov’s attempt to find principles 
of thought itself subtending the development of reality. His works suggest 
that the exploration of mind may offer the most likely pathway toward the 
discovery of deeper realities, because mind itself is more clearly reflective 
of those depths than are the behaviors of material bodies (whether planets 
or photons) moving through space and time.
 Vadim’s mind in Look at the Harlequins! seems to be if anything too 
connected to “physical” space and time: he cannot manipulate them men-
tally, just as he cannot imaginatively turn about and retrace his steps. His 
memoir, as a parody of Nabokov’s own Speak, Memory, differs radically 
from that original in its slavish attachment to chronological and spatial 
directedness. Aside from a few passing anticipatory references to “You” 
and a handful of other upcoming life elements, Vadim holds strictly to his 
life’s spatio-temporal trajectory. Unlike Nabokov’s, his metaphors do not 
create bridges between past and future, between local present and distant 
past.114 Unlike the chrono-clastic Fyodor in The Gift who says, “I seem 
to remember my future works,” Vadim constructs his works whole in his 
mind and then memorizes them, as composed.115 Vadim Vadimych is stuck 
within linear causality, whereas Nabokov proclaims his own freedom from 
it (“I do not believe in time”).
 Nabokov’s works ask us to maximize our conception of what psy-
chology is, and what it can be as the science of the human mind. In some 
respects, psychology represents a natural field for the scientific method 
Nabokov espoused, for, as in his studies of butterfly morphology, each 
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individual realization of the human mind offers its own unique, not neces-
sarily generalizable, set of features. Writing at a time when Freudian psy-
choanalysis and its popular literary incarnations came to dominate public 
discourse on the mind (and the unconscious) while behaviorism dominated 
the rest of the field, Nabokov fought against what he saw as a radical and 
false narrowing of the domain of psychological inquiry. His own works 
embody a great diversity of mental phenomena—some with causal expla-
nations, some quite mysterious. Artists, geniuses, dreamers, pedophiles, 
psychopaths, suicides, quirky professors, even relative mediocrities: every 
character is presented as a complete world, each containing “a trillion of 
mysteries,” as Adam Krug puts it in Bend Sinister.116 Nabokov explores 
the idea that at its outer limits, where sanity frays into other, problematic 
variations on consciousness, mental life may catch glimpses of a reality 
that extends beyond the one we usually perceive—a theme he revisited 
again and again. To Nabokov, popularized (a word used advisedly) Freud-
ian psychoanalysis did the exact opposite: it narrowed the field of psy-
chological interest and inquiry to a particular material problem (sexual 
development—hence, reproduction) and glibly claimed to eliminate the 
mysteries of mind. In striking contrast to William James, psychoanalysis 
worked to apply the tools of causality to the farthest reaches of mental life 
(hysteria, neuroses, dreams). Most tellingly, it turns our attention to cases 
that confirm its claims, ignoring those that do not (while also functioning 
in a manner not subject to refutation).117 Nabokov’s psychological por-
traits insist that there must be more to human consciousness than Freud’s 
work suggests, and for this reason he presents his readers with a variety 
of believable types whose actions are not easily reducible to Freudian sex-
ual causality. His ventures into the fringes of science, parapsychology and 
“psychical” studies may well demonstrate not superstition or a confident 
belief in ghosts and spirits, but an elaborate metaphor for the kinds of 
unpredictable, irrational phenomena that could linger just past the fringes 
of consciousness. That something is there, Nabokov appears to have been 
quite sure.118
h
One of the ways that Nabokov responds to modern psychology and psy-
choanalysis, with its stress on the unconscious component in storymaking 
and other human behaviors, is to use his works as a demonstration that 
intentionality, consciousness, and conscious creation are possible—not 
necessarily given or automatic, but nevertheless accessible to the species at 
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large. Thus we can call Nabokov’s texts hyperconscious, in that they make 
use of imagery, language, and various bits of other authors’ narratives in 
a highly deliberate, artistic way.119 It is also true that Nabokov recognized 
the possibility of unconscious inspiration, the presence of a mysterious ele-
ment even in the context of deliberate creation. As he wrote to Carl Proffer 
regarding the latter’s Keys to Lolita, “many of the delightful combinations 
and clues, though quite acceptable, never entered my head or are the result 
of an author’s intuition and inspiration, not calculation and craft. Other-
wise why bother at all—in your case as well as mine.”120 This disclaimer 
corresponds to what Nabokov puts into the philosopher Krug’s mind: that 
each individual is a combination of trillions of mysteries. From such a per-
spective, any discussion of discovering the causal root of anyone’s psychol-
ogy sounds misguided.
 Nabokov’s psychological explorations were not particularly scientific, 
although they might be considered a kind of imaginative taxonomy (and 
he was, after all, a taxonomist). Nevertheless, they take a place alongside 
the science of the mind as it progressed through the twentieth century. 
While many researchers and practitioners, especially within psychoanaly-
sis, were interested in establishing root causes for various psychological 
problems, Nabokov was conducting his own detailed expositions of how 
deranged or gifted minds might work, and how even their self-knowledge 
can be limited by overgrown departments of mental life—by obsessions, 
passions, or an inability to see the world around them. Nabokov wants 
his readers to recognize in his characters new species of mental being, indi-
viduals whose behavior seems grounded in an irreducible self rather than 
in a causal chain. The list of things we can only guess at is a long one. 
Whether consciousness is “soul” or else something emergent and sponta-
neous, discovering little-known types of mental life is at least as valuable 
as determining some of the knowable laws that govern human thought. 
Moreover, new unique incarnations continue to appear, giving constant 
expression to the mysterious power of nature, which “one cannot afford 
to despise,” as William James wrote, and as Nabokov spent his artistic 
career illustrating.121
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THere iS liTTle controversy in accepting Nabokov as a naturalist, and 
hardly any more in supposing that he was a serious student of human 
psychology. But physics? As we have seen, he told an interviewer that 
although he had “little physics,” he was not inclined to believe Einstein’s 
“slick formulae.”2 This flip dismissal conceals Nabokov’s intense and abid-
ing interest in the progress of modern physics and its implications for his 
world outlook. In his lectures on Chekhov and on tragedy, composed in 
1940–41, Nabokov gives the first explicit indication that he was aware of 
recent advances in subatomic theory and their eerie consequences. Looking 
closer, we find traces of that interest going at least as far back as Invitation 
to a Beheading (1934).3
 In the early 1940s, Nabokov claimed that in the works of Anton Chek-
hov, “we get a world of waves instead of particles of matter, which, inci-
dentally, is a nearer approach to the modern scientific understanding of the 
nabokov’s physics
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a lecture on einstein’s theory was scheduled at the new york natural history 
museum. a crowd of several thousand people, which had gathered outside the 
hall due to the lack of seating, broke through a police cordon and entered the 
hall. The auditorium was significantly damaged. This is the first time public 
disorder in new york has been caused by the thirst for knowledge.
—“khronika,” Rul’, January 11, 1930
broadly speaking the task of physical science is to infer knowledge of external 
objects from a set of signals passing along our nerves. . . . The material from 
which we have to make our inferences is not the signals themselves, but a 
fanciful story which has been in some way based on them. it is as though we 
were asked to decode a cipher message and were given, not the cipher itself, 
but a mistranslation of it made by a clumsy amateur.
—Sir arthur eddington, New Pathways in Science, 19351
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universe.”4 We see this same interest developing into a critique of general 
conceptions of Newtonian physics. Composed around the same time as his 
Chekhov lecture, his lecture “The Tragedy of Tragedy” included the fol-
lowing collection of statements identifying the ancient Greek genre’s cen-
tral weakness:
[T]his imagination of ours is regulated by a sound logic, and this sound 
logic of ours is so hypnotized by the conventionally accepted rule of cause 
and effect that it will invent a cause and modify an effect rather than have 
none at all.
[T]he old iron bars of determinism . . . have imprisoned the spirit of play-
writing for years and years. . . . 
[Tragedy is composed on] the illusion that life and thus dramatic art pic-
turing life should be based on a steady current of cause and effect driving 
us towards the ocean of death.5
Nabokov felt confident enough in his understanding of nature to propose 
that causality is not a complete description of the world’s workings. He 
does not reveal what might displace or supplement mechanistic causality, 
but he calls tragedy, with its dependence on cause-and-effect devices, a 
“clockwork toy made in Greece that little children wind up and then fol-
low on all fours.”6
 It appears that Nabokov took a serious interest in the advances of 
physics throughout the 1920s and 1930s and that this interest began to 
give specific shape to his art no later than 1934.7 The two essays discussed 
above, both composed between 1941 and 1943, reveal Nabokov’s particu-
lar interest in the underlying essence, shape and structure of the universe. 
It might seem inappropriate, even naïve for a literary figure to apply meta-
phors from physics to his works—and worse, to make claims about phys-
ics’ findings.8 However, there is nothing particularly new about seepage of 
specialized terminology across professional or conceptual boundaries, and 
such osmosis moves in both directions. We find a fascinating illustration of 
a reverse trend in the writing of Cambridge astrophysicist Arthur Edding-
ton, whose eclipse-viewing expedition in 1919 played a major role in con-
firming Einstein’s theory of general relativity. In New Pathways in Science 
(1935), Eddington wrote:
Our sensory experience forms a cryptogram, and the scientist is a Baco-
nian enthusiast engaged in deciphering the cryptogram. The story teller 
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in our consciousness relates a drama—let us say, the Tragedy of Hamlet. 
So far as the drama is concerned the scientist is a bored spectator; he 
knows the unreliability of these play-writers. Nevertheless he follows the 
play attentively, keenly alert for the scraps of cipher that it contains; for 
this cipher, if he can unravel it, will reveal a real historical truth. Per-
haps the parallel is closer than I originally intended. Perhaps the Tragedy 
of Hamlet is not solely a device for concealing a cryptogram. I would 
admit—nay, rather I would insist—that consciousness with its strange 
imaginings has some business in hand beyond the comprehension of the 
cipher expert. In the truest sense the cipher is secondary to the play, not 
the play to the cipher. But it is not our business here to contemplate those 
attributes of the human spirit which transcend the material world. We are 
discussing the external world of physics whose influences only reach us 
by signals along the nerve fibers; and so we have to deal with the story 
after the manner of a cryptogram.9
Recalling the theory that Sir Francis Bacon in fact authored Shakespeare’s 
works, Eddington’s analogy is amusing, instructive, and at the same time 
highly ironic (and it also, perhaps, relates to the elaboration of the Baco-
nian motif in Joyce’s Ulysses): taking Shakespeare’s tragedy as his model 
of the phenomenal universe, the Baconian sleuth who reveals cryptograms 
in the text—that is, as hidden messages and patterns pointing (perhaps) to 
the text’s real source—is the equivalent of a scientist who uncovers hidden 
regularities and recurrences in nature and with their aid constructs pic-
tures or mathematical descriptions of the world’s implied inner workings. 
The irony, of course, is that the Baconian cryptograms in Shakespeare may 
be nothing more than the fancy of those who seek them out, and Bacon 
himself may have had no role in the plays’ creation. Eddington, surely con-
sciously, chose to emphasize a fashionable and well-known cryptographic 
topic that demonstrates not only an aspect of the scientific method, but 
also the vulnerability of scientific theorizing to false pathways.
 Suggestively, Eddington then backs away from his analogy, offering a 
different perspective on it. For Hamlet may (or may not) contain crypto-
grams of this or that historical truth; but it is also, unquestionably, a play, 
producing aesthetic, intellectual, and emotional responses in the individu-
als experiencing it. This is a momentous concession: Eddington suggests 
that all of these intellectual-aesthetic aspects of the play’s reality are “pri-
mary”—are, in a sense, the real truth of the play as a work of art. Simi-
larly, the phenomenal world as it exists in and of itself (as perceived by 
the mind) is also primary; the cryptograms and the scientific theories are 
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secondary discoveries or appendages, things that may happen to be true 
but are not part of the experiential truth of the whole (“consciousness with 
its strange imaginings has some business in hand beyond the comprehen-
sion of the cipher expert”). But such truths, whatever they are and how-
ever real they might be, Eddington calls “attributes of the human spirit 
which transcend the material world.” Scientists have agreed to a set of 
rules and practices that restrict them to deciphering the cryptogram.
 It is refreshing to see one of the twentieth century’s most eminent 
physicists refer to his own work as analogous to wildly speculative, not 
to say crack-pot, textological scholarship. For readers of Nabokov, such a 
comparison has even greater significance, as so much of his work contains 
cryptogrammatic elements. When Shakespeare wrote “All the world’s a 
stage”—a theme which recurs throughout his dramas—he surely did not 
foresee his plays representing the world in quite this way. Eddington’s deci-
sion to offer great literature and its study as his analogy for the nature 
of the universe and our knowledge of it demonstrates the epistemological 
intersection of art and science. He could not make the point he wished to 
make within purely scientific discourse, which shuns the metaphysical. He 
thereby concedes the limits of that discourse and the constraints of the sci-
entific enterprise. Nabokov’s own interests in the natural world were based 
on scientific passions and a desire to describe, with accurate detail, certain 
parts of it. But clearly, he was always curious about the foundations of 
nature, and this curiosity led him to craft his own work in a way that cor-
responded to discoveries and puzzles then shaking the world of physics. 
Given his anti-materialist bent, it is no surprise that he would have been 
encouraged by the advances in physics in his early adulthood; these corre-
sponded comfortably to his efforts to demonstrate exceptions and contra-
dictions to Darwinian evolution within the world of natural mimicry, and 
to suggest a noncausal essence at the heart of consciousness.
nabokov and the “new physics”
Einstein’s theory of general relativity received its first decisive confirma-
tion in November 1919, based on results from Eddington’s trip to observe 
the effects of solar gravity on a distant star’s light during an eclipse.10 
The results showed that the star’s light was, in fact, bent the predicted 
amount by the sun’s gravity, and the finding upended the world of physics. 
London’s Times screamed “New Theory of the Universe” and “A Revolu-
tion in Science!” Classical, Newtonian laws were no longer adequate to 
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describe reality, and the new laws made it seem as though the reality we 
perceive may have little in common with what the world actually holds. 
Einstein became an overnight sensation, receiving the attention of a pop 
star in nearly all his activities from then on. Discussion groups formed 
to analyze relativity from various perspectives and to consider its philo-
sophical implications.11 It was, in short, a cultural phenomenon, and it 
spread widely as interpreters of science attempted to bring the new theory 
to the masses. There was a steady barrage of books and articles explicating 
relativity (both special and general), and it was not long before relativ-
istic themes began to appear in the arts. Works by James Joyce, Virginia 
Woolf, William Faulkner, T. S. Eliot, and others incorporated relativity-
related themes.12 And in 1925, Nabokov’s friend Iulii Aikhenvald reviewed 
a Soviet publication of May Sinclair’s story “The Finding of the Absolute,” 
writing that she “not without humor and not without philosophical depth, 
in literary form makes interesting suggestions” about Einstein’s thought 
on space and time, with reference to Kant.13 Nabokov had ample oppor-
tunities to hear and read about relativity, including from his friend Vladi-
mir Tatarinov, a science and political writer at Berlin’s Russian newspaper 
(Rul’), where Nabokov’s father had been a founding editor.14
 Similar sources would have brought Nabokov into contact with 
advances in quantum theory. Initiated in 1900 by Max Planck, quantum 
theory was not as famous as its precocious younger sibling, but it was 
perhaps even more momentous a hypothesis in its ultimate development. 
Various innovations were announced in the press and described in some 
detail to the lay reader; in addition to Einstein and Planck, the names of 
Niels Bohr, Ernest Rutherford, and Louis DeBroglie were familiar fare 
(they all received Nobel prizes between 1908 and 1929), and newcom-
ers Heisenberg and Schrödinger also made appearances in the Russian 
émigré press.15 Despite their less sensationalized reception, the theories 
of subatomic structure and mechanics raised questions that were equally 
alluring to Nabokov as possible ammunition against a purely mechanistic 
philosophy. It is from descriptions of this branch of physics that he derived 
his understanding of the “wave-like” nature of matter, which finds vivid 
expression in the popular and semi-popular accounts of the day.16 These 
same accounts offered quantum theory—especially in its post-Heisenberg, 
“uncertainty” or “Copenhagen” variant—as proof that classical causal-
ity was not active at the fundamental levels of matter, and hence was not 
fundamental. Arthur Eddington was “the first influential author to call 
[Heisenberg’s uncertainty] relations a ‘principle.’”17 To an author commit-
ted to discrediting materialist thought, a better scientific resource could 
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hardly be desired. Articles such as “Atoms and Stars” by Tatarinov further 
help to explain the sources for analogies in “Father’s Butterflies” linking 
speciation to both atomic and solar-system structures.18
 It would have been virtually impossible for Nabokov to avoid expo-
sure to the new ideas in physics, and there is fleeting evidence of a response 
to relativity even in Mary and King, Queen, Knave. Nabokov’s early note-
books and poems demonstrate that he mused over the idea of inhabited 
worlds orbiting far-off stars and our place in the vastness of the cosmos, 
even before Einstein’s meteoric fame.19 But such reflections were of a gen-
eral, essentially romantic and slightly metaphysical character, not really 
shaped by the spirit of astronomical inquiry.
Materialism versus idealism: new physics in The Gift
Nabokov’s serious encounter with the new physics was most likely spurred 
by his research into the life of Nikolai Chernyshevsky and reflections upon 
the materialist tradition he helped popularize in Russia, leading finally to 
the Bolshevik overthrow of the liberal Provisional Government in Novem-
ber of 1917. Conceived as the core of The Gift in 1933 with roots going 
back to the Soviet codification of Socialist Realism in 1932, the “Life of 
Chernyshevsky” reinterprets the socialist icon and critiques his philosophy, 
positivist materialism (or naïve realism). Sergei Davydov called this chap-
ter an “aesthetic exorcism,” which it certainly is, but it is more than that.20 
By creating a fictitious, deconstructive “portrait” of Chernyshevsky, one 
that draws constant attention to the ironies and contradictions in his life 
and thought, Nabokov attempted to concoct a powerful antidote to the 
image celebrated by the Bolsheviks and even by their liberal opponents. 
The fact that materialism is closely linked with scientific positivism, one 
of socialism’s most important ideological anchors, led Nabokov to take 
an increased interest in the changes science had undergone since the turn 
of the twentieth century. Reading voluminously (starting in about 1932) 
in the socialist polemics from Chernyshevsky’s day to Lenin’s, Nabokov 
was led by the great revolutionary himself to one of the key figures in rel-
ativity’s rise: Ernst Mach.21 The famous nineteenth-century physicist and 
philosopher of science is Lenin’s main opponent in the latter’s Materialism 
and Empirio-criticism, a work which establishes “Machism” as a major 
heresy within the socialist movement—a kind of science-based idealism, 
as Lenin saw it, that sought to deny the existence of the real-world “thing 
in itself.” It was Mach, Nabokov would have elsewhere learned, who first 
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questioned on scientific grounds Newton’s absolute time and space, laying 
some of the earliest foundations for Einstein’s new theories.22 From this 
inception, Mach, Einstein, and other proponents of the new theories sub-
tly wove their way into The Gift’s dense fabric.23
 But there was a detour along the way: after completing a draft of The 
Gift’s chapter 4 (and apparently without having written a line of the other 
chapters), Nabokov was suddenly moved to write another book, Invitation 
to a Beheading, in what he later called “a fortnight of wonderful excite-
ment and sustained inspiration.”24 Possible signs of relativity in Invitation 
are ambiguous at best. We do not have, as we do in The Gift, any distinct 
textual markers that point to specific scientists or their work. What we do 
have is a preoccupation with geometry (especially triangles and circles), 
time running amok, and a distinct departure from the ordinary laws of 
nature. The geometrical theme, combined with the fact that so often the 
novel’s geometry seems to be distorted, calls to mind Nikolai Lobachevsky, 
the Russian co-discoverer of non-Euclidean geometry. We know that 
Nabokov grew interested in Lobachevsky while working on the Cherny-
shevsky chapter, where he even quotes the radical’s derision of the great 
mathematician.25 And just as the spatial features of Cincinnatus’s world do 
not conform to our expectations, its time flow is also erratic and occasion-
ally even circular—although it does progress, relentlessly, to its promised 
end. The laws of classical physics are largely discarded, albeit not in a way 
that refers specifically to relativity or quantum theory (the novel follows 
what Nabokov elsewhere calls “dream-logic”).26 As an investigation into 
concepts of philosophical idealism, the novel also proposes that the quali-
ties of reality and its laws are in some ways dependent on the quality of 
the minds that support them in thought. While having nothing to do with 
Einstein’s famous theories, such an imaginative leap can be seen as a logi-
cal improvisation on the limits of the relativity concept in its barest form. 
Working on The Gift, Nabokov conceived various philosophical and scien-
tific ideas to explore and test, and Invitation became a part of that lengthy 
process.
 Even before the Chernyshevsky chapter, he had written the story “The 
Circle,” which he later referred to as a satellite orbiting The Gift, from 
which its characters are drawn.27 The story itself—written before the rest 
of the novel but portraying events after the novel’s time frame—enacts a 
circular structure, and when we take into account the same geometrical 
device in the novel as a whole and in several of its parts, it becomes imme-
diately clear that the circle is a guiding structural principle in this work. 
That initial impulse would continue to develop, in chapter 1’s “triangle in 
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a circle” and chapter 4’s “spiral within a sonnet,” expanding to encom-
pass planets, spheres, exploding stars and atomic nuclei in the speciation 
theory presented in the “Second Addendum [Father’s Butterflies].” Judging 
from its fitful and disorderly start, there was something about this novel 
that resisted the usual method of beginning a project at the beginning.28 
No doubt part of that something was the desire to use ideas from the new 
physics as a covert support for the novel’s anti-materialist thrust (layered 
on top of what Nabokov had learned about thought and memory from 
philosophers and psychologists).
 The novel’s playful engagement of relativity begins with the very first 
sentence, in its mock-precise establishment of the time of action. “Towards 
four in the afternoon, April 1st, 192–”: the April fool’s joke is on us, of 
course, because Nabokov interrupts both the sentence and the year with 
a lengthy parenthesis on the “honesty” of Russian authors who withhold 
precise dating of their novels. The plot begins on the street, as a married 
couple watches as their belongings are carried by a pair of movers from a 
van to their new apartment—which happens to be in the same building as 
the narrator’s new abode. Moving, or motion generally, is one of the nov-
el’s chief concerns, for a variety of reasons (emigration, a father’s adven-
turous travels across Asia, Chernyshevsky’s exile in Yakutsk). Everything 
is in motion, and when characters do sit still, it is with the purpose of con-
templating the motion around them, or imagining still greater departures 
and arrivals.
 The moving van itself turns out to be a cipher for relativity: its inscrip-
tion is “Max Lux,” painted in blue Latin letters shaded in black, “a dis-
honest attempt to climb into the next dimension.” On the van’s side the 
illicit next dimension is depth, but the phrasing also reminds readers of the 
existence of the fourth dimension, time (as had been famously discussed 
by Hermann Minkowski and Albert Einstein). The name “Max Lux” calls 
to mind a crucial part of relativity: that light (lux) moves at the maximum 
speed possible in the universe. If one treats a Cyrillic reading of the first 
word as another kind of “next dimension,” “Max” would be pronounced 
“makh,” pointing to Ernst Mach, Einstein’s revered predecessor. Nabokov 
hints that readers should make this shift by tweaking these same words 
across languages in the opposite direction: he tells us that their sound in 
German (or Latin) is like the Russian “Mak-s . . . Luk-s, vasha svetlost’” 
and transforms the scene into a farmers’ market: “What have we here? 
Poppies, sir. And here? Onions, your radiance” (in Russian the pun is 
more obvious: svet means “light”). The meaning of the words themselves 
is relative to one’s linguistic point of view, and this play with Latin-Cyrillic 
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coincidence recurs several times in the chapter (in Fyodor’s landlady, Clara 
Stoboy [from Latin claritas, clearness or brightness + Russian s toboi, with 
you] and in the special words “mama” and “kakao” that appear the same 
in German and Russian).29
 The couple whose belongings are being unloaded from the van are 
named “Lorentz”—introducing H. A. Lorentz, another of Einstein’s most 
significant immediate predecessors. The vehicle’s fan is star-like, reminding 
us of stars in general as hypothetical destinations or worlds, or as celes-
tial objects producing—and bending—the very light that Einstein theo-
rized about. That starry fan is said to be on the cab’s forehead, Russian 
lob: at this point, it seems reasonable to suggest a reference to Nikolai 
Lobachevsky, whose non-Euclidean geometry was also crucial to relativ-
ity’s discovery. Once departed, the truck leaves behind an oil spot with a 
rainbow in it. That rainbow brings us more light, now spread into a spec-
trum like the light that allows astrophysicists to measure the temperature, 
composition, and distance of stars. The spectrum is also a subtle reminder 
of that original (yet so unfashionable) natural philosopher, the discoverer 
of the laws of refraction, Sir Isaac Newton, who now, it seems, must wal-
low in the mire rather than play among the stars. Several more images 
in the chapter draw our attention to light’s odd properties: a mirrored 
dresser’s “parallelogram of sky” with a “human vacillation,” and linden-
shadows that “hastened headlong toward substantiation,” to offer the two 
most prominent examples.30
 The prismatic and reflective properties of light continue to play a 
major role throughout the novel. Near its end Fyodor, the novel’s protago-
nist, even becomes light in this remarkable passage, while relaxing in the 
Grunewald: “The sun bore down. The sun licked me all over with its big, 
smooth tongue. I gradually felt that I was becoming moltenly transparent, 
that I was permeated with flame and existed only insofar as it did. As a 
book is translated into an exotic idiom, so was I translated into sun. [ . . . ] 
My personal I [ . . . ] had somehow disintegrated and dissolved; after being 
made transparent by the strength of the light, it was now assimilated to 
the shimmering of the summer forest.”31 As light, Fyodor assimilates to the 
fragrant, sensuous world of nature around him, but then worries that “one 
might dissolve completely that way”—an ironic reference to Romantic or 
transcendentalist concepts of merging with the universe.
 Pedestrian variations on relativity saturate the entire first chapter. 
Fyodor’s new room, near his old one but on a crossing street, gives him 
an entirely new relation to this particular spot, which “had revolved and 
glided without any connection to him; today it had suddenly stopped; 
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henceforth it would settle down as an extension of his new domicile.”32 
The nature of the local space becomes a feature of the perceiving mind 
(if it is an attentive one), its former motion transfixed by Fyodor’s entry 
into this new frame of reference. Nor is time forgotten, and in fact the 
chapter presents a curious series of transitions between Proustian/Bergso-
nian perceptions and relativistic mutations. Fyodor’s rereading of his book 
of poems, which makes up the first large section of the novel, enacts its 
own temporal play, in both form and content. Fyodor makes two passes 
through the work, one as if at light speed: “he would skim in an instant 
the entire book, so that in the instantaneous mist of its madly accelerated 
music one could not make any readable sense of the flicking lines—the 
familiar words would rush past, swirling amid violent foam . . .”;33 and 
then, upon returning to his room, he reads with deliberate slowness, “as 
if in three dimensions, as it were, carefully exploring each poem, lifted out 
like a cube from among the rest and bathed from all sides in that wonder-
ful, fluffy country air. . . .”34 The passage of time takes on a relationship not 
only to the speed of the reference frame, but also to the speed of thought; 
we shift from the “violent foam” of extreme speed to the protracted recre-
ation of each moment of experience that entered into the poem’s composi-
tion—“everything, absolutely everything”—thus reliving the pure duration 
of lost time. Nabokov then plays two jokes on Fyodor: his watch begins 
behaving erratically, “now and then” moving backwards—a reflection of 
Fyodor’s occasional journeys into his past? Or his light-speed rereadings? 
Then, in his excitement to hear the supposed review of his poems at the 
Chenyshevskys’ flat, he attempts to “dawdle,” but in reality moves so fast 
that time seems to slow down, so that “the clocks he came across on the 
way . . . advanced even more slowly,” and he overtakes his acquaintance 
Lyubov Markovna “in one stride.” 35 The frames of reference are rather 
muddled here from a strictly relativistic point of view, but these repeated 
manipulations of temporal flow combine with variations upon light and 
space to produce a poetic embodiment of the Einstein revolution.
 The novel’s attention to time, light, and space, and their possible 
transformations, constitutes its primary field of action, complemented by 
thought.36 Although consciousness itself is not a part of Einstein’s physical 
theories, Nabokov’s novel exhibits a driving concern with the relationship 
between these phenomena and the perceiving and imagining human mind. 
Spurred by the apparent revolutionary overthrow of some of Newton’s 
laws, Nabokov explored the possibility that thought could, in its way, cre-
ate other, more local violations of accepted laws of physics. Hence Fyodor’s 
image of his father, who had recounted stepping into the base of a rainbow. 
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By means of the same process, Fyodor recreates first his own past, then the 
central Asian itinerary of his father’s explorations—even though he had 
never seen those exotic lands. Their scenery is transferred onto the ceil-
ing and walls of Fyodor’s room, where it is fully substantiated in Fyodor’s 
thought (even more fully than the shadows of linden branches on the van’s 
roof). Such habits also have practical applications: Fyodor, in his book 
“The Life of Chernyshevsky,” describes in detail how his protagonist, who 
mocked Lobachevsky, was forced to traverse physically much of the ter-
rain Fyodor covers in his armchair. Similarly, Fyodor is able to bend the 
straight lines of the Berlin streetcar system, turning a one-way ride into a 
round trip—although he often forgets to do this, not being very good at 
practical applications generally.37
 The novel’s poetics also seems permeated by a sense of subatomic the-
ory and quantum mechanics. This awareness becomes helpful in Fyodor’s 
effort to discredit Chernyshevsky’s materialism, as “for those in the know, 
matter turns into an incorporeal play of mysterious forces.”38 This is indeed 
how the subatomic world was beginning to look even to those who dis-
covered it. The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, devel-
oped at around the time Fyodor and Zina meet (roughly 1926), resulted 
in Werner Heisenberg’s famed uncertainty principle, which was well- 
publicized by the time Nabokov began work on his novel (1934). This 
principle showed that for subatomic particles—like an electron—it is possi-
ble to know with arbitrary precision either the position or the momentum, 
but not both, because of the mathematical consequences of such particles’ 
minuteness. This discovery meant that in the subatomic world, the future 
positions of particles are fundamentally unknowable, and not subject to 
typical analyses of cause and effect. This principle has also a psychologi-
cal parallel in the troubled subject-object relationship: the subject readily 
imprints a part of itself onto any object (which is experienced as represen-
tation in the brain, after all), leading Konstantin Godunov-Cherdyntsev 
to his admonition not to let “reason [ . . . ] prompt us with explanations 
which then begin imperceptibly to influence the very course of observation 
and distort it: thus the shadow of the instrument falls upon the truth.”39 
This phrasing is quite similar to the way Niels Bohr expressed the prob-
lem in 1931, and also, as we saw in chapter 2, to Goethe’s descriptions of 
scientific subjectivity.40 There is a difference, however, between obscuring 
the truth through subjective contamination and the unknowability that 
the uncertainty principle entails. It may well be that Nabokov had this 
latter sort of uncertainty in mind when he established the novel’s inscru-
table narrator, who shifts invisibly between first- and third-person voice, 
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compounded by Fyodor’s announcement that his novel will so “shuffle, 
twist, mix, rechew and rebelch everything . . . [so] that nothing remains of 
the autobiography but dust.”41 If we decide that we know who the fictive 
author is, then we do not know his “real” biography; if we decide that 
Fyodor’s life is accurately described, then the fictive author becomes an 
abstract concept.42 Whether or not the Schyogolevs’ departure for Copen-
hagen is a gentle echo of Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s work, Fyodor and Zina’s 
immediate future is also uncertain: will they or will they not gain access 
to the apartment? Will they discover they are keyless, and perhaps look 
through the mail slot and see Mrs. Schyogolev’s keys lying there, star-like?
 These intimations of the new physics, although not thoroughly 
grounded in the theories’ detailed mathematical equations, perfectly inter-
twine with The Gift’s primary concerns—the power of thought, memory, 
and art; the magical richness of worldly existence; the mysterious force of 
love—because they emphasize how strange and unknown the world really 
is at its deepest and grandest levels. The illusion of certainty promoted by 
Newtonian science gives way to the uncertainty of relativity and quantum 
mechanics, sparking hopeful play with (or playful hope for) the idea that 
matter is really subordinate to mind, that causality is conditional. And yet 
even while deploying these themes surreptitiously in his work, Nabokov 
was mocking those who imported the latest theories carelessly or simplisti-
cally. In the comically unbearable play by the hapless Busch, near the end 
of chapter 1, a chorus is said to represent both “de Broglie’s waves” and 
the “Logic of History.”43 Busch’s play serves as a warning of the differ-
ence between haphazard allegories based on scientific novelties and careful 
artistic reflections upon the new theories’ significance.
Mind over Matter: Bend Sinister
In the works that immediately follow The Gift, the new physics motif 
becomes less central to the philosophical argument, while maintaining 
a distinct, if sometimes inconspicuous, role. After some strong echoes in 
“Ultima Thule” followed by a de-accentuation in The Enchanter and The 
Real Life of Sebastian Knight,44 the motif emerges again in Bend Sinister, 
which returns in part to the vexed question of the ultimate nature of exis-
tence, with a brutish and brutal socialist-materialist, anagram-crazed dic-
tatorship—the “Ekwilist” regime—as its foil.
 Philosopher Adam Krug is well aware of recent advances in subatomic 
theory, and in this sense Bend Sinister (composed 1942–46) is the first 
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Nabokov work to bring the theme into the open. Although Krug had, for 
most of his career, been reluctant to probe the questions of nature’s ulti-
mate essence, the Ekwilist revolution and the steady disappearance of his 
friends lead him to do so. In a much-quoted passage from chapter 14, he 
ponders the relation between theoretical physics and ontology:
If (as some of the wiser neo-mathematicians thought) the physical world 
could be said to consist of measure groups (tangles of stresses, sunset 
swarms of electric midgets) moving like mouches volantes on a shadowy 
background that lay outside the scope of physics, then, surely the meek 
restriction of one’s interest to measuring the measurable smacked of the 
most humiliating futility. Take yourself away, you, with your ruler and 
scales! For without your rules, in an unscheduled event other than the 
paper chase of science, barefooted Matter does overtake Light.
 We shall imagine then a prism or prison where rainbows are but 
octaves of ethereal vibrations and where cosmogonists with transpar-
ent heads keep walking into each other and passing through each other’s 
vibrating voids while, all around, various frames of reference pulsate 
with Fitz-Gerald contractions. Then we give a good shake to the telesco-
poid kaleidoscope (for what is your cosmos but an instrument containing 
small bits of coloured glass which, by an arrangement of mirrors, appear 
in a variety of symmetrical forms when rotated—mark: when rotated) 
and throw the damned thing away.45
Many features of this passage recall the same theme’s more discreet pres-
ence in The Gift: Krug’s circular name (krug is Russian for “circle”), which 
echoes the earlier novel’s structural motif and its “satellite” story; the 
“measure groups” and “electric midgets”; the prismatic effects. Krug ques-
tions the value of a philosophy of existence based on this physico-math-
ematical theory and its unmeasurable consequences, because to his mind 
the analogies it evokes still require some sort of outside figure to rotate the 
kaleidoscope. Nevertheless, he clearly values the anti-causal implications 
of a world where measurement is futile, while causality and other purely 
material phenomena are subordinate and deceptive.
 Preferring to stick to the purer ambiguities of idealist philosophy, Krug 
offers what is, to him, the best and only possible definition of human exis-
tence, which he derives from his love for his son: “A little creature, formed 
in some mysterious fashion [ . . . ] by the fusion of two mysteries, or rather 
two sets of a trillion of mysteries each; formed by a fusion which is, at the 
same time, a matter of choice and a matter of chance and a matter of pure 
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enchantment; thus formed and then permitted to accumulate trillions of its 
own mysteries; the whole suffused with consciousness, which is the only 
real thing in the world and the greatest mystery of all.”46 In this way Krug 
overcomes the need for scientific-philosophical explications: he modestly 
asserts that the ultimate source and essence of existence is unknowable, and 
therefore all attempts to define it, whether through experiment, mathemat-
ics, or verbal probing, are doomed, pointless, and possibly even harmful.
 The novel’s main example of a harmful philosophy, as in most Nabo-
kov works, is socialist (“dialectical”) materialism along with its distorted 
version of positivist science. The Ekwilist regime’s socialist dogma mirrors 
quite closely the actual utopian aims of places like the early Soviet Union, 
aims to be achieved here through the material and intellectual equaliza-
tion of all members of the populace. When Krug is arrested, he relies on 
that positivist certainty of his captors, and their ability to act on it, when 
he argues to himself: “They will not harm the child. On the contrary, it is 
their most valuable asset. Let us not imagine things, let us stick to pure rea-
son.”47 This “pure reason” (is it also Kant’s?) is the very logic of Paduk’s 
regime, where strict cause and effect work out their determinist conse-
quences. However, such logic and reason are useless in a world where each 
individual comprises “trillions of mysteries,” and thus all predictions of 
human behavior and its consequences, even based on unalloyed self-interest 
(as were those of Marx and Chernyshevsky), are bound to fail at the cru-
cial moment.
 Stepping back from the novel’s main action and its overt references to 
the mysterious substrate of physical being, we find some subtle reinforce-
ments on an entirely unexpected plane: esoteric discussions of Hamlet. 
Chapter 7 presents the reader with a dense, arcane, and surprisingly long 
disquisition on the authorship, translation, interpretation, and staging of 
Hamlet. Brian Boyd called this chapter a “parody [of] the whole history 
of perverse misinterpretations of the play.”48 Hamlet, Boyd reminds us, 
shows us Shakespeare at his best, and thus represents a vivid refutation of 
the Ekwilist doctrine of universal mediocrity. But it is also more than that. 
The play’s role in Bend Sinister has another significance that relates as well 
to the posing of ultimate questions. This nuance should not be surprising, 
as the tragedy includes the bard’s most famous soliloquy, Hamlet’s “To be, 
or not to be.”49 In the west—including Russia—Hamlet plays a key role 
in discussions about the meaning of existence, even if it fails to provide 
unequivocal answers.
 Judging from Nabokov’s use of this material, it appears all but certain 
that he had read Eddington’s New Pathways in Science sometime after 
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its 1935 publication, and that he intended to engage Eddington’s crypto-
gram analogy, discussed at this chapter’s outset, in Bend Sinister. Chap-
ter 7 begins with a detailed description of three engravings that embody 
the Baconian hypothesis of Shakespearian authorship, including crypto-
grams:
“Ink, a Drug.” Somebody’s idle pencil (Ember highly treasures this scho-
lium) has numbered the letters so as to spell Grudinka which means 
“bacon” in several Slavic languages.
 Number two shows the rustic (now clad in the clothes of the gentle-
man) removing from the head of the gentleman (now writing at a desk) 
a kind of shapska. Scribbled underneath in the same hand: “Ham-let, or 
Homelette au Lard.”
 Finally, number three has a road, a traveler on foot (wearing the sto-
len shapska) and a road sign “To High Wycombe.”50
Ordinary interpretive or annotative scholarship is somewhat different 
from a search for cryptograms; as Eddington suggests, the play itself exists 
as something transcendent and contains hidden truths that are, perhaps, 
unutterable, but scholarship strives to identify at least the best approaches 
for glimpsing such truths. Of course, some efforts are better than others, 
and chapter 7 alternates comically between frivolous or self-serving inter-
pretations and the serious, passionate, and honest mental work done by 
Ember. The first reinterpretation we encounter, by one “Professor Hamm,” 
tells us that the play is not really about Hamlet at all, but rather about 
the recapture of the Danish throne by the house of Fortinbras, and pro-
claims that “to surreptitiously shift the stress from this healthy, vigorous 
and clearcut Nordic theme to the chameleonic moods of an impotent Dane 
would be, on the modern stage, an insult to determinism and common 
sense.”51 Note the “determinism,” which is precisely one of the features of 
reality Eddington tells us we must forego.52 Krug then considers Ember’s 
painstaking, loving translation work, which is like an “intricate piece of 
machinery which would [ . . . ] cast a shadow exactly like that of” the 
original. Of the translator’s servile path, Krug wonders, “could this sui-
cidal limitation and submission be compensated by the miracle of adaptive 
tactics . . . or was it, taken all in all, but an exaggerated and spiritualized 
replica of Paduk’s writing machine?”53 To translate, or not to translate? 
As Krug notes, he too is better at finding the weaknesses in others’ for-
mulae than in creating his own clear and crisp doctrine. To question and 
criticize is easier than to create. Yet the magic of the play embraces Krug’s 
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existence, even without Ember’s or any other commentator’s help, and that 
is precisely the point that Eddington wanted to make.
 In Bend Sinister, as in Invitation and The Gift, Nabokov works against 
a very specific philosophical system. In this regard, there is a logic driving 
the inclusion of advances in physical science, because they seemed at the 
very least to undermine the certainties behind materialist positivism and 
open various other possible explanations of reality, even idealist ones.54 
In later works, Nabokov never again took on materialism so directly, 
although its challenge is frequently hiding in the wings. Nevertheless, ref-
erences to innovative physical theories continue to proliferate, intersecting 
with various works’ main themes in surprising ways.
Struggles with the Material World in Pnin
Pnin, the “anti-Freudian story,” might seem a novel most unlikely to con-
tain a physics-related undercurrent. Its endearing, moving story of a rather 
clumsy, if brilliant, émigré Russian professor who cherishes his privacy 
and dislikes his narrator seems far removed from Einstein’s or Planck’s 
worlds. A closer look reveals several significant references, beginning 
with relativity itself. Much like The Gift, Pnin opens with an exaggerated 
presentation of trains on time, and time on trains, and the shifting dura-
tion of similar trips. While traveling to give a lecture at Cremona college, 
carrying a “stone-heavy bag,” Pnin takes a different train than the one 
suggested in the standard schedule: “I was thinking I had gained twelve 
minutes; now I have lost nearly two whole hours!”55 Playing with time, it 
seems, can be a risky business. Pnin is aware of the vicissitudes of human 
time from Tolstoy, whose twinned story-plots in Anna Karenina appar-
ently diverge, leaving them about a year apart when they recombine, deep 
into the novel—producing, as he calls it, “the best example of relativity 
in literature that is known to me.”56 In his lectures on Tolstoy’s novel, 
Nabokov proposes that it is due to the intensity and passion of Anna and 
Vronsky’s love (the emotional equivalent of light speed?) that their clocks 
move faster (although, once again, Nabokov seems to invert the speed/
time relationship that would obtain between relative high-speed and low-
speed reference frames).57 However that may be—and in Tolstoy’s pre-Ein-
steinian novel it is surely a simple accounting error—Nabokov’s use of 
this poeticized version of “relativity” serves to heighten the connection 
between time and consciousness, suggesting ways that physics might open 
out beyond a purely materialist conception of the universe.
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 In an ironic twist, the narrator of Pnin, V.V., appears to be a material-
ist, and his preference for Newtonian certainties and mechanical predict-
ability becomes his chief weakness and flaw as the conveyer of Pnin’s story. 
Tension between the narrator’s story and the described world is drawn to 
the extreme, as our ability to believe in the teller’s objectivity fades away 
to nearly nothing by novel’s end. The narrator supposedly wants to con-
vey an accurate biographical picture of Timofey Pnin, but he also wants 
a good story, and to him a good story obeys causality and determinism: 
“Harm is the norm. Doom should not jam. The avalanche stopping in its 
tracks a few feet above the cowering village behaves not only unnaturally 
but unethically.”58 That is, he has a belief in the quality and efficacy of a 
certain kind of story that excludes apparent miracles and happy endings. 
Pnin’s world, by contrast, is one where causality is suspect, a principle we 
see illustrated when he washes the dishes after his party, and the dropped 
nutcracker does not shatter the crystal bowl beneath the suds.
 Of all things, the inner life of a human individual is the least accessible 
to knowledge. The question of how to find and convey information about 
Pnin—his position and velocity, as quantum theorists would have it—is 
important to V.V., which is why he spends more ink following Pnin’s move-
ments (around Europe and around the United States) than he does convey-
ing his thoughts. The narrator—a lepidopterist like Nabokov—struggles 
with his desire to fix Pnin scientifically and classify him within a logical 
scheme, but his observations and their expression do not allow him to do 
this. The challenge is exacerbated realistically by the fact that Pnin himself, 
perhaps like some imagined particle a scientist attempts to isolate, is aware 
that V.V. wants to tell his story, that he has already done so in part on 
several occasions, with gross distortions: he is “a terrible inventor.”59 Like 
the scientist’s observations, the narrator’s intrusions on Pnin’s life change 
his course, so that when V.V. arrives to take a position as Pnin’s superior 
at Waindell, Pnin simply drives off in his little blue car (while trying, with 
some success, to prevent all direct, unequivocal observation of his position 
and velocity and much more besides: he wants to keep secrets). When V.V. 
collides with Pnin’s world, Pnin is ejected—he ejects himself—like a par-
ticle. Neither the narrator nor the reader knows where he will be minutes 
or hours from the novel’s conclusion. (The fact that he turns up in Nabo-
kov’s next novel as a department head and “martinet” extends the irony of 
uncertainty). It is the very uncertainty of his final position that frees him 
from the narrator’s mechanistic tyranny.60
 Similarly, in a manner reminding us of The Gift and The Real Life of 
Sebastian Knight, as we become aware of the narrator’s conflict of interest 
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and his tendency to inject himself into the story, our uncertainty about the 
story’s accuracy grows and grows, until finally we recognize that we have 
no idea, no way to be certain, where Pnin’s “truth” might end and V.V.’s 
“fiction” begin. This extreme skepticism may not be a tenable position 
with regard to most of our own sensations of the world around us; but 
whenever there is an intermediary—an independent observer and teller—
we must become suspicious of that person’s inclination to shape our pic-
ture of reality. Uncertainty—for Pnin, his impending unemployment—is 
preferable to somebody else’s (pre)determined plan for us.
Time, Space, and Thought in Ada
If in Pnin relativity and quantum theory serve primarily as peripheral 
metaphors—for the mysteries of consciousness, for the undefinability of 
an individual person, for the problems inherent in acquiring and report-
ing knowledge—in Ada, these scientific topics move to the work’s creative 
center, where they become subjected to complete poeticization. This is 
the novel that began with Nabokov’s desire to explore the nature of time 
through fiction, a philosophical project which led him to confront the his-
tory of human conceptions of time. The work is necessarily informed by 
relativity, but by no means governed by it: for it was while working on 
Van’s treatise that Nabokov attempted to develop a critique of relativi-
ty’s temporal implications. In this novel, space, time, light, electricity, and 
mechanics are presented in a way that foregrounds their physical nature 
while simultaneously straining at the limits that each one implies. As a 
result, the novel gives the impression of striving to break through all of the 
laws of physics by finding weaknesses, loopholes, or, simply, more poetic 
or attractive descriptions of reality creatively derived from theoretical 
physics. Rather than simply creating “science fiction” based on imagina-
tive extensions of recent discoveries—“Antiterra” as antimatter universe, 
say—Nabokov explores what it might be like if the laws of physics them-
selves were subordinate to mind, and could be transformed and molded in 
acts of aesthetic creativity, just as certain electromagnetic waves become 
the world of light, color, and the aesthetics of painting.
 In other words, when we think about the laws of physics as revealed 
by relativity and quantum theory, we are led more and more to think: 
what if even these laws are contingent—as, in the end, they must at the 
very least be contingent upon the existence of the universe (and as color 
and other qualities are contingent upon mind)? What if these laws, or 
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at least our experience of them, could be fundamentally different? This, 
in effect, is what Ada imagines when she develops her games with light, 
shadow, and time that adolescent Van finds so tiresome as a fourteen-year-
old: “The shadows of [limetree] leaves on the sand were variously inter-
rupted by roundlets of live light. The player chose his roundlet—the best, 
the brightest he could find—and firmly outlined it with the point of his 
stick; whereupon the yellow round light would appear to grow convex 
like the brimming surface of some golden dye. Then the player delicately 
scooped out the earth with his stick or fingers within the roundlet. The 
level of that gleaming infusion de tilleul [lime tea] would magically sink in 
its goblet of earth and finally dwindle to one precious drop.”61 Consider 
the implications of this game: light, a transient presence between the shad-
ows of leaves, metamorphoses into a liquid, a “golden dye.” Ada’s game 
suggests a completely new relationship between the senses and light, in 
which instead of an ethereal electromagnetic radiation, light takes on the 
substantiality of a body, to be weighed, touched, poured, counted. What 
would it be like to live in a world where the stuff that, for Einstein, helps 
define space and time (through its speed) could be stopped and held in a 
goblet? Such a transformation offers a glimpse of perspectives on the real 
beyond even those proposed by the new physics.
 Water and light are the novel’s two key natural elements, and they 
undergo various colorful transformations, playfully invoking light’s cen-
trality in modern physics. Alexey Sklyarenko has suggested that the first 
chapter contains a coded spectrum and that the entire novel is figured as a 
kind of rainbow—which is, of course, the spontaneous, natural generation 
of color from water-refracted sunlight.62 Light and water are intimately 
connected throughout the novel, most distinctly at its moments of great-
est dramatic tension. Lucette’s name openly recalls light, while her lineage 
(mother and aunt Aqua and Marina) evoke both water and the color pro-
duced by light shining in seawater. Lucette goes to her end in the ocean, 
her light thus swallowed up by water.
 Light and water evoke thoughts of Antiterra’s “L disaster,” suggest-
ing a motivation for its inclusion in the novel. The term refers to electric-
ity and some calamity that ensued from its exploitation by humans—the 
“Lettrocalamity,” as Van once calls it.63 The use of electricity is banned on 
Antiterra, its role taken over by hydraulics. Not electrons, but water mol-
ecules must provide the means by which to telecommunicate and perform 
other work-saving tasks. Water, however, fails to manage all of the func-
tions of its precursor—Van laments the loss of tape-recorders—but appar-
ently it serves some purposes, epitomized by the “dorophone.” Lucette, as 
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the novel’s primary onomastic source of light shining through its watery 
medium, produces its multifarious rainbow effects. The waves into which 
Lucette sinks remind us also of light waves and the wave-like properties of 
matter, generating the rainbow of the text. The L disaster, in turn, repre-
sents the hubris of humanity’s partially ignorant exploitation of the secrets 
of nature: it is dangerous to make a utilitarian device out of something 
that we will “never understand.” Composing a novel which, on the one 
hand, is merely a family chronicle and, on the other, is also a source of 
beautiful prismatic effects in a “literal” sense,64 Nabokov strives to dem-
onstrate the mysterious complexity of existence. This complexity, it should 
be noted, has a special character dependent upon consciousness, for as 
scientists beginning at least as early as Goethe observed (and as empha-
sized by other critics of Newton’s work), there is no such thing as color 
outside of perception and representation. Without this field of conscious-
ness, colors are nothing other than collections of electromagnetic waves 
of distinct amplitude and frequency. Thus color (produced when light is 
reflected or refracted, filtered or scattered, or when a source emits specific 
wavelengths) is the feature that defines the transformation of the world of 
radiation (light) into the world of consciousness.65
 By the 1960s, Nabokov appears to have decided to give relativ-
ity closer, more critical scrutiny from a fictional point of view. Nabokov 
bridles at the limits set by light’s speed, and also at time’s apparent con-
tingency upon relative speed. In his notes taken as he read philosophical 
and popular scientific treatises in preparation for writing Ada, he argues 
with relativity’s tenets. In particular, as he worked on “The Texture of 
Time” (Van’s philosophical treatise), he wrestled with the Minkowskian 
tendency to link time to space within a four-dimensional manifold. Van is 
a psychologist, novelist, and philosopher, and his abilities in mathematics 
are suggested when we learn that he could “solve an Euler-type problem” 
at the age of ten.66 Like Nabokov, Van read heavily in literature related 
to the science and philosophy of time after the appearance of relativity, 
and his background and intelligence are meant to suggest that he had the 
wherewithal to comprehend the most difficult aspects of this subject mat-
ter.
 So when Nabokov read about time and relativity in the 1960s, and 
when he parried Einstein’s version of the time-space-speed relationship, it 
is plausible to suggest that the conclusions he reached were colored by his 
effort to create his character’s vision. “I suspect I don’t” accept all of Van’s 
conclusions, Nabokov said, but he values them as working hypotheses that 
challenge what had become a scientific orthodoxy.67 Such challenges were 
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a part of the artist’s and the philosopher’s calling in an effort to continue 
the expansion of human knowledge.
 In the spirit of this challenge, he wrote, “I have no use for the arti-
ficial concepts of space-tainted time found in relativist literature.”68 In 
the novel, Van’s version became: “We reject without qualms the artificial 
concept of space-tainted, space-parasitized time, the space-time of rela-
tivist literature.” Also: “What many cosmogonists tend to accept as an 
objective truth is really the flaw inherent in mathematics which parades 
as truth.” His main concern appears to have been to recognize for time 
a reality apart from its use as a measure of change in the physical world. 
Van writes, “one can be a hater of Space but a lover of Time.”69 Consider-
ing his opposition to causality and purely materialist philosophies, this is 
no surprise. Nabokov concludes that “contrary to the assertion [in Fraser, 
The Voices of Time] that in a world that had ‘no natural change by which 
one state of the universe could be distinguished from any other’ there 
would be ‘no basis for a concept of time.’ This is nonsense. Even in ‘such 
a quiet world’ time would exist and that is the trouble with time.”70 In 
other words, the “states” of the universe—here taken to be purely physical 
states, detectable with the help of various instruments—and their changes 
exist within or alongside of time, but do not constitute time through their 
processes of change. Whatever conception of time can be derived from 
mechanical change, it is at best a highly limited and narrow one, Nabokov 
suggests. Commenting on G. J. Whitrow’s presentation of the idea of the 
“chronon,” the hypothetical, indivisible base unit of time, and its source 
the proton, Nabokov remarks, in brackets, that “‘protons’ and ‘chronons’ 
may prove to contain as many worlds of matter and time as there are 
atoms in the universe.”71 This argument reflects an affinity with Roman-
tic predecessors, and it echoes some of his own youthful musings about 
the universe. It expresses the desire always to explore past a given level of 
reality to its substrate or underlying components, onward, perhaps, to a 
regressive infinity. Van’s treatise demonstrates a philosophically grounded 
refusal to accept a definably material basis for existence or for time. As 
we have seen elsewhere, Nabokov surmises that consciousness itself may 
have a closer connection with “pure” or “ultimate” time than does space 
or space-time—and this is why he rejected the idea that high-speed travel 
through space might have its own independent effect on the experience of 
personal time.
 A conviction of time’s independence from calculations of spatial-
mechanical change derived from Nabokov’s sense that the universe may be 
more complex and mysterious than human mathematics can imagine; that 
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whatever truths or even absurdities such calculations might produce, they 
still only represent a particular, limited structure, for which one can imag-
ine an outside, encompassing or generating system. This intuition, that 
mathematics is a limited, closed but not complete system, puts Nabokov’s 
thought close to Kurt Gödel’s “incompleteness theorem,” of which he 
could have read a popular account as early as 1958, which states, approxi-
mately, that all sufficiently complex mathematical systems must contain 
propositions that cannot be proved true or false—therefore, they are not 
complete.72 In one note, also recalling Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, 
Nabokov wrote, “There is indeed a profound connection between the real-
ity of time and the existence of an incalculable element in the universe. An 
element of indeterminism and irreducible contingency in the universe.”73 
In his conviction that time and consciousness are not strictly subject to the 
mathematical laws of space and matter, Nabokov suggests that they are 
both signs of gaps through which the “outside,” the “beyond”—the irre-
ducible contingency—of the system can be hazily glimpsed.
 This mode of thought was encouraged by J. W. Dunne, whom Nabo-
kov was also reading while he worked on Ada. He noted approvingly the 
following statement in Dunne’s The Serial Universe: “Classical science 
involves, employs, and asserts . . . the view of every observer as an external 
potential interferer with an otherwise ‘determinate’ universe. . . . The deter-
minist bogy—that alleged offspring of classical science—was never even 
conceived, and the birth certificate signed by the materialist was a fake.”74 
Dunne’s rather esoteric argument relies on the regressive notion that all 
interfering observation (and all observation is interference) is embedded 
within a time-frame superior to the one which is observed and interfered 
with. These receding temporal vantage points produce receding perspec-
tives wherein each level contains its own set of distinct “observables,” no 
less real than the one we think of as empirical reality, but removed from 
our conscious awareness. These very concepts appear in greater relief in 
Transparent Things, where the metaphysically superior narrator and his 
colleagues see physical objects in their full temporal extension, from the 
present to distant past as dispersed molecules (but not very far into the 
future), demonstrating a partially causal chain upon which they, as oth-
erworldly beings, can have only the slightest influence. A similar regres-
sion to a broader temporal perspective that recognizes a specific layer of 
significance, invisible within the ordinary chronological flow of events, can 
already be discerned in The Real Life of Sebastian Knight, for example, in 
the idea of the identical pattern created by two brothers’ superficially con-
trasting styles of tennis play.75
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 Nabokov as a young boy was a mathematical prodigy, a gift he lost 
during a bout of pneumonia at the age of seven.76 As he begins his series of 
note cards on relativity, he opens by casting doubt on the ability of math-
ematics to express the very deepest truths of the universe and its essence. 
In a note anticipating his comment about Einstein’s “slick formulae,” he 
wrote: “The mathematical universe of Einstein et al is an unreal world, 
a jumble of symbols, a flourish of formulae.”77 In another card he seems 
to criticize Whitrow for accepting the physical consequences of relativity; 
the relativist “has discovered not an objective truth, but the flaw, inher-
ent in mathematics, parading as truth . . . An example of the mental mon-
sters produced by mating ‘light = signals’ with ‘traveling clocks’ by means 
of mathematical formulas [and not by hand as I suggest].”78 That “flaw 
inherent in mathematics” once again, deliberately or by chance, echoes 
Gödel’s theorem. Through several numbered cards from sets labeled “Rel-
ativity” and “Simultaneous Events,” Nabokov lays out ways to contradict 
the time-traveling implied by relativity, and to reassert the notion of simul-
taneity, which relativity had effectively nullified on the grander scales of 
cosmology.79 “The world-as-observed at a given instant of individual time 
cannot be identified with the world-as-it-is at a definite instant of universal 
time. [it could if the observer were everywhere simultaneously].”80 These 
considerations depend upon creating the concept of an observer who tran-
scends the physical possibilities made available within the system—that 
is, the empirical universe with its physical laws, as known. To illustrate 
this idea, on another card Nabokov describes an enormous hand touch-
ing two remote points in the universe, and conveying information about 
each of them to the hand’s owner, simultaneously. Van, in Ada, notices 
the difficulty of this line of argument: “will it not be touching both at the 
same time—or are tactile coincidences even more misleading than visual 
ones? I think I had better back out of this passage.”81 Physicists reject such 
arguments because they have no relationship to anything we can possi-
bly observe or know—and also because nerve signals are subject to speed 
limits. Indeed, such a large hand would be so massive—the size of untold 
numbers of stars—that its gravitational consequences would be profound, 
if not cataclysmic, for all objects in its gargantuan neighborhood—unless, 
of course, it were an immaterial hand, not subject to scientific observation 
or inquiry. Be that as it may, Nabokov’s desire to exploit these apparent 
paradoxes reveals his insistence on the contingent and subordinate essence 
of what he called Visible Nature and its discovered laws.
 Nabokov struggled with these relativistic effects, perhaps because 
he wanted to be able to refer to time as something that remained self- 
n a b O k O v ’ S  P h y S i C S

consistent in a way accessible to human consciousness, and also as 
something beyond deterministic causality. He seemed concerned that 
Minkowskian space-time might eliminate time as one face of the universe’s 
mystery. In the end Nabokov, through Van, senses that his best strategy 
is to restrict himself to time as experienced, although he was constantly 
tugged—by the relativist literature as well as by personal predilection—
toward the far-off stars: he begins one late note, “Remote objects in extra-
galactic space,” but then interrupts himself: “[but I am interested only in 
local time],”82 as if recoiling from a constantly reappearing temptation. If 
he can limit his discussion to time as experienced locally, then at least he 
need not win an argument with physicists and mathematicians.83
 The world portrayed in Ada is not exactly our own: the action takes 
place on “Antiterra,” a planet with a history similar to Earth’s, but with 
significant differences in historical detail, geography, and chronology. The 
distortions have been interpreted in a variety of ways, but I suspect that 
the best approach, encouraged by the novel itself, is the suggestion that 
this might be an “anti-world,” existing in some kind of secret relationship 
with its “Terra” partner.84 Nabokov’s novel proposes that these two anti-
worlds might have some sort of access to one another through conscious-
ness; such contacts, which are the object of Van’s psychiatric research as 
well as of a cult of “believers” on Antiterra, tend to appear through a 
variety of mental instabilities. The differences—distortions, from our point 
of view—might be well explained by Nabokov’s rejection of pure deter-
minism, so that even if two worlds are twinned through obscure psycho- 
physical channels, each is still free and independent of the other, within a 
certain set of constraints.85 In this way, Antiterra may represent the mac-
roscopic consequences of subatomic indeterminacy in mirror-twinned 
worlds—as imagined by Nabokov.
 It is highly unlikely that Nabokov knew of the many worlds interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics, which was first proposed in an obscure paper 
in 1957 but not popularized until the late 1960s and 1970s. More likely, he 
derived his Antiterra concept from H. G. Wells’ Men like Gods (1923), a 
novel in which people travel between Earth and its parallel world, Utopia, 
or Murray Leinster’s “Sidewise in Time.”86 He also made his own imagina-
tive conclusions based on the advances in theoretical physics he had seen. 
It is extraordinary that Nabokov has Van consider the parallel existence 
of alternate realities, and the tree-like forking of a life’s possible paths. 
This instability of causal pathways is a recurring feature in Ada, and some-
times reality metamorphoses from one face to another before our eyes. For 
example, after his father forbids the siblings’ relationship, Van appears to 
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attempt to shoot himself: “He pressed [the trigger]. Nothing happened—
or perhaps everything happened, and his destiny simply forked at that 
instant, as it probably does sometimes at night, especially in a strange bed, 
at stages of great happiness or great desolation, when we happen to die in 
our sleep, but continue our normal existence, with no perceptible break in 
the faked serialization, on the following, neatly prepared morning, with 
a spurious past discreetly but firmly attached behind. Anyway, what he 
held in his right hand was no longer a pistol but a pocket comb which he 
had passed through his hair at the temples.”87 This formulation, focus-
ing on the intersection between the boundaries of consciousness and the 
future’s alternate possibilities, once again puts mind in a pivotal position 
in reality’s progress. This “forking” model is closer to the many worlds 
interpretation of quantum theory than to the world- or dimension-hopping 
in Wells’ or Leinster’s novels. Nabokov’s artistic intuition brought him to 
contemplate ideas very similar to those of contemporary physicists, in a 
remarkable demonstration of the common ground shared by artistic and 
scientific investigations.
h
Ada represents the artistic culmination of Nabokov’s interest in physics, 
but the novels I have passed over, while not exhibiting the same degree 
of explicit play with physics-related concepts, all include quiet variations 
on the themes found prominently in other works. The Real Life of Sebas-
tian Knight (written in 1938), with its questing researcher, V., who collects 
the facts of his brother’s life, elaborates the concept of the problematic 
observer whose consciousness shapes the object while also being shaped by 
it, leaving the reader in a state of utter uncertainty about where the “real” 
boundaries of the novel’s world lie. V. also refers to Sebastian’s artistic 
practice in his novel The Doubtful Asphodel as a collection of themes that 
interact and communicate the book’s hidden meaning through “a succes-
sion of waves”—a phrase Nabokov echoes in his 1940 lecture on Chekhov 
and in “Ultima Thule.”88 Pale Fire (1962), which includes occult messages 
communicated by a circlet of light, is also structured so that in the midst of 
many puzzles and their solutions, the reader is left with utter uncertainty 
about the “real” ground for the novel’s action. This uncertainty, or hints 
about possible or definite flaws in the descriptions we are given by various 
narrators, became one of the most common and varied structural motifs 
in Nabokov’s work after 1934. The same impulse brought him to create 
Look at the Harlequins!, a novel that plays with metaphysical implica-
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tions of left-right symmetry on the molecular level, as Nabokov had come 
to know it from Martin Gardner’s The Ambidextrous Universe and other 
physics books he read in the 1960s while working on Ada.
 I have suggested that in every novel from Invitation to a Beheading on, 
a total of ten novels, Nabokov made major or minor use of concepts from 
twentieth-century advances in theoretical physics. Lolita might be singled 
out as a misfit in this group, but it activates many of the same uncertain-
ties that we find in The Gift, The Real Life of Sebastian Knight, Pnin, and 
Pale Fire. These entanglements with modern physics often contribute to 
philosophically tinged aspects of Nabokov’s works, echoing the fact that 
the leading early-twentieth-century physicists themselves all became phi-
losophers interpreting their own theories. For a writer whose main theme 
has been identified variously as “the artist,” or “nymphets,” or “exile,” or 
“the otherworld,” or “individuality,” this consistency is striking. It tells 
us that whatever dominant subject Nabokov may have placed at a work’s 
center, he was always considering it within a series of expanding contexts 
that included a search for the hidden solutions to nature’s cryptogram. It 
is especially characteristic that his engagement with these theoretical con-
cepts is essentially playful, challenging, and even irreverent. For although 
relativity and quantum theory had rattled humanity’s picture of the uni-
verse, Nabokov clearly thought that they were but signs of the incomplete-
ness and mutability of knowledge. His own created worlds, likewise, are 
ones that keep us forever seeking and forever guessing.
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Figure 
Wing diagrams. The middle image, labeled “feniseca tarquinis,” has an annotation on the left showing 
nabokov’s interest in absent features in nature. The paragraph begins, “in some specimens moreover the 
m3 and culitus may be lacking . . .” and goes on to discuss how such an absence may be a sign of evolu-
tion. (Source: henry W. and albert a. berg Collection of english and american literature, The new york 
Public library, astor, lenox and Tilden foundations)
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in one oF HiS most quoted aphorisms, Nabokov once said, “Whatever 
the mind grasps, it does so with the assistance of creative fancy.”1 The gist 
of this claim, and its usual interpretation, is that imagination plays a key 
role in determining “reality” as known and experienced by an individual. 
But in the passage, “fancy” transforms quickly into a scientific image: it 
is “that drop of water on a glass slide which gives distinctness and relief 
to the observed organism.” Fancy is the medium of viewing, and thus it 
makes the viewing possible, gives it clarity and perspective. If the medium 
is adequate, the object can be observed distinctly. But let us take a step 
back to reconsider the phrase, “whatever the mind grasps”: what about 
the things it doesn’t grasp? Nabokov’s essentially Kantian position on 
ungrasped things is apparent in his assertion that “we shall never know 
the origin of life, or the meaning of life, or the nature of space and time, or 
the nature of nature, or the nature of thought.”2 This amounts to an insis-
tence that there will always be a domain beyond the ken of human con-
sciousness in its present form, and that it is in this unknown domain—the 
interspaces or beyond of knowledge—that the essence of these ultimate 
questions lies permanently concealed. Nevertheless, Nabokov presents the 
possibility in his work and outlook that by detecting irregularities such as 
Minding the Gap
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his writing was a series of gaps, and you cannot ape a gap.
—nabokov, The Real Life of Sebastian Knight, 1941
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patterns in the shape of a life, anomalies in the evolution of life (such as 
nonutilitarian mimicry), apparent ruptures or lapses in laws of physics, 
and, perhaps, inklings of “paranormal” phenomena, one can intuit the 
presence of “the reverse of the weave,” or the world’s “unusual lining”—
or, more simply, the existence of an invisible, unknowable, wider context 
for phenomenal being with which it is intimately connected.3 The question 
finally becomes whether one can perceive, even indirectly, gaps and tears 
in reality’s texture. Science usually points away from its own blind spots; 
Nabokov wanted instead to celebrate them as places to seek intimations of 
deeper realities.
 The common thread through the preceding chapters has related to 
Nabokov’s apparent interest in the limits of science, in its revisability and 
reversibility. In all three areas of scientific inquiry that find some expres-
sion in his work—biology, psychology, and physics—Nabokov seeks out 
the insufficiencies at the farthest ends of possible knowledge: biologi-
cal science, he thought, fails to explain some examples of mimicry and 
of beauty; psychology raises more questions than it answers; and physics 
seems to arrive at impossible conceptions of “time” and overemphasizes 
the power of mathematics. On the whole, he demonstrates suspicion of 
mathematical and psychological generalization and contempt for intellec-
tual fashion. Thus at first Newton and Darwin, and eventually even Ein-
stein, become emblems for systems of knowledge that are subject, on the 
one hand, to ossification, oversimplification, overconfidence, and blind-
ness, and on the other—to expansion, subversion, even reversal. The case 
with Freud is somewhat different, as his writings represent (to Nabokov) 
not so much a scientific endeavor as an impressionistic theorizing based 
on a particular mass of collected data, an archeology of the unconscious 
mind as expressed in his psychiatric patients, in himself, in myth, and in 
literature. The central hypothesis of Freud’s approach—that adult neuro-
ses have their source in the mishaps of childhood sexual maturation—was 
not so much tested as applied en masse in the years following World War 
I and simultaneously adopted as the main ideology of the growing psy-
choanalytic community. As a cultural dominant and defined intellectual 
program, its theory of mind, self, and unconscious was equally vulnerable 
to the pitfalls of the “harder” sciences of biology and physics.
 Nabokov occupies a unique place in modern intellectual history not 
only because of his dual status as an artist and a scientist, but because 
his scientific work left him skeptical about the ultimate ability of science 
to provide answers to questions that most concern humanity. This is not 
to say that Nabokov did not believe in the value of scientific work—he 
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valued it very highly—but rather that he was ever wary of the ease with 
which scientific knowledge can turn into epistemological overconfidence, 
the development of political agendas, and the destruction of intellectual 
freedom. There is a specious irony in this juxtaposition of such skepticism 
with the “strong opinions” expressed in various interviews and essays. 
Specious, because many of those very opinions are the places where Nabo-
kov warns most urgently against the dangers of certain knowledge and 
claims about “reality.” Conversely, although he may have been intrigued 
by the uncertainty principle, that does not mean that Nabokov felt that 
all knowledge is radically uncertain or observer-dependent. Rather, his 
art and his science both demonstrate an instructive attraction to basing 
one’s conclusions upon massively detailed empirical evidence, provided by 
the senses and available tools, and to preserving an awareness that any 
such conclusions are always tentative and partial, even when they appear 
unquestionable. Scientific research tests hypotheses about nature, and the 
validity of results is certain only to the extent that they can be replicated in 
experiment. Explanations of scientific data tell a story based on the specific 
facts of an experiment. But those data are always partial (sometimes more, 
sometimes less), and the mere existence of missing data, of hypothesized 
but unconfirmed phenomena, stands as an inescapable fact in the scientific 
grasp of the world. It is exactly that fact that is most easily ignored in a 
society where science can be appropriated as an engine both for progress 
and for political opportunity.4 Our knowledge of the world is inherently 
gappy and partial; science expands knowledge but does not change its fun-
damental incompleteness. It is this epistemological skepticism, combined 
with a passion for discovering what can be known, that defines Nabokov 
as an artist and as a scientist.
 One distinct feature of Nabokov’s intellectual stance is his consistent 
impatience with inaccuracy, sloppiness, generality, and dishonesty. In some 
notes for the “Butterflies of Europe” project, he observes that “The only 
other writer in the world whom I can think of, that constantly and with 
beautiful exactitude refers to butterflies in his works is Leon-Paul Fargue. 
It should be added that Aksakov’s chapter on butterfly collecting is beneath 
contempt scientifically.”5 He ruthlessly critiques falsehoods and mistakes 
wherever he finds them, from Holland’s “hopelessly inaccurate” The But-
terfly Book to translations of Eugene Onegin.6 The point of this activity is 
that some things have been or can be discovered and established with rea-
sonable confidence, if one thoroughly takes into account available infor-
mation. When a lepidopterist misclassifies a species or genus of butterfly in 
a major reference work, Nabokov suggests, mistaken knowledge spreads 
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throughout the community, taking the place of accurate knowledge. Like-
wise, to pretend to possess knowledge that is in fact lacking, or to present 
information that is mistaken instead of available information that is cor-
rect, is far worse than a glib confession of ignorance. In creating and per-
petuating myths of truth, knowledge, and authority where none is present, 
good scientists along with fabricators and bunglers appease and foment the 
human expectation of such knowledge, abetting human complacency as a 
consequence of knowledge falsely won. Displacing established falsehoods 
is even more difficult than discovering new scientific truths, as Nabokov’s 
own career shows, and each false trail that becomes dogma represents 
more than a simple misstep in the advance of knowledge. Notwithstanding 
the acknowledgment of limitations in most scientific articles, the human 
preference for even false certainty over ambiguity is deep-seated, meaning 
that when a mistaken theory is unambiguous and rhetorically powerful, it 
stands a decent chance of overwhelming reasonable doubts and equivocal 
counter-evidence, at least for a time. Such was the case with the Ptolemaic 
model of the solar system, or the early resistance to plate tectonics.7
 In his own work as a lepidopterist, Nabokov not infrequently drew 
attention to the limitations of his knowledge as a researcher—to the lim-
ited number of specimens at his disposal, to the lack of corroborating data 
on a given preferred theory, to gaps in a projected continuous series of 
forms. We saw this in chapter 1 in discussions of speculative but prob-
able intergradations between known species; in subspecies Nabokov had 
identified but which he admitted might in fact be hybrids; and in his reluc-
tant hypothesis that members of the subfamily Plebejinae entered South 
America from Asia via Alaska, rather than by some other land bridge, even 
though no related forms existed in the alleged expansion route.8 Notice in 
the following passage from his drafts how he defines the quality of a taxo-
nomic category in terms of the gaps separating it from other such catego-
ries:
Genus. The quality of a genus i.e. its natural or its artificial condition 
depends upon the gap between it and any other genus and also upon the 
interspecific gaps within it. The greater the intergeneric hiatus and the 
smaller the interspecific ones the more natural the genus appears.
 But when—with a sigh of relief—we find a beautifully limited “natu-
ral” genus (Glaucopsyche or Scolitantides or the true Aricia) which dis-
plays a number of species closely linked—and yet different—in pattern 
and structure, all having a most satisfactory air de famille,—we are, I 
am afraid, deceiving ourselves: this “natural” genus is but an extended 
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species, and its representatives are so to speak fresh from the subspecific 
oven—they have just crossed the limit of specific alliance, of racial vassal-
dom—they are “good” species all right—but this rank has been acquired 
so recently that they still display exactly those conspecific features that 
we clutch at as being characteristics of a “natural” genus. The slender 
bridge between a species containing a number of well-defined subspecies 
and a well-defined genus containing a number of closely allied species is 
thrown over a stretch of very shallow water indeed.9
The gaps are crucial, because if there are none—if the series of forms 
is perfectly uninterrupted—then one is dealing with a “genus” that can 
hardly be distinguished from a polytypic species, and its absolute status 
is difficult to determine without the assistance of time. The presence of 
distinct gaps within a genus, or between genera, allows the taxonomist to 
create certain boundaries, but these delineations are always tentative. The 
synchronic approach restricts the scientist’s ability to understand the sta-
tus of a form or group of forms; diachronic study, if only it were possible, 
would free the observer from the illusion of fixed forms presently found in 
nature.10
 As a taxonomist, Nabokov was fascinated by the equivocal status of 
forms whose position in the classificatory system could change based on 
human research: as he wrote, “. . . a monotypic species can turn into a 
polytypic overnight—it is a case of bibliography not biology.”11 In regard 
to his own conclusion that Cyclargus Nab. was a monotypic genus (with 
ammon Lucas its only species), he wrote that “it is quite possible that 
someone else will 1) find that ammon produces well-defined local forms in 
some corner of Cuba or 2) [supplement these data] with facts which were 
unknown to me—and in result the monotypic ammon may revert with-
out any evolutionary activity on its own part whatever to the polytypic 
aspect it had prior to this paper.”12 And of his most significant accomplish-
ment, his revision of the more than 120 subspecies in the genus Lycaeides, 
he wrote to Edmund Wilson that its scientific authority would stand “for 
some 25 years, after which another fellow will show how wrong I was 
in this or that. Herein lies the difference between science and art.”13 The 
greater knowledge of the natural world, Nabokov recognized, was in con-
stant flux. Gaps are discovered, others disappear, and still others go unno-
ticed, depending upon the tools and criteria used to measure and define 
discovered forms. Thus human knowledge of nature’s processes remains, 
like nature itself, a flowing, changing entity, rather than a stable struc-
ture that expands as new units of information are annexed to it. It is for 
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this reason that Nabokov insisted on basing that knowledge upon precise, 
detailed observation, and on allowing gaps in knowledge to remain vis-
ible.
h
Nabokov was aware that generalizations and abstractions are uncertain 
and transitory, but a detailed, specific observation has enduring validity: 
“Whatever the method employed and no matter the length and unifor-
mity of his series, what he is describing is not an a priori geographical 
subspecies but the specimens he has before him. Only time assisted by sev-
eral polemically minded first, second, third and Nth revisers, can settle 
the objective existence of this or that geographical subspecies, but this can 
in no way cancel or distort the particular meaning of a clear description 
based on the actual structure of any actual insect.”14 Specific descriptions 
of individual specimens and the power of precise observation do not ensure 
a better theory, but they do allow access to facts. In his 1950 response to 
Martin Brown’s critique of “Nearctic Members of the Genus Lycaeides” 
Nabokov demonstrates vividly how he considers specific judgments based 
on detailed knowledge of individual cases superior to, and more meaning-
ful than, statistical presentations of general frequency or range of a given 
structural peculiarity. As he says, “I have been concerned with ‘qualitative’ 
subspecies (since I consider that merely ‘quantitative’ phenomena have no 
taxonomic status) and with trying to restore the qualitative approach to its 
position of honor, while placing at its service quantitative values to guide 
the next man . . .”15 This distinction between qualitative and quantitative, 
and the subordinate status of the latter, is pivotal: seeing and perceiving are 
placed above measuring and counting, which are made to serve the quali-
tative evaluation. The fact that Nabokov did not appreciate statistics is 
an expression of his passion for the precise observation over the abstract, 
general rule. This principled stance implies a reluctance to neglect the indi-
vidual case with its “qualitative” elements, and an abiding suspicion of 
the suppressive power of statistical generalization. Nabokov appears to 
be repulsed by the tendency of statistics to obscure or elide the data from 
individual cases in favor of an average value. His aversion to “generalities” 
(as he called them) may have prevented him from noticing the explanatory 
boost given by statistical information about baselines and ranges to serve 
as background for descriptions of particulars.16 Nowadays, we take for 
granted that statistical analysis is a powerful tool for understanding large 
amounts of data. But to the extent that statistical interpretation can come 
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to take the place of looking with extreme care at new examples—of seeing 
groups not as “averages” but as sets of individuals—it is at least poten-
tially misleading, from Nabokov’s point of view.
 Looking attentively at a particular butterfly reveals both positive and 
negative features. Nabokov was “interested more in what happens within 
a given interspace than in the wing pattern as a whole.”17 But each of a 
species’ traits can vary across individuals, and these variations create a dif-
ferent kind of pattern that seems to move observation from the synchronic 
to the diachronic level. As a conclusion of his “Notes on the Morphology 
of the Genus Lycaeides,” Nabokov proposes a dynamic terminology for 
indicating the fleeting essence of a species. This terminology is based on 
“the specific repetition, rhythm, scope, and expression of the generic char-
acters supplied by the eight categories discussed.”18 “Rhythm” is the most 
dynamic of these, so that when all the possible characteristics of a spe-
cies are considered, their predictable or surprising presence or absence in 
various subspecies taken into account, “these omissions, gaps, fusions, and 
syncopatic jerks will produce in one species a variational rhythm different 
from that of another.” This rhythm is itself a secondary phenomenon, a 
mobile pattern of presence and absence that is seen to characterize a spe-
cies, without necessarily defining it. This is a purely metaphorical transfor-
mation of geographical diversity into an approximation of temporal flow 
(rhythm); Nabokov uses the irregularity of present-day species as an anal-
ogy for the fluid, changing nature of species across time as well.
The Myth of infallibility
Nabokov’s special perspective on science and its limits gave him a particu-
larly contemptuous view of socialist positivism and its desire to construct a 
perfect society through the advancement of scientific knowledge. Of course, 
it might also be suggested that his personal catastrophe at the hands of the 
Bolsheviks was the cause of his critical, anti-positivist approach, but such 
a possibility looks very unlikely, in the context of everything known about 
his life. Growing up in a social context sympathetic to liberal humanism 
and to idealism—his father’s Kadet party—Nabokov faced no immedi-
ate pressures to embrace positivism. His childhood reading of William 
James’ Principles of Psychology, for example, would have only heightened 
his sense that scientific discourse is but a subset of broader discourse: it 
“answers to philosophy.” James goes to great lengths to demonstrate that 
one can produce a scientific work that is strict in its attention to fact and 
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observable laws, but at the same time expresses awareness of its limited 
sphere of application. Russia’s transformation into a regime embodying 
epistemological assumptions absolutely antithetical to Nabokov’s encour-
aged the extensive expression and artistic elaboration of an epistemologi-
cal outlook that was already deeply held.
 This struggle takes its most explicit, if not its earliest, form in chapter 
4 of The Gift, Fyodor’s “The Life of Chernyshevsky.” This work sets out 
to demonstrate the hopelessly self-contradictory nature of socialist thought 
by creating a factual collage of telling events in the life of the famous radi-
cal. The most striking contradiction for Fyodor is that the “materialists” 
have a poor understanding of the natural world, one which is clouded by 
their utopian ideology.19 Fyodor inserts (and perhaps exaggerates) Cherny-
shevsky’s quest to create a perpetual motion machine as an emblem of the 
materialists’ social alchemy. He suggests that Chernyshevsky’s ignorance of 
nature and erroneous approach to physics caused him to bump up against 
unforeseen obstacles in his life. This clumsiness forms the backdrop for the 
socialists’ scientific program, which—one way or the other—was meant to 
assuage all of humanity’s ills. This confidence in the ability to craft a new 
society based on rational principles and logical self-interest received its first 
public debunking in Notes from Underground by Fyodor Dostoevsky, not 
usually Nabokov’s ally but in this case treading the same ground with him. 
It was the certainty, the Promethean impulse behind Leninism (combined 
with its abandonment of traditional, bourgeois values) that allowed the 
Bolsheviks to undertake the complete re-creation of society and human-
ity—with no regard for the cost in human lives.
 Gaps in human knowledge are inevitable, but when they are denied 
the results can be disastrous. For Chernyshevsky and his followers, the 
desire to craft an all-encompassing worldview rendered the elision of 
gaps a practical necessity. But his own limitations are displayed in his 
(alleged) ignorance of the natural world; they receive a further dramatiza-
tion when he is found to be reading a public lecture from “blank pages” 
in his notebook (“a gruesome symbol” is Fyodor’s only comment).20 His 
near-sightedness makes explicit his inability to envision the minute details 
of the factual world around him—phenomena which really are there, but 
which he does not perceive. This limitation need not be taken as a special 
criticism of Chernyshevsky himself: his poor eyesight is analogous to the 
human condition generally, although his failure to recognize this flaw sets 
him apart. It is not only that the world’s details cannot be seen, but also 
that they often go unseen even though they might, with care, be noticed: 
it is easy to overlook things one is not trying to see. Such tunnel vision 
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anticipates Hermann’s obsession in Despair. He not only finds his exact 
double where none exists—because he was looking for him—but he also 
overlooks the most important bit of incriminating evidence in the midst of 
his “perfect murder”: the victim’s engraved walking stick left behind in the 
car. Like Hermann, Chernyshevsky and his successors are implied to have 
overlooked the inevitability of gaps and shortcomings in their vision of the 
world, and as a result they paved the way to a political system that was 
bound to move from mistake to mistake as it produced an alternate reality 
of horrific proportions.
 The problematic concept of mechanical perfection in the production 
of a utopian society receives special attention in Bend Sinister, in a device 
called a “Padograph.” Bend Sinister is the only Nabokov novel that depicts 
in some detail the workings of a utopian state based upon a positivistic, 
materialist outlook on the potential of human progress. As such, it figures 
a regime which, like that of the Bolsheviks, aimed to create a fully rational-
ized society, where all behaviors were calculated and studied as potential 
components in the quest for equality. The novel’s central image expressing 
this civic faith in human technology is the “Padograph,” invented by the 
new dictator’s father. This machine was designed to produce perfect forg-
eries of any handwriting, with the result that a person’s script was no lon-
ger a trait of individuality.21 Now, while it may seem self-evident that there 
is more to individuality than handwriting, in Paduk’s reasoning this device 
was the first step towards eliminating the unfair and pernicious differences 
among people’s talents. The mechanical ability to mimic handwriting per-
fectly was thought to presage the triumph over individualism, as if such 
a mechanical feat, itself fairly simple, had profound consequences for the 
state’s ability to manage and equalize various individual personalities. This 
overconfidence in the machine leads to illogical and impossible conclu-
sions—and grim consequences. Like his logic, Paduk’s ideology is flawed, 
and as a result it creates monstrosities in all of its further developments. 
It is not based upon a scientific view of the world but on an abstract the-
ory (we may recall here Goethe’s warnings about the dangers of theory), 
yet it becomes the guiding spirit of the nation’s science, which like every-
thing else in the Ekwilist state must forego excellence, because excellence 
is anti-egalitarian. As a result, the regime’s doltish psychologists are more 
concerned to study the amelioration of criminal and violent natures than 
to protect and foster vulnerable children. (This bizarre distortion of logic 
appears to embody Nabokov’s suggestion that once one has abandoned 
principles of reason and humanism, a situation arises where no result is 
truly illogical.)
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 For Nabokov, the concept of knowledge of the world came to be con-
nected with knowledge of specific phenomena and also with the possibility 
of accurate copying or representation of these phenomena. The “Pado-
graph” is a travesty of such copying and also a parody of the repeatabil-
ity of scientific experiments. The trope of copying is also relevant both 
intertextually, as a reminder of Gogol’s “The Overcoat” and its copy-clerk 
Akaky Akakievich, and metapoetically, as an echo of Fyodor’s, and later 
Nabokov’s, claim to be copying down a text with its own transcendent 
existence. In his less guarded moments, Nabokov admitted that his contact 
with this transcendent artwork did not give him full knowledge of what 
possibilities were contained in each creation.22 This transcribing process 
can be assumed to be as accurate as human perception can muster, but it 
is not mechanical or all-encompassing: apparently, there can be gaps in the 
author’s awareness of the creation’s signifying power.
unrepeatability: Translation, knowledge, and the unknown
Such incomplete transcriptions suggest an illuminating comparison with 
scientific work. Scientific observations must be repeatable; but that does 
not mean all forms of knowledge are, or can be, repeatable. Artistic inspi-
ration may resist a single perfect transcription. The experience of that inspi-
ration may be unrepeatable, and its expression in art does not follow the 
rules of science and may be incomplete. Sensitivity to such incompleteness 
characterized Nabokov’s approach to science and, even more dramatically, 
his scholarly approach to literature. His translation with commentary of 
Alexander Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin is a monument to the clash between 
the human desire for complete, reproducible knowledge and the reality of 
its impossibility. It is the same theme explored in Sir Arthur Eddington’s 
comparison of the phenomenal world to a clumsy mistranslation of the 
physical world (quoted in the epigraph to chapter 5).
 When Nabokov came to explore the problem of translation, particu-
larly that of poetry, he approached the scientific notion of repeatability 
from a different angle. Although he had made some rhymed verse transla-
tions in the 1940s, when he began work on Eugene Onegin he became 
convinced of the impossibility of bringing the poem’s full interplay of 
sound and meaning into another language. Thus the jerky, literal nature 
of his translation represents precisely the impossibility of creating a com-
plete and perfect translation of the original. Such an absolutist goal may 
be dismissed at the outset as unreasonable and quixotic, yet it expresses 
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and forces an important philosophical stance. It foregrounds the neces-
sary humility of the human mind in the context of things that are beyond 
its reach. In this case, the exact specifics and complete form of Pushkin’s 
poem are beyond the grasp of the English language and those who lack 
Russian; to conceal this inaccessibility behind a fluid translation, Nabo-
kov suggests, is to exaggerate the power of language itself as a tool of 
knowledge. Even with its stripped-down goal of literal, semantic copying 
(no rhyme, no meter), the translation fails since it requires a commentary 
roughly five times its length to communicate the full semantic layer. More-
over the commentary itself, however extensive, cannot be exhaustive, and 
in a way it serves to underscore the incompleteness of all translations, no 
matter how extensive the apparatus and how diligent and perceptive the 
translator. This stance is the next logical step beyond the translation model 
discussed in Bend Sinister concerning Ember’s versions of Shakespeare, 
which, as we saw, are like “shadowgraphs” of unbelievable complexity 
whose aim was to cast the same silhouette as Shakespeare’s works, while 
not resembling them in primary form. If in that novel Nabokov has Krug 
question whether the result was worth the effort, by the time of his work 
on Eugene Onegin his priority is to trample the myth of epistemological 
confidence that readable, poetic translation implies.
 The impossibility of translating a poetic work perfectly into a new lan-
guage is an analogue for the translation of the world into our conscious 
awareness. “Reality is a very subjective affair. . . . [A] lily is more real to 
a naturalist than it is to an ordinary person. But it is still more real to 
a botanist. And yet another stage of reality is reached with that botanist 
who is a specialist in lilies. You can get nearer and nearer, so to speak, to 
reality; but you can never get near enough because reality is an infinite suc-
cession of steps, levels of perception, false bottoms, and hence unquench-
able, unattainable.”23 The theme of humans’ limited ability to know the 
world takes various shapes throughout Nabokov’s oeuvre. The 1930 novel 
Laughter in the Dark (originally Camera Obscura) contains one of the 
most explicit embodiments of this proposition, taken entirely out of any 
metaphysical context. When the protagonist Albinus—film critic and pro-
moter of cinematographic innovation—goes blind after a car accident, he 
is forced to develop his conception of his surroundings from what he can 
touch, smell, and hear, combined with what he is told by his mistress Mar-
got. She creates and narrates his imagined world, the views it might hold, 
its shape and contents—often with deliberate deceptions about vistas and 
colors: “The fact that the blind man was obliged to picture his little world 
in the hues prescribed by [her paramour] Rex afforded the latter exquisite 
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amusement.”24 What she does not tell him—that in fact the two of them are 
not alone, but are accompanied by Axel Rex, with whom she is having an 
affair right under his nose—remains, for a while, outside of his conscious-
ness. The gruesome comedy develops as Rex gestures, dances, and mocks 
Albinus within inches of his unseeing eyes. Gradually, Albinus’s senses 
become more acute, and he starts to pick up on discontinuities: anomalous 
sounds, smells, and even intuitions that tell him that something is wrong 
with his world picture: “Soon it became quite difficult for Rex to come in 
or go out unnoticed. No matter how noiselessly he passed, Albinus turned 
his head at once in that direction and asked: ‘Is that you, darling?’”25 He 
frequently stops and strains to catch clues to this mysterious presence. 
In Albinus’s new dark world, Axel and Margot appear in the role of a 
malevolent demiurge, and the concealed, outer reality has almost nothing 
in common with Albinus’s conception of it. His life becomes a living hell 
of his own making, a consequence of his own selfish and cruel behavior—
the abandonment of the ethical consideration of others whose lives he has 
made into hell (and his disillusionment is echoed in Despair by Hermann’s 
rude awakening when he discovers the error in his “perfect crime”).
 Such a pessimistic picture of the relationship between the phenomenal 
world and ultimate reality is not typical of Nabokov’s works, however. 
Albinus’s ascent from a limited, erroneous consciousness to a higher state 
of awareness is a grotesque perversion of the enhanced consciousness 
of “multilevel thinking” espoused by Fyodor in The Gift.26 If Albinus’s 
revelation is based on perceived flaws in the reality Margot has painted 
for him, Fyodor also finds many anomalies, coincidences, patterns, and 
delights that speak to him of a benevolent beyond that shapes the contours 
or somehow participates in his world: “the constant feeling that our days 
here are only pocket money, farthings clinking in the dark, and that some-
where is stocked the real wealth, from which life should know how to get 
dividends in the shape of dreams, tears of happiness, distant mountains.”27 
He suggests that his father intuits the same metaphysical structure, which 
he sees in nature especially whenever he finds species whose existence is 
not justified by the struggle for survival. It is this vision that allows Kon-
stantin to step into the base of a rainbow and its colored air, implicitly 
defying the laws of physics. Fyodor breaks similar laws when he trans-
forms his tiny room into the expanses of central Asia, or turns a straight-
line streetcar ride into a circular one. These characters and their fictional 
kin perceive a basic goodness of ultimate reality through the fissures in 
ordinary life, even if they cannot know exactly what that “reality” is.
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 These implied lapses in the continuity of “reality”—alleged nonutilitar-
ian excesses in nature, or uncanny patterns in an individual’s life (“coin-
cidence”)—connect to lapses in the laws of physics (remember Fyodor’s 
erratically regressing watch and his ability to cross busy streets in a state 
of oblivion), and together these apparent flaws point toward the visible 
world’s subordination to a larger context. Traditionally, following Véra 
Nabokov’s famed revelation in the introduction to the 1979 collection of 
Nabokov’s poems, this context is called “otherworldliness” (potustoron-
nost’, from the poem “Being in Love”); but it might also be called the 
“not-yet-known,” or the “unknowable”—the limitations and lapses of 
human mind.28 Whatever we call it, this simple formula becomes a regular 
part of Nabokov’s narrative structures, and it is the main motivation for 
his use of concealed pattern in virtually all of his novels and most of his 
stories. But the patterns—the themes of a life, so to speak—are only one 
of the signs of this larger context. Nabokov also constructs his works so 
that there are deliberate gaps, flaws, and anomalies within the very tex-
ture of his created worlds and also in their textual substrate—the author’s 
language—and these aberrations are intended to mimic the very imperfec-
tions that intimate the world’s contingency. The relationship between these 
phenomena and mistakes is explicit—though inverted—in Despair and 
Laughter in the Dark, where the main characters are practically solipsists. 
It receives a positive, parodic, and exaggerated extension in Invitation 
to a Beheading, where the “cast” of characters “enacting” Cincinnatus’s 
bizarre incarcerating world makes various sorts of mistakes, accompanied 
by a complete breakdown in the laws of language, logic, and even physics. 
Likewise, the socialist dictatorship in Bend Sinister is comically and tragi-
cally blunder-prone in its tyrannical pursuit of perfection through univer-
sal equality.
 The mistakes of solipsistic “philistines” like Albinus, Hermann, Paduk, 
or Humbert are parodies of the wrinkles and fissures detected by the per-
ceptive and curious. These benighted characters are subordinated to other 
sorts of textual patterns and anomalies that they do not recognize, but 
which the author allows readers to see (some sooner, some later). Such, for 
example, is the profusion of phallic and mythological imagery in Despair, 
which leads to the suggestion that Hermann is in the grips of an elaborate 
Freudian psychosis focused on castration anxiety. Likewise, Hermann is 
presumably unaware of the extent to which his own text parodies contem-
porary literature—literature that surrounds him with a subtext of mock-
ery.29
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discontinuities in nature and art
Visible pattern, as a system of meaningfully interrelated moments, is only 
one aspect of Nabokov’s integration of texture. The gaps or discontinuities 
in a character’s conscious awareness, or in the reader’s experience of textual 
meaning, drives Nabokov’s work more and more toward the figuration of 
gaps at each available level of artistic material. Nabokov’s conception of 
gap comes in part from his experience of literary science as expressed in 
Andrey Bely’s “Lyric Poetry and Experiment,” in the voluminous theoreti-
cal work Symbolism, published in 1910.30 In the Introduction, I proposed 
that there were affinities between this Belyan emphasis on prosodic gaps—
unfulfilled stresses—in verse and Nabokov’s own interest in, for example, 
missing elements in the expected range of butterfly morphology. And in 
his own translation of Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin, Nabokov drew special 
attention to the missing stanzas—some of which had been suppressed by 
Pushkin, some of which may have never existed—by granting them full 
blank pages, with line numbers telling us where the text would have been. 
No other publication of the novel employs this strategy.31 Such yawning 
discontinuities as these are characteristic of the world as Nabokov sees it; 
he sought and found them to be characteristic of Gogol’s artistic outlook, 
as well (Andrei Bely had also drawn attention to the “negative” charac-
teristics of Gogol’s works, in his own Gogol’s Craftsmanship).32 Nabo-
kov clearly wanted readers to think hard about the fact that Pushkin has 
included these gaps in his “novel in verse.” Of the missing stanzas XXXIX 
through XLI of chapter 1, he writes, “It is not unthinkable that this gap is 
a fictitious one, with some musical value—the artifice of a wistful pause, 
the imitation of a missed heartbeat, the mirage of an emotional horizon, 
false asterisks of false suspense.”33 This emphasis is designed to suggest 
that the absences are crucial to a full understanding of the work, hinting 
also that they reveal a commonality between the two artists.34 The point 
for the scientist (literary or otherwise) as well as for the artist is that con-
sidering what is absent is just as important as examining what is present.
 When he began work on Onegin in the 1950s, these kinds of fine-grain 
textual lapses were already a long-standing feature of Nabokov’s artistic 
method. Beginning with Invitation to a Beheading, Nabokov deliberately 
included narrative anomalies that disrupt the regular flow of the reader’s 
experience. These disruptions, or ruptures, are at first (as in Invitation) 
features of the characters’ worlds, but by The Gift, they are integrated 
into the narrative form as experienced by the reader.35 The irregular, hid-
den shifting between narrative voices in that novel amounts to a series 
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of almost undetectable, but momentous, ontological shifts, in which the 
reader is left in a state of constant uncertainty about the narrative status of 
the text. Whenever the reader’s confidence is allowed to build, it is quickly 
dashed by another unnoticed shift in narrating perspective. It was prob-
ably such shifts that V. has in mind in The Real Life of Sebastian Knight 
when he asserts that Sebastian’s writing is an inimitable “series of gaps.”36 
This device—both obvious and hidden gaps in narrative flow—became 
one of Nabokov’s most potent embodiments of his claim that one can only 
reread a novel, because the first reading gives such an incomplete and one-
dimensional picture of a work’s multiple levels of meaning and their inter-
connections. A similar series of cognitive shifts takes place as a reader, in 
subsequent rereadings, comes to recognize blind spots in earlier readings, 
fragments from or references to other literary texts, and related hidden 
patterns, from which much of each work’s mosaic is composed. The prac-
ticed and passionate rereader is looking carefully for tell-tale signs of these 
“cryptograms,” to echo Eddington, just as Fyodor and his father look for 
similarly concealed anomalies in the natural world. The essence of the text 
is transformed from a system of unidirectional causal chains of story and 
plot into a network of hidden facts and their recursive discovery, in a way 
mimicking the scientific endeavor.37
 It was a natural development for Nabokov to bring the text-reality 
analogy into the realm of explicit play and manipulation through the 
introduction of cryptograms, and this happens as early as the story The 
Vane Sisters (1951), although it was augured in the long-unpublished 
phrase “rhymes of nature,” used to describe mimicry in “Father’s Butter-
flies.”38 A related locution appears in The Gift proper, where during Niko-
lai Chernyshevsky’s travels “a hole in the road loses its meaning of hole, 
becoming merely a typographical unevenness, a jump in the line.”39 And 
as we saw in chapter 5, the idea itself was echoed if not presaged in Arthur 
Eddington’s New Pathways in Science in his comparison of the phenome-
nal universe to a cryptogram. But the idea achieves its fullest development 
in Lolita’s “cryptogrammatic paper chase” and in Pale Fire’s text–texture 
dichotomy, emerging from a metaphysical typo (mountain vs. fountain as 
parts of a near-death experience)—in fact, through a whole network of 
virtually invisible typos, as James Ramey has argued;40 and in Ada’s alpha-
betical and typographical conundrums. In a string of text, a typographi-
cal error is a flaw or lapse, a break in the proper, rule-bound sequence 
of letters making up written language. It might be a chance event, or—as 
in Ada—it might be an otherworldly sign, but in either case, it is a place 
where the rules governing written language are interrupted by an external 
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event, subject to a separate set of laws: the laws of neurological ability, 
typing and error rates, chance distraction of the typist, or the rules of oth-
erworldly influence—whatever they might be. The point is that a typo is 
a simple mistake on one level, but if it is deliberately introduced by the 
author, then it is also a reference to a different ontological plane (the plane 
of authors, typists, and proofreaders). If the typo is also meaningful (part 
of an intentional pattern from beyond the inner story), then it opens up a 
connection between the two levels in the form of transcendent—not spe-
cifically defined—intrusions on worldly events. What these accidental yet 
meaningful (choice mimicking chance) events suggest within these works 
is that each level of existence is subject to effects from contiguous but usu-
ally unseen levels of being or meaning. Nabokov’s works deliberately pur-
sue metaphysically tinged structures that embody precisely this kind of 
layered significance (which is also reminiscent of J. W. Dunne’s regressive 
approach to temporal existence in his The Serial Universe).
 Certain kinds of intelligence—call it genius, like Krug’s in Bend Sinis-
ter, or like an artist’s or great scientist’s—are highly anomalous within the 
spectrum of human abilities. Such aberrations in human mental features 
are themselves discontinuities in nature’s expressiveness—irregularities 
that Paduk’s Ekwilist regime wants to eliminate in order to create perfectly 
smooth, homogenous equality. This project is an excellent example of how 
an idea (“equality”) can be misapplied to create a program completely at 
odds with the facts of reality (inequality, discontinuity, unpredictability). If 
one explores the world like a true scientist, examining individual samples 
and studying nature’s extremes as well as its average representatives, one 
develops a sense for the system’s complexity, the interrelation of all the 
parts and their dependence on one another. Equality, it turns out, is abso-
lutely antithetical to nature, which is characterized by differentiation—a 
property Nabokov explored in depth as he studied extensive groups of 
subspecies. Nature is filled with bumps, flaws, and gaps; to eliminate them 
is to work contrary to reality and to ignore the beauty that nature’s variety 
holds.
 Of Nikolai Gogol’s The Government Inspector, Nabokov wrote, “the 
play begins with a blinding flash of lightning and ends in a thunderclap. In 
fact it is wholly placed in the tense gap between the flash and the crash.” 
This iconic illustration demonstrates Nabokov’s fascination with the 
notion of a chasm between cause and effect. In the example he chooses, 
the pause, or “gap,” is easily explained by the differing speeds of light and 
sound. Nevertheless, the delay cannot last two hours, or long enough to fit 
a play’s duration. That apparent hiatus becomes emblematic for intuited 
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or perceived fissures in all causal chains, no matter how self-evident the 
links between action and reaction.
 Whatever may be the laws of causality and continuity in nature, a 
deeper law, Nabokov suggests, concerns interruptions, exceptions, and 
discontinuities. The essence of this law may be inaccessible to human per-
ception and reason, but clues to the incompleteness of causality are evident 
to the careful and open-minded individual, his work suggests. Nabokov’s 
intuition was confirmed, or at least shared, by physicists like Arthur 
Eddington, James Jeans, Niels Bohr, and Werner Heisenberg, and philos-
ophers of science Emile Meyerson, Philipp Frank, and others. Constant 
awareness of this implicit, though inscrutable, law helps preserve scientists 
against excessive faith in the power of their methods and the infallibil-
ity of their discoveries—in other words, it protects them against hubris. 
In his combined aesthetic and scientific explorations of these meta-causal 
phenomena, Nabokov helps to establish guidelines for the best practice of 
science and the pursuit of knowledge.
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THrouGHouT THiS Book, I have been encouraging the notion that 
Nabokov rejected determinism and even causality as fundamental prin-
ciples of worldly existence.2 Evolutionary development, he suggested, 
depends not exclusively on the mechanisms of natural selection; the mind’s 
history does not obey any deterministic laws; the known “physical” world 
tends to include patterns and discontinuities that are best termed meta-
physical. I have argued that he had essentially idealist convictions, embrac-
ing possibilities that come from beyond the world of sense experience. 
These are not claims one expects to hear about a scientist, although as we 
have seen, Nabokov was preceded by other major scientists with a similar 
metaphysical bent (William James, Oliver Lodge, Arthur Eddington, and 
physicist-manqué Henri Bergson, to name just a few). In this Conclusion, 
I will explore the paradox of the anti-causal scientist, meanwhile placing 
Nabokov within the context of later discussions of science vs. anti-science 
and affirming Nabokov’s place in the first camp, rather than the second. 
That accomplished, I will turn to a consideration of how this study’s pro-
posals affect our understanding of the most important interpretations of 
Nabokov’s work, and what consequences these hold for readers and scien-
tists alike.
Science, art, and ethics
delo v tom, chto ischezla granitsa / mezhdu vechnost’iu i veshchestvom—
gone, in fact, is the break between matter and eternity . . . 
—“Oculus,” 19391
conclusion
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 In the twentieth century’s early decades, physicists working on sub-
atomic and quantum theories came to deal first with the discontinuous 
nature of energy, then with the unknowability of complete data about sub-
atomic particles, along with the wave-particle complementarity of matter.3 
The results of these discoveries were so disconcerting and counterintui-
tive that even the scientists themselves had a hard time deciding what they 
meant.4 As several physicists began making popularizing or philosophi-
cal assessments of the new theories, debates arose about the ultimate ten-
ability of the law of causality in view of the fundamentally indeterminate 
and unpredictable behavior of subatomic matter. Nearly all popular treat-
ments of the new sciences included discussions of causality’s fall or persis-
tence: the demise of causality was emphasized by James Jeans and Arthur 
Eddington; in the strict context of subatomic phenomena Niels Bohr also 
cast doubt upon causality, while Werner Heisenberg and Einstein took the 
opposite point of view (although Einstein identified the anti-causal impli-
cations of quantum theory as early as 1917, leading to his enduring doubts 
about the theory).5 These revolutions, combined with Einstein’s relativity, 
set the stage for Nabokov’s skepticism regarding the form and immutabil-
ity of nature’s “known” laws.6
 Nabokov came to science from the standpoint of passionate observation 
and appreciation of detail. His approach to lepidopteral research began 
from an effort to identify undescribed species, which could only be accom-
plished by achieving a fine-grained sensitivity to the insects’ morphological 
characteristics. While we know beyond dispute that Nabokov took great 
interest in evolutionary theory and was pleased to challenge natural selec-
tion, we do not know when, exactly, he read Darwin’s works. Certainly he 
would have had significant exposure to them at the Tenishev School, where 
they would have been part of the biology curriculum, and where there 
were special materials and even exhibits on evolution and mimicry.7 How, 
exactly, Nabokov came to question the validity or comprehensiveness of 
natural selection remains unclear. His writings do not show definite signs 
of opposition until The Gift (unless one accepts my comments on Glory in 
chapter 2 as definitive). If we take literally the metaphysical expressions in 
a letter to his mother (about how the artist/writer, while primarily plagia-
rizing, adds bits of valuable new decoration to God’s creation),8 they lay a 
clear groundwork for an idealist approach to nature. On the other hand, 
such effusions are rare enough that they could well be figurative, and there 
is simply not enough information in Nabokov’s letters or private materi-
als to conclude whether Nabokov was privately a deist—or even a theist. 
The formulations in “Father’s Butterflies” clearly point toward an idealist, 
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perhaps pantheistic version of nature’s essence—but that is a work of fic-
tion. Taken as a whole, Nabokov’s fictional, autobiographical, and techni-
cal statements about Darwinism demonstrate a consistent effort to keep 
scientific, worldly knowledge enveloped within a larger context upon 
which it was contingent. In his suggestions that nature could be nonutili-
tarian, and hence escape the law of the struggle for existence (which he 
mentioned in another letter to his mother, in 1924),9 he appears to draw 
precisely on the noncausal potential foregrounded by the post-Copenhagen 
debates. Focusing on nature’s excessive creativity, its element of surprise, 
Nabokov repeatedly draws attention to the possible existence of other 
laws—undiscovered and perhaps inaccessible to human reason—that may 
function on levels of reality that physics and biology cannot touch.10
 Nabokov apparently felt, or hoped, that such a case could be made 
within biology proper. Nabokov’s last, incomplete or rejected scientific 
projects offer a clue as to how it might have been done. Véra’s description 
of his ambitious ideas for a comprehensive book on mimicry, collecting all 
known instances in the animal world, demonstrates his continued belief 
that mimicry, in its full development, would reveal nonutilitarian aberra-
tions.11 And his large guides “Butterflies of Europe” and “Butterflies of 
North America” were to lay out species in their actual relationships with 
a completeness and precision never before achieved. Perhaps he felt that 
the explosion of butterfly species demonstrated variety in excess of the 
possible needs caused by competition for survival, or that such a massive 
collection of information would provide others with the tools to discover a 
nonutilitarian principle in nature.
 It is telling that Nabokov did his most significant scientific work on 
the proper classification of groups of species—that is, on genera and sub-
families. His main interest was in seeing how various groups of related 
creatures formed different sorts of wholes: monotypic genera like Parachil-
ades, or polytypic ones like Cyclargus.12 He takes natural selection as if for 
granted, but he does not give it pride of place in the examination of taxo-
nomic relationships or the emergence of new forms. These groups of forms 
can form macroscopic, interspecific qualities or patterns, perceptible to 
the scientist, that have a certain phenomenal reality even though they can 
have no bearing upon species survival as such. This holistic envisioning of 
the qualitative aspect of nature asserts nothing more than the potentially 
valuable (to consciousness) existence of phenomena that may or may not 
be noticed, but that have no direct bearing upon utility or survival. Using 
his intellect to demonstrate the fascination of such phenomena, Nabokov 
proves by his own activity that the human mind as well is geared toward 
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“non-utilitarian delights.”13 Such a “proof” recalls Ernst Mach’s demon-
stration that some manifestations of curiosity have no possible purpose, 
but imply the appearance of a phase of life in which purpose, and with it 
cause-effect relations, is secondary.14
 As for psychological commitments, Nabokov’s relentless denigration 
of Freudian psychoanalysis, or at least of his own caricature of it, creates 
abundant interference surrounding his theory of personality and selfhood. 
As an essentially positivist, causally grounded account of human personal-
ity and neurosis, Freud’s theory appears to have struck Nabokov as sim-
plistic, reductive, and false.15 However, its power within the culture at large 
required him to wage constant battle against it. Thus the two most impor-
tant aspects of selfhood to emerge in Nabokov’s works are its essential 
mystery and its partial independence from positivistic causality. It would 
be absurd to suggest that there is no such thing as psychological causal-
ity, just as it would be foolhardy to deny all physical or biological causal 
chains. Yet Nabokov crafts his characters in such a way that the element 
of mystery is foregrounded, and causally obscure psychological events 
play a key role in a person’s narrative. Willingness to be taken by surprise, 
and to consider a surprise as something essentially new and spontaneous 
rather than as something to be explained away, stands at the core of this 
vision of the world and of self. When the mind is bent toward the discov-
ery and even the creation of new forms in the world, it is not “struggling 
for survival.” In this very Schopenhauerian vision, aesthetic perception (of 
nature or of art) allows the product of nature—human consciousness—to 
escape, at least briefly, the deterministic law of cause and effect, to be free 
of “will” in Schopenhauer’s sense.16 Like hypothesized nonutilitarian fea-
tures of plants or animals, consciousness’s pursuit of arcane knowledge or 
of aesthetic bliss does not confer any direct survival or reproductive ben-
efit. It is primarily, though perhaps not exclusively, mind and the essence 
of human selfhood that Nabokov wants to pull out of the deterministic 
mechanism, suggesting that these contain secrets that lie outside causally 
linked pathways. As for causality in the world of physics and material 
objects, we can judge something of Nabokov’s attitude from the way he 
frames the story in Transparent Things: this novel is narrated by a ghost 
(or ghosts), who describes the manner in which such beings are able, just 
barely, to affect the physical world and perhaps the actions of humans: 
“The most we can do when steering a favorite in the best direction, in cir-
cumstances not involving injury to others, is to act as a breath of wind and 
to apply the lightest, the most indirect pressure such as trying to induce a 
dream that we hope our favorite will recall as prophetic if a likely event 
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does actually happen.”17 Indeed, at the novel’s end they try to impinge on 
the causality of Hugh Person’s world in order to save him from the fire 
they foresee, but they fail because of his psychological independence from 
any acts they might perform, visible or invisible.18
 But what can this mean, and how can a scientist seriously propose 
departure from causality in everyday life? After all, even the Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum mechanics does not deny the causal predict-
ability of events at scales larger than the subatomic. All this anti-causal 
rhetoric might lead one to accuse Nabokov of an anti-scientific or relativ-
istic stance. The attention I have been drawing to Nabokov’s suspicions of 
epistemological certitude, in science or in society, may suggest to some an 
allegiance with those who discredit the privileged role of scientific work 
in modern society. At times, indeed, Nabokov seems to do so—as in his 
lecture “The Art of Literature and Commonsense,” where he explicitly 
downplays the fundamental value of mathematics and the sciences built 
upon it:
Man at a certain stage of his development invented arithmetic for the 
purely practical purpose of obtaining some kind of human order in 
a world which he knew to be ruled by gods whom he could not pre-
vent from playing havoc with his sums whenever they felt so inclined. 
. . . Then . . . mathematics transcended their initial condition and became 
as it were a natural part of the world to which they had been merely 
applied. Instead of having numbers based on certain phenomena that 
they happened to fit because we ourselves happened to fit into the pattern 
we apprehended, the whole world gradually turned out to be based on 
numbers, and nobody seems to have been surprised at the queer fact of 
the outer network becoming an inner skeleton.19
Considering this passage together with his dismissal of statistics, his 
preference for qualitative over quantitative research, and his desire to 
overturn dominant theories like natural selection, we have a portrait of 
someone who rejects the scientific method and its results in favor of a 
subjective and even slightly mystical view of the world. However, it is 
just here that the Goethean perspective allows for a correction, demon-
strating the existence of another approach to scientific method, in which 
hypothesis and experiment play a lesser role than data collection and pat-
tern-based analysis. Nabokov’s awareness of this methodological contrast 
shines forth in his story “Ultima Thule.” The truth-seeking protagonist, 
Sineusov, says, “When a hypothesis enters a scientist’s mind, he checks it 
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by calculation and experiment, that is, by the mimicry and the pantomime 
of truth. Its plausibility infects others, and the hypothesis is accepted as 
the true explanation for the given phenomenon, until someone finds its 
faults. I believe the whole of science consists of such exiled or retired 
ideas: and yet at one time each of them boasted high rank; now only a 
name or a pension is left.”20 This expression of the progress of science 
reflects quite neatly Goethe’s own conception of it—which also included 
reservations about the power of mathematics. And Goethe is not the only 
major thinker to raise similar questions: Arthur Eddington, whose expedi-
tion had helped confirm general relativity, offered similar doubts. Chal-
lenging James Jeans’ unequivocal embrace of mathematics, he wrote, “the 
main reason why the mathematician has beaten his rivals is that we have 
allowed him to dictate the terms of the competition. The fate of every 
theory of the universe is decided by a numerical test. Does the sum come 
out right? I am not sure that the mathematician understands this world of 
ours better than the poet and the mystic. Perhaps it is only that he is bet-
ter at sums.”21 This fundamental stance, according to which all theories 
are tentative and likely to be overthrown when new facts or new ways of 
looking are discovered, is really the essence of the modern scientific ethos. 
The fragility of scientific knowledge is less trumpeted than its spectacu-
lar successes, but Nabokov’s emphasis on the former over the latter does 
not make him any less a partisan and enthusiastic practitioner of science. 
Scientific work was for Nabokov one of the summits of consciousness, 
alongside artistic creation.
 Although he was no conventional scientist, there is every reason 
to believe that Nabokov would have been a passionate opponent of the 
idea that all scientific knowledge is essentially compromised by sociolog-
ical biases. However, he was acutely aware that science was vulnerable 
to political or personal bias. In fact, he wrote repeatedly and at length 
about the influence of the observer upon the object observed and of the 
teller upon the tale. Recognizing the dangers of prejudiced research, or of 
science blinded by its political commitments, Nabokov also felt that sci-
ence itself was a practice that could strive for an ideal of impartiality and 
studied insight, extending the sphere of human knowledge. Recall how he 
drew attention in his scientific papers to possible weaknesses in his own 
position or limitations to his empirical data, inviting future researchers 
to correct him, as we saw in chapter 1. Scientific work represents the very 
process of achieving finer and finer detail in the knowledge of phenomenal 
reality, and current errors or inaccuracies will be swept away by the next 
generation’s refinements.
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 Nabokov’s science was akin to his art in that it was essentially nonutili-
tarian from the standpoint of practical survival. He saw “pure science” and 
“pure art” as partners in the expansion of consciousness and the escape 
from the struggle for existence. Science as a nonutilitarian endeavor—pur-
suing knowledge for knowledge’s sake—represented one ideal for the pas-
sions of the fertile mind. Whatever its weaknesses and tendencies to error, 
these can be corrected within the normal functioning of the scientific com-
munity. As a member of that community, Nabokov worked to create the 
best possible new knowledge in his own special area, correcting errors of 
his predecessors while also drawing honest attention to unanswered ques-
tions or possible preconceptions in his own work.
 Nabokov’s interest in diverging from strictly realist, causally based nar-
ration in several of his works (Invitation to a Beheading, The Gift, Ada, 
Transparent Things, “The Vane Sisters”) should be considered within the 
context of his thought on evolution in the 1940s. Although Nabokov used 
adaptationist language with great consistency in his scientific papers, he 
also expressed his “dissatisfaction” with all available explanations of its 
workings. His interest in mimicry as a possible source for anti-Darwinian 
evidence brings forth his desire to highlight nondeterministic phenomena 
in nature. On the other hand, he never did publish a scientific work exclu-
sively about mimicry, and had he examined all available examples and dis-
cussed the project with his professional colleagues, it is likely he would 
have realized that this particular anti-selectionist argument would not 
withstand scrutiny. If he wanted to continue pursuing that line of research, 
he would have had to broaden his focus to encompass nonadaptive muta-
tions generally, especially the ones that endure over time.
 But most likely his interest would have moved in another direction, one 
also central to his art and to his vision of the natural world. As we saw in 
chapter 1, Nabokov arrived at his manner of differentiating individual spe-
cies by developing the concept of “synthetic character.”22 This “synthetic 
character of the species” is a composite concept, drawn from knowledge 
of correlated individual variations in several particular organs or subor-
gans of a given species. It represents a “metaknowledge” of the species, 
a sense of organism that transcends what is discovered in a single “type” 
specimen. (Nabokov was perhaps envisioning something analogous to the 
abstract potential of the genotype with all its variations across individuals, 
as opposed to the concrete phenotype as expressed in the individual crea-
ture.)
 This range of phenotypic expression is phenomenally “real” to the 
knowing consciousness, but is it a part of the mechanism or dynamic of 
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evolution’s actual development? Do such epiphenomena—not the varia-
tions themselves, but the “synthetic character” of all possible variations 
within each species and genus—have any status in the natural world? Are 
they useful to the species in question? Or are they simply useful—and per-
haps beautiful—to the human beings who wish to categorize them? In 
short, even within his own established scientific thought process, Nabo-
kov would have had no difficulty finding other routes past the concrete 
field of mechanism, competition, and survival, and indeed he was already 
finding them in the 1940s, albeit rather esoteric ones. Consciousness, and 
art itself, while not part of his scientific research program, also provided 
him with examples of activities born in nature that extend far beyond the 
domain of the purely “useful.”23
 It has been suggested that Nabokov’s scientific intuitions may have 
had some similarity to insights about emergent phenomena as presented 
in recent studies of complex systems.24 Would the possibility of emergent 
forms, arising not (exactly) due to natural selection but from saltatory 
shifts have compensated for the loss of useless mimicry? Only, we may 
suppose, if the results were equally “useless” in the battlefield of natural 
selection. In chapter 1, I drew attention to the way that Konstantin Godu-
nov-Cherdyntsev imagines evolution shifting from the realm of physical 
nature into the domain of consciousness itself. Although in Godunov-
Cherdyntsev’s version consciousness is achieved teleologically as part of 
an idealist outlook, there is no particular reason why consciousness might 
not be itself an emergent, nonteleological phenomenon while still retaining 
all the mystery Nabokov ascribes to it. Nabokov sought to determine the 
“synthetic character” of species, patterns in the unfolding of a day or a life, 
and other phenomena which, if not “designed,” must be emergent proper-
ties discoverable by consciousness (or else simply properties of conscious-
ness), or perhaps noncausal indices of “otherworlds” or gaps in reality’s 
fabric: in either case, they all constitute discrete components of phenom-
enal “reality” as experienced. If they are found, then they could be said to 
be discoveries (if, say, the “synthetic character” has an ideal reality, as the 
elder Godunov-Cherdyntsev believes); if invented, then they are creations 
of the mind, but still real inasmuch as they persist. They emerge from con-
scious activity and may or may not affect survival, just as they may or 
may not affect the nature of consciousness itself. I suspect that artworks in 
general fall into this category of creation for Nabokov, constituting a new 
realm where what matters is the development or evolution of conscious-
ness, the emergence of new forms of conscious existence. It is precisely this 
transition that comes forward in the innovative blends of disparate orchids 
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in Ada: the possibilities of evolution carry on in the mind, in thought, as 
much as—if not more than—in other parts of the natural world.25
 Nabokov’s knowledge of and interest in the development of science 
was central to his effort to conceptualize the world and to make artistic 
statements about it. I have attempted to show how this concern of his is 
reflected in all of his works on various levels. But how are we to relate an 
awareness of this theme to more “comprehensive” interpretations of the 
novels or stories? Surely it is not enough to suggest that they are primarily 
“about” the limitations of causality (in psychology, mechanics, or ecosys-
tems), just as Lolita is not “about” the causality of murder—or of pedo-
philia.
 In a study of the scientific contours of Nabokov’s literary art, it seems 
only fitting to consider the manner in which the author himself has become 
a subject of empirical research as well as aesthetic reflection, and how these 
two perspectives intersect. There are three major scholarly approaches to 
Nabokov in recent years that have aspirations to shape or guide all sub-
sequent considerations of his work, and I would like to deal with each 
of these separately. They are the metaphysicalist/idealist, the ethical, and 
the semiotic/intertextual. There is some overlap between these areas, but 
each of them has what I consider a dominant enunciation that is distinct 
from the others, and for the present purpose I will focus on these domi-
nant forms while attempting to acknowledge the important overlaps where 
appropriate.
 The metaphysical interpretation began its rise to prominence in the 
1980s through Brian Boyd’s work on Ada and D. Barton Johnson’s essays 
that led to Worlds in Regression: Some Novels of Vladimir Nabokov. In a 
sense it climaxed with Vladimir Alexandrov’s Nabokov’s Otherworld, and 
was further refined by Genady Barabtarlo’s Aerial View: Essays on Nabo-
kov’s Art and Metaphysics, and Boyd’s work on Pale Fire (all with support 
from a variety of other scholars). This last work showed with masses of 
evidence and meticulous argumentation how Nabokov’s precise choice of 
intertextual references supported his desire to weave a theme of supernatu-
ral agency and answerability into what some consider his most important 
novel. Throughout his scholarship, Boyd more than any other researcher 
has maintained keen sensitivity to Nabokov’s scientific dimension while 
laying out the epistemological implications of his artistic practice.26 In his 
emphasis on the experience of multiple readings, on the work of achieving 
ever more detailed knowledge of a text with its patterns, subtexts, and pat-
terns of subtexts, Boyd has shown close parallels between Nabokov’s pre-
ferred scientific methodology and the experiential-epistemological process 
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of studying (rereading carefully) his works. On the other hand, Boyd has 
also drawn attention to the tendency of Nabokov’s novels to present prob-
lems with unique and precise, albeit obscure, correct solutions, like those 
to chess problems.27
 Like Alexandrov’s and others’ emphasis on the highly controlled, 
determined nature of Nabokov’s works, this solution-oriented approach 
foregrounds and promotes the teleological aspect of his artistry, suggesting 
that the goal to be reached has been foreseen and predetermined by the 
author. This approach can be directly at odds with Nabokov’s understand-
ing of nature itself, which is “an infinite succession of steps, levels of per-
ception, false bottoms, and hence unquenchable, unattainable.”28 It is said 
of Nabokov’s novels that when the correct solution is found, it “clicks” 
characteristically, all the evidence falling neatly into place.29 If this is true, 
and all of his works strive towards an eventual unambiguous solution, it 
would seem to imply a tension between Nabokov’s artistic goals and his 
scientific philosophy, his epistemology. There is no particular reason why 
there should not be such tension: a desire for perfect knowledge in the face 
of its manifest impossibility. However, it is also true that ambiguity has 
been a consistent feature of Nabokov’s art since its earliest expressions. 
The clicks are real, and there is no doubt about them. But as Boyd’s own 
work has amply shown, the resolutions are always followed by further 
reconsiderations that destabilize the momentary equilibrium and lead to 
new sets of problems. And in the case of many of the novels, they lead 
finally to iconic figures of paradox and the infinite regress inherent in the 
quest for knowledge (for example, Fyodor’s self-distortion paradox in The 
Gift, and the authorship conundrum in Pale Fire).
 One of the biographical details that is frequently cited as a ground for 
his well-formed narrative structures is Nabokov’s affection for chess prob-
lems and their unambiguous solutions. However, two of his comments 
should force us to reevaluate these problems’ broader significance for him. 
In general, he especially loved problems designed to mislead a sophisti-
cated solver to follow a series of complex missteps, before retracing and 
discovering the simple solution that a naïve solver would find right away, 
“so that a great part of a problem’s value is due to the number of ‘tries’—
delusive opening moves, false scents, specious lines of play, astutely and 
lovingly prepared to lead the would-be solver astray.”30 Viewed holisti-
cally, the “right” solution involves being taken in, finding one’s error, and 
then seeing the simple answer. A direct path to the final solution is a second 
approach, simpler but inferior because it ignores ambiguities and hidden 
signs of complexity. Or take another favorite problem, based on retrograde 
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analysis, in which the solution hinges on white’s retracting a move before 
proceeding to the final mating combination. This problem (which Nabo-
kov calls a “fairy”)31 plays with the fact that, against all appearances, rules 
of play can be broken. And so chess problems turn out not to provide the 
kind of unequivocal support for teleological narrative that had seemed to 
be the case.
 It has been supposed, as well, that there is a clash between Nabokov’s 
metaphysical, even supernaturalistic narrative elements and his avowedly 
empirical scientific work and outlook, and that these two must therefore 
be kept separate (a separation that would have been supported, for exam-
ple, by Kant). However, in every case except perhaps Transparent Things, 
the putative ghostly or other metaphysical intrusions can be interpreted as 
being nonliteral, as manifestations of complex psychological realities or 
as models for one way that a system can “break the rules” (in this case, 
of physics and causality). And even Transparent Things, while seeming 
to grant the existence and limited influence of departed personal spirits, it 
does so within a framework that explores the temporal essence of reality 
(“space being the tumor”), assigning consciousness a privileged and inde-
pendent status beyond its material substrate. It does not, in any clear way, 
propose a designed, created teleological system. While such creative fancies 
or intuitions have almost nothing in common with science, they are closer 
to the spirit of scientific questioning than to outright metaphysical specu-
lation. In other words, rather than indicating a belief in spirits as actual, 
unambiguous participants in humanity’s progress toward some metaphysi-
cal goal, the novel seems to offer a hypothesis in answer to Nabokov’s puz-
zle in Speak, Memory: “If, in the spiral unwinding of things, space warps 
into something akin to time, and time, in its turn, warps into something 
akin to thought, then surely, another dimension follows—a special space 
maybe, not the old one, we trust, unless spirals become vicious circles 
again.”32 The novel’s “special space” is one where all past time becomes 
manifest in every object, and the near future is also visible, if only haz-
ily. But there is no more here of ultimate truths, of explanations for the 
ground of existence, than in any of Nabokov’s other works. It simply asks 
a question (alongside other, more mundane ones): what if consciousness 
can exist outside of time, after death?
 Such questions appear at first to be fundamentally unscientific. How-
ever, we have seen that Nabokov took a more than passing interest in so-
called “psychical research,” which attempted, and still attempts in a few 
quarters, to explore these questions by means of the scientific method. 
That it has failed to achieve convincing results is not the point: what mat-
S C i e n C e ,  a r T ,  a n d  e T h i C S
9
ters is that the reality of psychical phenomena might be amenable to scien-
tific investigation. Or, to put it another way, for someone not committed to 
a materialistic philosophy, the hope that intuited paranormal phenomena 
could perhaps be brought under the umbrella of rationality is not unrea-
sonable or anti-scientific or supernaturalist. In part because nothing of this 
“surplus” is presented as if it were known with certainty, it falls within the 
domain of hypothesis and thought experiment, and not within any sort of 
committed spiritualism. It is a proposed extension of scientific thinking, 
not its direct antithesis.
 The ethically grounded interpretation of Nabokov’s works is not far 
distant from the metaphysical, in part because it accepts the existence of a 
priori moral standards against which we are urged to evaluate the protag-
onists’ actions. Some of the leading proponents of this approach have been 
Ellen Pifer, in her Nabokov and the Novel, Julian Connolly in Nabokov’s 
Early Fiction, and once again Brian Boyd—especially in his work on Lolita 
and Ada, and in Gennady Barabtarlo’s “Nabokov’s Trinity,” which places 
love at the axiological center of Nabokov’s art.33 Barabtarlo puts his finger 
right on the intersection of the scientific and moral-ethical impulses when 
he states that Nabokov is “driven by an insatiable love for material detail 
accessible to any of the five senses,” which Barabtarlo further defines as 
“the ‘eye-thirsty’ love for the created world, in all its micro- and macro-
forms, for things small and large, unnoticed or unworded before and thus 
begging to be brought to life by precise and fresh description.”34 Science 
itself—the work of the naturalist, the taxonomist, the theorist—gives us 
the purest form of that brand of love in Nabokov’s world. In his consistent 
effort to achieve ever more refined approximations of nature’s “truth,”—
both truth of fact (individual, species) and truth of interrelations (genus, 
family, ecosystem)—he acts out this particular brand of love.
 The same principle governs his artistic creations—expressing physi-
cal environment and individual personalities—and his metaphysical mus-
ings. The valuation we put on our actions towards others constitutes the 
essence of ethics and morality, and even the attempt to know a person is 
an ethically charged act, as Mikhail Bakhtin observed. Whether a human 
being, replete with consciousness, can be the subject of scientific, empiri-
cal knowledge in the same way that the nonhuman natural world can is 
a question of great doubt for Nabokov. Indeed any knowledge of another 
human being is radically limited, even more so than the knowledge of 
empirical nature. As a result, Nabokov’s works reflect an imperative to 
imagine the inner lives of other human beings—as we see especially in The 
Gift, The Real Life of Sebastian Knight, and Pnin—and the harm of its 
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neglect, as in Lolita, Pale Fire, and Ada. It is thus an ethical concern that 
disrupts the science of psychology in Nabokov’s art: the idea that scientific 
study of consciousness runs the risk of obscuring or even dismissing its 
mystery and, perhaps inadvertently, destroying its autonomy, with conse-
quences like what occurs in the worlds of Invitation to a Beheading and 
Bend Sinister the probable result (and in some respects it is from this sort 
of outcome that Timofei Pnin flees at the end of his story).
 There is also an ethical component to Nabokov’s “advance probes,” 
to borrow Barabtarlo’s apt phrase, into the metaphysical beyond. While 
Nabokov was curious about scientific efforts to provide any glimmers of 
knowledge of what exists past the horizon of reason and worldly exis-
tence, his own artistic engagements with such topics call direct attention 
to their own hypothetical, if not purely playful, nature. With the excep-
tion of Nabokov’s explicit assumption of the world’s fundamental good-
ness, all metaphysical suggestions are clearly speculative. The works prove 
this in part through the repeated use of an inserted icon of the author’s 
presence—an anagram, or a disguised authorial cameo—for us a kind of 
romantic irony through which the writer refuses to claim or even hint at 
authoritative status with regard to the ultimate limits and ontological sta-
tus of the world. (Can one imagine Tolstoy ironizing his metaphysical pro-
nouncements in a similar way?) By withholding such claims of authority, in 
addition to activating an extreme limit of honesty, Nabokov also leaves his 
readers maximum scope for their own metaphysical imaginings, embody-
ing the way that claims of science or knowledge can curtail themselves out 
of ethical concern for others’ autonomy.35 As a project in knowledge, as a 
series of artistic representations of the passionate quest for understanding, 
Nabokov’s approach to portraying these three strata—physical, personal, 
metaphysical—demonstrates one way to figure the organic connection 
between scientific and metaphysical modes of investigation.
 In some ways, the major interpretive movement that I have called 
“intertextual” relates specifically to this epistemological progression out-
lined above and embodies the exact spirit of this differentiation. Devel-
oped most thoroughly by Alexander Dolinin, Omri and Irena Ronen, 
Savely Senderovich and Elena Shvarts, Irina Paperno, Yury Leving, and 
Eric Naiman, this kind of work seeks to discover, as it were, the exact 
nature of Nabokov’s compositional units and rules: it explores the fun-
damental substances and laws that make up his artistic universe. In its 
precision, rigor, and certainty, this field of scholarship is the most like 
“science” in its traditional, Kantian-Newtonian sense: the hypotheses are 
clear, the evidence is direct, the conclusions are modest, unambiguous, and 
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testable.36 The density and quantity of cultural and literary allusions in 
all of Nabokov’s work has ensured, and will probably long continue to 
provide, an extremely fertile field for exploration. This is, one could say, 
the “pure science” version of literary scholarship, the quest for ultimate 
constituents that may or may not result in definitive interpretations of a 
given work’s “meaning.” As the number of hidden yet verifiable intertex-
tual references grows, it begins to look more and more as though Nabo-
kov intended his creations to interact with their outer cultural context at 
every step, in almost every single sentence. Whether such a high degree of 
intertextuality in fact obtains remains to be seen, but already the density is 
so great that one can assert confidently that Nabokov composed his works 
by making active and extensive use of a vast wealth of cultural materials 
as his primary medium, rather than language as such, which was rather 
forced to accommodate or conform to this dominant compositional law.
 By discussing Nabokov’s works this way, we liken them to a universe 
in their own right, which we can come to know through careful study of 
the materials of which they are made, how they are formed, and how they 
give rise to meaning. “Meaning” is used here in a modest sense: not a final 
or ultimate meaning, but a local meaning with special significance to the 
themes of the work at hand. Practitioners of this approach have tended 
to avoid the quest for definitive meanings in Nabokov’s works, in part, 
surely, because the job of discovering allusions seems so far from finished. 
But there is another source for this reluctance, and that is apparently a 
desire to stay within the confines of a scientific approach—as inheritors, 
one might say, of the Formalist and Structuralist mantle. There is a ten-
dency to keep assertions and claims on the level of what can be proven 
empirically, without straying into possible philosophical or metaphysical 
hypotheses. This approach views the works as empirical phenomena about 
which some things can be said with high confidence, while others are the 
realm of speculation. We find this position expressed with particular clar-
ity in the seminal work of Savely Senderovich and Yelena Shvarts:
We set out to reconstruct motifs related by the provenance of reference 
in order to consider their networks as semantic strata, each spread over 
the entire body of Nabokov’s oeuvre, each endowed with a special func-
tion. It is precisely a unique function that turns a network of allusions to 
a particular writer or to a cultural context into a dimension constitutive 
to the Nabokov poetic world. [ . . . ] Thus, we are advancing a view of 
Nabokov’s oeuvre as a world situated along its own unique dimensions 
and ruled by its own idiosyncratic laws. From this point we have the 
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chance to understand the peculiarities of this world in a precise way, and 
one intended by the author, and not one that is merely an invitation to 
imaginative interpretation.37
Working in this manner, scholars stick closely to the definition of scientific 
activity laid out by Kant, and “ultimate meanings” in the works are kept 
at bay like those metaphysical things about which we can have opinions 
but no certainty, no empirical knowledge. In the same way Nabokov, in his 
lepidoptery and in his empirical commentary on Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin, 
kept within the bounds of scientific practice.
 Or did he? I have suggested some of the ways that Nabokov tried to 
break free of science’s formal constraints—in the proposal of a magic tri-
angle, or a “synthetic character” of a species, or a nonutilitarian, even 
artistic principle in nature (of course this last is extremely muted in the 
published scientific work, in contrast to the fictitious “Father’s Butter-
flies”). And it is worth remembering again Nabokov’s apothegm: “science 
answers to philosophy,” not to statistics. Accordingly, his works invite and 
reward the kinds of speculations about meanings that his characters also 
engage in, even if these activities do not provide “conclusive evidence” for 
absolute truth, but may offer support for deeply held “strong opinions.” 
Thus it is no surprise that sometimes, even empirically inclined scholars 
cross into the more dangerous realm of pure hypothesis, when they feel 
that they have collected enough evidence to propose a bold theory. Such, 
after all, was the method advanced by Francis Bacon, and Goethe, and 
embraced by Konstantin Godunov-Cherdyntsev in his speciation theory.
 Nabokov did not see art as governed by the same rules as science: 
the best art reaches immediately past the rational and the causal in ways 
that science is forbidden to do. As he wrote in “The Art of Literature and 
Commonsense”: “In this divinely absurd world of the mind, mathematical 
symbols do not thrive. Their interplay, no matter how smoothly it works, 
no matter how dutifully it mimics the convolutions of our dreams and 
the quantums of our mental associations, can never really express what is 
utterly foreign to their nature, considering that the main delight of the cre-
ative mind is the sway accorded to a seemingly incongruous detail over a 
seemingly dominant generalization.”38 This credo reflects Nabokov’s prin-
cipled belief that rational thought represents a closed system but not an 
absolute one. Following Kant, science obeys and discovers the rules that 
reflect the empirical regularities of the world. Art, in contrast, seeks out 
the irregularities, the singularities and incongruous details. The twist we 
find in Nabokov’s approach is the suggestion that empirical research itself 
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leads to glimpses or intuitions of irregularities—that the irregularities are 
the most exciting and promising area for research, something that proved 
true for his beloved discovery, the “mysteriously constant” Karner Blue 
butterfly.39 These anomalies may wind up being incorporated by some new 
theory—at which point they will be replaced by another set of inexplica-
ble data.40 Human reason tends toward regularity and consistency, which 
it will even create from whole cloth—it “will invent a cause or modify 
an effect rather than have none at all.” Thus, by definition, what resists 
rational systematization is a likely place to seek whatever might be beyond 
reason’s capacity to understand.
h
Nabokov was very careful about expressing his knowledge in any sphere, 
his certainty about any theory, and he was always far more likely to criti-
cize than to support reigning theory or ideology. In fact, he was likely to 
work diligently to undermine the authority of any systematizing theory or 
claim of knowledge, as he did in the cases of Dostoevsky, Freud, Darwin, 
and later, even Einstein, an approach recently promoted by physiologist 
and philosopher of science Robert S. Root-Bernstein.41 Nabokov attacked 
received wisdom in his scientific and in his pedagogical statements, and 
in his interviews. The similarity between his and Pyotr Ouspensky’s state-
ments about science “never knowing” certain things raises a question: 
if Nabokov admired the thought of Ouspensky enough to echo him in 
this way, did he value other, more metaphysical aspects of Ouspensky’s 
doctrine? The answer is that we do not know. And the reason we do not 
know is that Nabokov worked hard to keep all of his writings free of 
any metaphysical statement with unambiguous meaning; even his earliest 
journal writings are ambivalent (e.g., in “Poems and Diagrams” [“Stikhi 
i skhemy”]). There are two apparently contradictory things we do know: 
that he thought about metaphysical questions; and that he was critical of 
any and all programmatic expressions of mysticism. In the 1950s, he sin-
gled out what he called the “bogus mysticism” of Symbolist plays from the 
early twentieth century;42 in his twenties, he also criticized the same ten-
dency in his brother Sergey’s verse. If we combine these facts with Nabo-
kov’s oracular claim to “know more than I can express in words,” we can 
begin to extract a common principle: Claims of true knowledge carry enor-
mous responsibility and can be very dangerous due to unpredictable, often 
dire, consequences. We see this principle enacted in Nabokov’s scientific, 
literary, and expository work.
C O n C l U S i O n
200
 Knowledge claims have a central role in the history of humanity, espe-
cially in Western history since the eighteenth century. The rise of positiv-
ism after Newton and its post-romantic revival under the socialists was the 
result of the successful transfer of certain kinds of knowledge claims from 
the domain of science into those of politics and social theory. The kinds of 
claims that had been, and could be made about phenomena in nature led 
to their conversion into a political program for reshaping society on ratio-
nal grounds. This program was based in large part upon confidence in the 
ability of human science to solve every problem facing society. This confi-
dence became the centerpiece of the socialist and Bolshevik causes, and it 
eventually turned into the presumed infallibility of the Soviet regime. This 
transfer was a reenactment of the similar transfer of religious knowledge 
into state power during the Christianization of Kievan Rus and Muscovy. 
Such claims to perfect, unquestionable knowledge are religious in charac-
ter, but that is not the point. More importantly, this path leads to a double 
bind: the allegedly “true” knowledge is, on the one hand, full of error, 
which then is ignored; and, on the other, it breeds the likely danger that 
this sanitized, exploitable “knowledge” can be converted into a compel-
ling program of political action and hence power. It also turns the “knowl-
edge,” or “truth,” which is largely false, into an idol before which other 
values must be sacrificed (as we see illustrated dramatically and tragically 
in Bend Sinister and Invitation to a Beheading).
 An infatuation with knowledge—the Faustian bargain—and most espe-
cially an unequivocal faith in it leads to the privileging of knowledge over 
ambivalence and Socratic ignorance. This idolization of positive knowl-
edge may lead to tyranny of thought, if not to outright despotism. How 
does this happen? Scientists, who operate in a world where they are fully 
aware of their epistemological limits, nevertheless manage to make posi-
tive statements about nature. For various reasons, which Goethe had out-
lined with regard to Newton, they make selective statements about how 
their knowledge has been established, and are generally quiet about the 
messy, uncertain side of their work.43 Goethe was opposed to such laconi-
cism, and so, it appears, was Nabokov. They both practiced the full disclo-
sure of scientific process. The danger, they recognized, is that a scientific 
culture that downplays doubts, mysteries, and missteps ineluctably tempts 
human beings to place unwarranted confidence in the potential scope of 
human knowledge. Nabokov appears to have been acutely sensitive to the 
dangers produced by knowledge claims, largely due to his life’s experi-
ence, although such an attitude was common among the neo-idealists well 
before the Bolsheviks took power. Nabokov’s utterances conform to a rule: 
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any unqualified knowledge claim, whether scientific or religious, is related 
to an assertion of power. But as no interesting or significant knowledge 
claim can be truly complete, all-encompassing, and error-free, all asser-
tions of comprehensive knowledge represent an attempt to amass power 
based on false premises, compounded by the fact that the goal of the 
claimants is not knowledge, but power. Only claims that continually high-
light their own incompleteness, recognizing human cognitive as well as 
practical experimental limitations, discourage incorporation into a power 
quest. Thus both Goethe and Nabokov espoused an ethical science that 
takes into account different possible results of one’s discoveries—includ-
ing consequences not just of their matter, but also of their manner. The 
truth and knowledge embodied by scientific research reside not only in 
the end result, but in the entire process of their becoming. And only a self- 
questioning science with its characteristic discovery process leads to a 
culture of knowledge with solid defenses against political appropriation. 
Those in power—if they like science at all—do not like holistic, messy, 
self-doubting scientific doctrines, whose model is not easily imparted to 
the masses and converted into political support. Nabokov’s example as 
someone who refused to tell his readers what to believe, even while urging 
them to continue searching and asking, makes him one of the most pro-
foundly ethical writers of the modern era.
 The arts and sciences represent different kinds of knowledge: art may in 
fact contain knowledge that is inaccessible to science.44 For Nabokov, art 
and science both point toward what lies hidden at—or even beyond—the 
limits of reason and consciousness. Art seeks these limits by probing the 
inner forms of consciousness as the condition of knowledge and experi-
ence; science by measuring all the things consciousness can or might know 
empirically. Approaching from opposite directions, they join, as Nabokov 
suggests, atop a high, narrow ridge, with a glorious view of the landscapes 
all around.
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enthusiast with a net (129–31). In Nabokov’s copy of William J. Holland’s The Butterfly 
Book (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1931), he marked the place 
where Holland presents an anecdote about a lepidopterist who encountered a farmer who 
“surely thought, when he first saw him, that he had just escaped from a lunatic asylum” 
(113; Berg Coll.). Nabokov adds his own adventures to this lore: “The older the man, the 
queerer he looks with a butterfly net in his hand. Stern farmers have drawn my attention to 
NO FISHING signs; from cars passing me on the highway have come wild howls of deri-
sion; sleepy dogs, though unmindful of the worst bum, have perked up and come at me, 
snarling; tiny tots have pointed me out to their puzzled mamas; broad-minded vacationists 
have asked me whether I was catching bugs for bait; and one morning on a wasteland, lit 
by tall yuccas in bloom, near Santa Fe, a big black mare followed me for more than a mile” 
(SM, 131).
 20. “The paucity of true butterflies in the eastern United States is unrivalled in any other 
general area of the same size in the temperate part of holarctic territory” (NNP, 46n3.)
 21. See, for example, Boyd’s description in RY, 69.
 22. Johnson and Coates, Nabokov’s Blues, 38. They also note that this figure is not the 
highest among arthropods, an honor belonging to beetles.
 23. Anna Karenina, part 7, chapters 30–31. On Nabokov’s likely engagement with this 
Darwinian side-trail, see also Stephen H. Blackwell, “Three Notes on The Gift: An Inter-
text, a Revision, and a Puzzle Solved,” The Nabokovian (Spring 1998): 36–39.
 24. It is noteworthy, however, that N. G. Chernyshevsky, the leading Russian material-
ist thinker of the period 1850–80, wrote an article highly critical of Darwin’s theory, which 
offended him in its implication that harm (suffering, war, starvation) can produce good 
(progress, evolutionary “improvements”). “The Origin of the Theory of the Beneficiality 
of the Struggle for Life” (published under the pseudonym, “An Old Transformationist”) 
(Russkaia mysl’, 1888). Presumably Chernyshevsky would have preferred a more Hege-
lian version of natural progress; in the article, he extols Lamarck. The Soviet journal Pod 
znamenem marksizma published several articles in the 1920s relating Darwinism to the 
dialectic of history. See also Alexander Vucinich, Darwin in Russian Thought (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988).
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 25. Stephen Jay Gould calls this the “standard argument against Natural Selection,” in 
The Structure of Evolutionary Theory (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 2002), 359n. It appears variously in works of William James, Charles S. Peirce, 
Henri Bergson, and, notably, in Nabokov’s revered Nikolai Kholodkovskii. Although 
according to Alexander Vucinich, Kholodkovskii was opposed to teleogy, neo-vitalism, and 
metaphysics in biology, he nevertheless advised against seeing natural selection as “the only 
or almost the only factor responsible for such a complex phenomenon as organic devel-
opment” (emphasis added; quoted in Alexander Vucinich, Darwin in Russian Thought 
[Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988], 276 and n8; Nikolai Kholodkovskii, Bio-
logicheskie ocherki [Moscow, 1923], 138). For Kholodkovskii, the main weakness of natu-
ral selection lay in the “absence of any explanation for the appearance of the first variations 
that underwent Natural Selection” (Biologicheskie ocherki, 136 [not in Vucinich]). This 
argument does not really contradict Darwin but merely shifts the rhetorical emphasis. 
August Weismann countered this view, arguing that although “selection cannot create but 
only rejects, [ . . . ] precisely through this rejection its creative efficacy is asserted.” “Germi-
nal Selection,” The Monist 6 (1895–96): 250.
 26. “While accepting evolution as a modal formula, I am not satisfied with any of the 
hypotheses advanced in regard to the way it works.” NB, 356; cf. NNP, 2.
 27. Kurt Johnson, “Lepidoptera,” 38–55.
 28. FB, 219. This formulation echoes Ralph Waldo Emerson’s claim (in a sermon on 
related themes) that the “Universe . . . is adapted to give pleasure to us.” This sermon was 
first published in 1938, in Young Emerson Speaks: Unpublished Discourses on Many Sub-
jects (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin). Laura Dassow Walls suggests that Emerson’s sermon was 
in fact itself echoing William Cudworth’s The True Intellectual System of the Universe (four 
volumes, 1678). Whether Nabokov had access in 1939 to either of these texts is an open 
question, but they promise fertile ground for comparative study. See Walls, Emerson’s Life 
in Science: The Culture of Truth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 47. As I elaborate 
later in this chapter, there is good reason to suspect that Nabokov had read and was think-
ing of Emerson while he wrote The Gift and “Father’s Butterflies.”
 29. FB, 226.
 30. For example, Critique of the Power of Judgment, §§75–77.
 31. Some of Nabokov’s favorite examples of such mimicry included the Kallima genus, 
which contains several dead-leaf mimicking butterflies; an invented or misunderstood 
creature whose caterpillar allegedly mimics the root of a rhubarb or vice-versa (see Zim-
mer, GNBM, 171); oozing bubble-like spots on Owl Butterflies (Brassolinae; see Zimmer, 
GNBM, 117, 127; SM, 124; LL, 374); and hummingbird hawkmoths (Sphingidae: these 
last are not considered true mimics, by Nabokov or other scientists).
 32. Competing post-Darwinian evolutionary theories were proposed by many scientists, 
including Alpheus Hyatt (1880), William Bateson (1894), Theodor Eimer (1888), Hugo 
De Vries (1910), Simeon L. Berg (1922), and Richard Goldschmidt (1939). See Gould, The 
Structure of Evolutionary Theory, 351–466; and Kurt Johnson, “Lepidoptera,” Part II, 
11–33.
 33. Biologicheskie ocherki, 135.
 34. FB, 226. Victoria N. Alexander has observed that such spherical imagery has roots 
in German Transcendentalism, particularly in the work of Carl Gustav Carus. Nabokov-
L, October 27, 2001. Additionally, Friedrich Schelling’s First Outline of a System of the 
Philosophy of Nature (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004) also invokes the 
spherical concept in describing species (43–44). Stephen Jay Gould points to Fleeming Jen-
kin and Julien-Joseph Virey as proponents of spherical models (see Gould, Structure, 147, 
219, 297).
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 35. Nabokov, “Remarks on F. Martin Brown’s ‘Measurements and Lepidoptera,’” Lep-
idopterist’s News 4 (1950): 76.
 36. It also became characteristic of V. I. Vernadsky, the polymathic geologist and author 
of The Biosphere (1926)—and of a study of Goethe’s science: “Mysli i zamechaniia o Gete 
kak naturaliste,” in V. I. Verndadskii, Izbrannye trudy po istorii nauki (Moscow: 1981), 
242–89; and online at http://www.elibrary.ru/books/vernadsky/2.1.6.htm.
 37. A classic example of this phenomenon can be found in the electron-charge experi-
ments of Robert A. Millikan. See Gerald Holton, “Subelectrons, Presuppositions and the 
Millikan-Ehrenhaft Dispute,” in Gerald Holton, ed., The Scientific Imagination (Cambridge 
University Press, 1978), 25–83. See also Richard Feynman’s 1974 Caltech commencement 
address, “Cargo Cult Science,” online at http://calteches.library.caltech.edu/51/02/Cargo-
Cult.htm; and Allen Franklin, “Millikan’s Published and Unpublished Data on Oil Drops,” 
Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 11 (1981): 185–201.
 38. In addition to various disclaimers throughout On the Origin, Darwin in 1863 wrote 
in a letter to Hooker (“Life,” vol. iii, p. 18): “It is mere rubbish thinking at present of the 
origin of life; one might as well think of the origin of matter.” Quoted in J. T. Merz, His-
tory of European Thought in the XIX Century (Edinburgh: 1896–1916; New York: Dover, 
1965), vol. 2, 406n.
 39. “The strictly biological meaning forcibly attached by some modern zoologists to the 
specific concept has crippled the latter by removing the morphological moment to a second-
ary or still more negligible position, while employing terms, e.g., ‘potential interbreeding,’ 
that might make sense only if an initial morphological approach were presupposed.” NNP, 
3.
 40. Ibid., 6.
 41. NMGL, 110.
 42. Ada, 101. As Kurt Johnson and Steve Coates observe, “The crucial phrase here for 
modern scientists is ‘a phase of evolutional structure.’ Nabokov realized, quite remarkably 
for his time, that what scientists study in the laboratory is merely a momentary glimpse 
into a constantly changing, ongoing process of structural transformation in living organ-
isms. [ . . . S]ince the cladists have essentially returned to the notion of species as delineated 
by physical structures, precisely the point upon which he insisted and the hallmark of his 
methodology, Nabokov’s point of view has an impressively modern ring.” Nabokov’s Blues, 
338.
 43. Nabokov eventually decided to argue against the renowned Nikolai Kuznetsov, who 
suggested that “the [wing] pattern can be broken down into a series of stripes which under-
goes various modifications.” Lepidoptera, A. Mercado, trans. (Jerusalem: Israel Program 
for Scientific Translations, 1967), 166.
 44. This system was criticized by F. Martin Brown for its incomplete implementation 
of statistical analysis, a fairly recent tool which Nabokov had not mastered during his 
Harvard/AMCZ years. “Measurements and Lepidoptera,” Lepidopterist’s News 3 (1950). 
Nabokov replied in the next issue, “After all, natural science is responsible to philosophy—
not to statistics.” Lepidopterist’s News 4 (1950): 76.
 45. NMGL, 137. Note also the intriguing comment about the hindwing of species 
within the genus Lyceaides: “Its center in regard to the forewing lies outside the root of 
the latter at a point corresponding to the root of the forewing on the opposite side of the 
thorax, i.e., at a distance from the base of the wing equal to the breadth of the body at that 
point; the hindwing center, however, is situated at the very root of the wing (base of costa), 
so that in order to make the two curvatures coincide, the right hindwing must be placed 
upon the right forewing in such a way as to have its hub coincide with the root of the left 
forewing (see plate V). My ignorance of mathematical and mechanical matters is prodi-
n O T e S  T O  C h a P T e r  1
2
gious, and thus I am quite incapable of following up certain lines of thought which these 
curious facts suggest” (ibid., 113).
 46. Ibid., 138.
 47. NNP, 44; all italics original. As we saw above, Nabokov was aware that a group of 
related living species does not represent perfect historical development, “since a sequence 
in time is not really deducible from a synchronous series.” “Nearctic Forms of Lycaeides 
Hüb.,” NB, 280.
 48. For an introduction into Nabokov’s possible influences in thinking about mimicry, 
see Dieter E. Zimmer, “Mimicry in Nature and Art,” in Jane Grayson et al., eds., Nabo-
kov’s World (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2002), vol. 1, 47–57.
 49. EW to Nabokov, May 6, 1942, and Nabokov to EW, May 30, 1942, DBDV, 66, 
70. Nabokov also presented variations on this talk during his lecture tour to the southern 
United States in October of 1942. Letters to Véra, October 11, 1942, NB, 269; and Octo-
ber 17–18, NB, 270.
 50. Oct. 20, 1941, letter to Mark Aldanov, NB, 248.
 51. For a time, Nabokov may have been leaning toward a Bergsonian élan vital, if 
not an idealist teleology, as the moving force behind mimicry. Victoria N. Alexander has 
explored the relationship between emergent forms in complex dynamic systems and the 
appearance of species and mimicry in nature, comparing recent theories to Nabokov’s 
apparent views of evolution. See “Nabokov, Teleology, and Insect Mimicry,” Nabokov 
Studies 7 (2002–2003): 177–214.
 52. NB, 310.
 53. “From Minutes of the Cambridge Entomological Club,” NB, 278.
 54. Kurt Johnson, “Lepidoptera,” 62.
 55. See Zimmer, GNBM, 171, *Hepialus armoricanus Oberthür; and 248, Pseudode-
mas tschumarae.
 56. SM, 125.
 57. Johnson, “Lepidoptera,” 31.
 58. With the very notable exception of Russian/Soviet scientist V. I. Vernadsky—whose 
work in “holistic science” in such books as The Biosphere was also ignored by the main-
stream. See Kendall E. Bailes, Science and Russian Culture in an Age of Revolutions: V. I. 
Vernadsky and His Scientific School, 1863–1945 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1990).
 59. The fact that this chapter was not published or included in the text does not dimin-
ish its interest. There were a variety of reasons that Nabokov never followed through on his 
plan to attach two addenda to The Gift (“The Circle” and “Father’s Butterflies”), not least 
among them the novel’s troubled publication history: its crucial fourth chapter was sup-
pressed by the journal Sovremennye zapiski in 1938, and Nabokov had to wait until 1952 
to see the complete novel published. The addendum was prepared just before the onset of 
World War II, at a time when Nabokov was still experiencing the novel’s artistic afterglow. 
By 1952 he had changed countries and languages and was in the final years of his work on 
Lolita.
 60. FB, 216. This metaphor, perhaps unconsciously, inverts an image from Fran-
cis Bacon, for whom mind was a “mirror or glass capable of the image of the universal 
world” (quoted in Walls, Emerson’s Life in Science, 47). In Godunov-Cherdyntsev’s ver-
sion, mind comes first and nature is the mirror. This transformation may have taken place 
with the assistance of Emerson: as Laura Dassow Walls explains, “The important chapter 
[of Emerson’s book Nature] ‘Language’ develops the idea that since thought was the origin 
of nature, ‘Nature is the vehicle of thought,’ connecting us back to the Creator through the 
three steps of word, fact, and spirit: word is sign of fact; natural fact is symbol of spiritual 
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fact. The mirroring of things and thoughts guarantees the analogous relationship by which 
each is the means to understand the other . . .” (110). And: “Emerson alludes to Bacon in 
Nature when he declares: ‘parts of speech are metaphors because the whole of nature is a 
metaphor of the human mind. The laws of moral nature answer to those of matter as face 
to face in a glass’” (47).
 61. FB, 219. 
 62. Except perhaps in “Bol’shaia medveditsa” (The Great Bear, Ursa Major): see Boyd, 
RY, 150–51.
 63. Walls describes how for Emerson, “one studies nature to study mind. Intellect 
‘existed already in the mind in solution: now, it has been precipitated, and the bright sedi-
ment is the world’” (Emerson’s Life in Science, 123). There is ample circumstantial evidence 
that Nabokov read Emerson, especially his Nature, sometime before or while composing 
The Gift. Several key observations, by both Fyodor and his father, seem to echo passages 
from Emerson. Best known of these is the “complete and free eye” (Gift, 310; cf. Emerson’s 
“transparent eye-ball,” Nature, 13); later in the same chapter, Fyodor enjoys an upside-
down view of the Grunewald (332; cf. Nature, 64; William James uses a similar image, 
which he may also have drawn from Emerson; see chapter 4, n30); Fyodor soon after muses 
that he might “dissolve completely” (cf. Nature, 13: “I am nothing”); and in “Father’s But-
terflies,” Godunov-Cherdyntsev mentions “rhymes of nature,” an extremely rare echo of 
the same phrase by Emerson (FB, 221; cf. Emerson, Journals of Ralph Waldo Emerson, 
with Annotations, Edward Waldo Emerson and Waldo Emerson Forbes, eds. [Boston and 
New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1912], 46.)
 64. FB, 219.
 65. FB, 218–19.
 66. Godunov-Cherdyntsev also argues that selection alone could not explain mim-
icry, for lack of time. August Weismann made a similar argument in 1896, in support 
of his “germinal selection” thesis (cited in Gould, Structure, 218): “It would have been 
impossible for such a minute similarity in the design and particularly in the shades of the 
coloration, ever to have arisen, if the process of adaptation rested entirely on personal 
selection. . . . In such cases there can be no question of accident, but the variations pre-
sented to personal selection must themselves have been produced by the principle of the 
survival of the fit!”
 67. FB, 225. This formulation evokes the thought of C. S. Peirce, who argued that the 
laws of nature themselves evolve and change over time and even that “if we posit a primal 
habit in nature, viz. the tendency however slight to take on habits, then the result is often 
a high degree of regularity in the long run. For this reason, Peirce suggested that in the 
remote past nature was considerably more spontaneous than it later became, and that in 
general the habits nature has come to exhibit have evolved, just like ideas, geological for-
mations, and biological species have evolved.” Robert Burch, “Charles Sanders Peirce,” 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta, ed., 
online at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2008/entries/peirce/. Although the parallels 
between this description and what we find in Godunov-Cherdyntsev are striking, the degree 
of Nabokov’s exposure to Peirce is unknown.
 68. FB, 228.
 69. Ibid.
 70. FB, 214, 215, 227. At the time Godunov-Cherdyntsev was supposedly writing, 
stars were not yet widely known to explode. The first popular accounts of exploding stars 
(supernovae) appeared from December 1934 through April 1935, concerning “Nova Her-
culis”—perhaps too late to save Fyodor’s or his father’s metaphor from anachronism. The 
earliest report I have found suggesting that Novae were exploding stars appears in E. E. 
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Barnard, “Some Peculiarities of the Novæ,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society 61, no. 2. (1922): 99–106 (accessed via JSTOR).
  Walls’s discussion in Emerson’s Life in Science of astronomical metaphors in 
Coleridge offers an instructive parallel for Godunov-Cherdyntsev’s theories of nature. In 
detailing how Coleridge framed the subjective and objective aspects of life in nature, Walls 
notes that “Coleridge felt entirely comfortable borrowing metaphors from astronomy to 
discuss the formation of intelligence because he believed that ultimately he wasn’t borrow-
ing at all: science was the way by which intelligence realized itself” (132). This equation of 
nature with intelligence is a central part of Godunov-Cherdyntsev’s outlook, according to 
which human intelligence comes from nature’s “storehouse.”
 71. FB, 231.
 72. FB, 214.
 73. There is also a likely reference to Einstein’s early status as a patent clerk (while 
discovering relativity) in the same passage, where Godunov-Cherdyntsev’s intuitive revela-
tion is likened to the “meekest employee who suddenly appears before his employer with a 
plan that casts a whole new light on a deal the tycoon had negotiated with reckless haste, 
proposing certain options, a new connection” (FB, 214). This link reappears a few pages 
later in a comparison of an “evolutionist” to a passenger riding in a train—one of the stock 
images for the explanation of special relativity (FB, 218).
 74. In establishing the boundaries of species, the ability to force two butterflies to mate 
in the laboratory has little or no significance to Nabokov (nor does it to more recent sci-
entists): see, for example, NNP, 3–4. On the history of “torture” as a metaphor for sci-
ence, see Carolyn Merchant, “The Scientific Revolution and The Death of Nature,” Isis 97 
(2006): 513–53, esp. 526–27; accessed online at www.journals.uchicago.edu/ISIS/journal/
issues/v97n3/970308/970308.html. Cf. also Goethe: “The Greeks spoke of neither cause 
nor effect in their descriptions and stories—instead, they presented the phenomenon as 
it was. In their science, too, they did not perform experiments, but relied on experiences 
as they occurred.” (From Maxims and Reflections, collected in Scientific Studies, Douglas 
Miller, ed. and trans. [New York: Suhrkamp Publishers, 1989], 308.)
 75. For example, NB, 309–10; Fyodor quotes his father as calling Germans “masterful 
collectors, but wretched classifiers” (FB, 202; see also 199–201, especially the addendum’s 
opening paragraph: “The notorious Schmetterlingsbücher . . .”).
 76. Gift, 63; SSRP, 248.
 77. SO, 117.
 78. The earliest culture-related instance of the term “morphology” that I have been 
able to find comes, curiously enough, from Andrey Bely, who employed it in 1909. His 
essay “Comparative Morphology of the Rhythm of Russian Lyrics in Iambic Dimeter” 
appeared in his voluminous and influential theoretical work, Symbolism, which Nabokov 
knew well. This work is widely seen as an important precursor of Formalism. See Victor 
Ehrlich, Russian Formalism: History-Doctrine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981); 
or Peter Steiner, Russian Formalism: A Metapoetics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1984).
 79. See Irina Paperno, “How Nabokov’s Gift Is Made,” Russell Valentino, trans., Stan-
ford Slavic Studies 4, no. 2 (1992): 295–322; and Marina Kostalevsky, “The Young Godu-
nov-Cherdyntsev or How to Write a Literary Biography,” Russian Literature 43.3 (1 April 
1998): 283–95. Also Michael Glynn, who explores Nabokov’s reliance upon the ideas of 
Viktor Shklovsky, in “‘The Word Is Not a Shadow. The Word Is a Thing’—Nabokov as 
Anti-Symbolist,” European Journal of American Culture 25.1 (2006): 3–30.
 80. For example, “There comes a moment when I am informed from within that the 
entire structure is finished. All I have to do now is take it down in pencil or pen” (SO, 
n O T e S  T O  C h a P T e r  1
2
31–32). Or, as Fyodor says in The Gift, “I seem to remember my future works, even though 
I don’t know what they’ll be about” (94).
 81. In some draft materials written in 1944 that were never incorporated into any arti-
cle, Nabokov wrote, “It is my firm opinion that in order to discuss a given population, 
from any point of view, the worker must have had actual field-experience throughout sev-
eral seasons in the region discussed, must have tramped hundreds of miles and minutely 
examined hundreds of specimens . . .” (Berg Coll., Lepidoptera material, Box 9: NB, 308).
 82. The paintings of butterflies and moths apparently served as a partial surrogate for 
Fyodor, thanks to the living artistry in their depiction. FB, 204.
Chapter 2
 1. Nikolai Gogol, 64.
 2. Savelii Senderovich and Elena Shvarts, “Aurelian i Eleonora, ili Gde Nabokov lovil 
svoikh babochek,” Novyi zhurnal 123 (Dec. 1998): 205–12. By the same authors, “Nabo-
kovskii Faust. Predvaritel’nye zametki,” in Nora Buhks, ed., Vladimir Nabokov-Sirine; Les 
Anées Européenes (Paris: Institut d’études slaves, 1999), 155–76; and Omri Ronen, “Nabo-
kov and Goethe,” in Gennady Barabtarlo, ed., Cold Fusion: Aspects of the German Cul-
tural Presence in Russia (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), 241–51. Among other links, 
Ronen discusses likely sources for the accusation of “poshlust” (247–48).
 3. My own German is not strong enough for me to make any claims of special insight 
into these fascinating texts, which I have read mostly in English with the German text at 
hand for clarification.
 4. Recent scholars have emphasized that Goethe was not against mathematics in sci-
ence per se, but that he was concerned about its over-application. For example, Dennis L. 
Sepper: “Is Goethe an opponent of modern physics? He opposed Newton’s optics; but few 
realize that he spoke approvingly of the wave theory of light, which was formulated in 
a much more sophisticated mathematics than was Newton’s” (“Goethe against Newton: 
Towards Saving the Phenomenon,” in Frederick Amrine et al., eds., Goethe and the Sci-
ences: A Reappraisal, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 97 (Dordrecht: 
D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1987), 175. Cf.: “Like dialectics, mathematics is an organ for 
a higher kind of inner sense; in practice it is an art like rhetoric. Both value nothing but 
form—the content is unimportant. It does not matter whether mathematics counts pennies 
or guineas, whether rhetoric defends what is true or what is false.” Scientific Studies, Doug-
las Miller, ed. and trans. (New York: Suhrkamp Publishers, 1988), 310.
 5. “The object of morphology, as distinct from that of classification, can be defined as 
the attempt to describe, and if possible to comprehend and explain, the relative similarity as 
well as the graduated differences of form and structure which natural objects present to our 
gaze. Although the study can be conducted on a large as well as on a small scale, these simi-
larities and differences sooner made themselves felt in the comparatively smaller objects of 
living nature.” J. T. Merz, History of European Thought in the XIX Century. 4 vols. (New 
York: Dover, 1965), vol. 2, 231. See also Peter Steiner, Russian Formalism: A Metapoetics 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 69–71.
 6. In the third edition of On the Origin, Darwin acknowledged Goethe’s role as a 
major precursor to his work. See Robert J. Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life: 
Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 
4n8.
 7. See Dennis L. Sepper, Goethe contra Newton (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), chapter 3, esp. 102–3, and also his “Goethe against Newton.” See as well 
Merz’s quite detailed account: vol. 2, 231–52.
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 8. See the essays in David Seamon and Arthur Zajonc, eds., Goethe’s Way of Science: 
A Phenomenology of Nature (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998). The 
anthology includes scientific and philosophical perspectives on this alternative framework.
 9. Scientific Studies, 63.
 10. Ibid., 63, 64, 65.
 11. “Neither can we deny the high and seemingly creative independent power found in 
the inner faculties through which the evidence is grasped, collected, ordered, and developed 
(“The Experiments as Mediator,” Scientific Studies, 12).
 12. Ernst Mach, The Science of Mechanics (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1960), 283.
 13. “Experiment as Mediator,” Scientific Studies, 11.
 14. Ibid., 12. Nabokov appears to have conformed to this requirement, as when he con-
fessed his prejudice on questions of the origin of wing-markings, especially lines, by admit-
ting his own bias: “Although quite possibly my judgment may be affected by the fact that 
the genus which I have especially studied and to which we must now turn is most honestly 
‘spotted’—and also by the fact that I am interested more in what happens within a given 
interspace than in the wing pattern as a whole, still I am quite sure that it would be a waste 
of time to try and twist this or that illusion created by a transverse continuation of Lycae-
nid macules into this or that ‘prototypical line’” (NMGL, 120–21). An interesting echo of 
this rigorous method appears in Carl H. Lindroth’s historical sketch of early lepidoptery 
in “Systematics Specilizes between Fabricius and Darwin: 1800–1859”: “[H. T.] Stainton 
was extremely meticulous and self-critical. ‘He goes so far as to recommend that no species 
should be described upon less than twenty to thirty specimens, and advocated an amount 
of self-denial in such matters, which I imagine hardly any of us are prepared to put in prac-
tice’” (F. D. Godman, Trans. ent. Soc. London, 1892: XLVIII), in Ray F. Smith et al., eds., 
History of Entomology (Palo Alto: Annual Reviews Inc., 1973), 136.
 15. Notably, Dmitri Mendeleyev in his Principles of Chemistry makes a similar obser-
vation: “If facts themselves, as evident even from the word’s etymology (from factum est), 
include the person who observes them, then so much more inevitable is the presence of 
personal views [perspectives, envisionments] in the communication of a developed world-
view—derived from and discovered in experiments—that constitutes the essence of science. 
And therefore, with all the striving for objectivity in the development of science, it will 
always and inevitably contain more than a little of the subjective-personal and ephemeral.” 
Osnovy khimii, 8th. ed. (St. Petersburg: Tipo-lit. M. P. Frolovoi, 1906), iii.
 16. “Experiment as Mediator,” Scientific Studies, 13.
 17. Ibid., 15.
 18. See discussion in Sepper, Goethe contra Newton, 142–57; also, Karl J. Fink, 
Goethe’s History of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), chapter 7.
 19. Helmholtz was famous in the nineteenth century for his early critique of Goethe’s 
Theory and his late softening or retraction of that critique. See his “The Scientific Researches 
of Goethe,” in Selected Writings of Hermann von Helmholtz (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1971), 56–74, and the later “Goethe’s Anticipation of Subsequent Scien-
tific Ideas,” ibid., 479–500. Dennis L. Sepper suggests that “in the twentieth century there 
has been a partial rehabilitation of the Farbenlehre, especially in its treatment of physiologi-
cal and psychological aspects of color, and a greater readiness to acknowledge its virtues 
(e.g. concreteness) vis-à-vis modern theoretical physics” (“Goethe against Newton,” 175).
 20. “Experiment as Mediator,” Scientific Studies, 17.
 21. Ibid., 14.
 22. Robert J. Richards suggests that Goethe’s attitude to Newton emerged in part from 
an affinity with Spinoza: “He was driven by what he thought the defects of the Newtonian 
approach: insufficient experiment and hasty generalization which violated ‘the rights of 
nature.’ And in the essay [‘Experiment as Mediator’], the powerful influence of Spinoza can 
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still be felt insofar as Goethe understood the trajectory of scientific work to move from a 
careful, sequential ordering of experimental results to higher principles of connection. Such 
an ordering would allow the kind of cognition that might constitute an adequate idea and 
ultimately an intuition into the whole (scientia intuitiva, properly speaking).” Romantic 
Conception, 439.
 23. Gernot Böhme asserts that “in this way, Newton’s theory is physics and deals with 
the objective properties of light; Goethe’s theory is ‘science of perception’ and deals with 
laws of seeing.” “Is Goethe’s Theory of Color Science?,” in Frederick Amrine et al., eds., 
Goethe and the Sciences: A Reappraisal, 148–74, 163–64. Sepper suggests, “More than 
anything else Goethe was combating a defective conception of science and scientific method 
that had helped bring about the dogmatic entrenchment of diverse refrangibility” (“Goethe 
against Newton,” 182). More recently, Carl Popper refutes Newton’s claim to have devel-
oped his celestial mechanics by induction. See “On the Status of Science and of Metaphys-
ics,” in Conjectures and Refutations (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 184–200, 
esp. 185–86.
 24. See discussion in Böhme, “Is Goethe’s Theory of Color Science?,” in Amrine et al., 
eds., Goethe and the Sciences, 164–68.
 25. Goethe relates the anecdote in “Fortunate Encounter,” Scientific Studies, 18–21.
 26. Romantic Conception, 439–40. Richards quotes the following passage from a brief 
essay called “The Pure Concept” as a demonstration of Goethe’s efforts to bridge the gulf 
between idealism and realism: “Since the simpler powers of nature are often hidden from 
our senses, we must seek, through the powers of our mind [die Kräfte unseres Geistes], to 
reach out to them and represent their nature in ourselves . . . [for] our mind stands in har-
mony with the deeper lying, simpler powers of nature and so can represent them in a pure 
way, just as we can perceive the objects of the visible world with a clear eye” (439).
 27. Quoted in Richards, Romantic Conception, 477–78. Richards further observes, 
“Schelling’s theory of dynamic evolution, which Goethe accepted, postulated an organic 
foundation for a transformational series (namely in absolute mind), and Goethe’s own 
theory of the archetype augmented the Schellingian conception; moreover, by the time of 
Z[ur] M[orphologie], researchers had accumulated fossil evidence of such transformations” 
(490).
 28. “Toward a General Comparative Theory,” Scientific Writings, 55.
 29. Romantic Conception, 9.
 30. For example, see “Goethe, Nature, and Phenomenology,” in Seamon and Zajonc, 
eds., 1–14.
 31. Quoted in Richards, Romantic Conception, 489. This claim anticipates Nabokov’s 
observation that “average reality begins to rot and stink as soon as the act of individual 
creation ceased to animate a subjectively perceived texture . . .” (SO, 118).
 32. As Richards suggests, Goethe learned that “art and science had deep foundations 
within a nature that encompassed both the subjective and the objective. He would find in 
imagination not the betrayer of truth but the faculty of creative possibility. And he would 
be more circumspect concerning scientific theory and the way it might guide one to sound 
observation” (Romantic Conception, 438).
 33. Maxims and Reflections #1344. Translation by, and quoted in, Richards, Romantic 
Conception,  403.
 34. PP, 155–56.
 35. “I would not hesitate a moment to assign to subsolanus and sudderi a subspecific 
position within the polytypic argyrognomon had they not been centers radiating as it were 
their own forms . . .” (NMGL, 111).
 36. See Charles Lee Remington, “Lepidoptera Studies,” in Vladimir E. Alexandrov, ed., 
The Garland Companion to Vladimir Nabokov (New York: Garland Publishing, 1995), 
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274–82; Stephen Jay Gould, “No Science without Fancy, No Art without Facts: The Lepi-
doptery of Vladimir Nabokov,” in Sarah Funke, ed., Vera’s Butterflies (New York: Glenn 
Horowitz Bookseller, 1999).
 37. NNP, 6, reprinted in NB, 356.
 38. NMGLH, 483.
 39. Darwin had carefully collected and organized his evidence for two decades before 
being forced to publish his theory, so he cannot in any way be accused of the same faults 
that Goethe found in Newton. In addition, Darwin himself, at least in Origin of Species, 
took pains to point out that natural selection was the main, but not the only, mechanism by 
which species evolve.
 40. This emphasis on the regularity of geographic variation appears to support the 
early-twentieth-century challenge to natural selection known as orthogenesis. In modern 
biology, such variation is called “neutral evolution” or “genetic drift.”
 41. “An Intermaxillary Bone Is Present in the Upper Jaw of Man as Well as in Ani-
mals,” Scientific Studies, 115–16.
 42. NMGLH, 517. Cf. also: “From Alaska southwards and eastwards alaskensis imper-
ceptibly turns into scudderi, the delicate underside maculation becoming clear on a grayish 
or whitish ground and the female upperside becoming of a brighter blue with more or less 
developed aurorae.” Ibid., 504.
 43. NMGL, 111.
 44. Knowledge and Error, P. Foulkes and T. McCormack, trans. (Boston: D. Reidel 
Publishing Co., 1976), 53. Mach, a physicist and philosopher of science, even suggested, 
“Mechanics does not grasp the foundation, nor even a part of the world, but only an aspect 
of it” (Die Mechanik in ihrer entwicklung [1908], 554); quoted in Hjalmar Hegge, “Theory 
of Science in the Light of Goethe’s Science of Nature,” in Amrine et al., eds., Goethe and 
the Sciences, 199.
 45. Nomogenesis: Or, Evolution Determined by Law, J. N. Rostovtsov, trans. (Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969 [1922]), 314–38, esp. 319–24. For example, “Manders 
(1911), through observation and experiments conducted in natural surroundings in India 
and Ceylon, concluded that birds exterminate butterflies to a much greater degree than 
was previously supposed; according to his computations (p. 741), one hundred bee-eaters 
(Merops) could exterminate all the butterflies of one species (Catopsilia pyranthe) on a 
forest road of about seventy miles long within a period of two weeks. But it is noteworthy 
that birds, in India and Ceylon at least, make no difference between ‘edible’ and ‘inedible’ 
species: with equal satisfaction they consume both the ‘unpalatable’ Danais and Euploea, 
which are the imitated forms, and the ‘savoury’ Hypolimnas and Papilio, which mimic 
them so unsuccessfully. So that all this masquerade is to no purpose” (319–20). Berg does 
not argue that no mimicry confers adaptive advantage, but he criticizes the interpretation 
of accidental acquisition of similarities proposed by natural selection as examples of ran-
dom convergence. He proposes instead a strong latent tendency of two species to display 
the same forms: “We assume, on the contrary, that the factors of similarity were present 
from the very beginning both in the imitator and in the imitated, and an impulse alone was 
needed for their manifestation” (327). Berg’s work was brought to my attention by Victoria 
N. Alexander, personal communication.
 46. See Victoria N. Alexander, “Nabokov, Teleology, and Insect Mimicry,” Nabokov 
Studies 7 (2003): 189; Leona Toker, “Nabokov and Bergson,” in Alexandrov, Garland 
Companion, 367–73, and “Nabokov and Bergson on Duration and Reflexivity,” in Jane 
Grayson et al., eds., Nabokov’s World (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2002), v. 1, 132–40; 
Stephen H. Blackwell, “The Poetics of Science in, and around, Nabokov’s The Gift,” The 
Russian Review 62.2 (April 2003): 256–57.
 47. FB, 211.
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 48. Ibid., 226.
 49. Critique of the Power of Judgment, quoted in Richards, Romantic Conception, 
431.
 50. SO, 179.
 51. “Reine Begriffe,” in Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Sämtliche Werke, Briefe, Tage-
bücher und Gespräche, vol. 23, pt. 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Deutsher Klassiker Verlag, 
1991), 69–70; translated and quoted in Richards, Romantic Conception, 439.
 52. LRL, 11.
 53. PF, 17; SM, 35; Gift, 183, 328.
 54. “Stikhi i skhemy,” LCNA, container 10; daily diary for 1945, Nov. 17, 1945, Berg 
Coll. Nabokov described that a given letter, when visualized in combination with its char-
acteristic sound, would always take on a certain hue. See SM, chapter 2, and Donald Bar-
ton Johnson, Worlds in Regression: Some Novels of Vladimir Nabokov (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 
1985).
 55. SM, 381–82.
 56. This is not to say that audition colorée cannot be studied scientifically: it has inter-
ested empirical scientists (including William James) going back into the nineteenth cen-
tury, and Nabokov made a note of its earliest literary appearance, as reported by Alfred 
Binet, “Le probleme de l’audition colorée,” Revue des Deux Mondes 113 (1892): 586–614 
(“Notes on Various Subjects,” Berg Coll.).
 57. Poslednie novosti, 15 December, 1932.
 58. The title’s translation is by Dmitri Nabokov; its sense is accurate, although it loses 
the Goethean overtones and the double emphasis on “truth” in the French, German, and 
Russian versions of the same phrase, while retaining the poetic rhythm that would be lost 
in a literal rendition.
 59. “Über Wahrheit und Wahrscheinlichkeit der Kunstwerke,” Gedenkausgabe der 
Werke, Briefe und Gespräche (Zürich, Stuttgart: Artemis Verlag, 1965 [1954]), 175–91; 
see also Karl J. Fink, Goethe’s History of Science (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), esp. chapters 5 and 7.
 60. Nikolai Gogol, 64.
 61. Ludmila A. Foster, “Nabokov in Russian Emigré Criticism,” Russian Literature Tri-
Quarterly 3 (1972): 330–41, esp. 332–34; Foster cites Mikhail Osorgin, review of Camera 
obscura, Sovremennye zapiski 54 (1934): 458–60.
 62. SM, 218, 139.
Chapter 
 1. “On a Book Entitled Lolita,” AnLo, 314.
 2. “I write for my pleasure, but publish for money.” “Lolita and Mr. Girodias [from 
a letter to Girodias of Oct. 5, 1955],” Evergreen Review XI (1967): 37–41. Nabokov 
adopted the claim from Pushkin, who wrote, “. . . I write for myself and publish for money 
and certainly not for the smile of the fair sex.” From Pushkin’s letter to Prince P. A. Vya-
zemsky, Mar. 8, 1824, in Aleksandr Pushkin, Pushkin on Literature, Tatiana Wolff, trans., 
rev. by John Bayley (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1998), 85; Pushkin, Pol-
noe sobranie sochinenii (Leningrad: Akademiia nauk, 1937–59 ), vol. XIII, 88–89.
 3. “The Vane Sisters,” Stories, 626.
 4. Nikolai Kholodkovskii, Biologicheskie ocherki (Moscow: n.p., 1923), 136. Natural 
selection can also be seen as an emergent factor that comes about due to the appearance 
of mutations, a stance Nabokov seems to explore in Godunov-Cherdyntsev’s notion that 
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evolution itself evolves in nature (FB, 226–28). This question remains of interest today: see 
Massimo Pigliucci, “Is Evolvability Evolvable?,” Nature Reviews Genetics 9.1 (Jan. 2008): 
75–82.
 5. FB, 219.
 6. Ibid., 226.
 7. Such a formulation, if accurate, recalls somewhat also Schopenhauer’s version of 
freedom, which is manifest not in the events of the world (which are indeed mechanistically, 
causally determined) but in the hidden ways of the Will (hidden, that is, from any possibil-
ity of human cognition or awareness). See R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, trans., The World 
as Will and as Idea (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1883), vol. I (Book IV, §55), esp. 
369, 376–78. Compare also modern theories of complexity and emergence. Although these 
theories did not exist while Nabokov was composing most of his works, Victoria N. Alex-
ander has argued that he may have intuited something like emergence in his approach to 
speciation: see her “Nabokov, Teleology, and Insect Mimicry,” esp. 177–92.
 8. Nabokov suggests in “The Tragedy of Tragedy” that causality is not the basis of life 
and should not be viewed as fundamental in art (esp. tragedy) or in life. In USSR, 318.
 9. Susan Elizabeth Sweeney offers a new perspective on how the nature of human 
thought itself seems to guide Nabokov’s narrative forms, which seem to mimic innate, 
spontaneous consciousness in their sudden and surprising jumps across chasms of verbal 
meaning. See “Thinking about Impossible Things in Nabokov,” in Duncan White and Will 
Norman, eds., Transitional Nabokov (London: Peter Lang, forthcoming).
 10. “This occurs in scientific classification. Long ago, Linnaeus described a common 
species of butterfly, adding the laconic note ‘In pratis Westmanniae.’ Time passes, and in the 
laudable pursuit of accuracy, new investigators name the various southern and Alpine races 
of this common species, so that soon there is not a spot left in Europe where one finds the 
nominal race and not a local subspecies. Where is the type, the model, the original? Then, 
at last, a grave entomologist discusses in a detailed paper the whole complex of named 
races and accepts as the representative of the typical one the almost 200-year old, faded 
Scandinavian specimen collected by Linnaeus; and this identification sets everything right” 
(The Eye [New York: Phaedra, 1965], 63–64; SSRP, vol. 3, 69). Nabokov included a scien-
tific biography of Linnaeus on his Crimean reading list in October of 1918: Viktor Andree-
vich Fausek, Linnei, ego zhizn’ i nauchnaia deiatel’nost’ (Spb: Tipografiia tovarishchestva 
“Obshchestvennaia pol’za,” 1891). “Stikhi i skhemy,” inside back cover. LCNA.
 11. Donna Tussing Orwin, Tolstoy’s Art and Thought, 1847–1880 (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1993), 102–3. The Henry James story “The Figure in the Carpet” may 
also have contributed to Nabokov’s inspiration in challenging Herzen’s analogy. The focus 
on flaws and gaps, on foldability and linings, develops and expands the metaphysical, or 
simply mystical, implications of James’s metaphor, which had been disarmed in advance 
by Herzen’s critique. James Ramey notes that the theme of flaws becomes part of a larger 
pattern of “naturalistic literary camouflage” (“Parasitism and Pale Fire’s Camouflage: the 
King-Bot, the Crown Jewels and the Man in the Brown Macintosh,” Comparative Litera-
ture Studies 41.2 (2004): 185–213, 193), but he does not attend to the fact that it is their 
status as flaws on one level that breaks through to another plane of significance.
 12. PF, 17; Gift, 183.
 13. This intimation is echoed also in several stories, for example, “The Vane Sisters” 
and “Signs and Symbols,” as well as in the novel Transparent Things (New York: Vintage 
International, 1989).
 14. Significantly, an artist-turned-waiter from whom Martin orders food near the nov-
el’s end is named Danilevski, after N. Ia. Danilevskii, whose 1889 treatise Darwinism was 
“an elaborately structured synthesis of all anti-Darwinian arguments in circulation at the 
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time it was written” (Alexander Vucinich, Darwin in Russian Thought [Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1988], 123).
 15. Glory (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 198.
 16. Aleksandr Dolinin and Grigorii Utgof, “Kommentarii,” SSRP vol. 3, 727.
 17. Glory, “Foreword,” x.
 18. Ibid., 111–12.
 19. Ibid., 142–43.
 20. “Svoeobrazie” could also be rendered as “uniqueness” or “idiosyncrasy.” The 
choice of “originality” in the English may have been intended to preserve an overtone of 
personal creativity that “uniqueness” lacks, but that would have been overstated by the 
Russian “original,” which means “eccentric.” SSRP, vol. 3, 202.
 21. Glory, 168, 197; SSRP, vol. 3, 221.
 22. Charles Nicol, “Martin, Darwin, Malory and Pushkin: The Anglo-Russian Cul-
ture of Glory,” in Jane Grayson et al., eds.,  Nabokov’s World (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 
2002), vol. 1, 159–72, esp. 170–71. See also his “Why Darwin Slid into the Ditch: An 
Embedded Text in Glory,” The Nabokovian 37 (Fall 1996): 48–53.
 23. Glory, “Foreword,” xii.
 24. Most early reviewers, even the usually supportive Mark Tseitlin, found it too sim-
ple, too free of a binding idea or plot. See Dolinin and Utgof, “Komentarii,” SSRP, vol. 3, 
714–15.
 25. Lolita annotator Alfred Appel’s fellow soldier called the novel “God-damn lita-
chure” upon reading just two lines, and tossed it aside. ANLo, “Introduction,” xxxiv.
 26. Nabokov read extensively on adolescent physiology; one source reported that the 
average onset of puberty among girls was 13 years, 9 months. “Lolita Notes,” folder 4, 
LCNA. Dolly Haze is twelve and five months when Humbert finds her. She does, however, 
buy some sanitary napkins the morning of their first intercourse, but this does not appear 
to be due to menstruation. Later, in a gruesome reverie, Humbert does imagine reproduc-
ing with Lolita—but only in order to create a string of girl-children, each of whom would 
replace her mother in his bed at the appropriate age (Lolita, 174; cf. also “litter of Lolitas,” 
300).
 27. This assertion brings up the question: does Humbert really love Dolly when he (if 
he) visits her in Coalmont, now a young woman and six months pregnant? I think that even 
using the word “love” in Humbert’s case is problematic, despite his insistence.
 28. “Foreword,” Despair (New York: Vintage International, 1989), xiii.
 29. In Despair, although Hermann appears either to be infertile or to abjure parenthood, 
his main sexual energy is self-directed. He represents a parodic incarnation of a wide range 
of Freudian principles, combined with the Darwinian theme of murdering one’s neighbor in 
the struggle for survival. His narrative, which is intended to justify his murderous act as a 
work of genius and art, betrays his true motivation: the collection of life-insurance money. 
Art, Nabokov suggests, is never a tool of struggle, and, of course, murder can never be art.
 30. Nabokov’s brother Sergey and his Uncle Ruka were both homosexual. The Eye, 
Glory, Laughter in the Dark, Despair, The Gift all include explicit or tacit homosexual 
characters or themes.
 31. Darwin’s second most famous work, The Descent of Man, includes the subtitle 
“And Selection According to Sex.”
 32. Nabokov calls Freudianism a “police state of sexual myth” (SM, 325).
 33. Love is apparently also absent in Kinbote’s sexual world, but not from his dream 
world: “His dream-love for [Disa] far exceeded in emotional tone, in spiritual passion and 
depth, anything he had experienced in his surface existence” (note to lines 433–34, PF, 
210).
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 34. It is worth recalling here his claim that sex organs are relatively isolated from the 
environmental aspects of natural selection. NNP, 5.
 35. FB, 228.
 36. Note to line 629, PF, 238.
 37. Brian Boyd, Nabokov’s Pale Fire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 164; 
see also Dieter E. Zimmer’s more extensive discussion, GNBM, 147–48. Zimmer notes 
that “Disa” also refers to a butterfly species, Erebia disa (Thunberg, 1791); he has traced 
the generic name “Disa” to a mythical queen from the Uppsala region, popularized in the 
first Swedish play, staged by Johannes Messenius in 1611. Zimmer’s account is extraor-
dinary and must be seen to be believed. Curiously, the myth itself relates to the problem 
of survival. Darwin’s entire treatise on orchids was designed to demonstrate the law that 
“higher organic beings require an occasional cross with another individual; or, which is the 
same thing, that no hermaphrodite fertilizes itself for a perpetuity of generations” (Darwin, 
The Various Contrivances by Which Orchids Are Fertilized by Insects [Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1984], 1); and “That cross-fertilization . . . is the rule with the Orchi-
dae, cannot be doubted. . . . Nevertheless, some species are regularly or often self-fertilized. 
. . . In South Africa Disa macrantha often fertilizes itself; but Mr. Weale believes that it is 
likewise cross-fertilized by moths” (ibid., 290).
 38. Darwin noted, “Considering such cases as those of Ophrys, Disa, and Epidendrum, 
in which one species alone in the genus is capable of complete self-fertilization, whilst the 
other species are rarely fertilized in any manner owing to the rarity of the visits of the 
proper insects; . . . we are led to believe that the above-named self-fertile plants formerly 
depended on the visits of insects for their fertilization, and that from such visits failing they 
did not yield a sufficiency of seed and were verging towards extinction” (Various Contriv-
ances, 292). This argument suggests that the insects that fertilize these genera were formerly 
abundant, but are now rare due to unknown ecological shifts. The survival of a useless, 
even apparently harmful, anatomical feature is indicated, or else this feature is repeatedly 
regenerated by nature itself. In either case, the tendency toward production of such infertile 
forms gives Nabokov plausible grounds for his own anti-selectionist biases. Darwin himself 
expressed uncertainty about the survival value of the self-fertilizing adaptation in these spe-
cies.
 39. The term “Alpha Male” appeared in Science on June 5, 1954: 1179; but it was 
clearly already common usage by the time Jacob Uhrich wrote “The Social Hierarchy in 
Albino Mice” in 1937 (Journal of Comparative Psychology 5:2 [April, 1938]: 373–413). 
The “alpha” theme is present in two of the novel’s hereditary trees: Zembla’s four mon-
archs—Alfin, Blenda, Charles, Disa—mirror precisely the four daughters of judge Gold-
sworth: Alphina, Betty, Candida, Dee.
 40. A core concept of Kantian ethics and of Russian neo-idealism; see Randall A. Poole, 
ed. and trans., “Translator’s Introduction,” Problems of Idealism (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 2002), 28–34, esp. 33.
 41. In a letter to his mother, Nabokov called his brother Sergey’s homosexuality unnat-
ural and a dead end, while also insisting on his indifference to the religious side of the ques-
tion (15 June 1926, Berg Coll.). Homosexuality in nature had not yet been demonstrated at 
that time.
 42. “Orchids constitute the largest plant family of them all, perhaps as many as thirty 
thousand species, making up about 10 percent of the world’s plant species.” John Alcock, 
An Enthusiasm for Orchids (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006), vi. Darwin, in 
The Various Contrivances by Which Orchids Are Fertilized by Insects, calls orchids “among 
the singular and most modified forms in the vegetable kingdom” (1–2). According to the 
introduction by Michael T. Ghiselin, Darwin’s book on orchids “provides the first explicit 
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treatment of Darwinian evolutionary anatomy” (xvi) and “evoked a major revolution in 
botany and in biology as a whole” (xi). “On the other hand the predominant approach to 
structure was morphology, which, by definition, is the study of pure form, leaving out any 
consideration of function. This formalistic approach, which has not yet fully died out, was 
mystical, and rooted in Platonic metaphysics. It was popularized by Oken and Goethe” 
(xii).
 43. See also Bobby Ann Mason’s chapters “Insects and Incest” and “Ada or Orchids” 
in her Nabokov’s Garden: A Guide to Ada (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1974). Mason includes 
detailed discussion of the botanical and entomological examples used in Nabokov’s novel, 
suggesting that Nabokov includes these as signs of the solipsistic and harmful nature of 
Van’s passion (49–54, 74). She also draws attention to Darwin’s claim that self-fertilizing 
orchids were “degenerates” (80) and appears to view the sexual deviations in Ada from 
an essentially normative perspective (56–57). Mason was also the first to note the possible 
significance of Erasmus Darwin’s The Botanic Garden in Ada and in Pale Fire (170–72).
 44. Brian Boyd suggests that they “die into the manuscript record of their past.” AY, 
537.
 45. Ada, 289.
 46. Ibid., 99, 100.
 47. See Marina Grishakova’s related discussion, The Models of Space, Time and Vision 
in V. Nabokov’s Fiction: Narrative Strategies and Cultural Frames (Tartu: Tartu University 
Press, 2006), 67.
 48. The idea can also be found in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment, in his 
discussion of genius in §46: “Beautiful art is art of genius,” where he states, “Genius is the 
inborn predisposition of the mind (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art” 
(Paul Guyer, ed., and Eric Matthews, trans., New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
186 [5: 307]). Robert J. Richards suggests that for the Romantics this definition implied 
that “ineffable rules for the creation of beauty arise from the artist’s nature, which is of a 
piece with nature writ large” (Romantic Conception, 431).
 49. For a recent typology and theoretical discussion of Nabokov’s use of pattern, see 
Marina Grishakova, Models of Space, 64–71.
 50. See Nabokov’s Ada: The Place of Consciousness, Part One (Christchurch, NZ: 
Cybereditions, 2001), 19–63.
 51. Although it is not clear to me that Nabokov makes much use of parasitism as a 
structural form throughout his art, Pale Fire, at least, largely centers on parasitism. The 
novel itself is a parasitic parody of the scholarly edition; Kinbote’s commentary is parasitic 
upon John Shade’s poem; the title indicates the moon’s parasitic relation to the sun’s light. 
James Ramey finds another compelling parasitic mechanism behind Pale Fire’s narrative 
form: the life cycle of the botfly, which uses a mosquito as a courier to transmit its eggs 
onto a host, into which its newborn larvae then crawl. Nabokov saw a presentation on 
botfly maggots after his own talk on blue butterflies before the Cambridge Entomological 
Club in October 1944 (NB, 346). According to Ramey, “Kinbote resembles the botfly in 
a number of ways [ . . . ] Like the botfly, he ‘reproduces’ himself, in a sense, by attaching 
what he believes to be his life-story to an unsuspecting carrier, Shade’s poem, which is much 
likelier to reach potential ‘hosts’ than Kinbote’s own publications would be” (Ramey, 189). 
Ramey proposes that Nabokov’s own texts embody the workings of the newly invented, 
magical insect, the “King-botfly,” which uses language to parasitize readers’ minds and 
produce new “little Nabokovs” (208). As attractive and ingenious as this formulation is, I 
think its final conclusions clash with, or at least understate, the creative possibilities of an 
artwork elaborated within a new consciousness. From this perspective, Nabokov’s origi-
nal metaphor of wings (LL, 259) is more apt than Ramey’s suggestion of authorial self- 
cloning.
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 52. Irina Paperno, “How Nabokov’s Gift Is Made” (Stanford Slavic Studies 4.2 [1992]: 
295–322) and Marina Kostalevsky, “The Young Godunov-Cherdyntsev or How to Write a 
Literary Biography” (Russian Literature 43.3 (1 Apr. 1998]: 283–95; also Dieter E. Zimmer 
and Sabine Hartmann, “The Amazing Music of Truth: Nabokov’s Sources for Godunov’s 
Central Asian Travels in The Gift” (Nabokov Studies 7 [2002]: 33–74) and Nabokov reist 
in Traum in das Innere Asiens (Reinbek: Rowohlt Verlag, 2006).
 53. Essays in Poetics 24 (1999): 158–81.
 54. The question of “cryptomnesia”—referring to Nabokov’s possible subconscious 
memory of Heinz von Lichberg’s story “Lolita,” proposed by Michael Maar—would offer 
a significant counterexample. However, the story is so obscure and such a poor “survivor” 
that in biological terms, the mimicry definition could not really apply (a creature mim-
ics something in order to resemble it or be mistaken for it). But in reality, the book is not 
much like the von Lichberg story at all; the phenomenon here, if it is one, would rather be 
yet another component of Nabokov’s cultural butterfly collecting, with the results invisibly 
pinned into the pattern of a coherent narrative. See Michael Maar, The Two Lolitas (Lon-
don, New York: Verso, 2005).
 55. Discussions on NABOKV-L have also found important kinship with Edsel Ford’s 
poetry: Matthew Roth, “Three Allusions in Pale Fire,” The Nabokovian 58 (Fall 2007): 
53–60.
 56. Stories, 657.
 57. “Good Readers and Good Writers,” LL, 3. See also Grishakova’s discussion, Mod-
els of Space, 68.
 58. Lectures on Russian Literature (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1980), 
190–94.
 59. AnLo, 283. Humbert’s torment is knowing that his crimes matter: “Unless it can be 
proven to me . . . that in the infinite run it does not matter a jot that a North-American girl-
child named Dolores Haze had been deprived of her childhood by a maniac—unless this 
can be proven (and if it can then life is a joke), I see nothing for the treatment of my misery 
but the melancholy and very local palliative of articulate art.”
 60. Lolita, 5.
 61. Cf. David Burliuk et al., Slap in the Face of Public Taste, in Anna Lawton, ed., Rus-
sian Futurism through its Manifestos 1912–1928 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 
51.
 62. See n48 above.
 63. Finnegans Wake, for example, is a work that Nabokov considered to have departed 
from the allowable range of variation and therefore, from art itself (SO, 103).
 64. The Defense (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), 72.
 65. SO, 95.
 66. Notwithstanding Konstantin Godunov-Cherdyntsev’s fantastical assertion, con-
veyed in “Father’s Butterflies,” that in nature’s earliest days, before the advent of species as 
such, “a crawling root . . . turned into a snake solely because nature, noticing movement, 
wished to reproduce it” (FB, 225).
 67. For example, the structure of Pale Fire is foreshadowed as early as The Gift, in the 
chapter 5 references to an unreadable text with marginalia mimicking real annotations 
(Gift, 311), and in “Ultima Thule” in the narrator’s illustrations for an epic poem he could 
not read (Stories, 510). Embryonic Lolita appears in The Gift and in The Enchanter. This 
phenomenon in nature—the transitory, embryonic appearance of forms that emerge in later 
stages of evolution—was presented as part of orthogenesis, a theory often opposed to natu-
ral selection in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See L. S. Berg, Nomogen-
esis: Or, Evolution Determined by Law, J. N. Rostovtsov, trans. (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1969 [1922]), 85.
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 68. Compare Goethe’s discussion of all plants as being expressions of a “single plant” 
(the Urpflantze).
 69. LCNA, Pale Fire Draft, card 773a. Victoria N. Alexander discusses the suggestive 
analogy between word golf and “neutral” genetic drift in her “Nabokov, Teleology, and 
Insect Mimicry,” 199–207. The “genetic code” entered the popular sphere in about 1957 
(e.g., Time, 14 July 1957: 58).
 70. Gift, 349. “Znaesh’: potolok, pa-ta-lok, pas ta loque, potolog,—i tak dalee,—poka 
potolok ne stanovitsia sovershenno chuzhim i odichalym, kak ‘lokotop’ ili ‘pokotol’” 
(SSRP, 524).
 71. It is, of course, highly speculative to suggest that the skull image was on the butter-
fly’s wing before the human skull evolved, but at least it was most likely there before the 
human idea of the “death’s head” image entered cultural currency.
 72. Gift, 1.
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 1. SO, 173, 174.
 2. This was actually the world’s first psychoanalytic clinic, founded by Ernst Simmel in 
the former Humboldt Castle, also known as “Schloss Tegel.” The Tegel district is home to 
the Russian church and cemetery where Nabokov’s father was buried in 1922.
 3. LL, 3.
 4. BS, 188. 
 5. George Mandler, A History of Modern Experimental Psychology: From James and 
Wundt to Cognitive Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 144. David Hothersall 
summarizes the four principles of Gestalt psychology: “1. Holistic Thinking: the whole 
is always more than the sum of its parts. This tenet of supersummativity was central to 
the Gestalt psychology. 2. Phenomenological basis: Phenomena are the subject matter 
of psychology. [ . . . ]. 3. Methodology: Gestalt psychology makes use of lifelike (reality) 
experiments with a small number of subjects. 4. Isomorphism: Psychological processes are 
directly related to biological, especially brain, processes.” History of Psychology, 4th ed. 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 209–10.
 6. Mandler mentions the “limited utility of its system” (164).
 7. Mandler, 164; Hothersall, 391; Wagner and Owens, “Introduction,” D. Alfred 
Owens and Mark Wagner, eds., Progress in Modern Psychology: The Legacy of American 
Functionalism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), 10. Mandler elsewhere expresses this disci-
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cannot without loss of meaning be reduced to the ‘universal laws’” (15). Wilcox hails the 
holistic (and evolutionary) honesty of ecopsychology or what he calls neofunctionalism 
(Stephen B. Wilcox, “Functionalism Then and Now,” in Owens and Wagner, eds., Progress 
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a poet friend he writes, in sarcastic allusion to the New Psychology of the German mecha-
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express deeper truths than your weakminded poets ever dreamed.’ In a letter to his brother, 
the novelist Henry James, he refers to psychology as a ‘nasty little subject’ that excludes 
everything one would want to know. Only two years after completing his huge and magis-
terial Principles of Psychology he writes: ‘A string of raw facts; a little gossip and a wrangle 
about opinions; a little classification and generalization on the mere descriptive level; a 
strong prejudice that we have states of mind and that our brain somehow conditions them: 
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tury Student’s Perspective”; http://www.comnet.ca/~pballan/section5(210).htm). Accessed 
6/2/2008.
 11. Knight Dunlap, “The Social Need for Scientific Psychology,” The Scientific Monthly 
11, no. 6. (Dec. 1920): 502–17.
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Particular Problem,” American Imago 62.1 [2005]: 66.
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Brokgauz-Efron encyclopedia, it is the “study of the soul.” William James called it “The 
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in foregrounding the physiological, observationalist approach to psychology, and his resis-
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“Nabokov and Freud,” in Vladimir Alexandrov, ed., The Garland Companion to Vladimir 
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turier’s recent book, Nabokov, ou la cruauté du desire: Lecture psychanalytique (Seyssele: 
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Lacanian perspective. Regrettably, considerations of space do not allow me to treat this 
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 24. Letter to G. Struve: “I recently published my opinion about ‘Freudianism,’ which 
nauseates me, in ‘Novaia gazeta,’ so I don’t have any desire to write about it anew” [“Moe 
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G. P. Struve, chast’ vtoraia (1931–35)” published by E. B. Belodubrovskii, commentary by 
A. A. Dolinin, Zvezda 4 (2004): 139–63. Letter 29, 148.
 25. Jenefer Shute, “Nabokov and Freud,” in Vladimir Alexandrov, ed., Garland Com-
panion, 412–20, offers an incisive reading of Nabokov’s tango with Freud. However, one 
can argue with the claim that “the very methods employed to assert the text’s independence 
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excellent observations, one of the best is that “Nabokov, unlike Freud, considers conscious-
ness, rather than unconsciousness, psychology’s proper realm” (418). But to a large extent, 
both consciousness and unconsciousness remain inscrutable for Nabokov, a position we 
have seen validated for him by William James. Geoffrey Green, in Freud and Nabokov, 
in Shute’s words, attempts to prove that Nabokov was a Freudian despite himself. Leland 
De La Durantaye in “Vladimir Nabokov and Sigmund Freud, or a Particular Problem” 
explores other reasons why Nabokov felt it necessary to battle Freud so tirelessly. Along 
with the usual suspects (Freud’s emphasis on the general over the specific), De La Duran-
taye identifies an enticing hypothesis: “Nabokov would reproach less the failure of psycho-
analysis to be or become a science . . . than the very pretensions of psychoanalysis to be a 
science, its aspiration to function in the realm of the human sciences as would a natural 
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lack of attention to massive variety free from theorizing (the practice of, say, lepidopterist 
Godunov-Cherdyntsev in “Father’s Butterflies”)—contradicted Nabokov’s own scientific 
instincts. 
 26. See Esther Menaker, Otto Rank: A Rediscovered Legacy (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1982), 9, for discussion of Rank’s assessment of the place of causality in 
psychological and psychoanalytical studies. Manaker also presents the issues at the heart of 
Rank’s defection from Freudian orthodoxy, a divergence that led to his excommunication 
by mainstream Freudians (11–37).
 27. Shute makes a similar point but takes it quite a bit further by suggesting that when 
Nabokov began writing, Freud was “already there” in all the texts he wanted to write, 
that the “structures of desire that the writer wills into being and weaves into fiction have 
already been manhandled” by Freud (“Nabokov and Freud,” 416). I would argue that 
while Freudianism was present as a major potential and common interpretive mode, Shute’s 
version goes too far in implying Freudianism’s fundamental place as a universal within 
modern literary discourse. According to Knight Dunlap’s critical observation in 1920 (op. 
cit.), psychoanalysis already “la[id] claim not only to the field of psychology, but also to the 
fields of literature, art, religion, history, politics, and archaeology” (513). But such claims, 
Dunlap suggests, were not universally recognized as legitimate.
 28. Despair (New York: Vintage International, 1989), 41.
 29. On this subject, see especially James’s Principles, chapter 7, “Methods and Snares of 
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 30. Nabokov told Edmund Wilson that his father gave him James to read when he was 
twelve or thirteen. Letter of March 24, 1957; DBDV, 344. A partial list of curious echoes 
from James that appear in various spots, often prominently, includes the crossed-finger 
and pea illusion (Principles [1981], 732; cf. Glory); hypnogogic hallucinations (Principles 
[1981], 767–68; cf. SM); inverted head/horizon viewing (Principles [1981], 847; cf. Gift); 
multiple personalities (Principles [1981], 356ff.; cf. The Eye, PF); train motion (Principles 
[1981], 736; cf. KQK, SM, TT); kaleidoscope (Principles [1981], 17; cf. LATH, BS); col-
ored hearing (Principles [1981], 676; cf. Gift, SM); Socrates, “Other men are mortal” syl-
logism (Principles [1981], 1245; cf. PF); convergence of parallel lines (Principles [1981], 
1251–52; cf. Gift); aversion to a predecessor’s warmth on a seat or other surface (Principles 
[1890], chapter 24, note 35: http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/James/Principles/prin24.htm; cf. 
Lolita).
 31. For example, James wrote that “our psychology will remain positivistic and non-
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must some day be more thoroughly thought out, we shall abide there in this book, and 
just as we have rejected mind-dust, we shall take no account of the soul. The spiritualistic 
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to give a tinge of mystery to the expression of his positivism can continue to say that nature 
in her unfathomable designs has mixed us of clay and flame, of brain and mind, that the 
two things hang indubitably together and determine each other’s being, but how or why, no 
mortal may ever know” (Principles, vol. 1, 182).
 32. LRL, 183. Cf. James, Principles [1890], chapter 10 (vol. 1, 296).
 33. Cf. James, Principles [1890], chapter 5, “The Automaton Theory.” Of scientific 
knowledge of the brain’s inner states, James writes: “The organ will be for us a sort of vat 
in which feelings and emotions somehow go on stewing together, and in which innumerable 
things happen of which we catch but the statistical result” (vol. 1, 138).
 34. Letter to Edmund Wilson, March 24, 1957, in DBDV, 344. The philosophical 
anthology Problems of Idealism was published in 1903 when Nabokov was four years 
old; given his father’s political commitments, Nabokov would have been extremely likely 
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to read this collection as well as its successor volume, Vekhi (“Landmarks,” 1909), in his 
teenage years. V. D. Nabokov was close to several members of the Moscow Psychological 
Society (see Dana Dragunoiu, Vladimir Nabokov and the Poetics of Liberalism [forthcom-
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Hyppolite Taine, Veniamin Tarnowski, and Wilhelm Wundt. There is no English section 
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his works individually, the library contains a four-volume set and a biography by François-
Alphonse Aulard. For detailed discussion of the significance of Weininger for Nabokov’s 
works, especially Despair, see Joanna Trzeciak, “Viennese Waltz,” and her “Visions and 
Re-visions: Nabokov as Self-translating Author,” PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2005, 
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 36. Sergej Davydov, “Despair,” in Vladimir E. Alexandrov, ed., Garland Companion, 
100n21.
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the archival materials as it is in the published collections.
 38. James was an early president of the Society for Psychical Research, which advocated 
scientific investigation of paranormal phenomena (see, for example, Hothersall, History, 
338). John Ray, Jr., who pens the “Foreword” to Lolita, is a psychologist who is not quite a 
narrator, although a role for him in Humbert’s text has been proposed by George Ferger in 
“Who’s Who in the Sublimelight,” Nabokov Studies 8 (2004):137–98.
 39. For a thought-provoking angle on this question, see Zoran Kuzmanovich, “Suffer 
the Little Children,” in Gavriel Shapiro, ed., Nabokov at Cornell (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 2003), 49–57.
 40. AnLo, 5–6.
 41. This image of Ray is extended by his association with one Dr. Blanche Schwartz-
mann, whose work on pedophiles has apparently enlightened Ray so little, and by Quilty’s 
reference to Schwartzmann’s chromatic inversion, Dr. Melanie Weiss, “psychoanalyst and 
pornographer.” Gennady Barabtarlo points out the proximity of this name to Melanie 
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Klein, author of The Psychoanalysis of Children (1932). Phantom of Fact, 161. Compare 
also “Dr. Albina Dunkelberg,” in Pnin (New York: Vintage International, 1991), 50.
 42. Pnin, 88.
 43. Ibid., 49.
 44. Ada (New York: Vintage International, 1990), 340.
 45. Ibid., 338.
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all that’s not literature.] N.d., 1931. “Pis’ma V.V. Nabokova k G.P. Struve, chast’ vtoraia 
(1931–1935),” 142.
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 48. “The Art of Literature and Commonsense,” LL, 376. See also Anthony Anemone, 
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honorem Hugh McLean, Simon Karlinsky, James Rice and Barry Scherr, eds. (Berkeley: 
Berkeley Slavic Specialties, 1995), 421–31.
 49. SO, 45.
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was held in the Nabokov library in St. Petersburg. Ernst Mach, in Knowledge and Error, 
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His skin was insensible, and often he would fall into a state of complete insensibility and 
immobility, lasting several days’” (Théodule A. Ribot, The Diseases of Personality [Wash-
ington, DC: University Publications of America, 1977]), 32, citing Michéa, Annals medico-
psychologiques, 1856: 249ff.) Note also: “This old soldier did not imagine himself another 
(Napoleon, for example, although he was at Austerlitz)” (34). Ribot’s work goes on to 
consider other sorts of double personalities from various points of view.
 51. Nabokov would also have been aware of dissociation from Pierre Janet through 
William James’s account in Principles of Psychology [1890], e.g. chapter 25, n10.
 52. Olga Skonechnaia, “Primechaniia,” Sobranie sochinenii russkogo perioda v piati 
tomakh, v. 3, 713. See also her “‘People of the Moonlight’: Silver Age Parodies in Nabokov’s 
The Eye and The Gift,” Nabokov Studies 3 (1996): 33–52; and Anna Brodsky, “Homosexu-
ality and the Aesthetic of Nabokov’s Dar,” Nabokov Studies 4 (1997): 95–116. A similar 
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 54. Ibid., 93.
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bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 101–7.
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ders whose presence underlay some characters’ delusions. “Nabokov’s Neurology,” Cycnos 
10.1 (1993):113–22.
 57. The continued dominance of this approach appears to be confirmed by the recent 
work of Stephen Kern, whose book A Cultural History of Causality (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004) traces efforts to explore causal mechanisms behind murder in litera-
ture from the Victorian era forward, including a section on Lolita.
 58. Defense (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 22, 29, 34, 37.
 59. Ibid., 59–60.
 60. Ibid., 98–99, 103.
 61. Ibid., 163.
 62. Ibid., 164.
 63. Ibid., 162.
 64. Leona Toker’s reading of The Defense, one of the most insightful and sensitive, 
refers frequently to Luzhin’s mistakes and errors, among which are to “turn away from 
human reality in his pursuit of abstract harmonies and meanings” (Nabokov: The Mys-
tery of Literary Structures [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989], 86). The novel asserts 
a “need for balance between intellectual pursuits and human commitments” (87). This 
argument suggests that Mrs. Luzhin and others were right to attempt to create balance in 
Luzhin’s life after his collapse, although in fact of course they really attempt to eliminate 
Luzhin’s main intellectual passion, his sphere of mental being. I feel that reducing Luzhin’s 
point of view and behaviors to a “mistake” is unjustifiably normative. We have no rea-
son to believe, for example, that had the match with Turati been allowed to end naturally 
Luzhin would have had a breakdown; nor, on the other hand, that if he recovered and 
were allowed to resume his natural life, that such a life would not have had its own form 
of human warmth (a term Toker also emphasizes in her treatment [87]). See also Julian W. 
Connolly, Nabokov’s Early Fiction, 92–93. Vladimir Alexandrov discusses Gnostic symbol-
ism of evil surrounding Luzhin’s “recovery”: “The Defense,” in Vladimir Alexandrov, ed., 
The Garland Companion to Vladimir Nabokov, 75–87, esp. 80–82. Nabokov’s reading of 
Kafka’s “Metamorphosis” offers an instructive perspective on Luzhin’s situation. He writes, 
“the isolation, and the strangeness, of so-called reality—this is, after all, something which 
constantly characterizes the artist, the genius, the discoverer. The Samsa family around the 
fantastic insect is nothing else than mediocrity surrounding genius” (LL, 260).
 65. Defense, 16.
 66. Ibid., 21–22, 29, 57, 46 (ellipsis in original), 49, 57, 91.
 67. Nabokov connects ideas of illness with states of altered consciousness and contact 
with abstract realms in Speak, Memory. He relates that his short-lived mathematical gift 
“played a part in tussles with quinsy or scarlet fever, when I felt enormous spheres and huge 
numbers swell relentlessly in my aching brain. [ . . . ] Such were the monsters that thrived 
on my delirium, and the only way to prevent them from crowding me out of myself was to 
kill them by extracting their hearts . . .” His mother had been through similar experiences, 
and her “understanding would bring my expanding universe back to a Newtonian norm” 
(SM, 36–7).
 68. Defense, 95, 97.
 69. Ibid., 94. Esther Menaker, writing on Rank’s early Der Künstler, suggests that 
“While at this point, under the influence of Freud, Rank understands the artist’s motivation 
for and production of creative work as stemming form the sublimations of sexual drives, he 
is already concerned with the social dimension and with the impact of the artist on man’s 
cultural development.” Esther Menaker, Otto Rank: A Rediscovered Legacy, 16. Menaker 
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details Rank’s suspicion of “‘the inflated, introspective knowledge of self which modern 
psychology has established as a science of understanding the “causal” motives of thinking, 
feeling and action’” (from Rank, Psychology and the Soul, quoted in Menaker, 6).
 70. Defense, 84, 85, 90, 103, 210, 222.
 71. Ibid., 230–31.
 72. Ibid., 161.
 73. Using an approach based on the “Theory of Mind” branch of evolutionary psychol-
ogy, Lisa Zunshine also demonstrates that Humbert imputes the views he wants us to adopt 
onto various other characters in the novel. Why We Read Fiction (Columbus: The Ohio 
State University Press, 2006), 100–118. See also Nomi Tamir-Ghez, “The Art of Persuasion 
in Nabokov’s Lolita,” for a summary of accounts sympathetic to Humbert, in Ellen Pifer, 
ed., Nabokov’s Lolita: A Casebook (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) 17–37; 
Tony Moore gives a very detailed reconsideration of Humbert’s manipulations in “See-
ing through Humbert: focusing on the feminist sympathy in Lolita,” in David H. J. Lar-
mour, ed., Discourse and Ideology in Nabokov’s Prose (London and New York, Routledge, 
2002), 91–110.
 74. AnLo, 10. Cf. in his notes: “N. M. Iovetz-Tereshchenko. Friendship-love in adoles-
cence. London, 1936. (Diary of Russian schoolboy with very pedantic—to say the least!—
first ??mother??)” LCNA, “Lolita Notes,” folder 4.
 75. AnLo, 13–14, 16.
 76. Ibid., 283, 284.
 77. Ibid., 282–83.
 78. Despair, 4.
 79. Ibid., 46. Nabokov vividly expressed his contempt for this kind of causality, arguing 
that “the Freudian faith leads to dangerous ethical consequences, such as when a filthy mur-
derer with the brain of a tapeworm is given a lighter sentence because his mother spanked 
him too much or too little—it works both ways.” SO, 116.
 80. Julian Connolly suggests a causal, psychological explanation: that Hermann is dis-
placing his financial and romantic misfortunes onto Felix, whose death should then purge 
Hermann’s life and enable a new beginning (Nabokov’s Early Fiction, 150).
 81. Despair, 120. This passage also anticipates Humbert’s “seduction” by Lolita, in 
which she allegedly takes on the active and responsible role.
 82. Ibid., 97. Cf. Crime and Punishment, end of chapter 5: “He felt that he had thrown 
off the terrible burden that had weighed him down for so long, and his heart was light and 
tranquil. ‘Lord,’ he prayed, ‘show me the way, that I may renounce this accursed . . . fan-
tasy of mine!’” Immediately after this prayer, “he went out of his way to cross the Haymar-
ket instead of returning home by the quickest and most direct route [ . . . ] It was almost 
as if fate had laid an ambush for him.” Fyodor Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, Jesse 
Coulson trans., George Gibian ed., Norton Critical Edition (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Co., 1989 [1964]), 50–51. Humbert Humbert never plays this game: once he sees Lolita, all 
his actions are directed at ensuring his proximity to her.
 83. Despair, 114–15.
 84. See Gennady Barabtarlo’s discussion of these in Phantom of Fact: A Guide to Nabo-
kov’s Pnin (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1989), 158–64, where he uncovers many of the parodied 
tests.
 85. A minor fact adds to the Freudian/Oedipal motif: Pnin’s father was an ophthal-
mologist, an oblique and deflating reference to Oedipus’s self-blinding upon discovering 
his crimes. During his research for Pnin, Nabokov copied out the following from Ralph S. 
Banay, Youth in Despair (New York, 1948), 80—one presumes ironically: “Implicit in all 
these [attempts to kill fathers] acts of homicide or attempted homicide is sexual aggression. 
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The choice of the weapons—the gun and the knife, both phallic symbols—is alone a wit-
ness to this fact.” Nabokov goes on to observe that this passage could also be used in his 
Eugene Onegin Commentary. “Notes on Various Subjects,” Berg Coll.
 86. Pnin’s behavior could be explored from the Bakhtinian perspective adopted by 
Julian Connolly in Nabokov’s Early Fiction: in this case, the character is unwilling to be 
“finalized” by an outside description of him, although he is not particularly concerned to 
become an author himself (unlike the characters Connolly discusses).
 87. Pnin, 43.
 88. Ibid., 91.
 89. Abraham Stone and Lena Levin, American Journal of Psychiatry 107 (1950–51): 
195. That Nabokov shifts the article’s title in precisely this way confirms its ironic intent. 
The article in fact derives from Stone’s primary work in the study of marital disorders. 
“Notes on Various Subjects,” Berg Coll. Gennady Barabtarlo suggests that Nabokov also 
looked at Melanie Klein, The Psychoanalysis of Children (London: Hogarth, 1932). Phan-
tom of Fact, 161–62.
 90. Ada, 298.
 91. Brian Boyd, Nabokov’s Ada (Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis, 1985, and Cybereditions 
2002).
 92. The situation is somewhat clearer in “The Vane Sisters,” where at least there 
had been a relationship that went bad; and in The Defense, we have an intimate view of 
Luzhin’s psychological response to the phenomenal world—although even that does not 
fully explain his death, as discussed above. Yasha Chernyshevsky’s death in The Gift is 
portrayed as an immature misreading of death-oriented mystical poetry (an exaggeration of 
romantic pessimism). Kinbote/Botkin in Pale Fire is also obsessed with suicide. We do, in 
his case, have a wealth of fantastical material in his commentary to help us work out why 
this might be so.
 93. “O da, est’ zemnaia vozmozhnost’ bessmertiia. Umershii prodolzhaet podrobno 
i raznoobrazno zhit’ v dushakh vsekh liudei, znavshikh ego. [ . . . ] I kazhdyi po-svoemu 
vosprinial cheloveka, tak chto pokoinyi ostalsia na zemle vo mnogikh obrazakh, inogda 
garmonicheski dopolniaiushchikh drug druga.” “Pamiati Iu. I. Aikhenval’da,” SSRP, vol. 2, 
668.
 94. At the “Transitional Nabokov” conference in 2007, Susan Elizabeth Sweeney sug-
gested that Nabokov’s works actually mimic, structurally, cognitive strategies used uncon-
sciously by the human mind. Sweeney bases her approach on cognitive literary analysis, and 
her work promises to demonstrate how Nabokov understood, or intuited, how the mind 
operates. See Sweeney, “Thinking about Impossible Things in Nabokov,” in Will Norman 
and Duncan White, eds., Transitional Nabokov (London: Peter Lang, forthcoming).
 95. Nabokov may have felt that such feelings of guilt, shame, and loneliness were typi-
cal of homosexuals—and in his day they certainly cannot have been extremely rare. Nabo-
kov knew that his homosexual brother, Sergey, was struggling with his identity and his 
yearning to suppress it. In a June 15, 1926, letter to their mother, Nabokov even endorsed 
Sergey’s passionate turn to the Catholic Church in his efforts to change his ways. In a much 
later note, from the time of Pale Fire’s composition, Nabokov speculated about the extreme 
isolation of a homosexual college professor in a puritanical country, where a handshake 
would be the only possible erotic contact. “Notes on Various Subjects,” Berg Coll.
 96. Letter to G. Struve, “Pis’ma V. V. Nabokova k G.  P. Struve. 1925–1931.” Letter 
no. 12 [Late Feb, 1930], Zvezda 11 (2003): 115–50, 130–31.
 97. See espcially Art and Artist, 25–26; Rank relates that he first presented the concept 
in his earlier Der Künstler (1909), while he was still under Freud’s influence.
 98. Gift, 328.
 99. Ibid., 30, 206.
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 100. Ibid., 70–76, 338–43, 365.
 101. Gift, second paragraph of “Foreword,” n.p. 
 102. RLSK, 35.
 103. He employs this trope in varying ways in Laughter in the Dark, Bend Sinister, and 
The Real Life of Sebastian Knight as well.
 104. Vladimir Alexandrov, “The Defense,” in The Garland Companion to Vladimir 
Nabokov, 75–87.
 105. West’s book occasioned a full, double-sided card’s worth of notes. “Notes on Vari-
ous Subjects,” Berg Coll. The recorded material comes from Donald James West, Psychical 
Research Today (London: 1954), 58–63, 66, 123. D. Barton Johnson details some of Nabo-
kov’s earlier exposure to spiritism by means of his interest in Rupert Brooke and Walter de 
la Mare, in “Vladimir Nabokov and Walter de la Mare’s ‘Otherworld,’” in Jane Grayson et 
al., eds., Nabokov’s World (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave, 2002), vol. 1, 71–87.
 106. He jotted from West’s bibliography these sources: W. F. Prince, The Case of Patience 
Worth (Boston, 1927); Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, LI (1954).
 107. Brian Boyd, Nabokov’s Pale Fire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
 108. This position has been most forcefully advanced by Carolyn Kunin on the 
NABOKV-L discussion list, beginning in 2002: “Problems with Boyd’s Hazel-Solution to 
Pale Fire,” Sept. 4, 2002.
 109. Suellen Stringer-Hye, “‘“Laura” Is Not Even the Original’s Name’: An Interview 
with Dmitri Nabokov,” Nabokov Online Journal II, 2008.
 110. The passage from West that sparked the multiple personality theme includes a dis-
cussion of Ansel Bourne (Psychical Research, 58), whose three-week transformation into a 
secondary personality had also been described by William James in Principles [1890] (chap-
ter 10: vol. 1, 391–92). Nabokov’s preparatory notes begin to transform these concepts into 
the world of Pale Fire, and he jotted down the following ideas: “subject to hallucinations. 
A victim of mental dissociation, he developed a secondary personality wearing a radiant 
crown (the king as a lecturer in Zembla).” The date of this card is not certain, but was most 
likely after Nabokov had chosen Zembla as his invented land (unless, perhaps, it was while 
writing this card that he first thought of it). “Notes on Various Subjects,” Berg Coll.
 111. Principles [1890], chapter 10, vol. 1, 392.
 112. Look at the Harlequins! (New York: Vintage International, 1991), 195. Hereafter 
LATH.
 113. Nabokov proposed a variation on the same theme when he composed the follow-
ing syllogism: “Time without consciousness—lower animal world; time with conscious-
ness—man; consciousness without time—some still higher state” (SO, 29–30). Although 
Nabokov was reading from rejected notes for Pale Fire, the idea first appears in his “1951 
Diary” entry for February 16. This diary was also clearly part of Nabokov’s play with the 
secondary personality theme: during its brief course (he abandoned it by the end of March), 
he described the life, death, and afterlife of an imaginary alter ego, “Atman” (a term from 
Hindu and Buddhist philosophy, meaning “self” or “soul”). At times, he mentions thoughts 
that derive not from himself but from Atman, whom he even suspects of hypnotizing him 
(Jan. 19)! Needless to say, the self-distancing practice employed while writing this “diary” 
protects the author from any claims that it reflects his definitive thought. Berg Coll.
 114. Like the scene of father being tossed concluding SM, chapter 1 (31–32), and the 
butterfly hunting scene at the end of chapter 6 (138–39).
 115. LATH, 122–25.
 116. BS, 188.
 117. The status of Freudian psychoanalysis’s potential as a testable theory has been revis-
ited by philosophers with greater sympathy in recent decades. See Edward Erwin’s review 
essay on Adolf Grünbaum, The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique 
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(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), in Noûs 21, no. 1 (Mar. 1987): 77–80. 
For a more critical perspective, see Hans Jurgen Eysenck, Decline and Fall of the Freudian 
Empire (New York: Penguin Books, 1991, [1985]).
 118. Nabokov’s respect for the unexplained is not unlike that described by philosopher 
of science Émile Meyerson: “Indeed, man, in spite of his invincible tendency to believe in 
rationality, obviously sensed very early that there is irrationality in nature, that nature is 
not entirely explicable. [ . . . ] In sum, we can make only negative or altogether imprecise 
pronouncements in this area. We know where complete rationalization is impossible, that 
is, where the agreement between our reason and external reality comes to an end: those are 
the irrationals already discovered. But we do not know—and shall never know—where the 
agreement exists, since we can never be sure that there will be no new irrationals to add to 
the old ones. That is why we shall never be able really to deduce nature, even by taking into 
consideration all the given and irreducible elements, all the irrationals that we know at a 
given moment; we shall always need new experiments and these will always pose new prob-
lems, causing new contradictions between our theories and our observations to leap out at 
us, as Duhem puts it.” Explanation in the Sciences, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Sci-
ence, vol. 128, trans. Mary-Alice and David A Sipfle (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer, 
1991 [1921]), 172. In his classic work, Thomas S. Kuhn makes a similar point: “In science 
[ . . . ], novelty emerges only with difficulty, manifested by resistance, against a background 
provided by expectation. Initially, only the anticipated and usual are experienced even 
under circumstances where anomaly is later to be observed. Further acquaintance, however, 
does result in awareness of something wrong or does relate the effect to something that has 
gone wrong before.” The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1970), 64.
 119. Eric Naiman, among others, observes that Nabokov’s works deliberately encode 
parodic enactments of the Freudian literary analyses they seem to invite. “Litland: The Alle-
gorical Poetics of The Defense,” Nabokov Studies 5 (1998–99): 1–46.
 120. Sept. 26, 1966; Selected Letters, 391. In an editorial footnote, Dmitri Nabokov 
adds: “Last sentence added in holograph.”
 121. Principles [1890], chapter 6, vol. 1, 181. James also encouraged scientific investiga-
tion of paranormal phenomena, such as trance-possessions, but observed regretfully that 
it is “a field which the soidisant ‘scientist’ usually refuses to explore” (chapter 10, vol. 1, 
396).
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 1. “Khronika,” 3. Cf. “4,500 Battle in Museum to See Einstein Film; Police Quell 
Stampede after 8 Guards Fail,” The New York Times (1857–Current file); Jan 9, 1930; 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851–2003), 1. Arthur Eddington, 
New Pathways in Science (New York: Macmillan, 1935), 6–7.
 2. SO, 116.
 3. Michael H. Whitworth, in Einstein’s Wake: Relativity, Metaphor, and Modernist 
Literature (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001), details how the various compo-
nents of the “new science” penetrated throughout popular culture and modernist literary 
practice in England during the 1920s, focusing especially on T. S. Eliot, Virginia Woolf, 
Ezra Pound, and D. H. Lawrence. None of the figures in his study, it should be noted, was 
ever a scientist.
 4. LRL, 262. Curiously, in earlier drafts Nabokov first referred to “atoms” and then 
to “molecules.” “Chekhov (TS with Corrections).” Berg Coll.
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 5. USSR, 326, 327.
 6. Ibid., 327. Dana Dragunoiu’s discussion of the philosopher Bishop Berkeley sug-
gests an important precursor to, perhaps inspiration for, Nabokov’s explorations of non-
causality and immaterialism. See her chapter, “Berkeley, Ada, and the Splendor of Lone 
Thought,” in Vladimir Nabokov and the Poetics of Liberalism (forthcoming).
 7. Actually, even Nabokov’s first novel offers some likely reflections of Einstein’s the-
ory: Mary (1926) begins in an elevator (as it happens, a broken-down one) and ends with 
the juxtaposition of two train journeys (one arriving in Berlin, one set to depart). Both of 
these scenes could glance toward relativity: in the first, Ganin wonders about the time and 
worries about how long he will be stuck; in the second, he abandons one train for another 
in order to prevent his past (his affair with Mary) from coming back to him in a form he 
has neither authorized nor authored. Nabokov’s revised second novel, King, Queen, Knave 
(1928/1968) refers to a traveling clock with “its own concept of time” (KQK, 118, not in 
original: cf. SSRP, vol. 2, 207). However, such allusions are essentially ornamental in these 
novels whose primary concerns relate more to modernist explorations of time and memory.
 8. Nabokov was generous about such terminological appropriation: “Science means 
to me above all natural science. Not the ability to repair a radio set; quite stubby fingers 
can do that. Apart from this basic consideration, I certainly welcome the free interchange of 
terminology between any branch of science and any raceme of art” (SO, 79).
 9. Arthur S. Eddington, New Pathways in Science (New York: Macmillan, 1935), 8. In 
Eddington’s extended analogy, consciousness serves as a storyteller, weaving a tale from the 
sensations brought to it through the nervous system. Lolita includes an analogous scene, 
also evoking Sir Francis Bacon, in which Humbert Humbert describes the mental spider-
threads that reach out and report to him the contents and goings-on in various rooms of 
the Haze household (AnLo, 49–50). This passage alludes to a formerly well-known spider 
analogy from Bacon’s The Advancement of Learning (Bk. 1, Pt. IV, Sec. 5); see discussion 
in my “A New or Little-Known Subtext in Lolita,” The Nabokovian 60 (Spring 2008): 
51–55.
 10. There were also other, simultaneous expeditions: see A. C. D. Crommelin, “Results 
of the Total Solar Eclipse of May 29 and the Relativity Theory,” Science, New Series, vol. 
50, no. 1301 (Dec. 5, 1919): 518–20. “Revolution in Science. New Theory of the Universe. 
Newtonian Ideas Overthrown,” The Times, 7 Nov. 1919, 12. The scientific paper came 
out later, as F. W. Dyson, A. S. Eddington, and C. R. Davidson, “A Determination of the 
Deflection of Light by the Sun’s Gravitational Field, from Observations Made at the Total 
Eclipse of May 29, 1919,” Mem. R. Astron. Soc. 220 (1920): 291–333.
 11. Ronald W. Clark, Einstein: The Life and Times (New York: World Pub. Co., 1971). 
The Berlin daily Rul’ reported on Einstein’s travels, illnesses, political views, and a 50th 
birthday incident involving the Berlin city government, a villa, and a yacht, and a riot sur-
rounding a film on relativity at the New York Natural History Museum (see epigraph).
 12. For various examples, see Whitworth, Einstein’s Wake (op. cit.); Daniel Albright, 
Quantum Poetics: Yeats, Pound, Eliot, and the Science of Modernism (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997); Thomas Jackson Rice, Joyce, Chaos, and Complexity 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997). Marina Grishakova discusses the theme of Ein-
steinian relativity by means of an elevator scene and a bridge scene in Bend Sinister, which 
illustrate the relative ideas of location or frame of reference. The Models of Space, Time 
and Vision in V. Nabokov’s Fiction: Narrative Strategies and Cultural Frames (Tartu: Tartu 
University Press, 2006), 262–63.
 13. “Literaturnye zametki,” Rul’, April 29, 1925, 4–5.
 14. For example, “Teoriia otnositel’nosti prof. Einshteina” (film review), Rul’, Aug. 25, 
1923, 6; book review, “Prof. A. Brandt, ‘Teoriia Einshteina,’” Rul’, April 15, 1924, 4.
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 15. In addition to occasional brief news reports, Nabokov’s friend V. Tatarinov reviewed 
I. Krikhborger’s Atomnaia teoriia i teoriia kvant (“Atomic theory and the quantum the-
ory”) in Rul’ on Sept. 16, 1923; also T[atarinov], review of Elektrony i elektricheskie 
kvanty (“Electrons and electrical quanta”) [Berlin: 1924]; “Novye knigi po estestvoznaniiu 
i sel’skomu khoziaistvu,” Rul’, Dec. 31, 1924, 4.
 16. For example, James Jeans wrote in 1931 that “we are beginning to suspect that we 
live in a universe of waves, and nothing but waves.[ . . . M]odern science has traveled very 
far from the old view which regarded the universe merely as a collection of hard bits of 
matter in which waves of radiation occasionally appeared as an incident.” The Mysterious 
Universe (New York: Macmillan, 1931), 48. (Criticism of Jeans’s account is a commonplace 
in the history of science; see, for example, Whitworth, Einstein’s Wake, 55–57). Eddington 
reaches a similar conclusion: “Interpreting the term material (or more strictly, physical) in 
the broadest sense as that with which we can become acquainted through sensory experi-
ence of the external world, we recognize now that it corresponds to the waves not to the 
water of the ocean of reality” (New Pathways, 319). A similar discussion appeared in the 
Paris daily Poslednie novosti: Iu. Delevskii, “Nauchnye zametki,” Dec. 7, 1937, 4.
 17. Jan Hilgevoord and Jos Uffink, “The Uncertainty Principle,” The Stanford Ency-
clopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta, ed., http://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/fa112006/entries/qt-uncertainty/.
 18. Tatarinov, “Atomy i zvezdy.” The first supernova to be publicly identified as 
“exploding” was apparently discovered by J. P. M. Prentice on Dec. 13, 1934. See “New 
Star Reaches First Magnitude,” New York Times, 23 Dec, 1934, 17 (features explanation 
of explosion by Professor Harlow Shapley of Harvard Observatory at Oak Ridge); “Nova 
Herculis, ‘Exploding Star,’ No Longer Seen by Naked Eye, Fading to First Magnitude,” by 
The Associated Press, New York Times, Apr. 8, 1935, 21. The theoretical background for 
describing these explosions was laid out by W. Baade and F. Zwicky, “On Super-novae,” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 
20, no. 5. (May 15, 1934): 254–55. The earliest suggestion that novae and supernovae 
might be exploding stars appears to have been by E. E. Barnard, “Some Peculiarities of the 
Novæ,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 61, no. 2. (1922): 99–106.
 19. In 1919 Nabokov wrote a prose poem about a far-off world, in the album “Stikhi i 
skhemy” (LCNA, container 10); it is partially quoted in Boyd, RY, 152.
 20. Sergei Davydov, “The Gift: Nabokov’s Aesthetic Exorcism of Chernyshevskii,” 
Canadian-American Slavic Studies 19.3 (Fall 1985): 357–74.
 21. Lenin’s work is quoted in the Chernyshevsky chapter of The Gift, where he calls 
Chernyshevsky “the one truly great writer” who remained true to materialism (Gift, 245); 
see also A. Dolinin, “Komentarii,” in SSRP, vol. 4, 725n.
 22. See A. V. Vasiliev’s discussion in Prostranstvo, vremia, dvizhenie. Istoricheskoe vve-
denie v obshchuiu teoriiu otnositel’nosti (Berlin: Argonavty, 1922); translated as Space, 
Time, Motion. An Historical Introduction to the General Theory of Relativity, H. M. Lucas 
and C. P. Sanger, trans. (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1924). (The fictitious editor of The Gift’s 
literary journal is also called Vasiliev.) Mach’s intuition had predecessors, but Einstein 
gave him the most credit. “Ernst Mach,” The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein (Prince-
ton, 1997), vol. 6, 141–45. Nabokov would have also read about this genealogy in G. L. 
Lovtskii’s “The Rhythm of the World’s Movements” (Ritm mirovykh dvizhenii), Sovremen-
nye zapiski XVII (Apr.–May, 1923): 249–80. See Ernst Mach, The Science of Mechanics 
(LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1960), 271–305.
 23. The following discussion includes and develops further some material from my 
“The Poetics of Science in, and around, Nabokov’s The Gift,” The Russian Review 62.2 
(April, 2003): 243–61.
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 24. “Foreword,” Invitation to a Beheading (New York: Vintage International, 1989), 9.
 25. Gift, 240. Significantly, Nabokov’s chapter demonstrates how Chernyshevsky asso-
ciated non-Euclidean geometry with the composition of Russian poetry without verbs by 
Afanasy Fet, whom the critic called “an idiot without peers” (ibid.). A. V. Vasiliev also 
wrote on the spherical features of the new geometries in Space, Time, Motion (1922).
 26. “The Tragedy of Tragedy,” USSR, 327.
 27. Published in Poslednie novosti, 10–11 March 1934. On Nabokov’s misdating of the 
document, see Boyd, RY, 404–5, 572n57.
 28. Nabokov in later years claimed to abandon chronological composition entirely, 
using note cards to fill in the blanks of a work in any order that suited his inspiration. SO, 
68–69.
 29. In fact, there are two further associations to the van’s inscription: James Clerk Max-
well as the creator of classical electromagnetic theory; and Max Planck’s proof that all elec-
tromagnetic radiation (that is, visible and invisible light) is noncontinuous and consists of 
discrete quanta. Physicist and Nabokovian Jerry Friedman suggested to me that these two 
associations may, in fact, be the strongest, at least for those working in physics.
 30. English quotations in the preceding two paragraphs are from Gift, 6, 7; Russian 
from SSRP, vol. 4, 194, 195.
 31. Gift, 334–35.
 32. Ibid., 4.
 33. Ibid., 6.
 34. Ibid., 9.
 35. Ibid., 31.
 36. Of special significance is the fact that in the passages in chapter 1 of The Gift, 
Nabokov extends the idea of a speed-time relationship to thought, giving a preview of his 
later space-time-thought syllogism in Speak, Memory (SM, 301).
 37. In another example of misbehaving lines, in chapter 5 while resting and swimming 
in the Grunewald, Fyodor imagines striving for “infinity, where all, all the lines meet” (Gift, 
329).
 38. Gift, 282. This phrasing could also evoke Schelling’s Nature Philosophy, which con-
sidered (with curious foresight) all matter to be a tension of positive and negative charges. 
See Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature as Introduction to the Study of This Sci-
ence, Errol E. Harris and Peter Heath, trans. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), 174.
 39. Gift, 331. This criticism recalls Goethe’s remarks about Newton’s theory of light 
and color. The following passage is highly relevant for Nabokov’s and Konstantin’s point 
of view: “Empirical data should be presented without any theoretical context. . . . Every 
act of looking turns into observation, every act of observation into reflection, every act of 
reflection into the making of associations; thus it is evident that we theorize every time we 
look carefully at the world. The ability to do this with clarity of mind, with self knowledge, 
in a free way, and (if I may venture to put it so) with irony, is a skill we will need in order 
to avoid the pitfalls of abstraction . . .” (Goethe, Scientific Studies, Douglas Miller, ed. and 
trans. [New York: Suhrkamp Publishers, 1988], 159). Recall that Konstantin’s revolution-
ary species theory arose from just such a dispassionate consideration of accumulated empiri-
cal data. As Dennis L. Sepper describes, Goethe had heard that “Newton’s theory expressed 
the very essence of the facts and could explain them as well as one could desire, but when 
he compared what he read in Newton with what he saw experimentally he decided that the 
‘facts’ were expressed in a tendentious theory and that the argument was inexact and some-
times specious” (Goethe contra Newton [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988], 
105).
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 40. See Niels Bohr, “Light and Life,” in Niels Bohr, ed., Atomic Physics and Human 
Knowledge (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958), 6: “Indeed, any attempt to trace the 
detailed course of a transition process would involve an uncontrollable exchange of energy 
between the atom and the measuring instruments which would completely disturb the very 
energy balance we set out to investigate.” Bohr later discusses “this impossibility of dis-
tinguishing, in introspection, sharply between subject and object” (22), which he sees as 
providing some conceptual justification for the concept of free will.
 41. Gift, 364. Cf. Henri Bergson: “Evolution would fain go in a straight line; each spe-
cial evolution is a kind of circle. Like eddies of dust raised by the wind as it passes, the 
living turn upon themselves, borne up by the great blast of life.” Creative Evolution, trans. 
Arthur Mitchell, trans. (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1998 [1911]), 128. Fyodor’s 
dust returns immediately to light: it “makes the most orange of skies.”
 42. On this subject, see Alexander Dolinin, “Nabokov’s Time Doubling: From The Gift 
to Lolita,” Nabokov Studies 2 (1995): 3–40. It would not be long before Nabokov would 
make a more definite reference to uncertainty-like arguments: in “Ultima Thule,” the clair-
voyant Falter expresses his refusal to reveal whether human beings possess an immortal 
soul by means of the following analogy:
You want to know whether Gospodin Sineusov will forever reside within the snug-
ness of Gospodin Sineusov, otherwise Moustache-Bleue, or whether everything 
will abruptly vanish. There are two ideas here, aren’t there? Round-the-clock light-
ing and the black inane. Actually, despite the difference in metaphysical color, they 
greatly resemble each other. And they move in parallel. They even move at consid-
erable speed. Long live the totalizator! Hey, hey, look through your turf glasses, 
they’re racing each other, and you would very much like to know which will arrive 
first at the post of truth, but in asking me to give you a yes or no for either one or 
the other, you want me to catch one of them at full speed by the neck—and those 
devils have awfully slippery necks—but even if I were to grab one of them for you, 
I would merely interrupt the competition, or the winner would be the other, the 
one I did not snatch, an utterly meaningless result inasmuch as no rivalry would 
any longer exist. (Stories, 519)
 43. Gift, 67. Louis de Broglie proposed in 1923 that matter had a wave-like nature, 
akin to light, leading to the discovery of matter’s particle-wave duality.
 44. On “Ultima Thule,” see n42 above. Ambiguities of identity in The Real Life of 
Sebastian Knight could be viewed as exploring identity problems as raised in quantum 
theory. Peter Pesic reports how “in 1931, [renowned mathematician] Hermann Weyl wrote 
with some astonishment of two ‘quantum twins,’ Mike and Ike: ‘It is impossible for either 
of these individuals to retain his identity so that one of them will always be able to say ‘I’m 
Mike’ and the other ‘I’m Ike.’ Even in principle one cannot demand an alibi of an electron!” 
(Seeing Double, 98). Cf. Hermann Weyl, The Theory of Groups and Quantum Mechanics 
(New York: Dover, 1950), 241. The ambiguities of the text generate an instability that, 
consciously or not, mimics the indeterminacy of the subatomic world. When we narrow 
the possibilities to one, it is through an act of perspective and choice that effectively sets the 
rules necessitating that possibility.
 45. BS, 171–72. Robert Grossmith offers a powerful reading of these echoes of modern 
physics in the light of the Greek atomists in “Shaking the Kaleidoscope: Physics and Meta-
physics in Nabokov’s Bend Sinister,” Russian Literature TriQuarterly 24 (1991): 151–62.
 46. BS, 188.
 47. Ibid., 203–4.
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 48. Boyd, AY, 100. Susan Elizabeth Sweeney surveys the early critical response to this 
chapter and traces its connection to Nabokov’s friendship with Edmund Wilson in the 
1940s: “Nabokov, Wilson, and Hamlet in Bend Sinister,” Nabokov Studies 1 (1994): 179–
94.
 49. One tragifarcical Ekwilist translation of this speech, proposed by Krug’s friend 
Ember, can be rendered “To kill or not to kill . . .” (BS, 118).
 50. Ibid., 105.
 51. Ibid., 108.
 52. Eddington, New Pathways, 72–91.
 53. BS, 120. This machine could perfectly imitate anyone’s handwriting—thus making 
everyone calligraphically “equal.”
 54. Eddington and Jeans were criticized by some scientists and philosophers for encour-
aging and even embracing such metaphysical fancies. See Eddington’s response in his New 
Pathways in Science, chapters XIII (“Criticisms and Controversies”) and XIV (“Epilogue”). 
Eddington replies directly to Herbert Samuel’s “Cause, Effect, and Professor Eddington” 
in The Nineteenth Century and After (April 1933); C. E. M. Joad’s Philosophical Aspects 
of Modern Science (1932); W. T. Stace’s “Sir Arthur Eddington and the Physical World,” 
Philosophy 9 (1934): 40; and Bertrand Russell’s The Scientific Outlook (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Co., 1931).
 55. Pnin (New York: Vintage International, 1991), 17. The stone is likely a reference 
to Einstein: “Stein” is German for “stone.” It seems that Nabokov’s suspicion of Einstein 
had already begun to develop while writing Pnin (although Einstein’s early Bolshevik sym-
pathies may have contributed to Nabokov’s doubts): in a multi-disciplinary pun, the novel 
also includes a “Dr. Rosetta Stone,” “one of the most destructive psychiatrists of the day” 
(44)—linking the idea of a Freudian translation key (“Rosetta Stone”) for the unconscious 
with the “slick formulae” of relativity (in expositions of relativity, motion is also referred to 
as “translation”). In a highly ironic twist, during the passage concerning Victor’s upbringing 
by his psychoanalyst parents, the narrator commingles ideas of a Freudian childhood with 
a search for “frames of religious reference,” an unmistakably relativistic turn of phrase. 
Nabokov’s subversive approach to relativity may have derived from his distrust of its reli-
ance upon mathematics as a prospective language for materialist explanation. Compare 
also the following passage from the lecture “The Art of Literature and Commonsense”: “In 
this divinely absurd world of the mind, mathematical symbols do not thrive. Their inter-
play, no matter how smoothly it works, no matter how dutifully it mimics the convolutions 
of our dreams and the quantums of our mental associations, can never really express what 
is utterly foreign to their nature, considering that the main delight of the creative mind is 
the sway accorded to a seemingly incongruous detail over a seemingly dominant generaliza-
tion. When commonsense is ejected together with its calculating machine, numbers cease to 
trouble the mind. Statistics pluck up their skirts and sweep out in a huff. Two and two no 
longer make four, because it is no longer necessary for them to make four. If they had done 
so in the artificial logical world which we have left, it had been merely a matter of habit: 
two and two used to make four in the same way as guests invited to dinner expect to make 
an even number. But I invite my numbers to a giddy picnic and then nobody minds whether 
two and two make five or five minus some quaint fraction” (LL, 373). These remarks echo 
the comments on science, statistics, and philosophy in “Remarks on F. Martin Brown’s 
‘Measurements and Lepidoptera’” (1950).
 56. Pnin, 129–30.
 57. LRL, 194–98.
 58. Pnin, 25–26. Later, the narrator’s fascination with the materiality of matter emerges 
again: describing how Pnin’s father had removed a granule from his eye, V. V. calls it a 
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“black atom” and wonders “where that speck is now? The dull, mad fact is that it does 
exist somewhere” (176).
 59. Pnin, 185. Pnin’s comment follows the guidance not only of subject-object psy-
chology here, or only that of quantum theory, but also of Tolstoy, who in War and Peace 
discourses extensively upon the human tendency to see things subjectively and upon how 
the very process of turning events into stories causes tellers to change the facts to achieve an 
effect, to sacrifice truth to style. The need for reporting adds yet another layer on top of the 
inescapable fact of the subjective observer.
 60. The novel’s inclusion of a character named “Miss Eisenbohr” sounds very much 
like a conglomeration of Einstein, Heisenberg, and Bohr. As S. Ilyin and A. Liuksemberg 
note, it also means “iron drill” in German (“Kommentarii k romanu,” http://nabokov.
gatchina3000.ru/pnin09.htm, accessed 8 Aug. 2006).
 61. Ada (New York: Vintage International, 1990), 51–52.
 62. Aleksey Sklyarenko, “Reinforcement of the Rainbow: The Color Allusions in Ada,” 
NABOKV-L, Monday, 5 Nov. 2002. Rainbows and other spectra are frequent and porten-
tous features of several Nabokov works.
 63. Nabokov may have seen electricity and light as intrinsically related; John Shade’s 
poem “Electricity” suggests that Shakespeare’s soul may illuminate an entire town, upon 
which Kinbote suggests that “the Earth would not merely fall apart, but vanish like a ghost, 
if Electricity were suddenly removed from the world” (PF, 193). Emerson made a strik-
ingly anticipatory comment concerning magnetism: “Science is ‘a house held up by magne-
tism,—draw out the magnet, & the house falls & buries the inhabitant’” (quoted in Laura 
Dassow Walls, Emerson’s Life in Science: The Culture of Truth [Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2003], 221). Rachel Trousdale examines metaphysical implications of electricity in 
Pale Fire: “‘Faragod Bless Them’: Nabokov, Spirits, and Electricity,” Nabokov Studies 7 
(2002/2003): 119–28. Brian Boyd briefly discusses the place of modern physics in this novel 
in his Nabokov’s Pale Fire: The Magic of Artistic Discovery (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1999), 258–59.
 64. See also in this regard D. Barton Johnson’s “Alphabetic Rainbows of Speak, Mem-
ory,” in Worlds in Regression: Some Novels of Vladimir Nabokov (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 
1985), 10–27.
 65. A passage from Look at the Harlequins! shows vividly how the famous single- and 
double-slit experiments, used first to advance the wave theory of light and later to explore 
the wave-like properties of matter, can be transformed into an artistic moment: “. . . some 
damned slit, some atom or dimmet or artificial streetlight or natural moonlight that sig-
naled inexpressible peril when I raised my head with a gasp above the level of a chok-
ing dream. Along the dim slit brighter points traveled with dreadful meaningful intervals 
between them. Those dots corresponded, perhaps, to my rapid heartbeats or were con-
nected optically with the blinking of wet eyelashes but the rationale of it is inessential” 
(16).
 66. Ibid., 171. Any of several problems devised by Leonhard Euler, a prolific mathema-
tician brought to Russia’s Academy of Sciences by the Bernoulli brothers under Catherine 
the Great. In a discussion on NABOKV-L, attention was drawn to Euler problems such 
as “The Bridges of Koenigsberg” and one that concerns “the movement of a point under 
attraction by two gravitational centers” (Robert Weldon, NABOKV-L, 30 Oct. 2003). 
Euler had been in the news in the years shortly before Nabokov began work on Ada: one of 
his conjectures, concerning the superimposition of “Latin Squares,” was disproved in 1959. 
John A. Osmundsen, “Major Mathematical Conjecture Propounded 177 Years Ago Is Dis-
proved,” New York Times (26 Apr. 1959), 1; cf. R. C. Bose and S. S. Shrikhande, “On the 
Construction of Sets of Mutually Orthogonal Latin Squares and the Falsity of a Conjecture 
of Euler,” Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 95.2 (May 1960): 191–209.
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 67. SO, 143.
 68. This comment is highlighted and underscored in the card’s margin. “Notes for ‘The 
Texture of Time,’” Berg Coll.
 69. This series of quotations comes from Ada, 541, 543.
 70. The reference is to the essay “Time and Thermodynamics” by Richard Schlegel, 
in J. T. Fraser, The Voices of Time, 501. Card “Time 5,” in “Notes for ‘The Texture of 
Time,’” in “Notes on Various Subjects,” Berg Coll. The card continues: “Time isnot [sic] 
only change and the awareness of change isnot [sic] that of time.”
 71. Card “Spirals 3,” “Notes for ‘The Texture of Time,’” Berg Coll. This card is espe-
cially rich in content and worth presenting in detail: “Spiral nebulae. [Are they really orbits 
that look—owing to a distortion of ‘time’—like spirals].” On the card’s back: “an atom is 
an open work structure consisting mostly of empty space, with a small central nucleus and 
planet-like electron circulating in orbits around it. But electrons have another aspect, too, 
which is not that of material particles but of waves. A dual and mutually contradictory 
character. We do not know what an electron really is. P. 160 The modern physicist devises 
symbols for correlating observation and predicting facts but renounces any desire to know 
what sort of object is at the root of the explanation.” The text Nabokov refers to is Gerald 
James Whitrow, The Natural Philosophy of Time (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
1960). Whitrow (1912–2000) was a cosmologist, astrophysicist, historian, and mathemati-
cian at Imperial College, London. Note above especially the reappearance of interest in 
particle-wave complementarity.
 72. The earliest such edition was Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman, Gödel’s Proof 
(New York: New York University Press, 1958). Gödel’s theorems, first published in 1931, 
were a refutation of David Hilbert’s project to define a complete and consistent set of math-
ematical axioms, especially as embodied in Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathemat-
ica. Nabokov probably had not heard of the theorems in the 1930s, but he did express 
thoughts of his own that were similar in spirit: Falter, the savant in “Ultima Thule” (1939), 
tells Sineusov, “‘mathematics, I warn you, is but a perpetual game of leapfrog over its own 
shoulders as it keeps breeding—I kept combining various ideas, and finally found the right 
combination and exploded, like Berthold Schwartz’” (Stories, 514).
 73. From “Wh[itrow]. Card 39,” referring to Whitrow, Natural Philosophy, 295.
 74. Card “Time 8,” concerning Dunne, Serial Universe, 71. “Notes for ‘The Texture of 
Time,’” Berg Coll. Marina Grishakova provides a lengthy summary of this argument and 
its connection to Dunne’s concept of the “last observer” in relation to the novels Bend Sin-
ister, The Real Life of Sebastian Knight, Transparent Things, and the story “Ultima Thule.” 
Models, 261–72, esp. 262–63.
 75. This is V.’s analogy for the elusive similarity between himself and his half-brother: 
“Their strokes were totally different, and one of the two was far, far better than the other; 
but the general rhythm of their motions as they swept all over the court was exactly the 
same, so that had it been possible to draft both systems two identical designs would have 
appeared” (RLSK, 34).
 76. SM, 37; see also Boyd, RY, 70–71.
 77. Cards “Relativity 1&2,” “Notes for ‘The Texture of Time,’” Berg Coll. It should be 
emphasized that even in such notes, one never knows whether Nabokov is expressing his 
own thought or that of one of his characters.
 78. Card “Rel[ativity] 8: Whitrow (p 222),” “Notes for ‘The Texture of Time,’” Berg 
Coll. Compare the “traveling clocks” on this card to the same phrase in the 1968 transla-
tion of KQK (see n7 [this chapter] above).
 79. This is so because if three observers are moving at high velocity relative to one 
another, events happening at two of the moving locations might appear simultaneous to 
one of the three observers, but would appear sequential to the other two (and for those two 
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the sequence might be spaced differently, or even reversed). This is true independent of the 
distance between the objects, so the distance light must travel is not the issue here.
 80. Card “Rel[ativity] 6: Whitrow (p. 179),” “Notes for ‘The Texture of Time,’” Berg 
Coll.
 81. Ada, 544. Cf. card “Simult[aneous] ev[ents]. 7,” “Notes for ‘The Texture of Time,’” 
Berg Coll.
 82. Rel[ativity] 6. = (Wh[itrow] Card 29); “cf. also Sim ev 5 (=Whit card 28) p. 176. 
. . . the individual time of the sentient observer [is the subject of my work].” “Notes for 
‘The Texture of Time,’” Berg Coll.
 83. Nabokov’s suspicion of the durability of new discoveries can be seen in the follow-
ing passage in his notes: “Red-shifts in the spectra of ultimate nebulae are understood to 
mean that the universe is expanding—just as sun-shifts in the sky provided dramatic evi-
dence to our ancestors that Phoebus was turning around our planet. The nebulae have been 
successfully receding now, at a spanking speed, for about thirty years; we wonder whose 
new hunch or gadget will stop them tomorrow—and bring them back, Monday week, 
shrunk, no doubt, by the next witchdoctor.” From “Sim[ultaneous ev[ents] 4,” “Notes for 
‘The Texture of Time,’” Berg Coll. It appears that Nabokov did not understand or rejected 
the problem of the impossibility of directly perceiving two vastly distant objects in a single 
field of perception (by a single observer), which makes the concept of simultaneity mean-
ingless; also he did not seem to conceptualize that they may be moving at extreme speeds 
relative to one another, so that the simultaneity, which might be seen to exist from some 
arbitrary point of view, is relative to the speed of observer.
 84. Antimatter was discovered as early as 1932, and whole antimatter galaxies had 
been proposed by scientists before Nabokov began writing this novel (see, for example, 
Walter Sullivan, “Anti-Matter Test Shows Symmetry,” New York Times [Nov. 29, 1959], 
78). Moreover, Nabokov was familiar with the mirror-like doubling of various molecules, 
and the possibility of mirror-worlds, from Martin Gardner’s Ambidextrous Universe, whose 
mock-citation of his Pale Fire he mockingly cites in Ada (Ada, 542). See also N. Katherine 
Hayles’s discussion of Gardner’s presence in Ada, in The Cosmic Web: Scientific Field Mod-
els and Literary Strategies in the Twentieth Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1985), 111–37.
 85. On the question of freedom vs. determinism, Nabokov made the following note: 
“‘Eddington, A. S. Space Time and Gravitation 1921’ 51 ‘The division into past and future 
(a feature of time-order which has no analogy in space-order) is closely associated with our 
ideas of causation & Free-will. In a perfectly determinate scheme the p. and the F may be 
regarded as lying mapped out. . . . Our knowledge of things where we are not and of things 
when we are not, is essentially the same . . . so, if events are determinate, there is nothing 
to prevent a person from being aware of an event before it happens.’ [this is nonsense] 
[the idea of such a ‘mapping out’ and ‘awareness’ is in itself a refutation of determinism].” 
Card: “Determinism,” “Notes for ‘The Texture of Time,’” Berg Coll.
 86. On Ada as a part of the “alternate history” tradition in fiction, see Edgar L. Chap-
man and Carl B. Yoke, eds., Classic and Iconoclastic Alternate History Science Fiction, 
(Mellen, 2003); William Joseph Collins, Paths Not Taken: The Development, Structure, 
and Aesthetics of the Alternative History (Davis: University of California at Davis Press, 
1990); Nicholas Gevers, Mirrors of the Past: Versions of History in Science Fiction and 
Fantasy (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 1997); Karen Hellekson, The Alter-
nate History: Refiguring Historical Time (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2001); 
Edgar Vernon McKnight, Jr., Alternative History: The Development of a Literary Genre 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).
 87. Ada, 445. This is at least the second time that Nabokov has figured a suicide that 
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might have occurred, but is either averted or displaced by an alternate reality (the first is in 
The Eye [1931]). This passage also recalls the line from Pale Fire (1962): “And here time 
forked”—a line that coincides with Hazel’s Shade’s successful suicide. Perhaps significantly, 
Jorge Luis Borges’s similarly inflected story “The Garden of Forking Paths” appeared in 
English in 1948, and in March 1963 Nabokov told Alvin Toffler that Borges was one of his 
favorite writers among contemporaries (SO, 44).
 88. RLSK, 176.
Chapter 
 1. SO, 154 (correspondence interview with Allene Talmey of Vogue).
 2. Ibid., 45.
 3. Compare Eddington’s “Epilogue,” in New Pathways in Science (New York: Mac-
millan, 1935).
 4. Cf. the recent scandal over falsified data at the University of Vermont involving Eric 
Poehlman: Jeneen Interlandi, “An Unwelcome Discovery,” The New York Times Magazine, 
Oct. 22, 2006, accessed via http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/22/magazine/22sciencefraud.
html?pagewanted=1&ei=5088&en=e03f2ce7d86fd269&ex=1319169600. Also discussed 
in Harold C. Sox, MD, ed., and Drummond Rennie, MD, “Research Misconduct, Retrac-
tion, and Cleansing the Medical Literature: Lessons from the Poehlman Case,” Annals of 
Internal Medicine 144, no. 8 (18 April 2006): 609–13.
 5. Leon-Paul Fargue, 1876–1947, French poet. “Butterflies of Europe,” container 4, 
Berg Coll.
 6. DBDV, 137; cf. NMGL, 503.
 7. Thomas S. Kuhn famously refers to the overcoming of such fallacious dogmas as 
“paradigm shifts.” See The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Develop-
ment of Western Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957) and his The Struc-
ture of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
 8. This hypothesis came before the scientific acceptance of plate tectonics in the 1960s, 
although Nabokov may have heard of that theory directly from Vladimir Tatarinov, who 
translated a book on the subject by Alfred Wegener in 1923 (his The Origins of Continents 
and of Oceans [1915]). Rul’, Sept. 30, 1923.
 9. NB, 340–41.
 10. Diachronic study of such things as animal skeletons is, of course, common, but the 
features and organs used for lepidopteral identification cannot usually be preserved in a fos-
sil record.
 11. NB, 340–41.
 12. Ibid., 383.
 13. Oct. 11, 1944, DBDV, 159.
 14. “[Notes for a talk ‘A Genus of Blue Butterflies,’ October 10, 1944],” NB, 342.
 15. “Remarks on F. Martin Brown’s ‘Measurements and Lepidoptera,’” NB, 460.
 16. See his early public lecture, “On Generalities” (original title in English; lecture 
in Russian). Published and annotated by Aleksandr Dolinin, Zvezda 4 (1999): 12–14. It 
relates not to statistics or butterflies, but rather to historiography. See the quotation from 
“The Art of Literature and Common Sense,” LL, 374, in the “Introduction.”
 17. NMGL, 120.
 18. Ibid., 137.
 19. This contention was, of course, confirmed again in the “Lysenko” affair in Soviet 
genetics.
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 20. Gift, 286.
 21. “Philosophically speaking, the padograph subsisted as an Ekwilist symbol, as a 
proof of the fact that a mechanical device can reproduce personality, and that Quality is 
merely the distribution aspect of Quantity” (BS, 69–70).
 22. “A few vacant lots always remain, alas” (SO, 31).
 23. SO, 10–11. Cf. Goethe: “When ways of looking disappear from the world, the 
objects perceived often go missing too. In fact one can say that, in a higher sense, the way 
of looking is the object.” Maxims and Reflections #1147; quoted in R. H. Stephenson, 
Goethe’s Conception of Knowledge and Science (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1995), 45.
 24. Laughter in the Dark (New York: Vintage International, 1989), 261.
 25. Ibid.
 26. Gift, 164.
 27. Ibid.
 28. Vladimir Alexandrov calls it an “otherworld,” but without the “-ness” suffix it 
takes on associations that are far too concrete, despite his efforts to ward off such ten-
dencies in his introduction. Nabokov’s Otherworld (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1991). Vadim Vadimich calls it “the hereafter” in his paraphrase of the poem in Look at 
the Harlequins! (LATH, 26).
 29. See Stephen H. Blackwell, “Nabokov’s Wiener-Schnitzel Dreams: Despair and Anti-
Freudian Poetics,” Nabokov Studies 7 (2002–3): 129–50; and Alexander Dolinin, “Caning 
of Modernist Profaners: Parody in Despair,” latest version on-line at http://www.libraries.
psu.edu/nabokov/doli1.htm.
 30. Moscow, 1910; reprint: Munich: Fink Verlag, 1969.
 31. Editors usually just list the “missing” stanza numbers in between existing stanzas, 
and in some cases listing a whole range (for example, [I–VI] for the missing first six stan-
zas of chapter 4), but without holding space for the absent lines. This idiosyncrasy can be 
found only in the four-volume Bollingen editions (1963 and 1974); it was eliminated in the 
posthumous abridged paperback edition of the novel and commentary. The phenomenon 
of the missing stanzas is of some interest within the context of Pushkin’s life and Romantic 
literature. Pushkin’s decision to preserve their numbers rather than relabel the final version 
was due to a variety of causes. In some instances, Pushkin decided to suppress stanzas he 
had written for fear of the censor. In others, he simply was never satisfied with the verses he 
had in mind for a particular spot, but held their place anyway. Some gaps may have been 
intentionally and ironically produced, with no lines ever composed in that position. Still 
other missing stanzas were published in the first, serial publication but were suppressed in 
the first separate edition because they would have offended Pushkin’s wife. The absences 
also reflect the Romantic culture of the fragment, and in that context they would have 
implied the work’s organic, spontaneous nature and its honest presentation to the pub-
lic, warts (i.e., holes) and all. See, for example, Monica Greenleaf, Pushkin and Romantic 
Fashion: Fragment, Elegy, Orient (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), chapter 2.
 32. Masterstvo Gogolia (Moscow-Leningrad: Gosud. Izdat. Khudozhestvennoi Liter-
atury, 1934).
 33. Eugene Onegin, Paperback Edition in Two Vols. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1981 [1975]), Commentary pt. one, 164.
 34. Clarence Brown was the first to draw attention to the blank pages in Nabokov’s 
translation. See “Nabokov’s Pushkin and Nabokov’s Nabokov,” in L. S. Dembo, ed., Nabo-
kov: The Man and his Work (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 195–208.
 35. For further discussion, see my “Reading and Rupture in Nabokov’s Invitation to a 
Beheading,” Slavic and East European Journal (Spring 1995): 38–53; and Zina’s Paradox 
(New York: Peter Lang, 2000), chapter 3, “Structure of the Problematic Reading.”
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 36. RLSK, 35.
 37. As Brian Boyd has noted in various places, for example, Nabokov’s Pale Fire 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press), 3.
 38. “The man is the book” (RLSK, 175).
 39. Gift, 216.
 40. James Ramey, “Parasitism and Pale Fire’s Camouflage: The King-Bot, the Crown 
Jewels and the Man in the Brown Macintosh,” Comparative Literature Studies 41.2 (2004): 
185–213.
Conclusion
 1. PP, 101.
 2. In philosophy, doubts about the “law” of causality as a fundamental part of nature 
were raised by Hume and refined by Kant, for whom it was simply part of the essential 
manner in which consciousness perceives events and structures knowledge about them. 
Thus Nabokov was not breaking any new ground in his resistance to determinism, but in 
his apparent efforts to find a scientific approach to noncausal phenomena, he was indeed 
original.
 3. There were many other new discoveries, of course, including Roentgen’s X-rays. 
Niels Bohr first presented the idea of complementarity in 1927, at a conference at Lake 
Como, Italy. Jan Faye, “Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics,” in Edward 
M. Zalta, ed., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2008 Edition). http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/spr2008/entries/qm-copenhagen, 2008.
 4. For one detailed discussion of this ambivalence among scientists, see Gerald Holton, 
Science and Anti-Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 74–85.
 5. Jeans, The Mysterious Universe (New York: Macmillan, 1931), 22. The status of 
causality in the laws of physics and in “ultimate reality” was a matter of much discussion 
among scientists and philosophers of science, not only following the popularization of the 
uncertainty principle, but extending back into the nineteenth century. Émile Meyerson, 
writing a few years before Heisenberg’s principle, suggested that “man, in spite of his invin-
cible tendency to believe in rationality, obviously sensed very early that there is irrationality 
in nature, that nature is not entirely explicable. . . . In sum, we can make only negative or 
altogether imprecise pronouncements in this area. We know where complete rationaliza-
tion is impossible, that is, where the agreement between our reason and external reality 
comes to an end: those are the irrationals already discovered” (Explanation in the Sci-
ences, Mary-Alice and David A. Sipfle, trans., Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 
vol. 128. [Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer, 1991 (1921)], 172). Nevertheless, of vitalism 
Meyerson wrote that it “will not be able to find a legitimate place in science until research 
is infinitely more advanced than it is today” (ibid., 192). The question of how science can 
address these questions that depart from the standard rules of science, especially causal-
ity, was also the focus of Philipp Frank’s attention in The Law of Causality and Its Limits 
(Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998) (Das Kausalgesetz und seine Grenzen [1932], 
French translation published 1937): “The claim that only natural laws of the causal kind 
‘exist’ would make sense only if laws would exist ‘beside’ and ‘above’ human experience 
as the knowledge of a higher intelligence in a ‘true’ world. From the standpoint of a purely 
scientific conception, each order of experiences is justified that is correct, which means: 
connects our actual experiences with each other. And the practical significance of the causal 
order is not the establishment of a general causal law, but of special laws in causal form. 
. . . The question whether nature is causal, or similar questions, cannot be formulated as sci-
entific questions, for they no longer deal with the order of our experiences; this is described 
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by complicated factual situations as presented in ch. IX; but with such questions we want 
to know something about the ‘true’ world” (274). Thus Nabokov’s rejection of physical 
causality as an ultimate truth about the world corresponded well with the various discus-
sions occasioned by the discovery of quantum phenomena at the subatomic level. Nabokov 
would have learned of Frank, if not from reading him directly then from chapter 3 of Len-
in’s Materialism and Empiriocriticism (New York: International Publisheres, 1927), which 
attacked an earlier version of Frank’s work on causality. Gerald Holton relates an amusing 
anecdote in this connection, Science and Anti-Science, 48–49, n48. Holton cites a letter 
from Harvard physicist Edwin C. Kemble, who wrote that “of all those with the training of 
the working physicist Frank is perhaps the most complete philosopher” (ibid., 38).
 6. They certainly had that effect for Nabokov’s compatriot and fellow exile Wassily 
Kandinsky, the Bauhaus artist, who began responding to new physical theories as early as 
1913, the year Bohr’s model succeeded Rutherford’s: according to Gerald Holton, “Was-
sily Kandinsky’s autobiographical sketch about the years 1901–1913, in his book Rück-
blick . . . indicates how he overcame a block in his artistic work at that time: ‘A scientific 
event removed the most important obstacle: the further division of the atom. The collapse 
of the atom model was equivalent, in my soul, to the collapse of the whole world. Suddenly 
the thickest walls fell. I would not have been amazed if a stone appeared before my eye in 
the air, melted, and became invisible. Science seemed to me destroyed. . . .’” (Baden-Baden: 
Woldemar Klein Verlag, 1955), 16, cited in Holton, Science and Anti-science, 105, n19.
 7. Yuri Leving reports on the archival materials from TsGIA in Garazh, Angar, Vokzal 
(St. Petersburg: Izd. Ivana Limbakha, 2004), 251, and personal communication.
 8. 13 Oct. 1925. Berg Coll. Translated in Boyd, RY, 245.
 9. Having received a commitment for some paid translation work for the Times of 
London, he would not have to “struggle for survival,” he wryly observed. 31 Jan. 1924, 
Berg Coll.
 10. “Ultima Thule” offers the most direct expression of such possibilities in the words 
of Falter and Sineusov (Stories, 514).
 11. Victoria N. Alexander argues that these nonutilitarian phenomena may have been 
a source of fascination for Nabokov as examples of an emergent teleological principle, as 
“uncanny chance.” “Nabokov, Teleology and Insect Mimicry,” Nabokov Studies 7 (2003): 
182, 195.
 12. NNP, 6, 14.
 13. This conjecture occurred before the advent of evolutionary psychology, which has 
recently provided adaptationist accounts of aesthetic activity.
 14. “Once biological needs have caused mental life to reach a certain level, this mental-
ity goes on to manifest itself independently beyond those needs. . . . A monkey in a zoo 
caught a ’possum, examined it, found the pouch and took out the young, looked at them 
and put them back: here the curiousity of the little zoologist goes far beyond biological 
needs.” Knowledge and Error, P. Foulkes and T. McCormack, trans. (Boston: D. Reidel 
Publishing Co., 1976), 53.
 15. Especially in comparison to what he had read in William James’s Principles of Psy-
chology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981). Consider, for example, James’s 
discussion of psychology’s field of enquiry: “The boundary-line of the mental is certainly 
vague. It is better not to be pedantic, but to let the science be as vague as its subject, and 
include such phenomena as these if by so doing we can throw any light on the main busi-
ness in hand. It will ere long be seen, I trust, that we can; and that we gain much more by 
a broad than by a narrow conception of our subject. At a certain stage in the development 
of every science a degree of vagueness is what best consists with fertility. On the whole, few 
recent formulas have done more real service of a rough sort in psychology than the Spence-
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rian one that the essence of mental life and of bodily life are one, namely, ‘the adjustment 
of inner to outer relations.’ Such a formula is vagueness incarnate; but because it takes into 
account the fact that minds inhabit environments which act on them and on which they 
in turn react; because, in short, it takes mind in the midst of all its concrete relations, it is 
immensely more fertile than the old-fashioned ‘rational psychology,’ which treated the soul 
as a detached existent, sufficient unto itself, and assumed to consider only its nature and 
properties. I shall therefore feel free to make any sallies into zoology or into pure nerve-
physiology which may seem instructive for our purposes, but otherwise shall leave those 
sciences to the physiologists” (5). This openness to all avenues of exploration, in contrast to 
the narrow path selected by Freud, provides a clear picture of Nabokov’s scientific biases.
 16. For the most detailed examination yet made of Nabokov’s debts to Schopenhauer, 
see Savely Senderovich and Elena Shvarts, “‘If We Put Our Heads between Our Legs’: An 
Introduction to the Theme ‘Vladimir Nabokov and Arthur Schopenhauer’” (forthcom-
ing; manuscript kindly provided by the authors). The image in this title refers to the same 
upside-down viewing phenomenon mentioned in William James and in Emerson. See also 
Leona Toker, Nabokov: The Mystery of Literary Structures (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1989), and also her “Philosophers as Poets: Reading Nabokov with Schopenhauer 
and Bergson,” Russian Literature Triquarterly 24 (1991): 185–96.
 17. Transparent Things (New York: Vintage International, 1989), 92.
 18. Philipp Frank presents a fascinating and pertinent discussion of the relation between 
causality and extra-causal phenomena, or what he calls “miracles”: “The other, I should 
like to say more ‘scientific,’ conception is that it is not in the character of natural laws that 
they predetermine everything. Rather they leave certain gaps. Under certain circumstances 
they do not say what definitely has to happen but allow for several possibilities; which of 
these possibilities comes about depends on that higher power which therefore can intervene 
without violating laws of nature” (The Law of Causality, 76).
 19. LL, 374. Compare the version proposed by the seer Falter in “Ultima Thule”: 
“Mathematics, I warn you, is but a perpetual game of leapfrog over its own shoulders as 
it keeps breeding—I kept combining various ideas, and finally found the right combination 
and exploded, like Berthold Schwartz” (Stories, 514).
 20. Stories, 514. That this story was written around 1939, combined with all the other 
evidence, lends weight to the theory that Nabokov was reading Goethe extensively during 
the preceding decade.
 21. New Pathways in Science (New York: Macmillan, 1935), 324. Compare the descrip-
tion of Krug from Bend Sinister: “He had always felt the faint ridicule of a finite mind peer-
ing at the iridescence of the invisible through the prison bars of integers. And even if the 
Thing could be caught, why should he, or anybody else for that matter, wish the phenom-
enon to lose its curls, its mask, its mirror, and become the bald noumenon?” (BS, 144).
 22. For convenience, here is the passage once again: “A priori, I had assumed that in 
the course of the combination and segregation of generic characters in various racial forms 
(and this is incidentally the meaning I attach to the term ‘form’) each of the six structurally 
different groups (i.e., species) of Lycaeides would be seen to repeat certain stages of the 
same general (i.e., generic) variation, but would reveal differences in rhythm, scope, and 
expression, the total of which would produce the synthetic character of one species as dif-
fering from the synthetic character of another. This has proved correct insofar as the species 
are known at present. . . .” NMGL, 138.
 23. The same is true of the “magic triangles” Nabokov mapped onto the reproductive 
apparatus of the male butterfly. As we saw in chapter 1, Nabokov was especially interested 
in these forms because he felt that they were protected from environmental pressures and 
hence should be more stable than other characteristics. Nabokov’s program of synthetic, or 
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holistic, approach to species analysis anticipated the work of Stephen Jay Gould and Rich-
ard C. Lewontin in their classic article, “The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian 
Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme,” Proceedings of the Royal Society 
of London, Series B, Biological Sciences, vol. 205, no. 1161, The Evolution of Adaptation 
by Natural Selection (Sept. 21, 1979): 581–98, esp. 590–97. In that article, the authors 
lament the atomized focus of the “adaptationist doctrine” with its neglect of the “inte-
grated organism,” many of whose features might have no adaptive advantage whatsoever. 
In ensuing research Gould and Lewontin came to call all nonadaptive (i.e., not due to selec-
tive pressures) variations “spandrels.” See also Victoria N. Alexander’s related discussion in 
her “Nabokov, Teleology, and Insect Mimicry,” 183–86.
 24. Victoria N. Alexander has connected this possibility with the concept of “neutral 
evolution” and genetic drift, whereby radically new traits may appear suddenly when latent 
genes have mutated over time before some further mutation or environmental change brings 
those mutations to the surface. Ibid., 199–207.
 25. The same could be said of the partially “true,” partially “twisted” nature of 
Fyodor’s novel, The Gift.
 26. In Nabokov’s Pale Fire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), Boyd ends his 
first paragraph in this spirit: “In an age that has become particularly skeptical of the pos-
sibility of artistic discovery, both in art and about works of art, I want to affirm that writers 
and readers can discover new ways of writing and reading and that these discoveries have 
much in common with the process of scientific discovery” (3). In his very first book, Boyd 
observed that even in apparently metaphysical constructions, the scientific method held 
sway: “the invention and testing of hypotheses is exactly Nabokov’s method of thinking 
about the afterlife.” Nabokov’s Ada: The Place of Consciousness, 2nd ed. (Christchurch: 
Cybereditions, 2001), 238. In RY, Boyd proposes that Nabokov’s scientific and chess-prob-
lem backgrounds gave him the tools to attempt to mimic nature’s rich artistry in his works 
(317–18).
 27. “Experienced Nabokovians should know that Nabokov does not allow dual or 
multiple solutions: his solutions, like those of his chess problems, are exact (and, of course, 
not self-contradictory, like an ‘invented’ foreword)” (“‘Even Homais Nods,’ or, How to 
Revise Lolita,” Nabokov Studies 2 (1995): 62–86, reprinted in Pifer, Vladimir Nabokov’s 
Lolita: A Casebook [Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003], 57–82, 76). As Janet 
Gezari’s discussion confirms, Nabokov’s and others’ chess problems can have multiple solu-
tions and ambiguity: see n30 below.
 28. SO, 10–11. This passage as well may echo Eddington, who wrote: “As for the exter-
nal objects, remorselessly dissected by science, they are studied and measured, but they are 
never known. Our pursuit of them has led from solid matter to molecules, from molecules 
to sparsely scattered electric charges, from electric charges to waves of probability. Whither 
next?” New Pathways, 322–23.
 29. For example, Zoran Kuzmanovich, “From the Editor,” Nabokov Studies 10 (2006): 
viii. Compare also Eric Naiman’s assertion that “even the best of Nabokov’s fiction rests on 
the understanding that there are right and wrong ways to read and that for each text there 
is an underlying ‘correct’ interpretation: a ‘true understanding’ of the work.” “What If 
Nabokov Had Written ‘Dvoinik’? Reading Literature Preposterously,” The Russian Review 
64.4 (2005): 575–89.
 30. SM, 290. One particularly detailed example follows this passage in SM: “The false 
scent, the irresistible ‘try’ is: Pawn to b8, becoming a knight, with three beautiful mates 
following in answer to disclosed checks by Black; but Black can defeat the whole brilliant 
affair by not checking white and making instead a modest dilatory move elsewhere on the 
board. . . . However, it is only now, many years later, that the information concealed in 
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my chess symbols, which that control permitted to pass, may be, and in fact is, divulged” 
(293). This is also Problem 1 in Poems and Problems, 182. Similarly Janet Gezari, after a 
fascinating discussion of “virtual play” as a Nabokovian theme, draws attention to one of 
Nabokov’s last published problems, a prize-winning self-mate problem offering two solu-
tions. “Chess and Chess Problems,” in Vladimir E. Alexandrov, The Garland Companion 
to Vladimir Nabokov (New York: Garland Publishing, 1995), 51–52.
 31. Problem 18, PP, 199.
 32. SM, 301.
 33. Nabokov’s ethical themes have also been carefully explored by Leona Toker, 
Michael Wood, Zoran Kuzmanovich, and Dana Dragunoiu, in their works listed among 
the Bibliography.
 34. “Nabokov’s Trinity (On the Movement of Nabokov’s Themes),” in Julian W. Con-
nolly, ed., Nabokov and His Fiction: New Perspectives (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1999), 134.
 35. This stance conforms to, if it is not inspired by, Kant’s treatment of “opinion” in his 
“Transcendental Doctrine of Method,” Critique of Pure Reason (Rutland, VT: Everyman, 
1993 [1934]), 501–3.
 36. It should be noted that Brian Boyd has also discovered many intertextual allusions, 
especially in Ada and Pale Fire. However, in Boyd’s case these discoveries are shown to have 
specific functions within a framework of significance (e.g., the thematic relevance of Robert 
Browning’s Pippa Passes as a foil for Hazel Shade’s role within Pale Fire). Nabokov’s Pale 
Fire, 142–50.
 37. “Approaching Nabokovian Poetics,” Essays in Poetics 24 (1999): 158–81 (179).
 38. LL, 374. This passage echoes one in “The Tragedy of Tragedy”: “The highest 
achievements in poetry, prose, painting, showmanship are characterized by the irrational 
and illogical, by that spirit of free will that snaps its rainbow fingers in the face of smug 
causality” (USSR, 326).
 39. Lycaeides melissa samuelis, NNP, 539, 535.
 40. This is the nature of scientific progress proposed by Thomas S. Kuhn in his Struc-
ture of Scientific Revolutions.
 41. Root-Bernstein argues that such iconoclastic activity is of great value to science: 
“we learn most by challenging conventional wisdom with the biggest and best arguments 
we can muster. . . . [T]he process of trying to undermine dogma often reveals new aspects 
of knowledge, or forces it to be utilized in new and innovative ways that justify the rethink-
ing.” “The Arts and Sciences Share a Common Aesthetic Core,” in Alfred I. Tauber, ed., 
The Elusive Synthesis: Aesthetics and Science, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 
vol. 182 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996), 49–50.
 42. Jan. 15, 1951 diary. Berg Coll.
 43. As we saw with Goethe’s critique of Newton, and the modern Millikan oil-drop 
experiments. See chapter 1, n37, and Gerald Holton, “Subelectrons, presuppositions, and 
the Millikan-Ehrenhaft dispute,” in The Scientific Imagination (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978), 25–83.
 44. Cf. Root-Bernstein’s conclusion that “perhaps artists actually have knowledge about 
things that scientists do not.” “The Arts and Sciences,” 75.
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